RAF Rivet Joint
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Tuc
"You call it a success, and from the very narrow viewpoint of front line operators"
I appreciate that you only have our best interests at heart, but that quote pretty much sums up how badly you misunderstand what a military's purpose is.
I struggle to find a more valid viewpoint other than that of the front line operator.
Dervish
I have no knowledge of the RJ so have refrained from commenting on the
situation.
If pressed I would just say that I would have no issues with flying it. The US produce good aircraft.
"You call it a success, and from the very narrow viewpoint of front line operators"
I appreciate that you only have our best interests at heart, but that quote pretty much sums up how badly you misunderstand what a military's purpose is.
I struggle to find a more valid viewpoint other than that of the front line operator.
Dervish
I have no knowledge of the RJ so have refrained from commenting on the
situation.
If pressed I would just say that I would have no issues with flying it. The US produce good aircraft.
I'm all for taking everyone with us on this, Engines, particularly the men and women at the very sharp end. What I'm not for is the good old British fudge, whereby we make lots of changes, rename everything and everybody and basically carry on as before with the same jobs being done by the same people as before, ie pre and post Haddon-Cave.
It is because that Report dodged the real issue, of naming and shaming the real culprits responsible for this mess, and instead in time honoured way fed a few sacrificial lambs for slaughter that the MAA is the incompetent inept bunch of jobsworths that it is. If that is what you mean by:-
then we are indeed in violent agreement. It is that kind of jobsworth attitude that raises the hackles of the likes of Roland and has the effect of alienating the very people for which Air Safety strives, Military Aircrew. That is why the MAA and MAAIB have to be free of the MOD's malevolent dead hand. Their civilian DGs will have to have a lot of discretion to exercise thanks to the dysfunctional mess that is UK Military Air Safety. An unenviable task which will mean coming clean about the extent and cause of this scandal. For a start they need to show Haddon-Cave for the sham it is, and tell us all about what really went on during the so called 'Golden Period of Airworthiness'. At least then crews will be better informed about problems involving their fleet, their systems, and what is planned to deal with them.
It won't be easy, there will be many problems, but at least there will be the chance to get the military fleets airworthy again. At the moment that just isn't going to happen.
Tourist, you say you know little about RJ, well me too. I'd want rather more to reassure me that it was a viable prospect than a 'made in USA' sticker (dated presumably 1964, though that is quite close to your chosen Golden Year of 1968, I guess).
It is because that Report dodged the real issue, of naming and shaming the real culprits responsible for this mess, and instead in time honoured way fed a few sacrificial lambs for slaughter that the MAA is the incompetent inept bunch of jobsworths that it is. If that is what you mean by:-
it is possible for the less competent engineer to make airworthiness a 'fetish', a sort of 'holy grail', instead of applying their professional judgement and expertise to solve the problem and get the aircraft into service. I've had first hand experience of that (thankfully uncommon) side of the argument.
It won't be easy, there will be many problems, but at least there will be the chance to get the military fleets airworthy again. At the moment that just isn't going to happen.
Tourist, you say you know little about RJ, well me too. I'd want rather more to reassure me that it was a viable prospect than a 'made in USA' sticker (dated presumably 1964, though that is quite close to your chosen Golden Year of 1968, I guess).
in common with all other Military Air Accident investigations to date, this was investigated under the auspices of the operator. That does not make for objective conclusions on which one can build in order to avoid avoidable accidents.
Having investigated accidents in the USN, I find your assertion that military investigations do not make for objective conclusions on which one can build in order to avoid avoidable accidents to be false.
Back to RJ, the topic of this thread, and its various program challenges.
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Genstabler, in simple terms, there isn't a complete set of paperwork to say that the design, build and continued provision of the aircraft is safe. It may be safe, it may not, but without the paperwork it is automatically assumed to be unairworthy.
Not wanting to marginalise the argument, it's like buying organic food at the supermarket without the shop being able to confirm, with complete certainty, that the food is actually organic.
Not wanting to marginalise the argument, it's like buying organic food at the supermarket without the shop being able to confirm, with complete certainty, that the food is actually organic.
