AF 447 Thread No. 8
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Hi,
Flyinheavy
Then the ...
It is indeed a great find ....
Passengers are now responsible for accidents because they do not want to pay for safety ...
These words of an airline boss gives an idea about idiots who occupy such positions
The airlines (or the market) make the price ... not the passengers ...
As far I know .. at this time (2007) it was not a "memory item"
The procedure in force at February 2007 shows that there are 2 steps
1 - Before the thrust reduction
TOGA/15 °
2 - After the thrust reduction above FL 100
CLB / 5 °
Flyinheavy
an airline boss - not in SAmerica or Africa, but of an flag carrier in the middle of Europe - "Passengers are not willing anymore to pay a little extra for safety....".
It is indeed a great find ....
Passengers are now responsible for accidents because they do not want to pay for safety ...
These words of an airline boss gives an idea about idiots who occupy such positions
The airlines (or the market) make the price ... not the passengers ...
Well, as far as I did understand the procedure, above FL100 the memory items call for 5°/Climb thrust.
The procedure in force at February 2007 shows that there are 2 steps
1 - Before the thrust reduction
TOGA/15 °
2 - After the thrust reduction above FL 100
CLB / 5 °
Last edited by jcjeant; 2nd Jun 2012 at 01:08.
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My French is terrible, but what does the short sentence at the top of the procedure posted by Flyinheavy say? It seems to indicate that if the conduct of the flight is endangered then.........
If that is anywhere close to the meaning, then at cruise FL, the procedure is NA(Not Applicable)
If that is anywhere close to the meaning, then at cruise FL, the procedure is NA(Not Applicable)
Last edited by Machinbird; 2nd Jun 2012 at 03:23. Reason: explanation of NA
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Hindsight is not the issue. Just to reinforce what PJ2 wrote about Fukushima - warnings were plently and went as far back as the design of the original plant. They were constantly ignored through sheer laziness and attempts at cost cutting. Complacency and a risk management system based on odds also contributed. The whole system was corrupted including the regulatory authorities. When others refer to the supposed compromised nature of the BEA I smile ironically. If they knew what a compromised regulator is like they would pause before they wrote. The Japanese prime minister at the time of the disaster Naoto Kan had to order TEPCO to stay at the plant (TEPCO's plan was to withdraw all workers). The organisation was rotten and had been for years. Likewise, Air France developed a similar culture and this contributed to AF447. I do feel in a uncorrupted airline the PF would not have acted the way he did. Either he would have been sidelined or trained up to a suitable level. With over 30 UAS incidents happening before this one cannot say that we are shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted. One has to say that this is an organisational failure which could have been avoided.
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Hi,
Machinbird
Pitot tubes blocked trigger an "unsafe condition"
So .. cause this unsafe condition ... "the conduct of the flight is endangered" IMHO
Machinbird
My French is terrible, but what does the short sentence at the top of the procedure posted by Flyinheavy say? It seems to indicate that if the conduct of the flight is endangered then.........
If that is anywhere close to the meaning, then at cruise FL, the procedure is NA.
If that is anywhere close to the meaning, then at cruise FL, the procedure is NA.
So .. cause this unsafe condition ... "the conduct of the flight is endangered" IMHO
Last edited by jcjeant; 2nd Jun 2012 at 03:29.
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jcjeant
It appears to be a misinterpretation IMHO. Anything that has the effect of bringing an an aircraft above its ceiling is potentially very hazardous. Meanwhile, the aircraft has been in a stable cruise without any obstacle clearance problems and has the potential to keep doing so, so why would any sane pilot want to disrupt that process just because some of the instruments are confused?
Rote application of an emergency procedure without understanding the appropriate circumstances has downed more than one aircraft.
Pitot tubes blocked trigger an "unsafe condition"
So .. cause this unsafe condition ... "the conduct of the flight is endangered" IMHO
So .. cause this unsafe condition ... "the conduct of the flight is endangered" IMHO
Rote application of an emergency procedure without understanding the appropriate circumstances has downed more than one aircraft.
