AF 447 Thread No. 8
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It will never stall an aeroplane as long as there is sufficient power available. With 5° pitch maintained, aeroplane climbs, power drops, AoA goes up until level-off at 5° alpha is achieved. Any aeroplane.
Airbus has it wrong on that one, even its chief pilot says differently now.
Machinbird;
No, not to my knowledge and I keep in touch as best I can.
John T.
And it needn't be a drawn-out thing. Both pilots can get some practise in, in half-an-hour and carry on with the rest of the script. It's not difficult, doesn't require Congress to be involved in any new FAA regs and as you say, builds tremendous confidence. It was the most frustrating thing, to watch guys give up the opportunity to fly no matter what I said I'd help with. It's not difficult stuff but you can lose the touch and overcontrol quite easily, (seen it in the sim). What happened with the roll isn't serious but perhaps the PF didn't know that. I think that's all that happened with the PF trying to get the little bit of roll under control - don't stir the porridge...just set the stick in one position and hold it, wait for the massive machine to settle down, then tiny movements...But if you don't have the touch due to lack of training and experience, confidence in your solutions in trying to bring the airplane back with the stick can erode very quickly if you see yourself making a hash of things. It isn't complicated - it's what we used to routinely do.
Are modern day pilots still being taught to hand fly such exercises at any stage in their training?
John T.
Very much confidence building and the I/F stick and rudder skills skyrocketed.
Machinbird
This was standard fare when I went through as a student and much later when I instructed in the Navy advanced jet program. We called the exercises Basic Instrument exercises because they formed the foundation for the rest of instrument flying. Mostly we used the S patterns, primarily S-2 and S-3 patterns involving standard rate turns combined with standard climb/descent rates at constant airspeed.
This was standard fare when I went through as a student and much later when I instructed in the Navy advanced jet program. We called the exercises Basic Instrument exercises because they formed the foundation for the rest of instrument flying. Mostly we used the S patterns, primarily S-2 and S-3 patterns involving standard rate turns combined with standard climb/descent rates at constant airspeed.
Lazy 8
@PJ2 Your relevation is frankly speaking "shocking".
Last edited by RetiredF4; 8th Jun 2012 at 09:37.
RetiredF4;
Well, this is just one pilot's/captain's experience - others can speak out if they wish. For me, I really, really encouraged guys/gals to hand-fly including manual thrust levers and there were almost 100% no takers. When doing line indoctrination I taught manual flight, what to be aware of when disconnecting the autothrust, how Bangalore happened (the software's changed since then) and so on. I've only been a captain on Airbus aircraft. I hand-flew all the other types I was on but so did the captains, because we were better than the automation and it was, frankly, (serious) fun.
I think the Airbus is as easy and straightforward to hand-fly as any other type I've been on. The source of the "mystique" and therefore the fear of disconnecting and hand-flying is, in my view, twofold - 1) the airplane is complex with many modes including the autothrust, and 2) transition training and recurrent training focus competence and facility with the autoflight system and took competency at hand-flying (including thrust management) for granted.
The first time I did a proficiency check and IFR ride on the A320 it was entirely on the autopilot to demonstrate knowledge and understanding of the system. It felt really strange and it felt like I was somehow cheating and not demonstrating what I knew, (because with work, the autoflight systems aren't difficult to understand, remember and use).
Subsequent recurrent training sessions worked in a manually-flown approach on raw data and we'd also do steep turns. I never saw the "S-turns" exercise again and I'll bet these days most would find it very difficult to complete.
In steep turns, autothrust was left on and we used the bird, (FPV symbol) for steep turns. It was a piece of cake...for the autoflight. All that was necessary was to keep the FPV on the horizon. Looking back, with autotrim it wasn't really a test for handling skills in my opinion. Cognitive connection to the machine reduced because of this, I believe.
I hand-flew all previous types and so did the captains I flew with. For the A320 I often flew from top-of-descent to touchdown and the airplane was a joy to fly manually. I did the same for the A330/A340 into terminals such as Hong Kong, Narita, Sydney, London, (after we were handed off to the final approach controller and out of the hold!), Frankfurt on the downwind, Honolulu, the Caribbean.
Towards the end I gradually stopped hand-flying this way, not because the SIDS and STARS got too demanding but because I began to realize that if anything were to occur during hand-flying, the first thing they'd look at would be the fact that the automation wasn't engaged and I'd have some explaining to do. I think that is the wrong approach, but...before we come to a black-and-white conclusion that this is all bad, I think there is good reason on the part of airline managements to require the use of automation and to teach/train/instruct thoroughly on its use, abuse and failure modes. They are doing what they think is best in terms of risk management in an increasingly busy airspace and terminal environment.
That said, when an approach incident occurred, hand-flying was increasingly discouraged Formal policies which provide guidance as to when one can do it, (low traffic volume/low work load for the other pilot etc) helped but the policies effectively prohibited hand-flying because entering non-busy terminals, especially on international routes, simply doesn't happen.
I think the vicious circle has been complete for about a decade now where discouraging hand-flying has indeed resulted in a loss of those important but invisible skills: instrument scan while busy, smooth, anticipatory manual handling of the aircraft and engine thrust...in short, "energy management" (and therefore fuel cost management) and crew coordination during manual flying conditions...the change is subtle but material to effectively and safely piloting the airplane.
The routine was established in the 90's - the autoflight was engaged right after the last flap/slat retraction and disconnected at about 400ft on approach at destination. There is NO opportunity for practise under such conditions but guys realized that the airline wanted the autoflight engaged and most didn't argue. I think they should have, as pilot associations should have, but that is a personal view.
