UPS cargo crash near Birmingham AL
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by aterpster
This UPS accident involves an instrument approach procedure with complex technical conditions and limitations.
That one was easy to throw stones at. The UPS accident is far more complex.
In any case, your rant is racist. .
That one was easy to throw stones at. The UPS accident is far more complex.
In any case, your rant is racist. .
SoS, re "It is not optional, it is a ICAO required parameter. "
I understand that.
I don't want to take the thread off-topic nor do I mean to be blunt but if I may, it's a lot more complex than that.
To clarify my "may or may not" statement, "autopilot engaged/not-engaged" is indeed a required parameter almost everywhere flight data comes under the country's aviation regulations for FDRs. What is less certain under both ICAO Annex 6 and most country's regulations including Canada's and the United States is the requirement for autoflight parameters beyond that basic AP "on-off" parameter. In some documents, (§121.344), automatic flight control system modes and engagement parameters are stated as required but what is not stated is what parameters would satisfy the regulation.
There are many parameters such as MCP / FCU selections and autoflight modes which would be extremely useful but which are not required in law for all types. As you probably are aware, the rules for required parameters are not simple to navigate but I believe this aircraft (first flight, November, 2003, Part 121) may be under the "88-parameter" requirement, but I would be happy to be corrected, with references to documentation.
PJ2
I understand that.
I don't want to take the thread off-topic nor do I mean to be blunt but if I may, it's a lot more complex than that.
To clarify my "may or may not" statement, "autopilot engaged/not-engaged" is indeed a required parameter almost everywhere flight data comes under the country's aviation regulations for FDRs. What is less certain under both ICAO Annex 6 and most country's regulations including Canada's and the United States is the requirement for autoflight parameters beyond that basic AP "on-off" parameter. In some documents, (§121.344), automatic flight control system modes and engagement parameters are stated as required but what is not stated is what parameters would satisfy the regulation.
There are many parameters such as MCP / FCU selections and autoflight modes which would be extremely useful but which are not required in law for all types. As you probably are aware, the rules for required parameters are not simple to navigate but I believe this aircraft (first flight, November, 2003, Part 121) may be under the "88-parameter" requirement, but I would be happy to be corrected, with references to documentation.
PJ2
aterpster
This UPS accident involves an instrument approach procedure with complex technical conditions and limitations.
This UPS accident involves an instrument approach procedure with complex technical conditions and limitations.
But what leads you to that statement?
What's so complex in a technical way or concerning limitations on this NP approach?
Why and what exactly would, if it is complex, lead to hitting terrain on the extended centerline?
Last edited by RetiredF4; 20th Aug 2013 at 08:36.
Join Date: Apr 2009
Location: Hotel Gypsy
Posts: 2,821
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I think there are striking similarities between all three incidents (I'm including the SW nose wheel). For one, it would be difficult to deny that in all three the aircrew appear to have driven perfectly serviceable aircraft into the ground.
'Could have been any one of us'
Sorry, don't accept that. For one it's too early to state a definite reason for this crash.
But let's say it is CFIT, we go through a lot of training and checking at my airline to operate into airports with surrounding high terrain and in the 26 years i've been here we've managed to avoid hitting it.
Saying 'it could have been any one of us' presupposes it's just fate and some luck that keeps us out of the rocks.
If that's what you are relying on you should get out of this business.
Sorry, don't accept that. For one it's too early to state a definite reason for this crash.
But let's say it is CFIT, we go through a lot of training and checking at my airline to operate into airports with surrounding high terrain and in the 26 years i've been here we've managed to avoid hitting it.
Saying 'it could have been any one of us' presupposes it's just fate and some luck that keeps us out of the rocks.
If that's what you are relying on you should get out of this business.
Join Date: Jan 2006
Location: In a far better place
Posts: 2,480
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Enough of these "Stockholm Syndrome" enabling cliches
It will not happen to those who head the warnings issued by our aircraft.
