JAL incident at Haneda Airport
It is sobering to remind ourselves that there were three separate incidents over a few week period in the US last winter... JFK, AUS, and BOS where two aircraft were within 4 seconds or less from occupying the same space at the same time on a runway.
And as others already indicated, the Dash8 was on the right-hand side of the centerline.
My guess would be that, with the NLG still well above the runway, the NLG ploughed in 0.4 seconds, through the upper half of the Dash8's fuselage.
Dash8 was RHS of centerline, photo of wreckage shows (to me anyway) clearly the outline of the a/c with some lightblue nose part almost intact (pointing towards the 2 investigators in blue), cockpit messed up but only section that's not fully scorched, then fwd fuselage recognizable, totally messed up wingbox & aft fuselage section, and starting towards baggage compartment, again some original form appears from bulkhead till tail area.
This last part seems sliced open (by the NLG strut?) like a bread roll, with the 2 halves pretty much recognizable.
This massive impact on the NLG made the NLG wheel axle break free and forcing the nose down so that we get in the A2 scenario of post 624, both nacelles striking the Dash8's wings.
Last edited by DIBO; 5th Jan 2024 at 00:51. Reason: added 'A2 scenario of post 624' text & pic
Minor point: but I don't think it's necessary to assume the A2 derotation occurs within 0.4s.
That's a lot of angular momentum to overcome, especially when any impact force -- whether tending toward horizontal deceleration or upward reaction -- would tend toward forcing the A350 more (not less) nose-up.
Furthermore, if we assume a vertical drop of just 2m (from level pitch to nose on ground) in 0.4s, the implication is that the flight deck would have experienced a peak acceleration of at least 2.5Gs (and probably more). I don't see any force present that would virtually instantly derotate the A350 and angle it nose-down with that ferocity, especially not given the smaller mass of the DH3.
Fwiw, the A350 can well continue in a nose-up attitude, with the nacelles striking the DH3 wing in a manner consistent with photos, and collapse onto the ground post-impact with only the effect of gravity (1G) acting on the CG.
That's a lot of angular momentum to overcome, especially when any impact force -- whether tending toward horizontal deceleration or upward reaction -- would tend toward forcing the A350 more (not less) nose-up.
Furthermore, if we assume a vertical drop of just 2m (from level pitch to nose on ground) in 0.4s, the implication is that the flight deck would have experienced a peak acceleration of at least 2.5Gs (and probably more). I don't see any force present that would virtually instantly derotate the A350 and angle it nose-down with that ferocity, especially not given the smaller mass of the DH3.
Fwiw, the A350 can well continue in a nose-up attitude, with the nacelles striking the DH3 wing in a manner consistent with photos, and collapse onto the ground post-impact with only the effect of gravity (1G) acting on the CG.
The other point I'd make from Juan's video is that it shows very clearly how each of the A350's nacelle rims is damaged in 2 places, on both inboard and outboard sides (in other words, 4 points of contact between nacelle and wing). Looking at Flying Roland's diagrams, this is only possible if the two aircraft are almost perfectly aligned; it would not take much offset for the Dash 8's wingtip to miss the outer edge of one of the nacelles. (Edit: A350 engine centres are 10.5m from centreline, with nacelle radius 2m, so for the 90ft/27.4m wingspan of a DH3 to impact the nacelles in 4 places there can have been a maximum of 1.2m offset between the aircraft. Since the A350 fuselage is 6m wide, that means it definitely went over the top of the DH3...)
Originally Posted by DIBO
This massive impact on the NLG made the NLG wheel axle break free and forcing the nose down so that we get in the A2 scenario of post 624, both nacelles striking the Dash8's wings
I don't think the impact on the NLG would have forced the nose down to any significant extent. Rearwards force would be exerted on the A350 through the NLG mounting point, which for argument's sake would be 5-6 metres above ground level. With the aircraft being nose high, the CG would be at a similar height so little or no derotational force would be exerted. Perhaps the CG might be a metre or two higher, but even then the moment arm would only be a couple of metres. Given the enormous inertia of the A350, I think the NLG would have been ripped off long before it could have exerted a force of sufficient magnitude and duration to affect the A350's attitude. Derotation under gravity, and A350 MLG oleo compression (probably not accounted for in Flying Roland's diagrams) bring the uppper half of the A350 nacelles down to the Dash 8's wing height.