I'm not sure who said this:
"The military now lives in a world where if you need something done quickly and effectively, you step outside the military framework and get it cleared the civilian route!!
We deployed a UOR to Afghan totally bypassing Boscombe because it was the only way to get the capability to theatre inside a decade and a billion dollars..
How crazy is it that the civvys can pretty much glue anything they want to an airframe and the military cannot!!
The fact is that whatever UOR you installed without Boscombe's advice is likely to be undone at the soonest possible opportunity because it is...NOT AIRWORTHY. The mere fact that it currently works does not make it airworthy.
The main reason that MOD can't do this work unaided is simply because...THEY CAN'T DO IT.
The above collection of statements utterly supports Chug's & Tuc's fully justified drive to get a properly qualified and independently operating MAA...as opposed to the one masquerading as an aviation authority in Bristol today.
In my limited experience of working with one rather significant IPT they were severely understaffed, totally unqualified and generally incompetent in their designated tasks.
Those that were held responsible for the Maintenance Schedule had no concept of what was required - I considered their whole department as "Document holders" rather than Schedule Managers. They'd done no reviews in at least five years and their Data was a mess. Literally, they were a bunch of "City Fathers" sitting around clumps of desks waiting for their pensions. I remember one particularly pathetic Sqn Ldr who literally couldn't/wouldn't talk to me without a support crowd behind him.
It took me just 6 months to convince their (AOC's) bosses of the mess their most dependant data was in and for them pay "us civvy's" to take it off them. (£6m for the initial investigation, I believe)
It took a further two years to clean the triplicated "records" that were handed over.
I will stop before I go too far...Red Wine, and all that, leading to Red Mist.
"The military now lives in a world where if you need something done quickly and effectively, you step outside the military framework and get it cleared the civilian route!!
We deployed a UOR to Afghan totally bypassing Boscombe because it was the only way to get the capability to theatre inside a decade and a billion dollars..
How crazy is it that the civvys can pretty much glue anything they want to an airframe and the military cannot!!
The fact is that whatever UOR you installed without Boscombe's advice is likely to be undone at the soonest possible opportunity because it is...NOT AIRWORTHY. The mere fact that it currently works does not make it airworthy.
The main reason that MOD can't do this work unaided is simply because...THEY CAN'T DO IT.
The above collection of statements utterly supports Chug's & Tuc's fully justified drive to get a properly qualified and independently operating MAA...as opposed to the one masquerading as an aviation authority in Bristol today.
In my limited experience of working with one rather significant IPT they were severely understaffed, totally unqualified and generally incompetent in their designated tasks.
Those that were held responsible for the Maintenance Schedule had no concept of what was required - I considered their whole department as "Document holders" rather than Schedule Managers. They'd done no reviews in at least five years and their Data was a mess. Literally, they were a bunch of "City Fathers" sitting around clumps of desks waiting for their pensions. I remember one particularly pathetic Sqn Ldr who literally couldn't/wouldn't talk to me without a support crowd behind him.
It took me just 6 months to convince their (AOC's) bosses of the mess their most dependant data was in and for them pay "us civvy's" to take it off them. (£6m for the initial investigation, I believe)
It took a further two years to clean the triplicated "records" that were handed over.
I will stop before I go too far...Red Wine, and all that, leading to Red Mist.
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Originally Posted by Cows getting bigger
Genstabler, in simple terms, there isn't a complete set of paperwork to say that the design, build and continued provision of the aircraft is safe. It may be safe, it may not, but without the paperwork it is automatically assumed to be unairworthy.
As far as I can see, they haven't gone through all the US-standard paperwork yet to see if all the info needed to meet the UK-standard is present, and it appears they feel it will be quicker/cheaper to get a waiver than to work to transfer that info to the UK paperwork.
There may well be gaps (some significant) between the info in the US-standard paperwork and that required for the UK-standard paperwork, but I have not seen anything saying that the MOD has actually found that out.
Originally Posted by Rigga
The fact is that whatever UOR you installed without Boscombe's advice is likely to be undone at the soonest possible opportunity because it is...NOT AIRWORTHY. The mere fact that it currently works does not make it airworthy.
