Shell Management

Signs of a new scandel emerging. Three Years After Air France 447 Crash, A Hint of Scandal - Global - The Atlantic Wire
Perhaps CCTV should be fitted in rest areas.

mm43

• see
• think
• react

• input
• compute
• output

You can present the "triangle" in many forms, but you need to know conclusively two sides to ensure an understanding of the third.

The thousands of posts in many PPRuNe threads on the subject have traversed this fundamental triangle many times and from many angles, and all propositions inevitably involved guesstimates of at least one side and probably two. The BEA's final take on the same problem will most likely also fall into this great "unknown".

What bothers me most at this point, is the obvious disconnect between both co-pilots and their failure to observe SOPs in even an elementary form. So my conclusion is that this "disconnect" went beyond the confines of the cockpit and may well have involved all three of the flight deck crew.

Yes, just another triangle.

SM - Well, I wasn't referring to that, but if it helps solving the "problem", then use it.

Lonewolf_50

SM
Age: 64
Posts: 683
Couth: 0
So long as you don't mind CCTV cameras being fitted to your private office, your home, your bedroom, your shower, and your lavatory ... not that anyone wants to watch you ...

@mm: well said, in re various triangles, but not the silly love triangle speculation dreamed up by some.

Shell Management

When I have 300 lives in my hands I'd have no objection.
No true proffesional would.

jcjeant

Hi,

Welcome back of the sleeping captain Dubois story .....

BEA report N°3 (plain english)
2 h 11 min 45 - 2 h 01 min 46
Do your maths .....
10 minutes .....
Call me whatever you want .. but my opinion is that the back of the captain never touched the bed sack and the captain never closed his eyes ......
ZZZZZzzzzzzzzz

wiggy

From the "report"

"more than a minute" I'm shocked, I really am ....

Think about it - everyone the most mighty skygod, requires a few seconds to wake up, especially if they've gone off into a deep sleep....and most of us don't sleep in the uniform ( creased uniform is bad for the company's image, as is running to the flight deck in your shreddies, don't you know ) Most of the time on a flight with a "heavy" you're lucky to get a resting crewmember(s) back onto the flightdeck in under 5 minutes from initiating a wake up call. You can run all the love triangle and conspiracy theories you want but we all know (don't we?) that it takes time to wake up and be aware of one's surroundings - I can't see how putting TV cameras in the bunk area is going to solve that particular human factors' "problem", but nevertheless I see the usual suspect has declared him/herself as a fan of the idea .....

FWIW since I was utterly cream crackered somewhere over the Far East last night it took me less than ten minutes from seat to a very deep sleep j.c. , so my opinion is that yes, it certainly can be done.

jcjeant

Hi,

wiggy
You maybe .. what was your rest time before the flight .. how much time you had flying
Remember that captain Dubois had many many hours (days) for rest in Rio and he was not from looong time on flying AF447 on the return segment ....
Other:
I just finished watching the video of the Nightline program and Mr. Troadec (BEA chief) does not seem very at ease to answer certain questions or makes a dodge with a smile that speaks volumes
He was more at ease during his meetings in France
But journalists did not asked him the same questions

chrisN

If he was attending to a call of nature, getting back to the cockpit in a minute from when called is actually quite quick.


Chris N

wiggy

ChrisN

Agreed.


j.c.

It doesn't much rest he (or I for that matter) was rostered to have had. In an ideal world (the sort of world the regulators live in) after a multiday slip you will be well rested, but we all know that sometimes you're not at all rested. You've maybe had bad sleep, had your sleep disturbed by the party out by the hotel pool or the couple in the next room .

In heavy crew ops as a captain, IMHO, you are entitled to think that your colleagues on the flight deck can action, at the very least, the initial items a non-normal checklist, and contain a problem long enough for you to get dressed and return to the flight deck. If (note, I say "if") that wasn't the case on AF447 then the problem lies with AF's procedures, training and checking of junior crewmembers, not with captain Dubois sleeping arrangements.

Old Carthusian

Turbine D
I would argue that what we are doing is very definitely not 'hindsight'. To my mind the question with hindsight is 'could the actions taken in the past have been avoided with the knowledge available at the time?' If the answer is yes then the discussion is 'looking back' not hindsight. If the answer is no then the discussion is hindsight.

Leaving aside the issue of Air France and it's part in this accident if we ask whether the crew could have avoided the accident using knowledge that they could have reasonably expected to possess or have access to we reach an answer of yes they could. Why they didn't is part of finding out why the accident happened. A lack of any evidence that the correct procedures were followed leads one to think that things went very badly wrong but this is not hindsight. As I understand Airline training and practice it is based on following these and thus one would expect such practices and procedures to be followed in all cases. Once again this isn't hindsight but just an expectation that the already designed processes will be followed.