Last edited by Easy Street; 5th Jan 2024 at 08:05. Reason: Double negative removed
It can be very difficult to see aircraft on the ground at night, especially when their strobes are not switched on.
“Another matter investigated by the NTSB was why the pilots of the two planes did not see each other in time to avoid the collision. Although the Metroliner didn’t have a cockpit voice recorder, rendering it impossible to say what the pilots were doing, it was hard to imagine that they could have seen a plane which was directly behind them. The USAir pilots, however, should have had an opportunity to spot the Metroliner. After all, it was a perfectly clear night, with at least 25 miles of visibility. But in his testimony before the Board, First Officer Kelly, the only surviving pilot from either plane, stated that the runway appeared perfectly clear — it was like the Metroliner wasn’t even there.
To understand why, investigators waited until a night with similar weather conditions, then positioned an identical Metroliner at intersection 45 on runway 24L at LAX. The investigators then flew several simulated approaches to runway 24L in a helicopter while the pilots of the Metroliner tested different lighting configurations. What they found was that if all of the Metroliner’s lights were turned on, it was possible to discern the aircraft, but in most configurations, it would blend almost perfectly into the runway lighting.
The Metroliner was equipped with an anti-collision beacon on the tail, navigation lights on the wingtips and tail, a taxi light on the nose, strobe lights on the tail and wingtips, and landing/recognition lights on the wings. However, normal Metroliner procedures called for the strobes, taxi light, and landing/recognition lights to be turned on only after receiving takeoff clearance. That left only the anti-collision lights and the navigation lights. An examination of the light bulbs confirmed that only these lights were illuminated at the time of the crash.
Testing showed that if these were the only lights on the Metroliner, it would have been very difficult to see. The navigation light on the tail blended perfectly with the runway centerline lighting, and the red anti-collision beacon was surprisingly dim. It was possible to spot the Metroliner if one knew it was there, but if one didn’t, it would have been a challenge. The findings therefore confirmed that it was unlikely that the pilots of USAir flight 1493 could have avoided the accident by seeing the Metroliner.”
source: https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/...s-5d24ab5fec46
“Another matter investigated by the NTSB was why the pilots of the two planes did not see each other in time to avoid the collision. Although the Metroliner didn’t have a cockpit voice recorder, rendering it impossible to say what the pilots were doing, it was hard to imagine that they could have seen a plane which was directly behind them. The USAir pilots, however, should have had an opportunity to spot the Metroliner. After all, it was a perfectly clear night, with at least 25 miles of visibility. But in his testimony before the Board, First Officer Kelly, the only surviving pilot from either plane, stated that the runway appeared perfectly clear — it was like the Metroliner wasn’t even there.
To understand why, investigators waited until a night with similar weather conditions, then positioned an identical Metroliner at intersection 45 on runway 24L at LAX. The investigators then flew several simulated approaches to runway 24L in a helicopter while the pilots of the Metroliner tested different lighting configurations. What they found was that if all of the Metroliner’s lights were turned on, it was possible to discern the aircraft, but in most configurations, it would blend almost perfectly into the runway lighting.
The Metroliner was equipped with an anti-collision beacon on the tail, navigation lights on the wingtips and tail, a taxi light on the nose, strobe lights on the tail and wingtips, and landing/recognition lights on the wings. However, normal Metroliner procedures called for the strobes, taxi light, and landing/recognition lights to be turned on only after receiving takeoff clearance. That left only the anti-collision lights and the navigation lights. An examination of the light bulbs confirmed that only these lights were illuminated at the time of the crash.
Testing showed that if these were the only lights on the Metroliner, it would have been very difficult to see. The navigation light on the tail blended perfectly with the runway centerline lighting, and the red anti-collision beacon was surprisingly dim. It was possible to spot the Metroliner if one knew it was there, but if one didn’t, it would have been a challenge. The findings therefore confirmed that it was unlikely that the pilots of USAir flight 1493 could have avoided the accident by seeing the Metroliner.”
source: https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/...s-5d24ab5fec46
Paxing All Over The World
Have we reached a point of everything working like clockwork - that we have forgotten to wind the mechanism?
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I have been retired a long time, but I used to operate into Narita where the ATC was good.
From the transcript I can imagine it happening. JAL516 comes on frequency, hears DAL 276 taxiing full length for T/O, and then he’s Cleared to Land. In my day that meant, great, runway is all mine (except in USA where it meant, ‘I expect the runway to be clear when you get there’).