It may well have no detrimental affect whatsoever on the actual safety of flying & operating the aircraft, but that's not what is the issue - if it didn't get the full process then it is automatically assumed to be unsafe, whether it actually is or not, and whether removing it degrades the combat capability of the aircraft (and thus decreasing the safety of those relying on the aircraft to fight the enemy) or not.
There is a difference between being NOT AIRWORTHY because it actually is unsafe and being labeled NOT AIRWORTHY because the right paperwork wasn't done - but the MOD and many posters here believe the two are one and the same.
Yes, the ideal purpose of the paperwork is supposed to be to insure the actual, real-world safety of the aircraft with the modification, but the real-world purpose often ends up as insuring the paperwork is proper without regard to what happens outside the office.
Testing is as (or more) important as the paperwork process, but from what I have read testing is no longer a priority, as it costs more than a couple of office-workers checking tick-boxes.
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Couple of thoughts...
- The USAF have been operating RJs for years and, AFAIK, they don't fall out of the sky on a regular basis
- The USAF operates RJs out of the UK on a daily basis - often with UK crews. Somebody must have authorised this and "taken the risk"
I've read all the arguments about paperwork and audit trails and I understand the point that Tuc, etc are trying to get across, and I also understand the pain of the needless loss of family members due to negligence and cost cutting by those who had a duty of care to protect them (to the best of their ability).
Unfortunately, as is often the case, I feel that the real issue (Govt cost cutting and negligence by key service individuals) has been lost in the noise and everyone is now hiding behind the "audit trail" argument. Common sense and logic has gone out of the window and no doubt in part due to the authorisers being terrified of ending up in jail if the unthinkable ever did happen.
All the while the crews and jet sit around and we as a nation miss out on a valuable capability.
Only in blighty!
There is a difference between being NOT AIRWORTHY because it actually is unsafe and being labeled NOT AIRWORTHY because the right paperwork wasn't done - but the MOD and many posters here believe the two are one and the same.
All the bits that were installed on the Nimrod MR2 to provide it with AAR capability were presumably considered safe but the installation did not conform to the Airworthiness Regulations. As is the way with airworthiness shortcomings fate took its time to strike, but strike it did.
All the bits that comprised the MB Mk10 ejection seat were considered safe, so safe indeed that a Safety Case did not even exist, lots of paperwork saved there! As is the way with airworthiness shortcomings fate took its time to strike, but strike it did.
Would you buy a used car purely on the verbal assurances of a glib salesman, or would you insist on seeing written evidence of a full service history? After all, it's just so much bloody paperwork...
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Ah, yes - the "if the paperwork doesn't outweigh the aircraft then no paperwork exists" argument.
There IS a "full service history" of the aircraft in question, and of the modifications in question - as well as of the other aircraft (which are closely-related to the ones you bought) with those modifications.
But since it isn't a UK service history, then...
Yes, there should be an examination of whether there is any potential conflict or difference that hasn't been tested - and then test them to determine if there is or isn't an actual conflict or problem with the difference(s).
Re-read my post. I never said that we shouldn't have the safety paperwork, I said that we shouldn't let "following only the UK process" become the only goal!
There IS a "full service history" of the aircraft in question, and of the modifications in question - as well as of the other aircraft (which are closely-related to the ones you bought) with those modifications.
But since it isn't a UK service history, then...
Yes, there should be an examination of whether there is any potential conflict or difference that hasn't been tested - and then test them to determine if there is or isn't an actual conflict or problem with the difference(s).
Re-read my post. I never said that we shouldn't have the safety paperwork, I said that we shouldn't let "following only the UK process" become the only goal!
Greenknight, it isn't the quantity rather than the quality of the paperwork that is of concern. Are you saying that the RJ standing at Waddington is fully airworthy according to the US Military Airworthiness Regulations? That at least would be a start, but we have as yet to clear that first hurdle. Certainly there seems to be a problem with the UK Regulations, or why else isn't it even now being lovingly caressed by the very people waiting to take it to their bosoms?
Does the word 'ringer' mean the same there as it does here?
Does the word 'ringer' mean the same there as it does here?
Who signed this baby out of L3? Aircraft don't just levitate without someone signing her off...how did it get to the UK???
