I am not sure if it's helpful... In essence, the calculations are done very, very quickly, a lot quicker than the time relevant for moving a control surface between two distinct consecutive positions - 6 (microsec) to 9 (nanoseconds) order of magnitude. At that calculation speed rate, the calculations would be looking like being done in parallel, even if they were done serially.

To understand airtren, a simple question? How long after A/P loss is LAW change to ALTERNATE?

@Gums:
 

hi Gums,

Don't get me wrong, the 1°/g is not an absolute value.
It is used to explain the elevator deflection criteria.

The massive THS/Stab for heavy transporters are 'slow' screw driven, therefore the elevators takes the short term pitch orders while long term orders are for THS to neutralize elevator deflection.

The exact logic inside the PRIMs is for obvious reasons hidden from public eyes.

Since it is 'gee' driven it won't need a speed signal to operate, (speed used for rates and gains) but if it is missing the IR(accelerometers) it definitely revert to DIRECT.
Already in the first BEA report page 54/55 it was stated and explained why the system went in a latched ALTERNATE 2 law.

The figure and text is extracted from the FCTM.

http://i474.photobucket.com/albums/r...9/ElevFCTM.jpg

jcjeant, the stall alarm was reliable as long as the PF recalled the overly complex set of rules for the stall alarm being suppressed.

this is the sort of logic I contemplate
If the plane is in the air (no weight on wheels or wheels retracted)
thenNumbers need to be teased out somewhere. Even logic as simple as this is better than what the have now, as I see it:
If the plane is in the air (no weight on wheels or wheels retracted)
if airspeed is valid and below threshold
thenelse
then (airspeed invalid)(A perfect solution is hard to derive and requires AoA and other criteria. I'd also put some hysteresis on the warnings so that they're a little harder to trigger and a little harder to un-trigger.)

(Sorry about the formatting - it's best I can do with this interface in a reasonable amount of time.)

@Bearfoil:
 

where have you been last years?

1 sec!

02:10:05 AP disengage.
02:10:06 ALTERNATE LAW (at the start of the 10s monitoring proces)
02:10:08 A/THR disengage.
02:10:16 ALTERNATE LAW LATCHED.

@JD-EE
 

You forgot to program an END IF, EXIT IF and ERROR handler.........:8

Before 02:11:45 the CAS was not below 60Kts and SW operational.
They modified the system, AOA input to IR part of ADIRU and SW will now be NCD if CAS below 30Kts. (call it progressing technology)

I think they should prevent the A/C to become in such a upset situation.

Sorry also. I have re-read what you wrote and picked "leg" as the entire flight (as I remembered you corrected me on this point). Hence, maybe I confused you with my answer, as you get it right concerning this part of the flight.

My emphasis was to point at AF system for long-haul crews (équipage renforcé) which:
- do not use "relief" pilot (limited duty).
- do not rank F/Os (senior/junior)
- let the captain to decide and annouce who will be the pilot in charge between the two F/Os while he is resting.

What changed in the system is:
- Before: Pilot in charge was PF during captain's rest. (AF447 case).
- Now: Pilot in charge is PNF, in left hand seat, during captain's rest.

In fact no... they don't sound very similar. It's due to their particular prosodie (tone). Both are interjectives which phonetically sounds quite differently (at least for French native speakers): "hein ?" and "euh..." are not usually confused in transcription.

- "euh..." is a sign of hesitancy, hence it is pronounced low, like a breath.
- "hein ?" is a sign of insistancy, hence it is pronounced high, short and distinctively.

Also, "hein ?" would call for an answer / acknowledgement :
- je suis d’accord qu’on est en manuel hein ?
- Surtout essaie de toucher le moins possible les commandes en en latéral hein ?
- Je suis en TOGA hein ?

Hence, "il est où euh..." should point at something ("where is [it]... ), not at someone (who else?). The PNF only called the captain after saying that. Before calling him, he perfectly knew where his captain was (resting).

I will agree with your good point. Interpretation is based on context which is the primary clue. Notwithstanding, Such talks reading are revealing some ambiguousness not always easy to catch at first glance. Moreover, those dialogues are not complete and are lacking the necessary punctuation.

CVR transcipts lacks crucial referentials to be perfectly understood. If one factors the intrinsic ambiguousness of any langage while, in translation, further involontary ambiguousness could be added in the process, this may end quite far from the reality. Do not expect something clearer once released in English, rather the contrary!