The J722A comes onto Tower and cleared to C5, you’re number 1 (for departure, not for the runway, unclear). That JAL179 comes on, and is no 3, (so that DAL ahead must be no 2, and I'm no 1).
He arrives at C5, the red bar has been turned off already (didn't read the notam), he’s number one, so what does he do?
I know I’d have stopped and asked for verbal confirmation, and I’d have read it back loud and clear.
But he has heard nobody on approach, there are lights at 5 or 6 km, for 34L at a guess, he’s number 1, and 2 and 3 are taxying to C1 so the Coastguard crosses the line and lines up, waiting. JAL166 is told to slow down, for a departure (that must be me! gives me time) and still he waits, 166 is told ‘min app speed, (gives me more time) and then the world caves in.
JAL516 was convinced cleared meant runway is all mine and this happens. This flight has not been mentioned since Coastguard came on frequency.
I think in that situation (when stop-bars are u/s) they should erect a row of red lights across the holding point and all aircraft must use C1.
From the transcript I can imagine it happening. JAL516 comes on frequency, hears DAL 276 taxiing full length for T/O, and then he’s Cleared to Land. In my day that meant, great, runway is all mine (except in USA where it meant, ‘I expect the runway to be clear when you get there’).
The J722A comes onto Tower and cleared to C5, you’re number 1 (for departure, not for the runway, unclear). That JAL179 comes on, and is no 3, (so that DAL ahead must be no 2, and I'm no 1).
He arrives at C5, the red bar has been turned off already (didn't read the notam), he’s number one, so what does he do?
I know I’d have stopped and asked for verbal confirmation, and I’d have read it back loud and clear.
But he has heard nobody on approach, there are lights at 5 or 6 km, for 34L at a guess, he’s number 1, and 2 and 3 are taxying to C1 so the Coastguard crosses the line and lines up, waiting. JAL166 is told to slow down, for a departure (that must be me! gives me time) and still he waits, 166 is told ‘min app speed, (gives me more time) and then the world caves in.
JAL516 was convinced cleared meant runway is all mine and this happens. This flight has not been mentioned since Coastguard came on frequency.
I think in that situation (when stop-bars are u/s) they should erect a row of red lights across the holding point and all aircraft must use C1.
given all these runway incursions in the US and other places, have no airports considered the low tech solution of light beams across all runway entrances, that combined with ADSB to show who's landing, will sound an alarm? It's about as low-tech as you can get but also low cost and easy to implement and doesn't rely on anything installed on the aircraft
but as with the Air Canada in SFO nearly landing on the 3 widebodies waiting on taxiway I'm amazed in 2024 that the Mk1 eyeball and multitudes of flashing lights are used to control and land aircraft. The Wright brothers could identify with this aspect of operations, even if everything else has moved on a century.
but as with the Air Canada in SFO nearly landing on the 3 widebodies waiting on taxiway I'm amazed in 2024 that the Mk1 eyeball and multitudes of flashing lights are used to control and land aircraft. The Wright brothers could identify with this aspect of operations, even if everything else has moved on a century.
Much enthusiasm to praise the cabin crew and procedural training on the evacuation results.
It is about about 17 that years since my last safety school refresher, but I understood keeping calm and staying seated was a no no and in some instances those that made a beeline for exits lived and those that did not move, perished.
The reviews of the verbal announcements and facts surrounding the cabin address system function, evacuation signal and why so few slide deployments will be a topic will need to be answered.
The cabin video shows fire outside, the aircraft is in an abnormal attitude and yet passengers are not moving, prompted me to write the above.
It is about about 17 that years since my last safety school refresher, but I understood keeping calm and staying seated was a no no and in some instances those that made a beeline for exits lived and those that did not move, perished.
The reviews of the verbal announcements and facts surrounding the cabin address system function, evacuation signal and why so few slide deployments will be a topic will need to be answered.
The cabin video shows fire outside, the aircraft is in an abnormal attitude and yet passengers are not moving, prompted me to write the above.
(sory if my laptop keys are becoming sticky).
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Saudia Flight 163: "Although the Lockheed L-1011-200 TriStar made a successful emergency landing at Riyadh, the flight crew failed to perform an emergency evacuation of the airplane, leading to the deaths of all 287 passengers and 14 crew on board the aircraft from smoke inhalation."