From Aviation Week:
From Aviation Week:
The aircraft — ZZ664 — arrived at Waddington on Nov. 12 after a flight from Majors Field in Greenville, Texas, via Bangor, Maine. The aircraft, which was converted from a 1964-vintage KC-135R tanker, is the first of three RC-135s destined for the RAF under the Airseeker program, filling the capability gap in electronic and signals-intelligence gathering left open by the retirement of the Nimrod R1 in 2011.
The RAF is the first export customer for the Rivet Joint, and the $1 billion program is considered to be one of the most complex Foreign Military Sales purchases ever completed between the U.K. and the U.S.
ZZ664 was rolled out of L-3’s facilities in Greenville in early May and made its first post-conversion flight at the end of July. According to RAF officials, the aircraft achieved its flight trials ahead of schedule, allowing it to be delivered early.
The RAF is due to declare an initial operating capability with a single RC-135 in October 2014; new aircraft will then be delivered every two years, with full operating capability expected in mid-2017, six months earlier than initially planned.
The RAF is the first export customer for the Rivet Joint, and the $1 billion program is considered to be one of the most complex Foreign Military Sales purchases ever completed between the U.K. and the U.S.
ZZ664 was rolled out of L-3’s facilities in Greenville in early May and made its first post-conversion flight at the end of July. According to RAF officials, the aircraft achieved its flight trials ahead of schedule, allowing it to be delivered early.
The RAF is due to declare an initial operating capability with a single RC-135 in October 2014; new aircraft will then be delivered every two years, with full operating capability expected in mid-2017, six months earlier than initially planned.
"Who signed this baby out of L3? Aircraft don't just levitate without someone signing her off...how did it get to the UK???"
Well, it's unlikely to have been an SAC Tech on a detachment from Waddo. Whomever it was will have been under quite some pressure to deliver "something" at the required time...and probably with an IOU in his back pocket for delivery to the MAA and Waddington.
Well, it's unlikely to have been an SAC Tech on a detachment from Waddo. Whomever it was will have been under quite some pressure to deliver "something" at the required time...and probably with an IOU in his back pocket for delivery to the MAA and Waddington.
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Well that's an "interesting" position - "the only reason an aircraft modified to USAF specifications was allowed to fly in the US was bribery"!
I have nothing to say to that, nor anything more to you - ever.
Of course, this* is an attitude I find rampant on this site, so it shouldn't surprise me.
* The US military only operates via corruption and bribery by the contractors - nothing ever actually meets specifications or regulations - everything is authorized by someone who was bribed to do so.
I have nothing to say to that, nor anything more to you - ever.
Of course, this* is an attitude I find rampant on this site, so it shouldn't surprise me.
* The US military only operates via corruption and bribery by the contractors - nothing ever actually meets specifications or regulations - everything is authorized by someone who was bribed to do so.
Anfrewn
Precisely the point I made some time ago. One is not permitted to use, exclusively, the historical argument to justify future safety. (That's a regulation, not an opinion). But one is required to exercise engineering judgement if, for example, the audit trail is lacking. This has been done successfully for many years, and obviously applies to most UK military aircraft after the 1991 policy to knowingly NOT have a complete audit trail.
This is where the current drift of this thread, and those commenting on airworthiness, has gone astray. It is advisable, indeed a mandated requirement, to have a complete audit trail; but if the "system" has its own defences in depth (experience, competence, resources etc) then it is not the be all and end all of airworthiness.
But a major problem arises when you also get rid of most of the staff who were specifically trained to exercise this engineering judgement. And then raise the grade/rank of those who are permitted to exercise it. The former is now openly admitted by MoD. The latter is kept quiet. So, where we are now is past the critical point. Far too many savings have been made at the expense of safety. What I, certainly, moan and groan about was we saw this coming over 20 years ago, notified the powers that be; and they abrogated their responsibility to such a degree as to be criminal.
One other point I'd make. Try to remember that one first attains airworthiness, then maintains it. Attaining it is a prerequisite to deciding on Fitness for Purpose - the practical Operational Capability that is mentioned. And airworthiness facilitates serviceability. What MoD now lacks is a clearly defined boundary of responsibility between Attaining/Maintaining and FFP.