This isn't a sudden, unexpected, surprising state of affairs. In one of the many, many AOM changes we experienced came the admonition that "the autoflight WILL be engaged right after takeoff and disengaged on the landing roll". Aside from the fact that many of our approaches in the A320 were NPAs and couldn't be an autoland, the short-sightedness of such an airline policy was fought very hard and we won the freedom to hand-fly the airplane under an "automation policy". It was a step in the right direction but there was no formal acknowledgement that training was required and so the focus on autoflight comptetency remained and one hand-flew if one wished but it wasn't supported. I don't think we were unusual. We may be surprised and shocked but that's the way it was and, I suspect, is today.
These notions have been expressed since the mid/late eighties almost exclusively from pilots transitioning to fully-automated aircraft. The original reason pilots didn't want to hand-fly was because, "What's it doing now?" was a real question in the early 90's. "Click-click", (autopilot/autothrust OFF) was the solution until one sorted oneself out but pilots are primarily problem-solvers and sometimes will try to fix the problem (how do I get the OFFSET Page?...how do I get a hold entered again?), instead of changing horses and disconnecting while sorting it out. It's a cognitive thing, not a technical thing. It's why I keep saying that the UAS item shouldn't have been a problem...it's just straight manual flight, keeping it level and keeping thrust while the other guy/gal gets out the books. No big deal. Really.
So now we have to sort out why this one became a big deal and ended in an accident and in the eight or nine threads we've had a good go at it. Those here who are pilots know that this kind of thinking isn't unique, it's "what is". Nor am I alone in knowing that the solutions are comfort with the machine in all its normal and abnormal regimes and phases, and that the job of training (the company) and the job of learning (the individual pilot) isn't finished until that comfort is there. It isn't about notions like efficiency, cost-control or shortened training footprints, it's about pilots being familiar and therefore comfortable in their machine, no matter what it costs or how long it extends the training footprint. And it doesn't take tens of thousands of hours in a career, or weeks added onto the normal training footprint to achieve this comfort - it takes work, mainly on the part of the pilot, but also on the part of the airline in providing a supportive, comprehending management approach to foster this level of comfort.
In my view, the answers to AF447 are in one way not complicated. But these notions certainly are not "provable" in the traditional ways we are accustomed to accepting "evidence". There is no recorder that can record confusion, fear, competency or lack thereof. We must come to those conclusions, if possible, obviously by other means and these days, when Cartesian thinking invisibly rules (and narrows) our assessments of "evidence", we can miss some processes that may be relevant to the accident. The above "stream" tries to deal with this.
Getting this off my chest...sorry for the thread drift.
@PJ2 Your relevation is frankly speaking "shocking".
I think the Airbus is as easy and straightforward to hand-fly as any other type I've been on. The source of the "mystique" and therefore the fear of disconnecting and hand-flying is, in my view, twofold - 1) the airplane is complex with many modes including the autothrust, and 2) transition training and recurrent training focus competence and facility with the autoflight system and took competency at hand-flying (including thrust management) for granted.
The first time I did a proficiency check and IFR ride on the A320 it was entirely on the autopilot to demonstrate knowledge and understanding of the system. It felt really strange and it felt like I was somehow cheating and not demonstrating what I knew, (because with work, the autoflight systems aren't difficult to understand, remember and use).
Subsequent recurrent training sessions worked in a manually-flown approach on raw data and we'd also do steep turns. I never saw the "S-turns" exercise again and I'll bet these days most would find it very difficult to complete.
In steep turns, autothrust was left on and we used the bird, (FPV symbol) for steep turns. It was a piece of cake...for the autoflight. All that was necessary was to keep the FPV on the horizon. Looking back, with autotrim it wasn't really a test for handling skills in my opinion. Cognitive connection to the machine reduced because of this, I believe.
I hand-flew all previous types and so did the captains I flew with. For the A320 I often flew from top-of-descent to touchdown and the airplane was a joy to fly manually. I did the same for the A330/A340 into terminals such as Hong Kong, Narita, Sydney, London, (after we were handed off to the final approach controller and out of the hold!), Frankfurt on the downwind, Honolulu, the Caribbean.
Towards the end I gradually stopped hand-flying this way, not because the SIDS and STARS got too demanding but because I began to realize that if anything were to occur during hand-flying, the first thing they'd look at would be the fact that the automation wasn't engaged and I'd have some explaining to do. I think that is the wrong approach, but...before we come to a black-and-white conclusion that this is all bad, I think there is good reason on the part of airline managements to require the use of automation and to teach/train/instruct thoroughly on its use, abuse and failure modes. They are doing what they think is best in terms of risk management in an increasingly busy airspace and terminal environment.
That said, when an approach incident occurred, hand-flying was increasingly discouraged Formal policies which provide guidance as to when one can do it, (low traffic volume/low work load for the other pilot etc) helped but the policies effectively prohibited hand-flying because entering non-busy terminals, especially on international routes, simply doesn't happen.
I think the vicious circle has been complete for about a decade now where discouraging hand-flying has indeed resulted in a loss of those important but invisible skills: instrument scan while busy, smooth, anticipatory manual handling of the aircraft and engine thrust...in short, "energy management" (and therefore fuel cost management) and crew coordination during manual flying conditions...the change is subtle but material to effectively and safely piloting the airplane.
The routine was established in the 90's - the autoflight was engaged right after the last flap/slat retraction and disconnected at about 400ft on approach at destination. There is NO opportunity for practise under such conditions but guys realized that the airline wanted the autoflight engaged and most didn't argue. I think they should have, as pilot associations should have, but that is a personal view.