I agree with all of this. Indeed I think the only way which the Dash 8's wings could have damaged the engine nacelles in such a symmetric fashion is if the forward fuselage of the A350 passed over the top of the Dash 8, leaving both wings intact until contacted by the A350's nacelles and then very quickly the main gear. If the A350 had derotated almost instantly following impact as proposed by Flying Roland, then whichever of the Dash 8's wings it came down onto (probably the left, given the offset from runway centreline) would have been disrupted by the A350 fuselage and would not have produced the symmetric nacelle damage pattern highlighted in Juan's video (and would have made the Dash 8 captain's survival impossible). I think the video sequences back this up by the fact that no fire is seen until the Dash 8 is a long way back under the A350.
The other point I'd make from Juan's video is that it shows very clearly how each of the A350's nacelle rims is damaged in 2 places, on both inboard and outboard sides (in other words, 4 points of contact between nacelle and wing). Looking at Flying Roland's diagrams, this is only possible if the two aircraft are almost perfectly aligned; it would not take much offset for the Dash 8's wingtip to miss the outer edge of one of the nacelles. (Edit: A350 engine centres are 10.5m from centreline, with nacelle radius 2m, so for the 90ft/27.4m wingspan of a DH3 to impact the nacelles in 4 places there can have been a maximum of 1.2m offset between the aircraft. Since the A350 fuselage is 6m wide, that means it definitely went over the top of the DH3...)
The other point I'd make from Juan's video is that it shows very clearly how each of the A350's nacelle rims is damaged in 2 places, on both inboard and outboard sides (in other words, 4 points of contact between nacelle and wing). Looking at Flying Roland's diagrams, this is only possible if the two aircraft are almost perfectly aligned; it would not take much offset for the Dash 8's wingtip to miss the outer edge of one of the nacelles. (Edit: A350 engine centres are 10.5m from centreline, with nacelle radius 2m, so for the 90ft/27.4m wingspan of a DH3 to impact the nacelles in 4 places there can have been a maximum of 1.2m offset between the aircraft. Since the A350 fuselage is 6m wide, that means it definitely went over the top of the DH3...)
- GY
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Plenty of Monday morning quarterbacks critical of the Evacuation. Most crew will never ever have to deal with an evacuation period. Those that do, often recount during countless hours in all your annual Emergency Procedure courses, how things never ever run according to plan due to a multitude of reasons and generally the top of the list is a Communication breakdown between Cockpit and Cabin either due equipment or human.
It's very obvious this was such an event due to equipment malfunction not allowing communication with the crew. It's also obvious that after the initial explosion and subsequent fire (likely fuel from Dash 8) the subsequent fire abated as the aircraft came to rest. From listening to many passenger reports it's obvious that the crew largely succeeded in keeping the passengers calm in the initial stages and by not lauching into a full evacuation likely had more control over the subsequent evacuation (shown by very few passengers taking bags, well done CC). History has shown that it's unlikely to ever require an immediate evacuation without assessing the situation even if that does take a few minutes. Yes some procedures and learnings will come from this, but overall, i'd commend the CC on the current information I have seen. Also some alluding to the crew gradient in Japan playing a part, that is purely a racist observation, I am happy for my CC to take time to gather the Information before popping slides in panic, into fire, running engines etc.
Aircraft are certified to evacuate in 90secs it never means upon coming to rest it must be completed in 90secs. If 379 passenger evacuated safely in 8mins or 18mins then great effort. Too many people here that add no value to the discussion, that will never experience an emergency of this magnitude, while writing from the comfort of their sofa, getting their neck massaged, sipping wine.
It's very obvious this was such an event due to equipment malfunction not allowing communication with the crew. It's also obvious that after the initial explosion and subsequent fire (likely fuel from Dash 8) the subsequent fire abated as the aircraft came to rest. From listening to many passenger reports it's obvious that the crew largely succeeded in keeping the passengers calm in the initial stages and by not lauching into a full evacuation likely had more control over the subsequent evacuation (shown by very few passengers taking bags, well done CC). History has shown that it's unlikely to ever require an immediate evacuation without assessing the situation even if that does take a few minutes. Yes some procedures and learnings will come from this, but overall, i'd commend the CC on the current information I have seen. Also some alluding to the crew gradient in Japan playing a part, that is purely a racist observation, I am happy for my CC to take time to gather the Information before popping slides in panic, into fire, running engines etc.