One can say that Air France should have expedited the replacement of the pitot tubes and this accident wouldn't have happened. This would be hindsight given that non of the incidents had led to anything resembling AF447. A situation existed which needed change but one could argue that this accident could not have been anticipated. However, if we were to say that the crew should have responded to this situation in a different way this is not hindsight. This is just an expectation based on a reasonable supposition that the crew was properly trained and conversant with the procedures for successfully operating a large transport aircraft. We trust airline professionals to reach a certain standard and ability. We may not expect them to be supermen/women but we do expect a certain level and the vast majority to conform to our expectations.
OC

Turbine D

OC,

Thanks for your response.

Your quote is exactly what I meant by hindsight. I limited my post only to the pitot tube situation, leaving what the AF447 crew did or didn't do up to those have flown or presently fly commercial jet aircraft.

chrisN

OC, “if we ask whether the crew could have avoided the accident using knowledge that they could have reasonably expected to possess or have access to we reach an answer of yes they could.”

Do you think that they could have been reasonably expected to possess or have access to: manual flying expertise at FL350; and an appropriate UAS SOP at FL350?

(Not that these were the only factors in their inappropriate reaction to events – just some which seem to me and some others to exceed what might be expected, in view of the industry standard training in general from what I have deduced from these threads, and about AF training in particular.)

I think that SLF, regulators in principle, and MPs and the public, might have such reasonable expectations; but reading the difference between old-time pilots who grew up in a different era, and the modern 250-hour computer management “children of the magenta line”, do insiders believe it to be a reasonable expectation given the latter’s background?

Old Carthusian

chrisN
I am a general aviation pilot (biplanes, biplanes, biplanes) so I hope you will forgive me if my suppositions are wrong. I always understood it that modern civil airliners flew with a set of SOPs on board in the cockpit, immediately available for the crew to use. I also understood that airline training involved the use of SOPs and CRM to identify and troubleshoot issues that might come up. As for manual flying skills I agree with your last paragraph and I wasn't referencing these. I would suggest though that some form of manual flying skill is essential and to be expected - for any pilot.

alf5071h

OC re #1169. You appear to assume that because knowledge exits it can be recalled for use at any time, or that all situations will be understood (as you would understand them). Hindsight bias is within these assumptions.
Without detailed evidence we do not know what the crew thought – what was or was not recalled from memory, or how it was used in their assessment; similarly what they deduced about the situation and events.

The human mind has a natural tendency to ‘join-up the dots’ to create a familiar picture; – our understanding of the world as we would wish it to be. In order to learn from difficult accidents such as AF447 we have to restrain this tendency and only work with what we know factually.

There is much which we might learn from hypothetical speculation, by attempting to understand what the crew might have seen, thought, or decided. In this it is essential that our thinking is tightly controlled and that we do not form erroneous conclusions due to hindsight.
We might identify what physically happened; and with considered judgement it may be possible to identify contributing factors which could have influenced the crew, but without any assurance of proof.
In these circumstances the safety lessons to be learned come from questioning how we might see, think, or decide when faced by the contributing factors, e.g. as a start, would we have identified the situation as requiring reference to the UAS drill – why? Ask why 5 times, without knowledge of AF447 outcome.


Chris N, whilst it might be reasonable for MPs and the public (SLF) to have their expectations, those of the regulator and industry should be kerbed by the facts, and knowledge and application of human factors.
If, or when public judgement is required, then hopefully legal judgement would caution about hindsight bias. However, this is becoming a very disturbing area of aviation which requires both public (media) and industry restraint, supported with simple education of human factors to dampen expectations.

Old Carthusian

alf5071h
The issue here would be whether the knowledge available could be expected to be used by the individuals concerned and whether it was indeed provided for that purpose. Furthermore, one could ask whether the training is provided teach them about use of such knowledge. The answer to all these questions is yes. It is a reasonable expectation that a pilot of an airliner is familiar with his machine and knows how to access troubleshooting and analysis procedures. There are after all certain standards which must be maintained.

This is not hindsight or even linked with it. We know that the crew did not use the SOPs from the transcript of the CVR but we also know that airline training is based on use of these tools which are easily accessible. This also is not hindsight - the processes and systems are built on this usage. If (to hypothesise) the SOPs were not meant to be used by crew members then of course any statement that they should have used them would represent hindsight. This I do not think is the case - the SOPs are there to be used by flight crews and therefore to not use them is a demonstration of an incorrect response to the situation. This is fact - it is not hindsight.