This isn't a sudden, unexpected, surprising state of affairs. In one of the many, many AOM changes we experienced came the admonition that "the autoflight WILL be engaged right after takeoff and disengaged on the landing roll". Aside from the fact that many of our approaches in the A320 were NPAs and couldn't be an autoland, the short-sightedness of such an airline policy was fought very hard and we won the freedom to hand-fly the airplane under an "automation policy". It was a step in the right direction but there was no formal acknowledgement that training was required and so the focus on autoflight comptetency remained and one hand-flew if one wished but it wasn't supported. I don't think we were unusual. We may be surprised and shocked but that's the way it was and, I suspect, is today.
These notions have been expressed since the mid/late eighties almost exclusively from pilots transitioning to fully-automated aircraft. The original reason pilots didn't want to hand-fly was because, "What's it doing now?" was a real question in the early 90's. "Click-click", (autopilot/autothrust OFF) was the solution until one sorted oneself out but pilots are primarily problem-solvers and sometimes will try to fix the problem (how do I get the OFFSET Page?...how do I get a hold entered again?), instead of changing horses and disconnecting while sorting it out. It's a cognitive thing, not a technical thing. It's why I keep saying that the UAS item shouldn't have been a problem...it's just straight manual flight, keeping it level and keeping thrust while the other guy/gal gets out the books. No big deal. Really.
So now we have to sort out why this one became a big deal and ended in an accident and in the eight or nine threads we've had a good go at it. Those here who are pilots know that this kind of thinking isn't unique, it's "what is". Nor am I alone in knowing that the solutions are comfort with the machine in all its normal and abnormal regimes and phases, and that the job of training (the company) and the job of learning (the individual pilot) isn't finished until that comfort is there. It isn't about notions like efficiency, cost-control or shortened training footprints, it's about pilots being familiar and therefore comfortable in their machine, no matter what it costs or how long it extends the training footprint. And it doesn't take tens of thousands of hours in a career, or weeks added onto the normal training footprint to achieve this comfort - it takes work, mainly on the part of the pilot, but also on the part of the airline in providing a supportive, comprehending management approach to foster this level of comfort.
In my view, the answers to AF447 are in one way not complicated. But these notions certainly are not "provable" in the traditional ways we are accustomed to accepting "evidence". There is no recorder that can record confusion, fear, competency or lack thereof. We must come to those conclusions, if possible, obviously by other means and these days, when Cartesian thinking invisibly rules (and narrows) our assessments of "evidence", we can miss some processes that may be relevant to the accident. The above "stream" tries to deal with this.
Getting this off my chest...sorry for the thread drift.
Last edited by Jetdriver; 8th Jun 2012 at 16:51.
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PJ2,
Thanks (again) for your erudite and informative post.
IMHO, if THE FLYING PUBLIC, not only those "in the know," were to be made fully aware of this situation (never an easy proposition), the effect on the industry would be devastating. 'Twould be a huge scandal.
Speaking as a self-elected representative for SLF everywhere, being flown by "pilots" who CAN'T FLY THE AIRPLANE is absolutely, unconditionally UNACCEPTABLE. As discussed earlier, having pilots who can hand-fly the pane in a pickle is not only a reasonable expectation of every passenger, but must be mandatory.
I, too am shocked that this is even controversial at all. I don't care HOW much it costs the airlines-- this has to change, in the grim and bloody light of AF 447. If it doesn't, there will be more tragedies of this kind until it is fixed.
Thanks (again) for your erudite and informative post.
IMHO, if THE FLYING PUBLIC, not only those "in the know," were to be made fully aware of this situation (never an easy proposition), the effect on the industry would be devastating. 'Twould be a huge scandal.
Speaking as a self-elected representative for SLF everywhere, being flown by "pilots" who CAN'T FLY THE AIRPLANE is absolutely, unconditionally UNACCEPTABLE. As discussed earlier, having pilots who can hand-fly the pane in a pickle is not only a reasonable expectation of every passenger, but must be mandatory.
I, too am shocked that this is even controversial at all. I don't care HOW much it costs the airlines-- this has to change, in the grim and bloody light of AF 447. If it doesn't, there will be more tragedies of this kind until it is fixed.
Organfreak;
Caution is advised in interpreting these remarks.
The industry's record speaks for itself and it is a superb record overall.
It is critical to an understanding of these remarks that they emerge from and dwell within a context of significant and even spectacular success. They do not portray an industry "coming apart at the seams" about which we must then ride off in all directions regarding skies and the falling thereof. Rather, if I may, these remarks represent a distillation of ongoing issues which have been "in process" for many years and with which most pilots and certainly all safety specialists are familiar. We know that the character of accidents is changing. Many interested parties will interpret these changes in terms of their own specialties, which is a good thing because nobody is capable of seeing and then communicating well, the whole picture, while keeping in mind the industry's successful record and extremely safe state of affairs.
This is pretty open stuff. Our industry is, because of its high-risk nature, pretty open itself because we value learning and prevention of untoward trends and events, above all.
No other industry or endeavour demonstrates this willingness quite so strongly and so such frankness requires a reserved and contemplative approach. These are not sudden trends or sudden events. We should be even more willing to discuss some of the less attractive aspects of the business but over-reaction is what stops many. Yes, there are always politics involved; -we need only take a look at what is happening in Nigeria* at the moment to know that there remains an enormous misunderstanding about how our industry makes itself so safe.
These kinds of things discussed in the post must be taken with some forebearance and perspective - millions and millions of hours of safe and unremarkable passenger transport, decade after decade. Such events as AF447 are vanishingly-rare. Whether perfection is achievable or not is not the quest - the attempt is what examination of these aspects of our industry is about.