The Attaining and Maintaining should be largely invisible to front line; more so the former. The reason you are hearing so much of it is not because of too much process. It is because the process has been willfully ignored and, having been caught out, MoD no longer has anyone who knows how to resurrect the system. The system grinds to a halt as many decisions have to be taken by too few.
As for Rivet Joint. Who is underwriting the aircraft? Boeing, L-3 or the USAF? Pick any one and it is the wrong answer. All 3 must be involved, and the first question I'd ask is the nature of this relationship in the contract. It is a procurement strategy fraught with risk.
Couple of thoughts...
- The USAF have been operating RJs for years and, AFAIK, they don't fall out of the sky on a regular basis
- The USAF operates RJs out of the UK on a daily basis - often with UK crews. Somebody must have authorised this and "taken the risk"
I've read all the arguments about paperwork and audit trails and I understand the point that Tuc, etc are trying to get across, and I also understand the pain of the needless loss of family members due to negligence and cost cutting by those who had a duty of care to protect them (to the best of their ability).
Unfortunately, as is often the case, I feel that the real issue (Govt cost cutting and negligence by key service individuals) has been lost in the noise and everyone is now hiding behind the "audit trail" argument. Common sense and logic has gone out of the window and no doubt in part due to the authorisers being terrified of ending up in jail if the unthinkable ever did happen.
All the while the crews and jet sit around and we as a nation miss out on a valuable capability.
Precisely the point I made some time ago. One is not permitted to use, exclusively, the historical argument to justify future safety. (That's a regulation, not an opinion). But one is required to exercise engineering judgement if, for example, the audit trail is lacking. This has been done successfully for many years, and obviously applies to most UK military aircraft after the 1991 policy to knowingly NOT have a complete audit trail.
This is where the current drift of this thread, and those commenting on airworthiness, has gone astray. It is advisable, indeed a mandated requirement, to have a complete audit trail; but if the "system" has its own defences in depth (experience, competence, resources etc) then it is not the be all and end all of airworthiness.
But a major problem arises when you also get rid of most of the staff who were specifically trained to exercise this engineering judgement. And then raise the grade/rank of those who are permitted to exercise it. The former is now openly admitted by MoD. The latter is kept quiet. So, where we are now is past the critical point. Far too many savings have been made at the expense of safety. What I, certainly, moan and groan about was we saw this coming over 20 years ago, notified the powers that be; and they abrogated their responsibility to such a degree as to be criminal.
One other point I'd make. Try to remember that one first attains airworthiness, then maintains it. Attaining it is a prerequisite to deciding on Fitness for Purpose - the practical Operational Capability that is mentioned. And airworthiness facilitates serviceability. What MoD now lacks is a clearly defined boundary of responsibility between Attaining/Maintaining and FFP.
The Attaining and Maintaining should be largely invisible to front line; more so the former. The reason you are hearing so much of it is not because of too much process. It is because the process has been willfully ignored and, having been caught out, MoD no longer has anyone who knows how to resurrect the system. The system grinds to a halt as many decisions have to be taken by too few.
As for Rivet Joint. Who is underwriting the aircraft? Boeing, L-3 or the USAF? Pick any one and it is the wrong answer. All 3 must be involved, and the first question I'd ask is the nature of this relationship in the contract. It is a procurement strategy fraught with risk.
tourist
I think I've posted often enough on the subject to have demonstrated the safety of aircrew has always been my primary concern. To make my position clear, I think the front line operators should be able to rely upon those behind them to do their jobs properly. Operators have enough to think about without worrying about things going on in DE&S, the MAA and London. They rightfully expect to be presented with an airworthy aircraft that meets its specification (or has acceptable limitations) and has an acceptable Aircraft Data Set. That is what I meant by narrow viewpoint. It is not a criticism. What I criticise is when operators are distracted by suspicions that all is not well; like Flt Lt Tapper was on Chinook. It was utterly extraordinaruy that he felt the need to visit Racal and even more so that he was allowed to. That single fact, and what lay beneath, should have been a bloody great red flag to his superiors. But they were too busy actively preventing those at the rear doing their jobs.