Flyinheavy;
I wrote on July 30th, 2009 that the correct response was to "do nothing". I don't claim any special prescience...it's just the logical thing to do when in cruise. When this entire matter was conflated in subsequent discussion, I argued that the memorized items were not only confusing but the entire drill and checklist were poorly written. The "above FL100" memorized item to pitch to 5deg and set CLB thrust was, in my view, intended to cater to high density altitude airfields, not cruise altitudes. But this is not clear in the drill.
There has been plenty of discussion on this item throughout these threads, and I suggest the use of mm43's excellent PPRuNe search tool, to find these discussions.
The BEA press conference comment is, in my view, incorrect. While control would not be lost with an increase of pitch of 2.5deg to an attitude of 5deg, (because the pitch is already 2.5deg in cruise, roughly), the maneouvre does de-stabilize the aircraft when the aircraft is already stabilized in level flight with a good pitch attitude and power setting which were just fine moments before the UAS event. In fact, if one is not trained or accustomed to high altitude handling of a transport aircraft, one may be hunting a great deal with either a CC or an SS to maintain a pitch of 5deg. I just can't see, and never could see this memorized item making any sense whatsoever when in cruise flight.
jcjeant;
The items have been memory items July, 2006 according to the BEA IR#3 and the Airbus OLM training PDF on the UAS Abnormal cited below. The following is typical of the drill at the time:
There is the following PPT, from 2006, which illustrates that the need for clarifications to this drill and checklist may have been recognized as early as 2006:
http://www.iag-inc.com/premium/Airbu...ableSpeeds.pdf
In my view, the UAS drill and checklist extant at the time provided inappropriate "if-then" decision points for a crew faced with a loss of airspeed in cruise or the late climb/early descent phases of flight.
The primary decision-point is based upon whether the safety of the flight was impacted. That is an entirely subjective matter, as is evidenced by the differences in opinions offered on the matter by those who do this work.
In the above PPT presentation, it is stated that crews will be informed of the nature of this decision "in training", but as read by crews, the memorized items might, or might not be accomplished depending upon one's interpretation of the initial condition - the safety of the flight.
At cruise altitudes, I have argued that this was no emergency at all, it was an abnormal which required standard responses as trained, and which required no action other than to get out the QRH checklist for the pitch and power settings. Most here disagreed with this view, citing the "Above FL100 decision-point, but frankly there is no way that setting 5deg pitch is indicated in cruise.
Whether this PF intended to set 5deg or 15deg or something else cannot be factually determined at this time. But the airplane pitched up, and it was held there until the stall while both pilots accepted the trajectory, the pitch attitude and the loss of energy. We can only surmise why, and that, is, I think hindsight territory.
Here was my attempt at changing the UAS drill into something reasonable, last year sometime:
This "bifurcates" (makes a decision-point for the crew) the drill on altitude, not a subjective assessment in a moment of failure regarding the safety of the aircraft. Close to the ground, one sets memorized pitch and power. At higher altitudes in climb, cruise or descent, one sets QRH values while "doing nothing" to destabilize the airplane. That's what 30+ other crews actually did when faced with a UAS event.
Pitching up and changing power destabilizes a stable aircraft and, critically, takes it away from those conditions which had produced stable flight, into regimes which are far from stable flight, giving the crew an enormous situational awareness problem in determining the way back to stable flight, where they were in the first place. The "5deg pitch above FL100" is misleading and wrong but, read correctly, the drill does not require such a pitch attitude but instead requires the selection of GPS altitude on the GPS page of the FMGC and the stabilizing of the aircraft in level flight while the QRH is brought out by the other crew member for pitch and power settings.
Well, as far as I did understand the procedure, above FL100 the memory items call for 5°/Climb thrust.
I found it strange, but as I never have flown a bus, I asked some friends current on the A330 and they concurred, although confirming, that they'd rather stay with the attitude/N1 which had been before the event.
I found it strange, but as I never have flown a bus, I asked some friends current on the A330 and they concurred, although confirming, that they'd rather stay with the attitude/N1 which had been before the event.
There has been plenty of discussion on this item throughout these threads, and I suggest the use of mm43's excellent PPRuNe search tool, to find these discussions.