Such frankness and openess can result in a form of "autoimmune" disease, if you will. The very characteristics of frankness and a willingness to look at the nasty bits, all of which make our aviation transportation system safe, (our "immune system") also at the very same moment in time, has the capacity to damage or even destroy that which makes it so safe.
In short, that which makes us successful also equally has the power to harm. The key to our industry's health (and therefore its continuing high levels of safety) is in how "the immune system" is treated.
Caution is advised in interpreting these remarks.
The industry's record speaks for itself and it is a superb record overall.
It is critical to an understanding of these remarks that they emerge from and dwell within a context of significant and even spectacular success. They do not portray an industry "coming apart at the seams" about which we must then ride off in all directions regarding skies and the falling thereof. Rather, if I may, these remarks represent a distillation of ongoing issues which have been "in process" for many years and with which most pilots and certainly all safety specialists are familiar. We know that the character of accidents is changing. Many interested parties will interpret these changes in terms of their own specialties, which is a good thing because nobody is capable of seeing and then communicating well, the whole picture, while keeping in mind the industry's successful record and extremely safe state of affairs.
This is pretty open stuff. Our industry is, because of its high-risk nature, pretty open itself because we value learning and prevention of untoward trends and events, above all.
No other industry or endeavour demonstrates this willingness quite so strongly and so such frankness requires a reserved and contemplative approach. These are not sudden trends or sudden events. We should be even more willing to discuss some of the less attractive aspects of the business but over-reaction is what stops many. Yes, there are always politics involved; -we need only take a look at what is happening in Nigeria* at the moment to know that there remains an enormous misunderstanding about how our industry makes itself so safe.
These kinds of things discussed in the post must be taken with some forebearance and perspective - millions and millions of hours of safe and unremarkable passenger transport, decade after decade. Such events as AF447 are vanishingly-rare. Whether perfection is achievable or not is not the quest - the attempt is what examination of these aspects of our industry is about.
Such frankness and openess can result in a form of "autoimmune" disease, if you will. The very characteristics of frankness and a willingness to look at the nasty bits, all of which make our aviation transportation system safe, (our "immune system") also at the very same moment in time, has the capacity to damage or even destroy that which makes it so safe.
In short, that which makes us successful also equally has the power to harm. The key to our industry's health (and therefore its continuing high levels of safety) is in how "the immune system" is treated.
*Nigeria’s chief aviation regulator, recommended for suspension after the nation’s deadliest accident in almost 40 years, defended his record as several safety advocates said he may become a scapegoat.
“Would you please wait for the accident investigation to complete, to have seen the black boxes, before we start judging?” Harold Demuren, director general of the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority, asked in a phone interview yesterday.
Demuren appealed for patience during the investigation into the Dana Airlines Ltd. crash on June 3. All 153 people on board and an unknown number on the ground were killed when the Boeing Co. (BA) MD-83 jetliner crashed and burst into flames in a Lagos suburb while approaching the airport on a domestic flight.
Nigeria’s aviation industry had one of the world’s worst safety records in 2006, a year after Demuren took his job. Four years later, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration gave Africa’s largest oil producer a Category 1 rating, which allowed its domestic carriers to fly to the U.S.
“We have become one of the safest places in Africa,” Demuren said, speaking from Nigeria.
Nigeria’s Senate voted June 5 to recommend that Demuren be suspended. The minister of aviation, Princess Stella Adaeze Oduah, will convene a panel June 11 to review the nation’s
“Would you please wait for the accident investigation to complete, to have seen the black boxes, before we start judging?” Harold Demuren, director general of the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority, asked in a phone interview yesterday.
Demuren appealed for patience during the investigation into the Dana Airlines Ltd. crash on June 3. All 153 people on board and an unknown number on the ground were killed when the Boeing Co. (BA) MD-83 jetliner crashed and burst into flames in a Lagos suburb while approaching the airport on a domestic flight.
Nigeria’s aviation industry had one of the world’s worst safety records in 2006, a year after Demuren took his job. Four years later, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration gave Africa’s largest oil producer a Category 1 rating, which allowed its domestic carriers to fly to the U.S.
“We have become one of the safest places in Africa,” Demuren said, speaking from Nigeria.
Nigeria’s Senate voted June 5 to recommend that Demuren be suspended. The minister of aviation, Princess Stella Adaeze Oduah, will convene a panel June 11 to review the nation’s
Last edited by PJ2; 8th Jun 2012 at 17:33.
PJ2
Thank you very much for your open words.
A friend of mine, also a retired Phantom driver, flew the A320 until final retirement 2 years ago. On the few occasions we were able to talk about flying the bus he was happy with the manual handling qualities, he always told me "franzl, you wouls have loved that plane". In the same moments he was telling the stories about FO´s unwilling to handfly the plane except for T/O and Land, and in more than one occasion he was reported up the chain for doing so.
Well, i didn´t believe everything he said, and your post sheds a different view to his narratives.
My nephew got accepted by LH to become a pilot last month, he is very happy about it. I myself was and am not sure, wether i should slap his shoulder for well done or wether i should caution him on being alert not to get a kid of the magenta line.
A friend of mine, also a retired Phantom driver, flew the A320 until final retirement 2 years ago. On the few occasions we were able to talk about flying the bus he was happy with the manual handling qualities, he always told me "franzl, you wouls have loved that plane". In the same moments he was telling the stories about FO´s unwilling to handfly the plane except for T/O and Land, and in more than one occasion he was reported up the chain for doing so.
Well, i didn´t believe everything he said, and your post sheds a different view to his narratives.