'Could have been any one of us'
Join Date: Oct 2009
Location: France
Age: 60
Posts: 22
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Pride and prejudice
This thread has been, from start, characterised by a very cautious and balanced approach from most PPrune contributors. Many factors, other than pilot performance, have been put forward and discussed: mechanical/technical failure, optical illusion, inaccuracy/imprecision of the charts, plane performance, bird strikes, the potential contribution of fatigue etc…
This seems, to me, the right and positive way to approach any accident. I’ll refrain from using the much tainted terms of “fair and balanced”, but that’s the overall spirit. Such restraint has also characterised the “Southwest KLGA gear collapse” thread, with a very neutral title and, again, a rather impartial approach.
However, this was not the case with the “Asiana flight crash at San Francisco” thread, which from the onset was plagued with a number of downright xenophobic comments and frequent, broad and negative characterisation of “Asian” pilots. This reveals, by the way, a deep lack of knowledge: There are no more “Asian” pilots than “African” pilots, but that’s besides my point here.
I am not suggesting that factors such as culture, whether induced by nationality or fostered inside a given company, should not be examined during any in-depth investigation. But they cannot serve as an initial, catch-all “explanation”. Sadly and ironically, this prejudiced approach was mainly expressed bluntly by some members posting from the United States, the handful of usual offenders.
I guess that what I’m trying to say, along with several other members, is that the three events present one commonality: all three flights ended up with an accident, of a severe and potentially life threatening nature. It would be refreshing to see the same cautious and balanced approach taken in all three cases, without the level of prejudice expressed by some.
But it’s just a wish…
A.
This seems, to me, the right and positive way to approach any accident. I’ll refrain from using the much tainted terms of “fair and balanced”, but that’s the overall spirit. Such restraint has also characterised the “Southwest KLGA gear collapse” thread, with a very neutral title and, again, a rather impartial approach.
However, this was not the case with the “Asiana flight crash at San Francisco” thread, which from the onset was plagued with a number of downright xenophobic comments and frequent, broad and negative characterisation of “Asian” pilots. This reveals, by the way, a deep lack of knowledge: There are no more “Asian” pilots than “African” pilots, but that’s besides my point here.
I am not suggesting that factors such as culture, whether induced by nationality or fostered inside a given company, should not be examined during any in-depth investigation. But they cannot serve as an initial, catch-all “explanation”. Sadly and ironically, this prejudiced approach was mainly expressed bluntly by some members posting from the United States, the handful of usual offenders.
I guess that what I’m trying to say, along with several other members, is that the three events present one commonality: all three flights ended up with an accident, of a severe and potentially life threatening nature. It would be refreshing to see the same cautious and balanced approach taken in all three cases, without the level of prejudice expressed by some.
But it’s just a wish…
A.
Last edited by Agnostique75; 20th Aug 2013 at 10:02. Reason: Typo
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: Aloft
Posts: 40
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I swore I wasn't going to contribute to this thread anymore, only observe for anything interesting to come out, but...
Now, to get away from the personal vitriol, with a reply to a few earlier comments.
CHARTING Issues
Re discrepancies between Jepp (or other provider, or company special) and FAA charts, obviously the national provider's charts and data reign (even if they have things that could be improved). Jepp, like all authorised chart providers and DB coding and packing organisations, have pretty rigorous quality procedures including independent checking methods. But systems are never perfect and any human interaction also has the potential to contribute error.
Re the 910' vs 915' obstacle just after the IMTOY stepdown mentioned earlier, Jepp sometimes does add margins to obstacles and terrain and/or other obstacles and higher terrain points based on their own data sets. I'm not sure they should (and maybe this varies depending on the LoA they have with the relevant supplying country), but they do. (I have seen this in charts for different countries and have verified through direct correspondence with them on various occasions in this specific regard.)
At the same time, Jeppesen have always been extremely quick to respond to any queries raised with them and in my experience have always been very quick to assist and resolve such issues.
Re any liabilities for errors made by them, well I guess that's probably why (I'm sure) they have pretty big insurance coverage somewhere within the Boeing umbrella.
CHART NIGHT MIN Box
I'd suggest that if you're flying at night, this would be the first box that you'd look at and this would part of your SOP.