The BEA press conference comment is, in my view, incorrect. While control would not be lost with an increase of pitch of 2.5deg to an attitude of 5deg, (because the pitch is already 2.5deg in cruise, roughly), the maneouvre does de-stabilize the aircraft when the aircraft is already stabilized in level flight with a good pitch attitude and power setting which were just fine moments before the UAS event. In fact, if one is not trained or accustomed to high altitude handling of a transport aircraft, one may be hunting a great deal with either a CC or an SS to maintain a pitch of 5deg. I just can't see, and never could see this memorized item making any sense whatsoever when in cruise flight.
jcjeant;
As far I know .. at this time (2007) it was not a "memory item"
The procedure in force at February 2007 shows that there are 2 steps
1 - Before the thrust reduction
TOGA/15 °
2 - After the thrust reduction above FL 100
CLB / 5 °
The procedure in force at February 2007 shows that there are 2 steps
1 - Before the thrust reduction
TOGA/15 °
2 - After the thrust reduction above FL 100
CLB / 5 °
There is the following PPT, from 2006, which illustrates that the need for clarifications to this drill and checklist may have been recognized as early as 2006:
http://www.iag-inc.com/premium/Airbu...ableSpeeds.pdf
In my view, the UAS drill and checklist extant at the time provided inappropriate "if-then" decision points for a crew faced with a loss of airspeed in cruise or the late climb/early descent phases of flight.
The primary decision-point is based upon whether the safety of the flight was impacted. That is an entirely subjective matter, as is evidenced by the differences in opinions offered on the matter by those who do this work.
In the above PPT presentation, it is stated that crews will be informed of the nature of this decision "in training", but as read by crews, the memorized items might, or might not be accomplished depending upon one's interpretation of the initial condition - the safety of the flight.
At cruise altitudes, I have argued that this was no emergency at all, it was an abnormal which required standard responses as trained, and which required no action other than to get out the QRH checklist for the pitch and power settings. Most here disagreed with this view, citing the "Above FL100 decision-point, but frankly there is no way that setting 5deg pitch is indicated in cruise.
Whether this PF intended to set 5deg or 15deg or something else cannot be factually determined at this time. But the airplane pitched up, and it was held there until the stall while both pilots accepted the trajectory, the pitch attitude and the loss of energy. We can only surmise why, and that, is, I think hindsight territory.
Here was my attempt at changing the UAS drill into something reasonable, last year sometime:
This "bifurcates" (makes a decision-point for the crew) the drill on altitude, not a subjective assessment in a moment of failure regarding the safety of the aircraft. Close to the ground, one sets memorized pitch and power. At higher altitudes in climb, cruise or descent, one sets QRH values while "doing nothing" to destabilize the airplane. That's what 30+ other crews actually did when faced with a UAS event.
Pitching up and changing power destabilizes a stable aircraft and, critically, takes it away from those conditions which had produced stable flight, into regimes which are far from stable flight, giving the crew an enormous situational awareness problem in determining the way back to stable flight, where they were in the first place. The "5deg pitch above FL100" is misleading and wrong but, read correctly, the drill does not require such a pitch attitude but instead requires the selection of GPS altitude on the GPS page of the FMGC and the stabilizing of the aircraft in level flight while the QRH is brought out by the other crew member for pitch and power settings.
Last edited by PJ2; 15th Jun 2012 at 13:07. Reason: Information regarding UAS Memory items
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Interim Report #1, page 70:
Interim Report #2, page 53, study of 13 events of UAS:
Is that intended as a 'slap on the wrist' or do they mean 'well done'?
On the date of the accident, the operator’s procedures mention that the following actions must be carried out from memory by the crew when they have any doubt concerning the reliability of a speed indication and when control of the flight is “affected dangerously”:
(Memory items IAS DOUTEUSE)
If conduct of the flight does not seem to be affected dangerously, the crew must apply the UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION / ADR CHECK procedure (see appendix 9).
(Memory items IAS DOUTEUSE)
If conduct of the flight does not seem to be affected dangerously, the crew must apply the UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION / ADR CHECK procedure (see appendix 9).
With regard to crew reactions, the following points are notable:
(...)
Four crews did not identify an unreliable airspeed(12) situation (...)
For the cases studied, the recording of the flight parameters and the crew testimony do not suggest application of the memory items(13) in the unreliable airspeed procedure:
(...)