My nephew got accepted by LH to become a pilot last month, he is very happy about it. I myself was and am not sure, wether i should slap his shoulder for well done or wether i should caution him on being alert not to get a kid of the magenta line.
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Originally Posted by PJ2
Getting this off my chest...sorry for the thread drift.
Manually flying the 330 with A/THR + FD has nothing to do with manually flying.
It's only when FD is missing on the PFD that one can realize how much mental work is needed to keep things straight.
You told us how little manual flying is done these days, how much of that little is done without FD guidance ...
For AF447, as FD were not selected OFF, they keep coming back, the PF did not doubt them and was probably too happy to put his faith in them.
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It isn't about notions like efficiency, cost-control or shortened training footprints, it's about pilots being familiar and therefore comfortable in their machine, no matter what it costs or how long it extends the training footprint. And it doesn't take tens of thousands of hours in a career, or weeks added onto the normal training footprint to achieve this comfort - it takes work, mainly on the part of the pilot, but also on the part of the airline in providing a supportive, comprehending management approach to foster this level of comfort.
Unfortunately the bean counters (think reduced training time) & the regulators think testing testing is the way to go, but then they will not be in the smoking hole and can always go and get another job.
Originally Posted by PJ2
The drill was indeed viewed as obligatory as far as the BEA was concerned (in their press conference) and as far as many on this board were/are concerned.
By the time AF447 made its final flight I already left A320 and I have never worked for Air France. Our unreliable airspeed on 19/20 was very, very similar to AF on 30 with one very significant difference: there was no option to consider whether to apply memory items or to maintain cruise thrust/pitch. Legally, if I ever got to UAS, I had to apply 5° pitch above FL100 while PNF gets the weight/power/pitch tables out. Outcome-wise, it would not make a lot of difference if I would have set it or kept the things as they were.
Originally Posted by PJ2
Why pitch-up at all when in cruise flight just because the pilot considers that there is "immediate risk to the safety of the flight"?
(...)
Regardless, the main point I have always made and which you continue to miss is, Why destabilize a transport aircraft in cruise flight when a better course of action is to keep the pitch and power settings which existed prior to the failure?
(...)
Regardless, the main point I have always made and which you continue to miss is, Why destabilize a transport aircraft in cruise flight when a better course of action is to keep the pitch and power settings which existed prior to the failure?
Originally Posted by CONF iture
It sure brings you to the stall warning. That's flying on the edge with no necessity. What's the point when usual pitch and thrust for cruise is the answer.
Airbus has it wrong on that one, even its chief pilot says differently now.
Airbus has it wrong on that one, even its chief pilot says differently now.
Originally Posted by PJ2
I have long posited the notion that perhaps the pitch-up was due to a remembered response in training, right after takeoff, of the UAS memory items
Originally Posted by PJ2
We actually don't know if the PF was applying this procedure or not as his actions were never announced nor was the PNF included in what was happening as the PFs actions took place.
Originally Posted by Machinbird
Hey Clandestino, we are talking about trained pilots, not random guys you pick up on the street.
Originally Posted by Machinbird
The only emotion an actual pilot might experience should be surprise. If any of the other emotions are being experienced, then that person doesn't belong in a cockpit without further training to convert those negative emotions into positive and considered action.
Pilots must have far, far better emotional stability than general public, however it can not be absolute. Emotions do affect the pilots' performance and everyone can break down, given enough pressure. Trick is having the breaking point in the area which is extremely unlikely to be encountered in flight. Can this be achieved through training? I don't know.
Originally Posted by Machinbird
Flying is not supposed to have a lot of emotion attached to it other than appreciation for the beauties of the sky and the earth.
Originally Posted by alf5071h
Previous A330 ice crystal / ADC / ASI events may have concluded that flight into such conditions was an acceptable risk because of the non-fatal outcomes (with hindsight).
Originally Posted by alf5071h
To progress safety the industry requires to take a more abstract view for continued airworthiness (systems thinking), vice the probabilistic based certification view
Originally Posted by Lonewolf50
As before, the unanswerable "what was he seeing" during this time segment comes to mind.
Originally Posted by Lonewolf50
what is the likelihood that all 30 or so events were shared and understood by crews at the time?
Originally Posted by Machinbird
One thing that demonstrably took much of PF's attention during the first 35 seconds after the AP drop was the very significant roll oscillation and the method used by PF to control the oscillation.
Originally Posted by PJ2
It isn't about notions like efficiency, cost-control or shortened training footprints, it's about pilots being familiar and therefore comfortable in their machine, no matter what it costs or how long it extends the training footprint. And it doesn't take tens of thousands of hours in a career, or weeks added onto the normal training footprint to achieve this comfort - it takes work, mainly on the part of the pilot, but also on the part of the airline in providing a supportive, comprehending management approach to foster this level of comfort.
Originally Posted by John Tullamarine
Then, interspersed through the routine session stuff of the endorsement, get the trainee up to being able to hand fly, raw data, an ILS in 0/0 to a stop on the centreline. Very much confidence building and the I/F stick and rudder skills skyrocketed.
Originally Posted by John Tullamarine
I would have expected Flight Standards Management (not just AF, but any operator of the Type) to have put a small sample of line pilots into the simulator to observe what their responses might have been to such events ? The outcome of such an experiment might then have suggested whatever when it comes to training program variations.
Hindsight or just human behaviour
OC, re #1174, I agree with your thoughts on expectation, but any conclusion that the crew should have followed a specific drill (SOP), because it was the obvious course of action, involves hindsight bias.