Re the Jepp charting discrepancy (at least on the 17-AUG-2012 version posted by Aterpster), while the NIGHT MIN box was blank, Note 2 is a repeat of the FAA note for the Amdt 2A 08-MAR-2012: 'When VGSI inop, procedure not authorized at night'.
So, even 5 months later the chart is unclear in this regard (to me, anyway).
That said, even if the publisher hasn't pick up an error, inconsistency or something that is confusing themselves, it's strange that such a long period can go by before an industry user raises a query. Has this procedure not been used based on a Jepp chart at night before? What of preflight briefings?
UPS Charts & LOC RWY18 at Night
What's more interesting is what SomewhereFarAway had to say (bold emphasis is mine):
If (and only if) this is the case, and if true that there were no mechanical or aircraft/system-related technical errors (as indicated so far by the NTSB briefings), then sadly it does look as though - for whatever reason - the cause could potentially be related to that same old Distance+Altitude equation (ie, failure to maintain sufficient altitude at the appropriate distance from the landing location).
In the case of the Asiana accident at SFO my personal opinion that it was a bad case of get-there-itis (as well as potentially fear of company reprisals based on FOQA stats) and they should have gone around long before as it was evidently a very unstable approach from 5+ miles out.
In this BMH accident - I'm prepared to await more NTSB findings.
[Gawd it never looks this long when I write this stuff. Sorry
]
Now, to get away from the personal vitriol, with a reply to a few earlier comments.
CHARTING Issues
Re discrepancies between Jepp (or other provider, or company special) and FAA charts, obviously the national provider's charts and data reign (even if they have things that could be improved). Jepp, like all authorised chart providers and DB coding and packing organisations, have pretty rigorous quality procedures including independent checking methods. But systems are never perfect and any human interaction also has the potential to contribute error.
Re the 910' vs 915' obstacle just after the IMTOY stepdown mentioned earlier, Jepp sometimes does add margins to obstacles and terrain and/or other obstacles and higher terrain points based on their own data sets. I'm not sure they should (and maybe this varies depending on the LoA they have with the relevant supplying country), but they do. (I have seen this in charts for different countries and have verified through direct correspondence with them on various occasions in this specific regard.)
At the same time, Jeppesen have always been extremely quick to respond to any queries raised with them and in my experience have always been very quick to assist and resolve such issues.
Re any liabilities for errors made by them, well I guess that's probably why (I'm sure) they have pretty big insurance coverage somewhere within the Boeing umbrella.
CHART NIGHT MIN Box
I'd suggest that if you're flying at night, this would be the first box that you'd look at and this would part of your SOP.
Re the Jepp charting discrepancy (at least on the 17-AUG-2012 version posted by Aterpster), while the NIGHT MIN box was blank, Note 2 is a repeat of the FAA note for the Amdt 2A 08-MAR-2012: 'When VGSI inop, procedure not authorized at night'.
So, even 5 months later the chart is unclear in this regard (to me, anyway).
That said, even if the publisher hasn't pick up an error, inconsistency or something that is confusing themselves, it's strange that such a long period can go by before an industry user raises a query. Has this procedure not been used based on a Jepp chart at night before? What of preflight briefings?
UPS Charts & LOC RWY18 at Night
What's more interesting is what SomewhereFarAway had to say (bold emphasis is mine):
I'm a Captain with UPS (won't say which fleet) and work in our TC. Currently I am out of the country.
Our company charts for the LOC approach say NA at
night. I'm not talking about the NA at night for lack of VGSI. This is due, undoubtedly to the terrain and black hole effect of night operations.
Also, interestingly, we have an RNAV GPS to 18 which does not have that restriction, but according to NTSB briefings they were using the LOC 18 as reference.
Our company charts for the LOC approach say NA at
night. I'm not talking about the NA at night for lack of VGSI. This is due, undoubtedly to the terrain and black hole effect of night operations.
Also, interestingly, we have an RNAV GPS to 18 which does not have that restriction, but according to NTSB briefings they were using the LOC 18 as reference.
