Anfrewn
Couple of thoughts...
- The USAF have been operating RJs for years and, AFAIK, they don't fall out of the sky on a regular basis
- The USAF operates RJs out of the UK on a daily basis - often with UK crews. Somebody must have authorised this and "taken the risk"
I've read all the arguments about paperwork and audit trails and I understand the point that Tuc, etc are trying to get across, and I also understand the pain of the needless loss of family members due to negligence and cost cutting by those who had a duty of care to protect them (to the best of their ability).
Unfortunately, as is often the case, I feel that the real issue (Govt cost cutting and negligence by key service individuals) has been lost in the noise and everyone is now hiding behind the "audit trail" argument. Common sense and logic has gone out of the window and no doubt in part due to the authorisers being terrified of ending up in jail if the unthinkable ever did happen.
All the while the crews and jet sit around and we as a nation miss out on a valuable capability.
Precisely the point I made some time ago. One is not permitted to use, exclusively, the historical argument to justify future safety. (That's a regulation, not an opinion). But one is required to exercise engineering judgement if, for example, the audit trail is lacking. This has been done successfully for many years, and obviously applies to most UK military aircraft after the 1991 policy to knowingly NOT have a complete audit trail.
This is where the current drift of this thread, and those commenting on airworthiness, has gone astray. It is advisable, indeed a mandated requirement, to have a complete audit trail; but if the "system" has its own defences in depth (experience, competence, resources etc) then it is not the be all and end all of airworthiness.
But a major problem arises when you also get rid of most of the staff who were specifically trained to exercise this engineering judgement. And then raise the grade/rank of those who are permitted to exercise it. The former is now openly admitted by MoD. The latter is kept quiet. So, where we are now is past the critical point. Far too many savings have been made at the expense of safety. What I, certainly, moan and groan about was we saw this coming over 20 years ago, notified the powers that be; and they abrogated their responsibility to such a degree as to be criminal.
One other point I'd make. Try to remember that one first attains airworthiness, then maintains it. Attaining it is a prerequisite to deciding on Fitness for Purpose - the practical Operational Capability that is mentioned. And airworthiness facilitates serviceability. What MoD now lacks is a clearly defined boundary of responsibility between Attaining/Maintaining and FFP.
The Attaining and Maintaining should be largely invisible to front line; more so the former. The reason you are hearing so much of it is not because of too much process. It is because the process has been willfully ignored and, having been caught out, MoD no longer has anyone who knows how to resurrect the system. The system grinds to a halt as many decisions have to be taken by too few.
As for Rivet Joint. Who is underwriting the aircraft? Boeing, L-3 or the USAF? Pick any one and it is the wrong answer. All 3 must be involved, and the first question I'd ask is the nature of this relationship in the contract. It is a procurement strategy fraught with risk.