It is not the physical presence of a drill which is important; it is the mental process which decides to use it. We can establish the presence of a drill and associated training, but not what the crew thought, or what might have influenced their thinking – the effectiveness of the drill / training.
“…the SOPs are there to be used by flight crews …” yes, but when the crew has understood the situation as requiring that specific drill, and thus the drill is selected. Inferring that this is obvious judges the crew’s awareness and decision making after the fact – this is hindsight bias.
“… and therefore to not use them is a demonstration of an incorrect response to the situation”, yes this is one possible hypothesis, another is that the crew did not understand the situation and thus ‘chose’ not to use the drill – it never occurred to them (see ref).
We can construct many hypotheses from the information gathered after the fact, which can be used as valuable tools for investigation and safety response, but instantly a hypothesis is taken as ‘fact’ without evidence, this involves hindsight bias.
In this instance, the bias is our assumption that the crew understood the situation as involving UAS, and thus did not follow the appropriate drill.
It is just as plausible that the crew’s actions were entirely consistent with the situation as they saw it; but we don’t know what that was and currently can only speculate on a rage of alternatives.
Unfortunately, the vast majority of the thread discussion is based on a biased starting point, although to be fair some contributions have qualified their points as hypothetical.
There may be some significant safety issues arising from these hypothetical explorations, particularly in the process of awareness in the first few seconds of the event (not the subsequent and more salient stall condition – which also the crew may have not been aware of).
Some significant contributors have been identified:-
UAS drill formulation; is the title relevant, will the crew know when to select it. These are issues of procedure formulation and industry wide communication.
How to identify UAS situations (involving system malfunction): what are the key features, were these explained in training and associated with the range of recovery procedures. These are training issues, but also aspects of memory and recall in context.
Human behaviour in sudden and surprising events; what might effect perception and choice of action, - Human Factors.
Are these a source of the problem or a solution?
Errors in Aviation Decision Making, Orasanu & Martin.
It is not the physical presence of a drill which is important; it is the mental process which decides to use it. We can establish the presence of a drill and associated training, but not what the crew thought, or what might have influenced their thinking – the effectiveness of the drill / training.
“…the SOPs are there to be used by flight crews …” yes, but when the crew has understood the situation as requiring that specific drill, and thus the drill is selected. Inferring that this is obvious judges the crew’s awareness and decision making after the fact – this is hindsight bias.
“… and therefore to not use them is a demonstration of an incorrect response to the situation”, yes this is one possible hypothesis, another is that the crew did not understand the situation and thus ‘chose’ not to use the drill – it never occurred to them (see ref).
We can construct many hypotheses from the information gathered after the fact, which can be used as valuable tools for investigation and safety response, but instantly a hypothesis is taken as ‘fact’ without evidence, this involves hindsight bias.
In this instance, the bias is our assumption that the crew understood the situation as involving UAS, and thus did not follow the appropriate drill.
It is just as plausible that the crew’s actions were entirely consistent with the situation as they saw it; but we don’t know what that was and currently can only speculate on a rage of alternatives.
Unfortunately, the vast majority of the thread discussion is based on a biased starting point, although to be fair some contributions have qualified their points as hypothetical.
There may be some significant safety issues arising from these hypothetical explorations, particularly in the process of awareness in the first few seconds of the event (not the subsequent and more salient stall condition – which also the crew may have not been aware of).
Some significant contributors have been identified:-
UAS drill formulation; is the title relevant, will the crew know when to select it. These are issues of procedure formulation and industry wide communication.
How to identify UAS situations (involving system malfunction): what are the key features, were these explained in training and associated with the range of recovery procedures. These are training issues, but also aspects of memory and recall in context.
Human behaviour in sudden and surprising events; what might effect perception and choice of action, - Human Factors.
Are these a source of the problem or a solution?
Errors in Aviation Decision Making, Orasanu & Martin.
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Hi,
clandestino
This air chief pilot quote is in a video (in french) posted earlier in this thread
clandestino
Do you think this behavior normal ?
This is in contradiction with the rules
clandestino
August 2001:
The DGAC mandates the replacement of the sensor Rosemount probes by the
Goodrich and Thales AA by AD 2001-354 (B) (Appendix 3).
July 2002:
In the OIT 999.0068/02/VHR SE (Annex 4), Airbus made the observation of defects
probe Thales (formerly Sextant) P / N C16195AA.
December 2002:
The FAA mandates the replacement of the sensor Rosemount probes by the
Goodrich and Thales AA , specifying the hazard out of the flight and that is the answer to an "unsafe condition" (Annex 39)
January 2005 : Thales launch the project « ADELINE » (annexe 5). Actual air data equipment is composed of a large number of individual probes and pressure sensors. This equipment delivers vital parameters for the safety of the aircraft’s flight such as air speed, angle of attack and altitude. The loss of these data can cause aircraft crashes especially in case of probe icing.
clandestino
Besides, it would add some credibility to the statement of yours if you could provide quote of Airbus chief pilot.
clandestino
Pilots were so unfazed that they didn't even make reports.
This is in contradiction with the rules
clandestino
Yes, if we apply selective and very narrow hindsight. Every aeroplane type has dozens if not hundreds technical issues being investigated simultaneously. How can you determine which is minor, which major and which will turn out to be lethal if left unchecked long enough? Before AF447 it seemed that UAS is somewhere in the middle of the seriousness scale as pilots have successfully coped with it. There was no rush to change the offending pitots.
The DGAC mandates the replacement of the sensor Rosemount probes by the
Goodrich and Thales AA by AD 2001-354 (B) (Appendix 3).