In the case of the Asiana accident at SFO my personal opinion that it was a bad case of get-there-itis (as well as potentially fear of company reprisals based on FOQA stats) and they should have gone around long before as it was evidently a very unstable approach from 5+ miles out.
In this BMH accident - I'm prepared to await more NTSB findings.
[Gawd it never looks this long when I write this stuff. Sorry
]
Last edited by roulette; 20th Aug 2013 at 10:10. Reason: Apology for lack of brevity
You use the approach plate issued by your company. Ours (not UPS) for the LOC 18 are tailored and state VGSI required at night, and the night minimums block says NA. An easy one to miss for sure.
If that fundamental skill is being lost, or has lost emphasis due to automation, then Lord help us.
On the other hand, I appreciate the point you make. You use the tools the company has chosen. Who in the company reviews the products for errata such as the above, or contacts Jepps with questions? I suppose it depends upon the company.
@Somewherefaraway:
Our company charts for the LOC approach say NA at night. I'm not talking about the NA at night for lack of VGSI. This is due, undoubtedly to the terrain and black hole effect of night operations.
Join Date: Aug 2008
Location: U.S.A.
Posts: 15
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I think there is/was a Jepp notam to say that the LOC 18 approach was usable at night with the VGSI operative. I still feel like the most likely reason for the LOC approach vs. the RNAV is that neither approach was line selectable in their database meaning no Profile(VNAV) approaches available to 18.
Join Date: Jul 2009
Location: Atlanta, GA USA
Age: 60
Posts: 183
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I read that the other runway was closed for repairs or maintenance, at the time of the crash. At the risk of oversimplification, is it possible, that they'd never flown into runway 18, even in daylight, and made the assumption, that it was just like landing at the other one? It doesn't seem possible as Birmingham's varied terrain is pretty obvious, at least, in the daylight. Also, the pilots were from North Carolina and Tennessee, nearby states with similar varied terrain. It does seem like there was some wrong scale or wrong decimal place involved. It's hard to believe, they'd make such a leap of faith, that a runway, running in a different direction, would be the same as landing on the other.
Trying to read the minds of dead pilots is a frustrating line of inquiry, to be sure.
Join Date: Jul 2009
Location: Atlanta, GA USA
Age: 60
Posts: 183
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
From the accounts of his neighbors and his obituary, the pilot, Cerea Beal Jr, was a good and righteous family man. Cerea Beal Jr. Obituary: View Cerea Beal's Obituary by Charlotte Observer It's sad to read, that his beautiful daughter, Sarah, was just starting college on a basketball scholarship and to think how proud he would have been to see his daughter play, and how proud she would have been to play in front of her beloved father. https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?f...type=3&theater Sure, no man is an island entire of itself, but good, family men, seem to be in short supply these days, so I hate to see one go. Small world. Years ago, I dated a girl from Cerea's birthplace, Greenville, Mississippi. RIP Cerea Beal Jr., may your family's faith give them the strength to get through this tragedy.
Last edited by Coagie; 20th Aug 2013 at 16:47. Reason: Grammer worse than usual
Loss of Fundemental Skills
If that fundamental skill is being lost, or has lost emphasis due to automation, then Lord help us.
Everything is under control.
Join Date: Jul 2001
Location: Washington, D.C.
Posts: 435
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
NTSB member Sumwalt addresses the recovery of non-volatile memory
Practically, this is no big deal regarding PAPI but it makes me wonder how reasonable NTSB is with other units of measure. Just because your calculator can read 9 digits . . .
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: Within AM radio broadcast range of downtown Chicago
Age: 71
Posts: 849
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Asiana does not equal UPS
I cannot find the right word to express the combination of 'intrigued by' and "troubled by'. I am X word by the notion that the Network here has viewed the SFO 777 crash through a prism of racism, even in part, whilst trying to understand what MIGHT have happened to the UPS A300 in purely technical terms (and plenty of technical terms, and factors, there are).