(...)
There was no search for display of an attitude of 5°.
(...)
Four crews did not identify an unreliable airspeed(12) situation (...)
For the cases studied, the recording of the flight parameters and the crew testimony do not suggest application of the memory items(13) in the unreliable airspeed procedure:
(...)
(...)
There was no search for display of an attitude of 5°.
Last edited by HazelNuts39; 2nd Jun 2012 at 08:16.
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PJ - it certainly looks as you say that the QRH was not well written and that 'inclusion' of the 'Above MSA/Cct Alt' in the memory box 'immediate actions' would have been a better presentation (as 'appears' to have happened in the PDF), since 447 SHOULD have gone straight into the 'Level off for Troubleshooting' branch rather than zooming to the stars. I said a while back that 'going' to 5 degrees for the very short time before the a/c would be levelled off in the 'Above MSA' cruise situation would not really cause a problem, although your point about 'destabilisation' is true. However, leaving aside 'liability' on the QRH writers, it would not be unreasonable, surely, to expect crews of this level and a 'good' training dept to have ironed this out? It appears to come back to a general lack of awareness of what was happening, aka 'airmanship'.
It remains for me, I'm afraid, an inexplicable accident.
It remains for me, I'm afraid, an inexplicable accident.
Last edited by BOAC; 2nd Jun 2012 at 07:46.
HN39;
Re Post #1047 , I'm not sure what the (translated) statement, "There was no search for display of an attitude of 5°" means but quite possibly it means, according to the available flight data from the flights studied, that no crews attempted to pitch the aircraft up to 5° but instead maintained the pitch attitude at the time of the failure.
One way it could be meant is, "investigatively", as a statement of fact with no judgement as to value (right thing to do/wrong thing to do) either way. In the press briefing, the BEA has stated that the correct response is to execute the memory items, (ie, pitch the airplane to 5°), so it is difficult to know how this has been assessed in their Final Report.
In my view, even if the original memorized item of setting 5° turns out to be the intent of the decision-point of "Above FL100", what I (and crews who didn't respond to the UAS) believe to be an incorrect response is not in and of itself a problem, as BOAC has observed in past threads. A 5° pitch attitude isn't going to stall the airplane any time soon. (But the FCTM cautions the pilot to set level-flight pitch and power quickly because speed excursions can develop...I suspect that the caution was contemplating high-speed excursions ).
But it is the de-stabilization that could remove one quite quickly from his/her situational awareness in terms of stabilized, (high altitude, dark night, somewhat turbulent) flight and make it difficult to return to normal cruise settings for troubleshooting.
BOAC;
Regarding inexplicability of why this accident occurred, even if the pitch was mostly unintentional and a result of the PFs attempt to control a slight roll, recovering from the pitch-up would, and should be straightforward for a trained A330 pilot so yes, it is difficult to understand the continued pitch attitude especially after the stall warning.
Re Post #1047 , I'm not sure what the (translated) statement, "There was no search for display of an attitude of 5°" means but quite possibly it means, according to the available flight data from the flights studied, that no crews attempted to pitch the aircraft up to 5° but instead maintained the pitch attitude at the time of the failure.
Is that intended as a 'slap on the wrist' or do they mean 'well done'?
In my view, even if the original memorized item of setting 5° turns out to be the intent of the decision-point of "Above FL100", what I (and crews who didn't respond to the UAS) believe to be an incorrect response is not in and of itself a problem, as BOAC has observed in past threads. A 5° pitch attitude isn't going to stall the airplane any time soon. (But the FCTM cautions the pilot to set level-flight pitch and power quickly because speed excursions can develop...I suspect that the caution was contemplating high-speed excursions ).
But it is the de-stabilization that could remove one quite quickly from his/her situational awareness in terms of stabilized, (high altitude, dark night, somewhat turbulent) flight and make it difficult to return to normal cruise settings for troubleshooting.
BOAC;
Regarding inexplicability of why this accident occurred, even if the pitch was mostly unintentional and a result of the PFs attempt to control a slight roll, recovering from the pitch-up would, and should be straightforward for a trained A330 pilot so yes, it is difficult to understand the continued pitch attitude especially after the stall warning.