July 2002:
In the OIT 999.0068/02/VHR SE (Annex 4), Airbus made the observation of defects
probe Thales (formerly Sextant) P / N C16195AA.
December 2002:
The FAA mandates the replacement of the sensor Rosemount probes by the
Goodrich and Thales AA , specifying the hazard out of the flight and that is the answer to an "unsafe condition" (Annex 39)
January 2005 : Thales launch the project « ADELINE » (annexe 5). Actual air data equipment is composed of a large number of individual probes and pressure sensors. This equipment delivers vital parameters for the safety of the aircraft’s flight such as air speed, angle of attack and altitude. The loss of these data can cause aircraft crashes especially in case of probe icing.
Last edited by jcjeant; 10th Jun 2012 at 15:03.
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Pilots were so unfazed that they didn't even make reports.
....Clandestino
This is iPad Facto from the releases, and not a clear finding, certainly not expressed in this way.
If this statement is casually accurate, the fault is with the regulator, via the airline. The airline is responsible, in an agency, for the regulations. The Pilots, as representatives of the line, are the visible ones, but to understand "unfazed" the culture at AF is on the hook.
The decision maker acts according to his/her understanding of the situation, and the source of error is in the decision maker's knowledge base or in the process of reaching a decision. ....Orasanu et al
With respect, this is incomplete. It is a poor judge who lays off a decision on knowledge alone. Including "process" does not help.
One can have excellent knowledge base; without experience, it is not only partial, it is dangerous to believe data can fly. Untrained, U/A recovery is a crapshoot, and UAS recovery the same. Machinbird has demonstrated this fully, as others have, and does one doubt the lack of training will remain unaddressed in the report?
Has anyone here had a singular experience in the sim, without help, in UAS recovery, though conversant in the platform's operation? Dozy?
....Clandestino
This is iPad Facto from the releases, and not a clear finding, certainly not expressed in this way.
If this statement is casually accurate, the fault is with the regulator, via the airline. The airline is responsible, in an agency, for the regulations. The Pilots, as representatives of the line, are the visible ones, but to understand "unfazed" the culture at AF is on the hook.
The decision maker acts according to his/her understanding of the situation, and the source of error is in the decision maker's knowledge base or in the process of reaching a decision. ....Orasanu et al
With respect, this is incomplete. It is a poor judge who lays off a decision on knowledge alone. Including "process" does not help.
One can have excellent knowledge base; without experience, it is not only partial, it is dangerous to believe data can fly. Untrained, U/A recovery is a crapshoot, and UAS recovery the same. Machinbird has demonstrated this fully, as others have, and does one doubt the lack of training will remain unaddressed in the report?
Has anyone here had a singular experience in the sim, without help, in UAS recovery, though conversant in the platform's operation? Dozy?
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ALF
I see your point but can't find myself in agreement with it. We do not have any evidence that the crew actually followed any procedure to identify what the cause of the initial situation was. This would seem to go against their training. Hindsight bias would appertain if for example they chose an SOP other than UAS and we state well they should have followed UAS instead. However, to say that they should have followed a course of action to analyse the situation which fits in with what we might reasonably expect was trained does not show hindsight at all. One should have expectations that trained behaviour should be followed and in this situation we can't say that this was the case. Note I am not saying that they should have followed the UAS drill but that they should have followed an analysis procedure which allowed them to arrive at an appropriate conclusion about the situation they were in. This is what airline pilots are supposedly trained to do. I cannot see any hindsight bias in this.
I see your point but can't find myself in agreement with it. We do not have any evidence that the crew actually followed any procedure to identify what the cause of the initial situation was. This would seem to go against their training. Hindsight bias would appertain if for example they chose an SOP other than UAS and we state well they should have followed UAS instead. However, to say that they should have followed a course of action to analyse the situation which fits in with what we might reasonably expect was trained does not show hindsight at all. One should have expectations that trained behaviour should be followed and in this situation we can't say that this was the case. Note I am not saying that they should have followed the UAS drill but that they should have followed an analysis procedure which allowed them to arrive at an appropriate conclusion about the situation they were in. This is what airline pilots are supposedly trained to do. I cannot see any hindsight bias in this.
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We do not have any evidence that the crew actually followed any procedure to identify what the cause of the initial situation was.
We also have not seen a procedure to follow.
We also have not seen a procedure to follow.
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ALF posted a link to a very appropriate paper. The gist of it is in 3 key paragraphss.
I can see AF447 as Situation Assessment error leading to a Course of Action error (Creative). The initial roll oscillation figures into this.
Originally Posted by ALF from Errors in Aviation Decision Making
Thus, there are two major ways in which error may arise. People may (a) develop a wrong interpretation of the problem, which leads to a wrong decision because they are solving the wrong problem -- an SA error, or (b) establish an accurate picture of the situation, but choose the wrong course of action -- a CoA error.
Situation assessment errors can be of several types: situation cues may be misinterpreted, misdiagnosed, or ignored, resulting in a wrong picture; risk (threat or danger) levels may be misassessed; or the amount of available time may be
misjudged.
Errors in choosing a course of action may also be of several types. In rule-based decisions, the appropriate response may not be retrieved from memory and applied, either because it was not known or because some contextual factor mitigated against it. In choice decisions, options also may not be retrieved from memory, or only
one may be retrieved when in fact multiple options exist. Constraints or factors that
determine the adequacy of various options may not be retrieved or used in evaluating the options. Finally, the consequences of various options may not be considered. The decision maker may fail to mentally simulate the possible outcomes of each considered option. Creative decisions may be the most difficult because they
involve the least support from the environment. The absence of available options means candidate solutions must be invented to fit the goals and existing conditions.