Hi,

Come back from some pages .. (this thread run quick lol)
takata
Yes the captain tell "here it is,use that"

It answers who and what he was asked?
Mystery ..
Typical error you said ?
I rather think that we lose our time trying to put words into actions and timing
The CVR transcript in this Report No. 3 is very incomplete (it does not take a linguist to say such a thing)
No doubt the final report will be more complete
And last .. it will certainly be the complete version during the trial .. because judges and lawyers will not be satisfied by charades we read now

A33Zab
 

Thank you for the useful information of your last post (00:24 Z on 2d). I'd say you have to be very well informed. I mean, it's more than just having a manual lying around. I have some questions-- you wrote:

"The massive THS/Stab for heavy transporters are 'slow' screw driven, therefore the elevators takes the short term pitch orders while long term orders are for THS to neutralize elevator deflection."

My question here is, when CG is full aft, and elevator authority thus at a designed minimum of 1 degree per 1 g, how fast does the "slow" screwjack move the plane of the HS, compared to how fast the movement of the SS moves the elevator through 1 degree?

It seems to me that in any case, the rate at which the screwjack catches up with the elevator is 2-1/2 times faster at full aft CG than it would be at full forward CG. This further seems to me that PF would have only 40% as much times to assess the results of his SS inputs, when CG is full aft, compared to his situation with CG full forward. Am I missing something there?

Beyond that, it is fairly obvious (well, I didn't see it until now, I admit) that 13 degrees NU of the HS jackscrew cannot be reeled off regardless of the speed of the jackscrew, until the A/C has reduced its forward velocity to the point where such angle NU of the HS will not tear the wings off (ie, g < 2.5) (or is there some law where <3.5 would apply?).

It further appears that at some lesser value of degrees NU of HS the A/C is not actually flying, but is so slow that it must stall out. It would seem this angle would be rather readily calcuable. Why did the control computers for trim not make this calculation? Would not air density per altitude probe been the only outside information needed for this? ... together with weight of A/C less fuel burn and fuel in HS, presumably available on board to the computers...)

I admit to asking the question without taking time to see if I am overlooking something obvious. But it would still be better for someone of your familiarity with the THS issue to give an authoritive answer than for I to muddy the waters here by claiming it has to be the way I am seeing it at the moment. Thanks.

Also, in going to 15 degrees NU of the A/C attitude, what is the effect of partial fuel in the hollow HS sloshing to the rear of the HS tank, on aft CG... and then on the above considerations?

Toga & ths
 

I did post the image before, THS movement E4 thru E5 related to TOGA C4 thru C5

Now with this text from FCTM:

Flight Mode
In pitch, when an input is made on the sidestick, the flight control computers
interpret this input as a “g” demand/pitch rate. Consequently, elevator deflection
is not directly related to sidestick input. The aircraft responds to a sidestick order
with a pitch rate at low speed and a flight path rate or “g” at high speed. When no
input is made on the sidestick, the computers maintain a 1g flight path. Pitch
changes due to changes in speed, thrust and/or configuration, which in a
conventional aircraft would require the pilot to re-trim the aircraft, are
compensated for by the computers repositioning the THS. The pitch trim wheel
moves as the control law compensates for these changes. Sometimes, changes
of trim due to changes in thrust may be too large for the system to compensate,
and the aircraft may respond to them in pitch in the conventional sense and then
hold the new attitude at which it has stabilised after the trim change.

http://i474.photobucket.com/albums/r...emarkable1.jpg

Takata,

My reading of the BEA text was also that the PNF was referring to the "Captain" as the BEA document refers to the PNF calling the Captain in the couple of seconds following 2:10:47 - the "il est ou, euh" is at 2:10:49.

But if I let myself convinced by your post, and look at what could "il" be in "il est ou, euh?..." as in something that he does not find... and the Captain brings and hands back to him, then:

You've mentioned "documentation". But "documentation" in French is feminine, therefore it is replaced by the pronoun "elle", not "il", so it's not that.

2. a page? - French "la page" is feminine, prenoun should be "elle"...

so it's not that

3. instruction? - French "instruction" is feminine, therefore "elle"

so it's not that

What else then, as the "genre" seems to be a problem for those three....
:confused:

Hi,

No problem ..
The French language is rich in synonymous :8
takata will answer to you by:
The instruction book (male)
The workbook contains the documentation (male)
etc. ..
If you really think that the question was related to documentation ... you are now satisfied because the gender issue is resolved :D

To be fair there is no practical way to duplicate the conditions encountered for testing purposes other than millions of hours flying looking for those conditions and running tests in the few seconds the test plane is within those conditions. They're that exotic. There is also the problem that nobody could conceive of such conditions existing until very recent years.

