The "Startle" Effect during type rating training.
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There should be no training beyond SOPs but pilots should be aware of where they stop so that the can act outside the box
I don't suppose that the presenter indicated upon what basis crews might
(a) recognise the occasion, and, subsequently,
(b) "act outside the box"
in the absence of any relevant role-play exercises which might provide some basis for so doing competently ?
I see little point in endeavouring to train for black swan events, per se, but to use appropriate scenarios to provide generically useful training (for confidence and resilience) appear to be useful, I would have thought ?
Whatever happened to the skilled artisan pilot philosophies of yesteryear ?
I'm afraid that many of the older pilot brethren will have a jaundiced view of the cited philosophy ...
I don't suppose that the presenter indicated upon what basis crews might
(a) recognise the occasion, and, subsequently,
(b) "act outside the box"
in the absence of any relevant role-play exercises which might provide some basis for so doing competently ?
I see little point in endeavouring to train for black swan events, per se, but to use appropriate scenarios to provide generically useful training (for confidence and resilience) appear to be useful, I would have thought ?
Whatever happened to the skilled artisan pilot philosophies of yesteryear ?
I'm afraid that many of the older pilot brethren will have a jaundiced view of the cited philosophy ...
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NTSB recommendation - Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, Part 135, and Part 91 Subpart K operators to include a dual-engine failure scenario occurring at a low altitude in initial and recurrent ground and simulator training designed to improve pilots’ critical-thinking, task-shedding, decision-making, and workload-management skills. (A-10-69)
A few thoughts. I have been in more simulators than care to remember as Captain, Co-pilot and Instructor - thankfully I will never enter one again !
There are many ways to use a simulator to best effect. Systems training aid, procedural training, emergency procedures, loft exercises etc etc. Any simulator session should be used for both training and refreshing pilots allied to test and check items as required.
It is easy to overload even the most experienced and skilled pilot should the console operator choose to do so - in my experience such an approach does not achieve a great deal.
The lack of 'real aircraft handling' in recent years has meant an ever increasing tendency to fly aircraft by numbers. There are legions of training captains out there who have never shut down an engine in flight in anything bigger than a Seneca - that is a fact of life based upon airline economics but in my view not a good thing.
The 'startle factor' which began this thread is a problem that many pilots will have faced in both the aeroplane and simulator. The much quoted Hudson birdstrike was ample proof that even the most skilled pilots will need a finite period of time to analyse any problem and in particular an unusual problem which they may not have encountered in training which I guess leads us onto the 737-800 Max accidents.
In the UK, many companies have adopted the 'first look' principle in recurrent simulator training - in simple terms, guaranteed engine failure at or just above V1 in marginal weather, perhaps at max weight on the first take-off. If the handling pilot does not excel in that first problem, the whole tenor of that session may go downhill. To my mind the aim of the simulator is to train, refresh and finally examine with an assessment of the pilot made at the end of the series of sessions in the sim. Mistakes may be made, perhaps items repeated but there is no need to do anything other than gradually raise the 'pressure' on the pilots according to their level of performance.
When I hear of pilots practicing in the real aeroplane in preparation for the simulator, I do feel that we are beginning to get things a little out of synch !
There are many ways to use a simulator to best effect. Systems training aid, procedural training, emergency procedures, loft exercises etc etc. Any simulator session should be used for both training and refreshing pilots allied to test and check items as required.
It is easy to overload even the most experienced and skilled pilot should the console operator choose to do so - in my experience such an approach does not achieve a great deal.
The lack of 'real aircraft handling' in recent years has meant an ever increasing tendency to fly aircraft by numbers. There are legions of training captains out there who have never shut down an engine in flight in anything bigger than a Seneca - that is a fact of life based upon airline economics but in my view not a good thing.
The 'startle factor' which began this thread is a problem that many pilots will have faced in both the aeroplane and simulator. The much quoted Hudson birdstrike was ample proof that even the most skilled pilots will need a finite period of time to analyse any problem and in particular an unusual problem which they may not have encountered in training which I guess leads us onto the 737-800 Max accidents.
In the UK, many companies have adopted the 'first look' principle in recurrent simulator training - in simple terms, guaranteed engine failure at or just above V1 in marginal weather, perhaps at max weight on the first take-off. If the handling pilot does not excel in that first problem, the whole tenor of that session may go downhill. To my mind the aim of the simulator is to train, refresh and finally examine with an assessment of the pilot made at the end of the series of sessions in the sim. Mistakes may be made, perhaps items repeated but there is no need to do anything other than gradually raise the 'pressure' on the pilots according to their level of performance.
When I hear of pilots practicing in the real aeroplane in preparation for the simulator, I do feel that we are beginning to get things a little out of synch !