Aircraft are certified to evacuate in 90secs it never means upon coming to rest it must be completed in 90secs. If 379 passenger evacuated safely in 8mins or 18mins then great effort. Too many people here that add no value to the discussion, that will never experience an emergency of this magnitude, while writing from the comfort of their sofa, getting their neck massaged, sipping wine.
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I'm reminded of an incident at Heathrow in April 2000 when an aircraft on final overflew another aircraft that was lined up for takeoff.
The AAIB report said (at p.27): "... the use of strobe lights would have improved the conspicuity of the ... aircraft on the runway. Some UK companies have operating procedures requiring their crews to activate strobe lights whenever their aircraft are on an active runway. However, at present there is no national regulation requiring this. The use of strobe lights on the ground could be disturbing to other crews awaiting take off particularly at night. Nevertheless, the use of strobe lights would increase the conspicuity of aircraft on an active runway. It would therefore be appropriate for the CAA to standardise procedures and require all UK aircraft to use strobe lights, when fitted, when on an active runway in [the] UK."
The recommendation (at p.37) was that "The [CAA] should issue instructions requiring United Kingdom Registered aircraft to use strobe lights, if fitted, when on an active runway in the UK."
Was this adopted, and is it SOP for UK airlines? Is it widespread elsewhere? And in the light of this accident, should it be?How long did it take to drown the uncontrollable engine on VH-OQA at SIN? ISTR that it wasn't finally shut down until about three hours after the aircraft landed, but a lot of other things had been tried in the interim.
The AAIB report said (at p.27): "... the use of strobe lights would have improved the conspicuity of the ... aircraft on the runway. Some UK companies have operating procedures requiring their crews to activate strobe lights whenever their aircraft are on an active runway. However, at present there is no national regulation requiring this. The use of strobe lights on the ground could be disturbing to other crews awaiting take off particularly at night. Nevertheless, the use of strobe lights would increase the conspicuity of aircraft on an active runway. It would therefore be appropriate for the CAA to standardise procedures and require all UK aircraft to use strobe lights, when fitted, when on an active runway in [the] UK."
The recommendation (at p.37) was that "The [CAA] should issue instructions requiring United Kingdom Registered aircraft to use strobe lights, if fitted, when on an active runway in the UK."
Was this adopted, and is it SOP for UK airlines? Is it widespread elsewhere? And in the light of this accident, should it be?How long did it take to drown the uncontrollable engine on VH-OQA at SIN? ISTR that it wasn't finally shut down until about three hours after the aircraft landed, but a lot of other things had been tried in the interim.
Plenty of Monday morning quarterbacks critical of the Evacuation. Most crew will never ever have to deal with an evacuation period...................................................... ............... If 379 passenger evacuated safely in 8mins or 18mins then great effort. Too many people here that add no value to the discussion, that will never experience an emergency of this magnitude, while writing from the comfort of their sofa, getting their neck massaged, sipping wine.
"Neck massaged, sipping wine" -gratuitous commentary that adds no value.
FWIW I have had the experience of evacuating a cockpit with smoke in it, in a light aircraft. I declared an emergency, landed and got out PDQ. I've never been so happy as when the person on short final got out of the way.
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Plenty of Monday morning quarterbacks critical of the Evacuation. Most crew will never ever have to deal with an evacuation period. Those that do, often recount during countless hours in all your annual Emergency Procedure courses, how things never ever run according to plan due to a multitude of reasons and generally the top of the list is a Communication breakdown between Cockpit and Cabin either due equipment or human.
It's very obvious this was such an event due to equipment malfunction not allowing communication with the crew. It's also obvious that after the initial explosion and subsequent fire (likely fuel from Dash 8) the subsequent fire abated as the aircraft came to rest. From listening to many passenger reports it's obvious that the crew largely succeeded in keeping the passengers calm in the initial stages and by not lauching into a full evacuation likely had more control over the subsequent evacuation (shown by very few passengers taking bags, well done CC). History has shown that it's unlikely to ever require an immediate evacuation without assessing the situation even if that does take a few minutes. Yes some procedures and learnings will come from this, but overall, i'd commend the CC on the current information I have seen. Also some alluding to the crew gradient in Japan playing a part, that is purely a racist observation, I am happy for my CC to take time to gather the Information before popping slides in panic, into fire, running engines etc.