Situation assessment errors can be of several types: situation cues may be misinterpreted, misdiagnosed, or ignored, resulting in a wrong picture; risk (threat or danger) levels may be misassessed; or the amount of available time may be
misjudged.
Errors in choosing a course of action may also be of several types. In rule-based decisions, the appropriate response may not be retrieved from memory and applied, either because it was not known or because some contextual factor mitigated against it. In choice decisions, options also may not be retrieved from memory, or only
one may be retrieved when in fact multiple options exist. Constraints or factors that
determine the adequacy of various options may not be retrieved or used in evaluating the options. Finally, the consequences of various options may not be considered. The decision maker may fail to mentally simulate the possible outcomes of each considered option. Creative decisions may be the most difficult because they
involve the least support from the environment. The absence of available options means candidate solutions must be invented to fit the goals and existing conditions.
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Machinbird
Hey Clandestino, we are talking about trained pilots, not random guys you pick up on the street.
Clandestino
Where did you get that about Yuri Gagarin? The Russians to this day do not really know what happened to his aircraft other than both guys rode it in.
As for Elliot See flying into the building--how many circling approaches do you think he had made in his life? (I'll bet very few.) His initial approach as a section of two aircraft was FUBAR and his wingy (Gene Cernan) lost sight during the subsequent circling approach and wisely pulled up into the clag for another go on his own. It seems as if visibility was worse than given to the crews and was not suitable. The whole circling thing was improvised on the spot from all appearances. Is it any wonder it didn't turn out well?
Quote:
Originally Posted by Machinbird
One thing that demonstrably took much of PF's attention during the first 35 seconds after the AP drop was the very significant roll oscillation and the method used by PF to control the oscillation.
This looks like a Clandestino opinion piece. Do you have any facts to back it up? Have you tried it in a simulator? Have you mapped out and analyzed the roll oscillation?
Everything I've read about PIO events indicates that it is like the aircraft suddenly seems to switch from a Dr. Jekyll to a Mr. Hyde personality. What frequencies do you think PIO events tend to occur at? They are relatively low frequencies where the pilot is able to make inputs into the cycle. The only problem is that the inputs contribute to the oscillation.
Originally Posted by Machinbird
Hey Clandestino, we are talking about trained pilots, not random guys you pick up on the street.
When I'm talking about Yuri Gagarin succumbing to spiral dive in cloud or Charles Basset and Elliot See perishing in controlled flight into building, I'm talking about astronauts, not some random airline pilots.
Where did you get that about Yuri Gagarin? The Russians to this day do not really know what happened to his aircraft other than both guys rode it in.
As for Elliot See flying into the building--how many circling approaches do you think he had made in his life? (I'll bet very few.) His initial approach as a section of two aircraft was FUBAR and his wingy (Gene Cernan) lost sight during the subsequent circling approach and wisely pulled up into the clag for another go on his own. It seems as if visibility was worse than given to the crews and was not suitable. The whole circling thing was improvised on the spot from all appearances. Is it any wonder it didn't turn out well?
Quote:
Originally Posted by Machinbird
One thing that demonstrably took much of PF's attention during the first 35 seconds after the AP drop was the very significant roll oscillation and the method used by PF to control the oscillation.
Originally Posted by Clandestino
Roll oscillation before stall was of low frequency, low and decreasing amplitude. It spells: insignificant and irrelevant. After stall all bets regarding roll control are off, unless you happen to fly some extremely aerobatic aeroplane, which A330 is not. Even if notion that preoccupation with roll precluded control in pitch were true, pilot unable to control the aeroplane around two axes simultaneously is severely incapacitated.
Everything I've read about PIO events indicates that it is like the aircraft suddenly seems to switch from a Dr. Jekyll to a Mr. Hyde personality. What frequencies do you think PIO events tend to occur at? They are relatively low frequencies where the pilot is able to make inputs into the cycle. The only problem is that the inputs contribute to the oscillation.
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Read the CVR breakdown.
The comments and such indicate lack of situational awareness not lack of hand flying skills. FO tried to correct, left seater took over, he comments that he can't figure it out, and by this time the captain, probably with his head in the middle comments he can't figure it out either.
Honestly I can't believe no one else is seeing this...but if there was a loss altitude from FL3700 to sea level...someone would be reading off a VSI and decreasing altitudes...nope...comments indicate that the only indication of an impending crash was the Ground prox (pull up pull up).
If I were to guess, and it's just that...lighting strike took out their avionics and fly by wire. AP disconnects as it's not getting reliable information...from where you say? The computer...pilots are now handflying bland tubes, maybe rebooting...they have not attitude indication, much less AS or alt...
Anyone here with Airbus experience flown the standby gyro with no AS or Alt?
The comments and such indicate lack of situational awareness not lack of hand flying skills. FO tried to correct, left seater took over, he comments that he can't figure it out, and by this time the captain, probably with his head in the middle comments he can't figure it out either.
Honestly I can't believe no one else is seeing this...but if there was a loss altitude from FL3700 to sea level...someone would be reading off a VSI and decreasing altitudes...nope...comments indicate that the only indication of an impending crash was the Ground prox (pull up pull up).
If I were to guess, and it's just that...lighting strike took out their avionics and fly by wire. AP disconnects as it's not getting reliable information...from where you say? The computer...pilots are now handflying bland tubes, maybe rebooting...they have not attitude indication, much less AS or alt...
Anyone here with Airbus experience flown the standby gyro with no AS or Alt?
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Originally Posted by Lyman
*
We also have not seen a procedure to follow.
We do not have any evidence that the crew actually followed any procedure to identify what the cause of the initial situation was.