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I've got to say that the answer from your old military friends caught me off guard, not because it was wrong but because they actually want to show and teach what should be done ( perfect instruction from my point of view) rather than showing off and shouting at students ( what I am used to)
Disconnecting the Auto Pilot under effort in a reflex action is particularly significant as it generally results in a large control input. Indeed, many high altitude upsets would never have become upsets had pilots contained the startle factor. This is a critical area of human factor development that cannot be overstated.
This avoids the rapid change of airflow that can occur depending on what angle the wake turbulence was encountered and in turn minimises the tendency to not only over control but to inadvertently apply control in the opposite direction causing significant airframe damage. The Challenger suffered severe damage during the recovery process with severe injuries to some passengers.
See: https://avherald.com/h?article=4a5e80f3
It seems to me that the new fad for deliberately setting up a startle or surprise event is counter- productive and contrary to good instructional technique. Call it practicing bleeding if you like. What is the point of practicing being frightened or startled? It already happens numerous times in everyday life including flying.
The difference between giving someone an unbriefed Static blockage, and demonstrating the same fault with ‘pattering’, is that in the first case, the pilot is shocked into realising that they perhaps did not spot the error or take the correct action; so they get sweaty with the thought of what could have happened in the real aircraft. This will hopefully spur them on to revise instrument failures, revise their instrument scan, and perhaps even bring instrument failures into their take-off brief.
With the second ‘non surprise’ method it is too easy to subconsciously think ‘yeah, I would have spotted that, and done the right thing’.
Being confused or startled in the SIM might help us make sure that if that fault ever occurs for real, we will recognise it and take the correct action. I am not proposing SIMs that consist of a series of nightmare subtle but dangerous failures - resulting in pilots who don’t have the confidence to even walk, let alone fly a plane - but I think it would be very useful to experience some instrument failures on a regular basis to keep our knowledge fresh. Being shown a Static blockage in the SIM some years’ ago and never since then, does not keep it fresh in the mind.
Perhaps a non jeopardy section in each SIM should consist of a couple of instrument failures each, non briefed and random, just to keep our skills fresh and ensure that if it all goes wrong, we automatically revert to pitch + power = performance.
Last edited by Uplinker; 29th Dec 2019 at 10:21.
Why now
Research highlights that startle and surprise are similar, but surprise is more significant due to duration and depth of effect. Also, that surprise can build slowly or be reinvigorated if events do not progress as expected after crew action. (Landman).
The description of cognitive effects is a good guide, but the conclusions of the research into methods of intervention are less convincing; similar to the range of views in this thread.
Opposed to debating alternatives to alleviate the issue, reconsider what the issue actually is, why is surprise now being considered - a new fad.
Surprise is a human reaction to a situation - stress, part of our natural defences and education.
Why is surprise now of greater concern in aviation; human nature hasn't changed.
Aviation is evolving, safer, fewer challenging situations from technical failure; similar due to the environment. Thus the view that decreased exposure to surprise and experience of managing the effect is contributive.
Conversely, historical accident rates were higher than now, but we did not record the number of accidents involving surprise. The contribution of surprise then could have been very much higher than now, so in effect aircraft and environmental change has helped - even thought humans will always be surprised. The issue is that we are ‘surprised’ by the apparent change or not knowing why.
Another view is that with high levels of safety, accident investigators have fewer occasions to probe human contributions, but when opportunity arises they do so in more depth. Very few accident reports cite surprise as ‘the cause’, only as a possible contribution, which investigations consider with different levels of debate along with other possibilities.
The issue is typically complex, many views of what should be considered or implemented. Also those who profess solutions may only contribute to the mess; regulators, training organisations, etc.
Re-reading the research on training intervention with a view to identify the issue opposed to intervention, suggests that much of what is already being trained could be detrimental.
Regulators could review what is being trained now, and how this might relate to research findings - negative training; also to consider that by requiring more training they risk diluting hard pressed resources from more urgent safety need.
Landman https://pure.tudelft.nl/portal/files...on_startle.pdf
The description of cognitive effects is a good guide, but the conclusions of the research into methods of intervention are less convincing; similar to the range of views in this thread.
Opposed to debating alternatives to alleviate the issue, reconsider what the issue actually is, why is surprise now being considered - a new fad.
Surprise is a human reaction to a situation - stress, part of our natural defences and education.
Why is surprise now of greater concern in aviation; human nature hasn't changed.
Aviation is evolving, safer, fewer challenging situations from technical failure; similar due to the environment. Thus the view that decreased exposure to surprise and experience of managing the effect is contributive.
Conversely, historical accident rates were higher than now, but we did not record the number of accidents involving surprise. The contribution of surprise then could have been very much higher than now, so in effect aircraft and environmental change has helped - even thought humans will always be surprised. The issue is that we are ‘surprised’ by the apparent change or not knowing why.