Aircraft are certified to evacuate in 90secs it never means upon coming to rest it must be completed in 90secs. If 379 passenger evacuated safely in 8mins or 18mins then great effort. Too many people here that add no value to the discussion, that will never experience an emergency of this magnitude, while writing from the comfort of their sofa, getting their neck massaged, sipping wine.
It's very obvious this was such an event due to equipment malfunction not allowing communication with the crew. It's also obvious that after the initial explosion and subsequent fire (likely fuel from Dash 8) the subsequent fire abated as the aircraft came to rest. From listening to many passenger reports it's obvious that the crew largely succeeded in keeping the passengers calm in the initial stages and by not lauching into a full evacuation likely had more control over the subsequent evacuation (shown by very few passengers taking bags, well done CC). History has shown that it's unlikely to ever require an immediate evacuation without assessing the situation even if that does take a few minutes. Yes some procedures and learnings will come from this, but overall, i'd commend the CC on the current information I have seen. Also some alluding to the crew gradient in Japan playing a part, that is purely a racist observation, I am happy for my CC to take time to gather the Information before popping slides in panic, into fire, running engines etc.
Aircraft are certified to evacuate in 90secs it never means upon coming to rest it must be completed in 90secs. If 379 passenger evacuated safely in 8mins or 18mins then great effort. Too many people here that add no value to the discussion, that will never experience an emergency of this magnitude, while writing from the comfort of their sofa, getting their neck massaged, sipping wine.
Unplanned emergency, night time, no indication of what happened, pilots not knowing that was a fire or collision initially, pilots trying to shut down the engines and at least one is still running, coms failure....soooo many factors to be considered.
Once again folks, cabin crew did amazing job, they evacuated that full plane using the available exits (that were safe to operate). Stop repeating non-sense about how long it took them without having all the info or the expertise to analyse such events.
Edit: cooperplace I am also very interested to find out more and see what worked and what recommendations will be made in the report. In aviation, we always learn and often amend SOPs after such events. However, from what we know so far, crew did an amazing job. (sorry for repeating myself).
Last edited by skytrax; 5th Jan 2024 at 04:11. Reason: added and spelling
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TV Asahi (see video) had a reporter on board the A350 during the accident.
news.tv-asahi.co.jp/news_society/articles/000331050.html
Footage taken by passengers from inside the plane shows that the left wing is severely damaged and on fire even before the plane comes to a complete stop. 3 minutes after touchdown the other engine starts to burn brightly (see footage). The Asahi reporter witness says that the CA's were repeating "Please stay calm" "It is fine", whereas some of the passengers in the back were screaming at them (in Osaka dialect) "Why? (nandeyanen = why not do something, why are you unreasonable?)". Video shows CA's shouting please keep your head down, please don't bring your baggage, we request your cooperation. One of the CA's were witnessed to shout "Captain captain can you hear me?" but there was no response as the intercom did not work. This prevented the CA's from communicating with each other and reduced situational awareness. One of the CA's shouted to a person in white, "The engine is on fire", the person in white shouted back "which engine?" and they began discussing with each other (the person in white is the chief purser).
The expert commentator says "The crew succeeded in preventing the initial panic of the passengers (this is where a lot of the effort was concentrated), if they start to panic then we lose control of the situation". JAL implied that it took time to evaluate which exits are safe and which are not.
After the evacuation was completed, the captain went row by row and found additional passengers left on the plane (too scared to move?) and made them leave. He was last to leave the plane, at that point 18 minutes had passed since touchdown. Once on the ground, one of the passengers engaged in a discussion with a person who appeared to be the captain (=the last person off the plane). He said, during the approach the runway was clear, but at the last moment a white shadow was seen for an instant (apparently this conversation occurred 20 minutes or so after the accident).
Poor translations mine.
news.tv-asahi.co.jp/news_society/articles/000331050.html
Footage taken by passengers from inside the plane shows that the left wing is severely damaged and on fire even before the plane comes to a complete stop. 3 minutes after touchdown the other engine starts to burn brightly (see footage). The Asahi reporter witness says that the CA's were repeating "Please stay calm" "It is fine", whereas some of the passengers in the back were screaming at them (in Osaka dialect) "Why? (nandeyanen = why not do something, why are you unreasonable?)". Video shows CA's shouting please keep your head down, please don't bring your baggage, we request your cooperation. One of the CA's were witnessed to shout "Captain captain can you hear me?" but there was no response as the intercom did not work. This prevented the CA's from communicating with each other and reduced situational awareness. One of the CA's shouted to a person in white, "The engine is on fire", the person in white shouted back "which engine?" and they began discussing with each other (the person in white is the chief purser).