Last edited by Jetdriver; 2nd Jun 2012 at 17:27.
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Hi PJ2...
Yours, above. recovering from the pitch-up would, and should be straightforward for a trained A330 pilot so yes, it is difficult to understand the continued pitch attitude especially after the stall warning.
IF PF had an insecure seat (due unbelted), would he at least at some point let go the stick, to get a visual if not a feel for the neutral point? I cannot remember if this has been discussed?
As to BEA intent ( "no effort was made to acquire 5 degrees..." ). It may be anticipatory, but a short analysis. No statement can be made re: a finding of fact w/o a foundation, even in a Presser, in my experience. IOW, they have not mentioned the A/C procedures, so they have supplied a dangling finding. It may be inadvertent, but if so, I doubt we will see a repetition. It is a guess, and an honest one; the possibility exists that BEA are throwing the airline a Bon, here. They have helped Airbus with the memo, and perhaps a slight push in the direction of isolating the crew for examination ( without prejudice ) such that there is a bit of pressure off AF, if only a little.
Who rights the OM? The Airline? Or the Airframer?
Yours, above. recovering from the pitch-up would, and should be straightforward for a trained A330 pilot so yes, it is difficult to understand the continued pitch attitude especially after the stall warning.
IF PF had an insecure seat (due unbelted), would he at least at some point let go the stick, to get a visual if not a feel for the neutral point? I cannot remember if this has been discussed?
As to BEA intent ( "no effort was made to acquire 5 degrees..." ). It may be anticipatory, but a short analysis. No statement can be made re: a finding of fact w/o a foundation, even in a Presser, in my experience. IOW, they have not mentioned the A/C procedures, so they have supplied a dangling finding. It may be inadvertent, but if so, I doubt we will see a repetition. It is a guess, and an honest one; the possibility exists that BEA are throwing the airline a Bon, here. They have helped Airbus with the memo, and perhaps a slight push in the direction of isolating the crew for examination ( without prejudice ) such that there is a bit of pressure off AF, if only a little.
Who rights the OM? The Airline? Or the Airframer?
Lyman;
The manufacturer writes the AOM but the airlines are free to modify according to their own requirements, obviously within reason. The modification I believe must be approved by the manufacturer and the country's regulator... someone?
Under the heading that anything is possible, positing an unbelted pilot remains in the "extremely unlikely" category in which everything is possible but without the capacity to enhance understanding.
If the PF had let go the stick the airplane likely would have gently, slowly recovered on its own, not, perhaps before impact but it may have silenced the stall warning, got the airspeed indicators working again, (because they had recovered by the time the airplane started down, post-apogee), and reduced confusion. It was the mostly-NU stick that held the airplane in the stall.
I view the BEA remark as nothing more than an investigative observation of fact.
The manufacturer writes the AOM but the airlines are free to modify according to their own requirements, obviously within reason. The modification I believe must be approved by the manufacturer and the country's regulator... someone?
Under the heading that anything is possible, positing an unbelted pilot remains in the "extremely unlikely" category in which everything is possible but without the capacity to enhance understanding.
If the PF had let go the stick the airplane likely would have gently, slowly recovered on its own, not, perhaps before impact but it may have silenced the stall warning, got the airspeed indicators working again, (because they had recovered by the time the airplane started down, post-apogee), and reduced confusion. It was the mostly-NU stick that held the airplane in the stall.
I view the BEA remark as nothing more than an investigative observation of fact.
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HN Yes, he did pull back, intentionally or not, we don't know:
2 h 10 min 07: The copilot sidestick is positioned: - nose-up between neutral and ¾ of the stop position; VS and VSsel are both zero.
2 h 10 min 08: The FD 1 and 2 become unavailable.
2 h 10 min 17:The FD 1 and 2 become available again; the active modes are HDG/ALT CRZ*. VS is then 4000 fpm.
2 h 10 min 07: The copilot sidestick is positioned: - nose-up between neutral and ¾ of the stop position; VS and VSsel are both zero.
2 h 10 min 08: The FD 1 and 2 become unavailable.
2 h 10 min 17:The FD 1 and 2 become available again; the active modes are HDG/ALT CRZ*. VS is then 4000 fpm.