Another view is that with high levels of safety, accident investigators have fewer occasions to probe human contributions, but when opportunity arises they do so in more depth. Very few accident reports cite surprise as ‘the cause’, only as a possible contribution, which investigations consider with different levels of debate along with other possibilities.
The issue is typically complex, many views of what should be considered or implemented. Also those who profess solutions may only contribute to the mess; regulators, training organisations, etc.
Re-reading the research on training intervention with a view to identify the issue opposed to intervention, suggests that much of what is already being trained could be detrimental.
Regulators could review what is being trained now, and how this might relate to research findings - negative training; also to consider that by requiring more training they risk diluting hard pressed resources from more urgent safety need.
Landman https://pure.tudelft.nl/portal/files...on_startle.pdf
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"I see little point in endeavouring to train for black swan events, per se, but to use appropriate scenarios to provide generically useful training (for confidence and resilience) appear to be useful, I would have though"
Safety First-issue 7
"Containing the startle factor applies to every situation a pilot may encounter, regardless of high altitude or sea level operating environment. It is a natural reaction; perhaps even reflex action, to want to do something when one is startled. Reactively, disconnecting an Auto Pilot and making un-calibrated open loop rudder and/or control yoke or sidestick inputs will never be the correct reaction and will almost always lead to an amplified abnormal situation. It is in this area that pilots must develop skills to discipline themselves from putting their hands and/or feet into motion, without first understanding what is going on and what the potential consequences of their actions will be. Disconnecting the Auto Pilot under effort in a reflex action is particularly significant as it generally results in a large control input. Indeed, many high altitude upsets would never have become upsets had pilots contained the startle factor. This is a critical area of human factor development that cannot be overstated."
A good startle event I had on a sim session was during a take off just after V1 was called and prior to Vr the airspeed dropped to around 20 knots below V1, (wind shear) 2 choices remain, stop with no guarantees or select TOGA and rotate at the end regardless.
Last edited by deja vu; 30th Dec 2019 at 22:50.
Perhaps a non jeopardy section in each SIM
Yeah, but that is a crazy situation isn’t it?
If a competent guitarist tried to play something from memory they haven’t played for three years; their first attempt is likely to be a bit dodgy, with the odd wrong note or wrong chord while they remember the proper sequence*. Once they have recalled the piece, they will be able to play it extremely well.
Pilots have the problem of not being able to take the aircraft home to practise stuff, (!! that would be cool
). The only opportunity we have to go over things and refresh our memories, is in the SIM. If the entire SIM is a jeopardy situation, officially or unofficially; no pilot will want to explore or do anything beyond what is strictly necessary to pass that particular SIM.
*(I have heard Paul McCartney go wrong at a concert, stop and start again, but nobody would claim he is a bad musician).
If a competent guitarist tried to play something from memory they haven’t played for three years; their first attempt is likely to be a bit dodgy, with the odd wrong note or wrong chord while they remember the proper sequence*. Once they have recalled the piece, they will be able to play it extremely well.
Pilots have the problem of not being able to take the aircraft home to practise stuff, (!! that would be cool
). The only opportunity we have to go over things and refresh our memories, is in the SIM. If the entire SIM is a jeopardy situation, officially or unofficially; no pilot will want to explore or do anything beyond what is strictly necessary to pass that particular SIM.*(I have heard Paul McCartney go wrong at a concert, stop and start again, but nobody would claim he is a bad musician).
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Startle- Fear- Panic!
I find some of the " New" politically correct words are masking the real problem.
In the old days we were surprised, then we got scared, and then we panicked into action!
This feeling and urge to do something, ANYTHING, had to be controlled , or we made things worse.
"Take a deep breath , sit on You hands" was at times good advice!
Airbus has apparently come to the same conclusion.
With regards to sim training:
Do not teach anything wrong, ie Unrealistic , unsolvable stuff just to " startle" pilots.
Otherwise , anything goes in the sim ,as I would rather ask for a sim reset with a red face then try to dig myself out of a hole in the ground in real life.
This coddling, pre -planned, feelgood, predictable sim stuff, has reached its useful limit, in my humble opinion!
Eating some humble pie in the sim has certainly worked for me, and I did some of it live in Hollywood the first 4000hrs before I ever touched a sim.
Since getting Yourself properly confused and scared in a Cessna 185 up towards Hudson Bay is not the recommended way anymore I propose we push our personal limits for say 15 minutes a year in a safe and cozy sim box.
Remember:
" What happens in the sim, stays in the sim" as I always assured my victims!
The self-insight and knowledge You bring with You to the real world, when applicable.
On that note, I am gone fishing! The Cod is in!
I wish You all the best for the New Year.
Safe Landing to all.
Kind regards
Cpt B
In the old days we were surprised, then we got scared, and then we panicked into action!