Machinbird

One thing that demonstrably took much of PF's attention during the first 35 seconds after the AP drop was the very significant roll oscillation and the method used by PF to control the oscillation. (He had apparently never seen Alt2 law at altitude.)

If you look at the periodicity of the oscillation, and of the roll control inputs, his control inputs accelerated (in an apparent attempt to get ahead of the oscillation.) His inputs did not cease although the aircraft momentarily stopped roll oscillating on approximately 3 occasions, and these continued inputs caused a phase shift in the roll oscillation-based upon my analysis. This type of control input indicates formation of a control strategy, and correction of the control strategy. Clearly, a significant portion of his attention was devoted to the early roll control problem.

PJ2

OC;
Some observations, for what it's worth...

I couldnt' get a single F/O to hand-fly the A320 or the A340/A330 when I offered (and in some cases asked them to fly). Primarily they were afraid of the thrust levers, (disconnecting them, controlling thrust etc) but for whatever other reason they just didn't want to actually hand-fly. I always thought flying a visual was both challenging and about all we have left to us to practise that part of our craft that was being discouraged, but I was told by my F/Os that a lot of captains refused the request to hand-fly because they themselves were uncomfortable disconnecting and it increased the workload on the PM. The PM set all the autoflight windows...the headings/altitudes and programmed the FMC when needed (which was heads-down of course), and kept a watch (there was usually a third pilot, an RP, in the cockpit...hand-flying was discouraged by the company except in low traffic density airports...yeah, right...low density international destinations) and when there was an "event" associated with hand-flying, they tightened the rules even more. We used to do it all the time on the DC8's/9's B727's, Lockheeds even the B767's but airlines want the automation used and now navigation procedures (RNP, STARS, SIDS) make autoflight necessary. The loss of skills, both handling and thinking, is a vicious circle process.

Now before we assume too much in this, the actual hand-flying the airplane isn't much of a challenge...trim is done for you, thrust is automatic and the autopilot is (depending upon the "hands"), smoother. In fact while hand-flying isn't much of a pilot's challenge, its more of an interesting challenge to make the autoflight work well. What's lost is the thinking skills when you have your hands on the controls....it's different than programming and flying through the Mode Control Panel; You're "connected" to the airplane.

I always felt I had good reason to trust the guys up front when I went back for the break. Still, as a rule I didn't go back went during the ITCZ crossing, "just because". It wasn't because of the hand-flying issue...to be blunt, I just didn't know what kind of radar skills everyone had.

At the time, I'd never heard of such a thing as "UAS" and losing the airspeed data at altitude, (1999 - 2007 on the 340/330). It was just never discussed or demonstrated.

I don't know what the answer is. Automation has become necessary, not just nice to have. But handling skills (which form thinking skills and a proper scan in my books) need to be re-introduced, taught and reinforced with practise. It wasn't in the script, but I can recall one sim in particular where the check captain made us do climbing then descending S-turns while changing speed. Every skill was practised...including the instrument scan.

john_tullamarine

climbing then descending S-turns while changing speed.

Such or similar fun used to be a standard first endorsement sim exercise to give the trainee a feel for the machine.

My favourite was to start S&L on a heading and then enter a steady climbing turn to arrive on the same heading, 1000 ft higher while increasing steadily to 30kt faster ... and then do the same on the way back down. Then repeat, this time losing the speed increments.

Got the eyeballs and thinking cells active.

Then, interspersed through the routine session stuff of the endorsement, get the trainee up to being able to hand fly, raw data, an ILS in 0/0 to a stop on the centreline. Very much confidence building and the I/F stick and rudder skills skyrocketed.

Machinbird

This was standard fare when I went through as a student and much later when I instructed in the Navy advanced jet program. We called the exercises Basic Instrument exercises because they formed the foundation for the rest of instrument flying. Mostly we used the S patterns, primarily S-2 and S-3 patterns involving standard rate turns combined with standard climb/descent rates at constant airspeed.

If the training aircraft had an autopilot, they were not maintained/not used and it was strictly a manual exercise.

Are modern day pilots still being taught to hand fly such exercises at any stage in their training?

CONF iture

FD1 was continuously displayed and FD2 was missing for a split second. The low resolution of the published data do not allow to tell more.

I disagree on that.
What was displayed in the FMA as a vertical mode ?
Where is the FD/AP vertical mode trace ?

It will be a major blow if the FD behavior is not extensively covered in the coming BEA final report ...