I have the controls
Ignition start
“Stall, stall”
What is that?
SV : “Stall, S”
We haven’t got a good
…
We haven’t got a good
display…
We’ve lost the the the
speeds so… engine
thrust A T H R engine
lever thrust
… of speed
Last edited by grity; 2nd Jun 2012 at 17:47.
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Originally Posted by PJ2
The modification I believe must be approved by the manufacturer and the country's regulator... someone?
From FAA AC 25.1581-1 Airplane Flight Manual:
3. Definitions
a. Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). An FAA-approved document that contains information (operating limitations, operating procedures, performance information, etc.) necessary to operate the airplane at the level of safety established by the airplane's certification basis.
b. Flightcrew Operating Manual (FCOM). A document developed by a manufacturer that describes, in detail, the characteristics and operation of the airplane or its systems.
c. (etc.)
Last edited by HazelNuts39; 2nd Jun 2012 at 19:43. Reason: FAA AC 25.1581 definitions
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PJ2;
There may be differences from country to country as to how airlines are supervised. To my knowledge the FAA Flight Standards Service does not formally approve operator's AOM's. But I must admit that I'm more familiar with the airworthiness branch.
There may be differences from country to country as to how airlines are supervised. To my knowledge the FAA Flight Standards Service does not formally approve operator's AOM's. But I must admit that I'm more familiar with the airworthiness branch.
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Originally Posted by grity
HN wouled you look at the FD in this few seconds while controling the roll left right left...and simultaniusly hear/talk this text and have a look at the ecam messages .......???
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Hi,
PJ2
Methink if the PF let go the stick (auto reposition in neutral position) this will not help as the commands (mobile surfaces) will stay in the position they were set (climb .. THS climb .. etc..) and the aircraft will eventually stall
Push on the stick is necessary to move again the mobile surfaces for stop (or reduce) the climb or for go down
PJ2
If the PF had let go the stick the airplane likely would have gently,
Push on the stick is necessary to move again the mobile surfaces for stop (or reduce) the climb or for go down
Last edited by jcjeant; 2nd Jun 2012 at 20:43.
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jcjeant
If he is letting go the stick......
I think the mechanicals are split, the ailerons and spoilers would nest at neutral, because they are in Direct, Non? In Pitch, the airplane will keep climbing, (and climbing more and more steeply), it doesn't matter the stick in pitch, alright? And no way is there to know what the stick inputs produce, when in Pitch Mayonnaise, is that right?
If he is letting go the stick......
I think the mechanicals are split, the ailerons and spoilers would nest at neutral, because they are in Direct, Non? In Pitch, the airplane will keep climbing, (and climbing more and more steeply), it doesn't matter the stick in pitch, alright? And no way is there to know what the stick inputs produce, when in Pitch Mayonnaise, is that right?
jcjeant;
Yes, the pitch change towards ND from 15deg NU would not be brisk, that's for sure, but with no Nose-Up input, the nose itself would slowly, (languidly) drop, probably not very far but it wouldn't be in positive territory, (I recognize that you are including the THS 13.6deg NU position as having an effect - I leave that to the aeronautical engineer people).
Also, I'm considering that "letting go" would not be a sustained response (I would hope!), but a momentary action if indeed he had to re-establish "neutral". But in fact, the neutral position of the stick is abundantly felt and is not at all a problem to place, so practically speaking, the entire scenario posited, (unbelted, finding neutral on the stick) is not plausible.
HN39, thank you. I'm likely a bit provincial in my awareness of these things!
Yes, the pitch change towards ND from 15deg NU would not be brisk, that's for sure, but with no Nose-Up input, the nose itself would slowly, (languidly) drop, probably not very far but it wouldn't be in positive territory, (I recognize that you are including the THS 13.6deg NU position as having an effect - I leave that to the aeronautical engineer people).
Also, I'm considering that "letting go" would not be a sustained response (I would hope!), but a momentary action if indeed he had to re-establish "neutral". But in fact, the neutral position of the stick is abundantly felt and is not at all a problem to place, so practically speaking, the entire scenario posited, (unbelted, finding neutral on the stick) is not plausible.
HN39, thank you. I'm likely a bit provincial in my awareness of these things!