Having said that, I always wanted and encouraged aircrew involvement. Again, and I know you're sick of me saying this, it is actually mandated yet the necessary resources were chopped and it is seldom implemented now. How many routinely attend Design Reviews? Believe it or not, the regulations actually acknowledge aircrew are pretty busy, and make provision for Design Reviews to be taken to them, at (in your case) Typed Air Stations. Another regulation that is routinely ignored nowadays. The aim here is that what turns up on Day 1 comes as no surprise and the limitations are acceptable, understood and manageable. To cite Chinook again, none of this happened and what they were given came as a huge surprise and had no clearance whatsoever.
To cite Rivet Joint, the aircraft that turned up is lying unused with the airworthiness certification process slipping daily. By definition, the Aircraft Data Set is incomplete and grossly immature. Question: did this come as a surprise to Rivet Joint users? If so, why? If not, when did they know, what did they know, who did they report it to and what action was taken?
"You call it a success, and from the very narrow viewpoint of front line operators"
I appreciate that you only have our best interests at heart, but that quote pretty much sums up how badly you misunderstand what a military's purpose is.
I struggle to find a more valid viewpoint other than that of the front line operator.
I appreciate that you only have our best interests at heart, but that quote pretty much sums up how badly you misunderstand what a military's purpose is.
I struggle to find a more valid viewpoint other than that of the front line operator.
I think I've posted often enough on the subject to have demonstrated the safety of aircrew has always been my primary concern. To make my position clear, I think the front line operators should be able to rely upon those behind them to do their jobs properly. Operators have enough to think about without worrying about things going on in DE&S, the MAA and London. They rightfully expect to be presented with an airworthy aircraft that meets its specification (or has acceptable limitations) and has an acceptable Aircraft Data Set. That is what I meant by narrow viewpoint. It is not a criticism. What I criticise is when operators are distracted by suspicions that all is not well; like Flt Lt Tapper was on Chinook. It was utterly extraordinaruy that he felt the need to visit Racal and even more so that he was allowed to. That single fact, and what lay beneath, should have been a bloody great red flag to his superiors. But they were too busy actively preventing those at the rear doing their jobs.
Having said that, I always wanted and encouraged aircrew involvement. Again, and I know you're sick of me saying this, it is actually mandated yet the necessary resources were chopped and it is seldom implemented now. How many routinely attend Design Reviews? Believe it or not, the regulations actually acknowledge aircrew are pretty busy, and make provision for Design Reviews to be taken to them, at (in your case) Typed Air Stations. Another regulation that is routinely ignored nowadays. The aim here is that what turns up on Day 1 comes as no surprise and the limitations are acceptable, understood and manageable. To cite Chinook again, none of this happened and what they were given came as a huge surprise and had no clearance whatsoever.
To cite Rivet Joint, the aircraft that turned up is lying unused with the airworthiness certification process slipping daily. By definition, the Aircraft Data Set is incomplete and grossly immature. Question: did this come as a surprise to Rivet Joint users? If so, why? If not, when did they know, what did they know, who did they report it to and what action was taken?
.... when did they know ?
If not, when did they know, what did they know, who did they report it to and what action was taken?
NB I've been trying to guess what's been blacked out (and whether it would fit the black bit or has been lengthened or shortened to fool us nosy beggars.)
As for Rivet Joint. Who is underwriting the aircraft? Boeing, L-3 or the USAF?
Provisional Apologies in advance ....
I'm not sure if these extracts answer Tucumseh's questions, or even if I've understood his questions correctly. This may also be old stuff that's been posted before. It seemed vaguely relevant.
LFH
Last edited by Lordflasheart; 5th May 2014 at 11:02. Reason: clarifications
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If the MoD is not yet satisfied with ZZ664 which remains parked at Waddington, why is it OK for 51 Sqn to continue to accumulate thousands of flying hours on the USAF fleet of very similar aircraft?
51 Squadron Personnel Reach 20,000 Operational Flying Hours | The Insight Online
51 Squadron Personnel Reach 20,000 Operational Flying Hours | The Insight Online