HN39;
Re Post
#1047 , I'm not sure what the (translated) statement, "
There was no search for display of an attitude of 5°" means but quite possibly it means, according to the available flight data from the flights studied, that no crews attempted to pitch the aircraft up to 5° but instead maintained the pitch attitude at the time of the failure.
Is that intended as a 'slap on the wrist' or do they mean 'well done'?
One way it could be meant is, "investigatively", as a statement of fact with no judgement as to value (right thing to do/wrong thing to do) either way. In the press briefing, the BEA has stated that the correct response is to execute the memory items, (ie, pitch the airplane to 5°), so it is difficult to know how this has been assessed in their Final Report.
In my view, even if the original memorized item of setting 5° turns out to be the intent of the decision-point of "Above FL100", what I (and crews who didn't respond to the UAS) believe to be an incorrect response is not in and of itself a problem, as
BOAC has observed in past threads. A 5° pitch attitude isn't going to stall the airplane any time soon. (But the FCTM cautions the pilot to set level-flight pitch and power quickly because speed excursions can develop...I suspect that the caution was contemplating high-speed excursions ).
But it is the de-stabilization that could remove one quite quickly from his/her situational awareness in terms of stabilized, (high altitude, dark night, somewhat turbulent) flight and make it difficult to return to normal cruise settings for troubleshooting.
BOAC;
Regarding inexplicability of why this accident occurred, even if the pitch was mostly unintentional and a result of the PFs attempt to control a slight roll, recovering from the pitch-up would, and should be straightforward for a trained A330 pilot so yes, it is difficult to understand the continued pitch attitude especially after the stall warning.