Flying today is an order of magnitude or two safer than it was in the days of the "old farts" here. Dredge up statistics for yourself. You owe it to your reputation for honesty and fairness around here.

(Yes, I looked it up. B is slightly safer than A at this time for current models. All are so much better than the old C, D, B707 era, and other older planes it's silly to compare them on a linear graph.)

SAturnv

"The wife of the PF had gone with him to Brazil because the crew had a long layover in Brazil. As it was also Pentecost weekend, this meant a long holiday weekend. She taught physics in high school. Their two young sons remained in France"

I know many families must have been destroyed by this accident, but after reading the above it just choked me up. To think that these two young boys would have been told that 'mummy and daddy' will be home in the morning. And when they woke up someone had to tell them that 'mummy and daddy' will not be coming home.........ever.

Lonewolf 50
The pitot tube issue despite being the trigger is actually irrelevant to what caused the accident and I think one has to be careful not to attribute a major design flaw to the pitot tubes. To say that there is something wrong with the aircraft is a value judgment implying a serious problem. Remember, according to BEA the pitot tube problem in this incident did clear itself up after a short period.
The actual issue, though is why the crew reacted to the situation they were in in the particular way they did. What caused them to ignore the procedure for UAS? This is the issue, it is nothing to do with the aircraft. Attempts to somehow blame the aircraft are erroneous. One has to look at training and responses to unusual situations. As many others have noted - on the information we have this was not initially a serious incident. We are in the realms of psychology and human reactions here, not physics or computer science.

Hi,

I think so too .. say otherwise would be in bad faith.
On the other hand we must also realize what the objective criteria that have achieved such results
There are many and not only the progress made to the aircraft or avionics.
The airports are now equipped for the most part help ensure a better security approach for landing
Weather forecasts and knowledge of the atmosphere at altitude also helped to improve safety.
In terms of plane .. the engine has made tremendous progress and thus the fatal engine failures are rare
The FBW has assisted flight and also allowed to consider the construction of aircraft with new materials and significant economic returns have been created.
And there are other aspects that certainly forget
Remains the Achilles heel ... pilots ...
Considerable progress is still to do on this side .. since .. statistics have now changed and the human factor (errors) took the lead in the reasons for accidents
Anyone know where is the problem ..
Now .. as has been done about any technical problems .. we must find solutions .. is certain that despite other progress .. figures and statistics will frozen in the state as today .. or worse .. deteriorate ...

I hope you will be in court of justice for explain the facts above ...
Thales and Airbus will have you a debt of gratitude if you been as persuasive in your message
I dunno if AF will be so happy ....

Old Carthusian:
In spite of meeting certification specifications, heating of pitot probes is hardly rocket science, and to have them ice up repeatedly in a $multi-million plane means the design or maintenance is inadequate. The Thales AA probes were condemned, as were the Thales AB probes. Even the Goodrich replacements on an A330 have suffered at least one icing event.

This points to either unfortunate placement of the probes, or insufficient heating from the airplane's power source. Something as minor as probe bonding to aircraft skin could adversely affect the heat transfer.

Yeh, I suppose you could argue if it hadn't been iced pitots, some other event would have eventually brought that (incompetent) crew to grief. I don't buy it.

airtren;
Yes it is helpful, thank you, airtren. I didn't state it as such, but it was indeed the speed of processor operation that I was thinking about in terms of the "disconnection two seconds before the CAS dropped" - that the speed of processors enable downline processors (FCPC's to be exact), to "know and act", (ie., disconnect the AFS) long before the data recorders, sampling at various but obviously much slower rates, "knew" and recorded the event.

It is a point regarding the reading and interpretation of flight data that I have been wishing to make since the beginning - that when it comes down to microprocessor speeds we cannot say what is occurring "in-between" SSFDR data points and especially when we are examining parameters with different recording/sample rates such as 'g', which is typically eight to sixteen times-per-second, and CAS which is typically (depending upon dataframe programming), once per second and sidestick position which is typically four times per second - we cannot always interpolate data points in such events because there is often sufficient time between samples for a parameter to reverse itself or go to a limit then return, the actual recorded values being "none the wiser", so to speak.