The expert commentator says "The crew succeeded in preventing the initial panic of the passengers (this is where a lot of the effort was concentrated), if they start to panic then we lose control of the situation". JAL implied that it took time to evaluate which exits are safe and which are not.
After the evacuation was completed, the captain went row by row and found additional passengers left on the plane (too scared to move?) and made them leave. He was last to leave the plane, at that point 18 minutes had passed since touchdown. Once on the ground, one of the passengers engaged in a discussion with a person who appeared to be the captain (=the last person off the plane). He said, during the approach the runway was clear, but at the last moment a white shadow was seen for an instant (apparently this conversation occurred 20 minutes or so after the accident).
Poor translations mine.
Plenty of Monday morning quarterbacks critical of the Evacuation. Most crew will never ever have to deal with an evacuation period. Those that do, often recount during countless hours in all your annual Emergency Procedure courses, how things never ever run according to plan due to a multitude of reasons and generally the top of the list is a Communication breakdown between Cockpit and Cabin either due equipment or human.
It's very obvious this was such an event due to equipment malfunction not allowing communication with the crew. It's also obvious that after the initial explosion and subsequent fire (likely fuel from Dash 8) the subsequent fire abated as the aircraft came to rest. From listening to many passenger reports it's obvious that the crew largely succeeded in keeping the passengers calm in the initial stages and by not lauching into a full evacuation likely had more control over the subsequent evacuation (shown by very few passengers taking bags, well done CC). History has shown that it's unlikely to ever require an immediate evacuation without assessing the situation even if that does take a few minutes. Yes some procedures and learnings will come from this, but overall, i'd commend the CC on the current information I have seen. Also some alluding to the crew gradient in Japan playing a part, that is purely a racist observation, I am happy for my CC to take time to gather the Information before popping slides in panic, into fire, running engines etc.
Aircraft are certified to evacuate in 90secs it never means upon coming to rest it must be completed in 90secs. If 379 passenger evacuated safely in 8mins or 18mins then great effort. Too many people here that add no value to the discussion, that will never experience an emergency of this magnitude, while writing from the comfort of their sofa, getting their neck massaged, sipping wine.
It's very obvious this was such an event due to equipment malfunction not allowing communication with the crew. It's also obvious that after the initial explosion and subsequent fire (likely fuel from Dash 8) the subsequent fire abated as the aircraft came to rest. From listening to many passenger reports it's obvious that the crew largely succeeded in keeping the passengers calm in the initial stages and by not lauching into a full evacuation likely had more control over the subsequent evacuation (shown by very few passengers taking bags, well done CC). History has shown that it's unlikely to ever require an immediate evacuation without assessing the situation even if that does take a few minutes. Yes some procedures and learnings will come from this, but overall, i'd commend the CC on the current information I have seen. Also some alluding to the crew gradient in Japan playing a part, that is purely a racist observation, I am happy for my CC to take time to gather the Information before popping slides in panic, into fire, running engines etc.
Aircraft are certified to evacuate in 90secs it never means upon coming to rest it must be completed in 90secs. If 379 passenger evacuated safely in 8mins or 18mins then great effort. Too many people here that add no value to the discussion, that will never experience an emergency of this magnitude, while writing from the comfort of their sofa, getting their neck massaged, sipping wine.
At last, a few have seen past the applause for the crew actions, along with Manchester B737 can I remind readers of the Saudia L1011 flight 163 incident when prompt evacuation did not happen after a fire in the cabin and All aboard perished; much of the 'luck' in getting All persons off the JAL should be credited to the modern fire/smoke resistance of cabin interiors.
(sory if my laptop keys are becoming sticky).
(sory if my laptop keys are becoming sticky).
I couldn’t agree more. The crew had no idea what the situation was. One engine was still running. Extremely difficult to decide which doors to open and they made the right decision. With no centre doors open passengers in the middle of the plane had to move from the middle of the plane to the two front exits and one rear exit. The stress on the crew would have been extreme. The last person off the plane was the captain and I have no doubt the crew would have checked the plane thoroughly to make sure everyone was off which would have taken several minutes.
This was a catastrophic event, and the crew were confronted with a condition that is about as bad as can be imagined where any survival is likely. We do not know yet that the evacuation time was a help or a hindrance, and premature assumption that fire physics have miraculously changed from Riyadh, Manchester or Halifax is not beneficial for everyone who is charged with the safety of the travelling public.