This feeling and urge to do something, ANYTHING, had to be controlled , or we made things worse.
"Take a deep breath , sit on You hands" was at times good advice!
Airbus has apparently come to the same conclusion.
With regards to sim training:
Do not teach anything wrong, ie Unrealistic , unsolvable stuff just to " startle" pilots.
Otherwise , anything goes in the sim ,as I would rather ask for a sim reset with a red face then try to dig myself out of a hole in the ground in real life.
This coddling, pre -planned, feelgood, predictable sim stuff, has reached its useful limit, in my humble opinion!
Eating some humble pie in the sim has certainly worked for me, and I did some of it live in Hollywood the first 4000hrs before I ever touched a sim.
Since getting Yourself properly confused and scared in a Cessna 185 up towards Hudson Bay is not the recommended way anymore I propose we push our personal limits for say 15 minutes a year in a safe and cozy sim box.
Remember:
" What happens in the sim, stays in the sim" as I always assured my victims!
The self-insight and knowledge You bring with You to the real world, when applicable.
On that note, I am gone fishing! The Cod is in!
I wish You all the best for the New Year.
Safe Landing to all.
Kind regards
Cpt B
BSU, good points, sound advice
See the presentation below.
It uses the word ‘startle’ throughout, but the discussions cover other words and definitions which describe aspects of surprise elsewhere in this thread.
Slide 5 - startle magnitude, ‘false alarm’, could represent the level achievable in simulation. You can be surprised, but not deeply and not for very long.
Compare this with slides 6 and 7, which better relate to the real world.
Slide 9 - self efficacy indicates some ways forward.
Most of which can be developed without a simulator, and previously identified as qualities within airmanship.
http://www.icao.int/Meetings/LOCI/Pr...Strategies.pdf
See the presentation below.
It uses the word ‘startle’ throughout, but the discussions cover other words and definitions which describe aspects of surprise elsewhere in this thread.
Slide 5 - startle magnitude, ‘false alarm’, could represent the level achievable in simulation. You can be surprised, but not deeply and not for very long.
Compare this with slides 6 and 7, which better relate to the real world.
Slide 9 - self efficacy indicates some ways forward.
Most of which can be developed without a simulator, and previously identified as qualities within airmanship.
http://www.icao.int/Meetings/LOCI/Pr...Strategies.pdf
That is true. Readers may recall the CL604 Challenger that lost control after being affected by wake turbulence from an A380 at high altitude over the Middle East . The investigation revealed excessive and inappropriate flight control inputs by the pilot of the Challenger exacerbated the initial roll caused by the wake turbulence. It recommended that rather than instantly countering an initial roll caused by wake turbulence, it is better for pilots to delay corrective action for a few seconds until wake turbulence stops and then recover.
This avoids the rapid change of airflow that can occur depending on what angle the wake turbulence was encountered and in turn minimises the tendency to not only over control but to inadvertently apply control in the opposite direction causing significant airframe damage. The Challenger suffered severe damage during the recovery process with severe injuries to some passengers.
See: https://avherald.com/h?article=4a5e80f3
This avoids the rapid change of airflow that can occur depending on what angle the wake turbulence was encountered and in turn minimises the tendency to not only over control but to inadvertently apply control in the opposite direction causing significant airframe damage. The Challenger suffered severe damage during the recovery process with severe injuries to some passengers.
See: https://avherald.com/h?article=4a5e80f3
With regards to "startle" training itself, I think it works well for some people less well for others. People are different and learn differently so there is no one "right" system. But whatever techniques are used, I don't subscribe to the old idea that people must "suffer" in order to learn something. Confidence is the key to performance in my mind as long as it is checked, and not over confidence of course.
Last edited by Private jet; 14th Jan 2020 at 12:15.
For unusual attitude recovery, wake turbulence etc I was taught from basic training and also on the Chally course, to do it in stages (a bit like "blipping" the stab trim), so input - back to neutral - see what happens- input again - back to neutral - see what happens & repeat until back to normal. I don't know how it can be done any other way, especially on instruments.
To see-saw the aircraft just to "see what happens" means to me the pilot doesn't quite know what to do next and is buying thinking time.
That seems to me an extraordinary teaching and someone's personal opinion. If the aircraft has rolled nearly inverted (wake turbulence for example), alternating control inputs in order to get wings level again can only delay the aim of the exercise which is to get wings level as quickly as possible, remembering it could be in IMC. Jerking the aircraft not only increases the chances of structural damage but is an extraordinary way of flying on instruments.
To see-saw the aircraft just to "see what happens" means to me the pilot doesn't quite know what to do next and is buying thinking time.
To see-saw the aircraft just to "see what happens" means to me the pilot doesn't quite know what to do next and is buying thinking time.