In response to your question HN39, and I'm just exploring the idea I here that I began developing in my first response, (and it may be stretching a point, I don't know yet!), - that the drop in Mach, which shows up in the data as one second long and (apparently) "caught two seconds before the CAS" may be the result of the nature of flight data recordings rather than an actual two-second difference. There is a small dip in CAS at the same time the Mach goes to M0.26, but that may be looking for data that isn't there.

The question is really, Did the FCPC disengage the AFS two seconds before the CAS showed a drop, and if so, what engagement condition was no longer satisfied among those listed in the AMM, or is the above notion a plausible explanation?

Indeed it can be argued that the pitot tubes could be better designed and also that Air France should have taken quicker action to replace the Thales design with the Goodrich design.

That does not negate the need for the crew to respond appropriately to the incident. This crew didn't and how and why the crew responded to an incident which wasn't necessarily terminal is the key to the accident. It doesn't rest on incompetence but what caused them to disregard laid down procedures and adopt a totally different course of action. This question is not an aircraft issue but a human issue. After all pilot training for these big aircraft rests on dealing with unusual situations in the simulator. Maybe this situation isn't covered in which case there might be a training deficiency. Even if this is the case training should have been sufficient for the crew to successfully diagnose and avoid the stall and crash. I did mention in a previous post that there are occasions were people will do something they actually don't think they are doing in a stress situation and others have spoken of the instinctive reaction to pull back on the stick. This may have a bearing on what happened in the cockpit. Here is where training and standard procedures are vital. As to why this crew did not follow the latter - this is what I mean by the realms of psychology and human reaction. The transcript released by the BEA is instructive.

A33Zab;
Just trying to understand...., - Are you saying through the quoted statements above that setting TOGA thrust is contributing to the change in THS setting towards the NU setting? Wouldn't the increased thrust vector drive the THS to the ND position to maintain 1g, and not the NU which would exceed 1g due to pitch-up? That's how I'd be trimming a conventional aircraft...increase in thrust = pitch up (through increased speed and thrust vector), requiring re-trimming ND (to maintain altitude in a conventional aircraft, and here, to maintain 1g).

PJ2:
 

Youre right but only if they wanted to maintain 1g flight.
They wanted up, SS command >1g while A/C response was down <1g.

From the FDR plots I see (I may be wrong) that the elevator+THS became further biased 'nose-up' once TOGA was applied ... and that change is not so obviously related to an increased nose-up stick position?

The french for handbook (as in quick reference handbook) is manuel, which is masculine.

The assumption, working premise if you will, was/is that the bodies of the two first officers were retrieved with their seats. And that these were the bodies sent back to France for DNA identification. The successful results of the testing led the court to authorize recovery of the other bodies from the abyss.

The fourth seat in the cockpit was also retrieved at the time that seats 1 and 2 were recovered. There was wondering at the time on why the fourth seat and not the third seat was retrieved.

Three seats, two bodies. But the new information in interim report 3 raises the possibility, likely small, that the first two bodies recovered were those of the PNF who was belted in, and the wife of the PF who was sitting in the fourth seat, and also belted in. And that the body of the PF was not recovered (at that time) as he was not belted in. (The captain is now presumed to be standing or perhaps seated unbelted in the third seat.)

As the fourth seat was located directly behind the seat of the PF, this could explain why the PF was not belted in, as he could more easily turn to converse with his wife.

From a conversational context, when the PNF explains the smell of ozone, is he saying that to the PF or to the wife of the PF, who is a physics teacher?

A33Zab;
Yes, understand - so I would conclude that the rate of THS change towards NU was actually slower than if TOGA had not been selected. That does make sense, thank you A33Zab.

Buffet boundaries
 

Four hours into a Rio-Paris flight, AF447 was cruising normally at FL350. The crew noted from their flight data that they were still too heavy to climb to the next appropriate higher cruise FL.

But moments later AF447 'zoomed' – for whatever reason – up to FL380.

So having unintentionally arrived at FL380 at a heavier than planned weight, what were the new 1g stall (low speed) and Mach buffet (high speed) IAS boundaries for AF447?

@ A33Zab: Flight Mode
When I look at the typical pattern of flying, it would seem that most "hands on" flying by crews in the AB330 would be in the take off, departure, climb, and then terminal phases, to include landing. While the SS does not have artificial feedback per se, the SS (joystick) positions needed "to get the plane to do X" will over time become part of the pilot's tactile memory. (fingers, wrist, forearm, brain all having "remembered" this pattern).