I have evacuated aircraft in the military, and it is not so much fun, I have sat there making a decision to evacuate or not a plane with smoke from a ACM that blew up with 370 pax, and it is an unpleasant decision, in my case it was able to be circumvented, but it was a line call. This crew were faced with a condition that was outside of training parameters, and they took what they did in order to effect their egress. 18 minutes is a very very long time, while there is fire that is not controlled.
I am not criticising the crews actions at all, they have acted in a controlled and professional manner. I am concerned that there is a chance that the takeaway lesson is that a great deal of time is available to take such critical actions. After 45 years of safety investigation and analysis, I cannot say I am comfortable with slow evacuations of aircraft with known threats. The decision in this case was not whether to get out, it was what door(s) to open.
What should be of concern to all investigators and regulators is the evidence that has been presented of the times for fire to breach the fuselage and result in an untenable cabin environment. In this case, the damage from heat and then the break through of the flame front, and the associated smoke volume that develops is alarming. The structure may have retained its integrity, but the fire has resulted in the interior becoming toxic. This whole event is a miracle of an outcome, and how much of that is down to the decisions and actions of the crew will be determined in due course. 18 minutes is 12 times the certified limit to get everyone off the aircraft. That was never going to happen in this case, the certification assumes 50% blockage of doors, and this case had 5/8ths of the doors compromised, and 1/8 was problematic, and another 1/8 was a high risk door that people did use. There was 1/8 of the doors, being 25% of the certified exits that were reasonably useable, and that is why I consider this a miracle more than anything else. Luck is not a bad thing to have on occasion.
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I think this is exactly how this happened. The registration marks on BOTH engine nacelles, on BOTH inner and outer sides, requires a more or less center of aircraft to center of aircraft aligned impact (+/-1m). The track through the Dash 8 makes sense being caused by the NLG and correlates with the nose of the A350 being raised sufficiently to avoid the T-tail going directly through the cockpit, and closer to under it as it detached. As the NLG wheels and leg were detached, the nose of the 350 immediately drops, causing immediate and significant damage to the electronics bay which is just aft of the NLG. The 350 engines caught both L/R wings, taking them off and parts of which were subsequently dragged by the MLG, which fortunately remained relatively fully intact. Had either MLG legs collapsed I think this would have been much, much worse, so credit to Airbus for building a tough aircraft.
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This whole event is a miracle of an outcome, and how much of that is down to the decisions and actions of the crew will be determined in due course. 18 minutes is 12 times the certified limit to get everyone off the aircraft. That was never going to happen in this case, the certification assumes 50% blockage of doors, and this case had 5/8ths of the doors compromised, and 1/8 was problematic, and another 1/8 was a high risk door that people did use. There was 1/8 of the doors, being 25% of the certified exits that were reasonably useable, and that is why I consider this a miracle more than anything else. Luck is not a bad thing to have on occasion.
Given the circumstances, the 90 seconds mark was not possible to begin with. None of the 3 exits used in evacuation were at an optimal angle to achieve 2 pax per second rate. Those are dual lane slide (type A doors) and the calculation of timings takes into consideration that rate.
To put this evacuation into perspective, few people know that even during a full scale simulation of an evacuation...there are injuries. Now, we are talking about a real accident where a full plane was evacuated by the cabin crew using 3 exits out of 8 (none of the 3 in optimal conditions to achieve 2 pax per second rate) and there are no serious injuries. Did it take longer than 90 seconds? Yes, but many aspects need to be taken into consideration and we do not have the facts even if some of us have the expertise.
Last edited by skytrax; 5th Jan 2024 at 05:30. Reason: spelling
Maybe this is the time to go back to basics.
What does it mean when Tower gives a landing clearance of "CLEARED TO LAND"?
Worse still, when an aircraft calls Tower at 8nm final in the USA and the Tower says:" You are number 3 runway XX, Cleared to land"? Is the runway really cleared? How did we end up with this meaningless practice that is now a norm?
What does it mean when Tower gives a landing clearance of "CLEARED TO LAND"?
Worse still, when an aircraft calls Tower at 8nm final in the USA and the Tower says:" You are number 3 runway XX, Cleared to land"? Is the runway really cleared? How did we end up with this meaningless practice that is now a norm?