I wonder whether readers and posters would find it helpful to think about whether there are simply two different kinds of human factors analytic mindsets involved in the two different mishaps. In SFO, the crash seems to have been an act of obliviousness to really obvious flying conditions. Coupled with the fact that hand-flying is an alien art form to the 'children of the magenta line'. Or something like that.
While on the other hand, what happened in Alabama seems more caught up in the very fine points of fairly detailed information on an approach plate; discrepancies between the FAA and the Jepp; speculation about mirages (thankfully no Mysteres) and also about black hole sighting, and many other really interesting - but hard to comprehend let alone intergrate into a non-PIC -- like regulatory -- framework - RNAV VGSI PAPI MDA MAP MAPt you get the idea. Please, I am not trying to add to the talk-amongst-the-aviators - just trying to collect terms and simplify to some reasonable first-order approximation.
May it be said with a fair degree of accuracy and assurance of not being walked-down-plank (wing) that there is a differential yielded by:
(ONE) the fact that the Korean air carrier has some history, at least to some extent, of over reliance on authoritarian hierarchy on flight decks and when coupled with Airbus glass cockpit over-automation (if that's what it is) this is highly susceptible to CFIT runway-threshold style, and
(TWO) flying at night just changes everything, particularly when there are lighting, approach details, and terrain issues? Don't you sometimes notice the depth perception of your vision making a fine adjustment when you get into your motor vehicle at night after being in a lighted establishment for a while? And a sense of having been disoriented for a short moment but only after some light has hit the retina that reestablishes where you're at? I get that the cognoscenti here may well say but of course this is true, Mr. Obvious. But if it is obvious, then it explains (ed.: does it not??) why looking at UPS is like writing a mystery novel. SFO runway debris - Res Ipsa Loquitor (Latin-law for, The Thing Speaks for Itself, named for a legal doctrine which apocryphally arose when a barrel rolled out a warehouse second-floor window).
I wonder whether readers and posters would find it helpful to think about whether there are simply two different kinds of human factors analytic mindsets involved in the two different mishaps. In SFO, the crash seems to have been an act of obliviousness to really obvious flying conditions. Coupled with the fact that hand-flying is an alien art form to the 'children of the magenta line'. Or something like that.
While on the other hand, what happened in Alabama seems more caught up in the very fine points of fairly detailed information on an approach plate; discrepancies between the FAA and the Jepp; speculation about mirages (thankfully no Mysteres) and also about black hole sighting, and many other really interesting - but hard to comprehend let alone intergrate into a non-PIC -- like regulatory -- framework - RNAV VGSI PAPI MDA MAP MAPt you get the idea. Please, I am not trying to add to the talk-amongst-the-aviators - just trying to collect terms and simplify to some reasonable first-order approximation.
May it be said with a fair degree of accuracy and assurance of not being walked-down-plank (wing) that there is a differential yielded by:
(ONE) the fact that the Korean air carrier has some history, at least to some extent, of over reliance on authoritarian hierarchy on flight decks and when coupled with Airbus glass cockpit over-automation (if that's what it is) this is highly susceptible to CFIT runway-threshold style, and
(TWO) flying at night just changes everything, particularly when there are lighting, approach details, and terrain issues? Don't you sometimes notice the depth perception of your vision making a fine adjustment when you get into your motor vehicle at night after being in a lighted establishment for a while? And a sense of having been disoriented for a short moment but only after some light has hit the retina that reestablishes where you're at? I get that the cognoscenti here may well say but of course this is true, Mr. Obvious. But if it is obvious, then it explains (ed.: does it not??) why looking at UPS is like writing a mystery novel. SFO runway debris - Res Ipsa Loquitor (Latin-law for, The Thing Speaks for Itself, named for a legal doctrine which apocryphally arose when a barrel rolled out a warehouse second-floor window).
Last edited by WillowRun 6-3; 20th Aug 2013 at 20:26. Reason: typo in acronym CFIT
Join Date: Jul 2009
Location: Atlanta, GA USA
Age: 60
Posts: 183
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Asiana does not equal UPS
Last edited by Coagie; 20th Aug 2013 at 20:42. Reason: Correcting mistake. Thanks Gabonostick.