I find it of interest that the "responds with 'g' " versus "responds with pitch" zones are so markedly different. If hand flying at altitude is not practiced, then the only muscle/touch/brain memory to rely on is the patterns from the low end and low speed flying regime.

This makes me wonder: was the aircraft responding as the pilot flying expected it to? If it wasn't (see some previous posters comments on the delicacy of hand flying at high altitudes) this would explain to me an early onset of pilot frustration and confusion. (Some people have used the term panic, which I see no evidence of. There is ample evidence of frustration, and of confusion).

The PNF is telling him to do this or that with the nose, he makes inputs, he acknowledges what he needs to do, but he can't get the aircraft to do it to his own satisfaction. (Nor the PNF's, nor later the Captain's).

I had previously suggested that Loss of Control is roughly defined as "your flight controls will not do as you command them to." AF447 is not just an upset scenario. From what CVR excerpts have shown so far, there seems to have been a mild case of loss of control (as defined above) even before the stall. LOC in this case meaning "he couldn't get it to do what he wanted it to do using his flight controls."

In sports terms -- you tend to play the way you practice.

Old Carthusian:
We are actually in rough agreement. I won't beat the dead horse about necessary and sufficient conditions, which pitot failure classifies as, but yes, as I've said on numerous occasions, malfunction not emergency by itself.

I understand your point, and I have been addressing and discussing training and systemic human factors issues for some weeks.
And program management. :p

But I will disagree somewhat with your summary here, or maybe just flesh it out a bit.



We are dealing specifically with

1. the man / machine interface (which means machine design is a player)
2. both training and proficiency (and currency/recency)
3. and
4. with the overall system's influences on behavior, both formal and informal. The aircraft manufacturer and company management are both part of "the overall system" in this regard. So too the regulatory realm, and airworthiness.

I'll take this criticism a step further: if you take a min/max approach to systems performance, you will frequently find decisions made that optimize an area of key interest (say, fuel consumption) which action sub optimizes another area. (My understanding on this is informed somewhat by retail, and by aircraft operations and maintenance).

I'll leave to the reader to puzzle out whose min/max priorities are a root cause here, in terms of how one runs an operation or an industry.

Hi airtren,
Don't be so short sighted. I mentioned that it may be a "part of the documentation" (generic class), because maybe you didn't noticed, but there is no mention of any procedure applied by the pilots and we know that there was no ECAM procedure until later. This could also explain why the captain was called back when the PNF was looking for "it".

The gender of the word (for "it") is certainly not ruling out such hypothesis; in fact, there is plenty of words that could fit: "classeur", "manuel".... he could meant also "ce putain de truc/machin/bordel..."

SaturnV,

The BEA report is mentioning that the composition of the pilot team was conforming the operational procedures - page 80. That does not say weather there was or not an additional person in the cockpit, or weather the statement is based on the CVR, or pilot bodies found and retrieved.

But don't you think that the voice of an additional person in the cockpit would be heard? particularly if the Ozone comments were directed to her?

It would be a very significant stretch - which seems 100% impossible to me - to assume that BEA has suppressed that from the transcript of the CVR.

Saturn/airtren:

If I may appeal to Occam's Razor, given that it is around two in the morning, (three Rio time?) isn't she more likely to have been in her seat, in the cabin, asleep? She has two boys waiting for her in Paris.

Autotrim Unhelpful
 

When entering turbulence, the classic procedure is to maintain pitch and power and let the aircraft just float with the updrafts and downdrafts, accepting minor departures from the assigned altitude (up to several hundred feet) and intervening with the controls only occasionally. Assuming that you were trimmed properly when entering the turbulence, you don't touch the trim. Assuming that the power was properly set upon entering the turbulence, you don't touch the power.

Gums:It was very unhelpful of the autotrim to run the THS all the way to 13, notwithstanding that the PF, inexplicably pulled back on the stick.

Hello PJ2

I think I've posted this earlier, but somehow it got deleted - my mistake - when I corrected some spelling errors.

The "Chapter 1.16 Essais et recherches", at page 42, of the BEA report is providing information that seems to be relevant to your thoughts.

Additionally, "section 1.11.3" is mentioning that it is possible to mine further data from the on board computers that were retrieved, in regards to the sequence of speed calculations and rejection, around 2:10:xx as they have non-volatile storage that may still hold readable data. This is work and effort that is planned, so additional information will be available in a next report.

airtren

Ed, wouldn't you want the aircraft to respond to your control inputs if you were flying it? If the pilot's stick inputs were to not be responded to or obeyed, don't you think there would be a greater cause for concern?

FBW or not, if I pull back on the stick, I sincerely hope the aircraft responds with an appropriate elevator command to do what I asked it to do.

(Granted, in normal mode, it seems that sometimes the aircraft doesn't do this ... different topic.)

Agree :ok:

The idea that the PF's wife was in the cockpit seems to have become a pseudo-fact with no basis as far as I can see? Sure it was possible but I cannot imagine it would not have been identified as a factor by the BEA in the information to date, or noted in the CVR. I assume the recovery of the cockpit seats was/is normal (in the context of such an accident at least...), but there has been no hint there was anyone other than crew in the cockpit as far as I can see.

airtren, if she was present and did speak (two BIG assumptions) her voice would be on the CVR. However, the CVR conversation presented in Interim Report 3 is not a full transcript, as extraneous conversation has been omitted. I think anything she said would be considered extraneous, and omitted.

The legal term in English for leaving out what she might have said if she were present and speaking is "redacted".

The leading clues to her possible presence are, 1.) the PF had not fastened his seat belt, which seems inscrutable behavior as he is flying the plane in turbulence, and, 2.) the retrieval of the fourth seat. If I recall correctly, it took about three hours for the submersible to descend to the wreckage, and a comparable time to ascend, and it would be unlikely that the fourth seat would be a priority item for retrieval given the effort and time it took to retrieve any item. Back when, I had thought perhaps they wanted to check whether the captain had sat in the 4th seat.

I think it is unlikely she was present, but given the clues above, I don't think it can be completely excluded given the partial information released so far. There are still whole gaps in the transcript, such as at what time did they attempt to contact DAKAR?
__________
GY, they did not recover the third seat.

I think it is important to continue discussing possibilities. BEA is the inscrutable one, and there are too many "reasons" for and against what is and is not disclosed, that an otherwise dismissive attitude is unwise? From a human factors standpoint, it is most important to entertain a four person cockpit. It would explain to this honorary Frenchman why some cockpit behaviour was lacking, and other types present. Improper seating has killed before.

Different topic? Maybe - but I think it's important to make clear that the only time it won't do it is if you've permanently disabled autothrust (as in held A/T disengage down for more than 15 seconds) earlier in the flight and the elevator deflection you are commanding would stall the jet.

That's one way of looking at it, but the other way of looking at it is that the ability to command trim with the sidestick was predicated by the designers on the (reasonable) assumption that the pilot would know what he or she was commanding. Another of the assumptions I frequently see made on here that irks me is the idea that the flight control logic was entirely predicated on the idea that pilots always need to be protected from themselves, which is categorically not - and never was - the case, unhelpful remarks made by one person early in the A320's career notwithstanding.

I've wondered aloud quite a few times if the perception of the Airbus FBW system among some pilots would have been different if Gordon Corps had lived longer. He was the yin to Ziegler's yang.

bear, I think her presence, IF she was present, is totally immaterial and irrelevant after 0208.
________________________________
Am I correct in assuming as there is no mention of the PNF leaving his seat, that the captain is able to open the cockpit door by himself?

others have spoken of the instinctive reaction to pull back on the stick. This may have a bearing on what happened in the cockpit. Here is where training and standard procedures are vital. As to why this crew did not follow the latter - this is what I mean by the realms of psychology and human reaction. The transcript released by the BEA is instructive.


If you go back to CVR there is something related to basic flight training how do we understand what flight controls do,how the wing works stall/spin awareness, AoA .

PF said he is not getting the speed with TOGA thrust and here it is teaching POWER for SPEED idea...

Later when he was told about Altitude he said he had FULL SS back. To him the PITCH controls Altitude

Another point, if you go back to CVR when the aircraft rolled to the right he said he had SS to the left. Again he did t get the result he wanted and there is a reason for that too.

Another one somebody said there was confusion on the flight deck .CPT said you are descending he was looking at the Altimeter where else but PF did t see it he was looking at PITCH ATTITUDE i would say thinking my SS is back nose high pitch i must be climbing. This matches 30 -40 deg AoA you can even tell by pitch attitude and high RoD. Where the airlane points and where the airplane is going there is your AoA.

At the end like many who give to their instincts and have wrong idea how thing works in flying end up like in this case again FULL STICK BACK PARTIAL OR FULL POWER.

You can have all protections you want like AB but the best one is if you have it in your head..It is basic training how it is done today pay and we ll make you a pilot in 6 months..Just check out some FTOs see their program and this kid i d say been trough one of them..