V1 question.
Join Date: Aug 2003
Location: Sale, Australia
Age: 80
Posts: 3,832
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
When an aircraft simply pulls the throttles back post V1, only to taxi back to a hangar, find a mechanic...it's not even an incident, never makes the NTSB reporter, much less an FAA call
B. Occurrence (PTRS Code 1725, 3720, 5720). An occurrence is defined as an event that is not readily discernible as an incident. Events, such as a low speed abort or a turnback are considered occurrences and must be investigated to determine the impact on safety of operations.
C. Correlation Between an Occurrence and an Incident. Not all events that are brought to the attention of AFS have an obvious impact on the safety of operations, nor are they readily identifiable as an incident. Until an event can be identified as an incident, it should be regarded as an occurrence. The advantage of labeling an event as an occurrence is that it allows for an investigation of the facts for an accurate identification of the event without generating unnecessary reports.
NOTE: Safety improvement recommendations may result from either incident or occurrence investigations.
C. Correlation Between an Occurrence and an Incident. Not all events that are brought to the attention of AFS have an obvious impact on the safety of operations, nor are they readily identifiable as an incident. Until an event can be identified as an incident, it should be regarded as an occurrence. The advantage of labeling an event as an occurrence is that it allows for an investigation of the facts for an accurate identification of the event without generating unnecessary reports.
NOTE: Safety improvement recommendations may result from either incident or occurrence investigations.
Moderator
It's really all about the need for routinely operating in a disciplined (ie the opposite of a cavalier winging it) way of doing business.
.. abandoned just after V1... Something went 'BANG!'... They stopped. Subsequently discovered that only 'D' hydraulic system remained. 'D' system didn't do very much.
Hardly the basis of a well executed decision process. The history, on this occasion, says "thank heavens for that". However, on any sort of rational risk managed approach to life, the decision probably was grossly flawed if the story is as presented.
The important thing is to compare the historically based probability of successful versus unsuccessful outcomes in the situation where the reject is initiated late.
The common thinking in aviation is to find answers, post crash, and use those answers as a preventative to future similar problems
exactly the situation .. providing that we are working to a probabilistic gameplan rather than generalising from the exception to a rule.
The myopic view of aviation is to look at ..
The SOP view of things is that we should accommodate the average sort of capability. While the superhero pilot (and these folk exist - a frustration to the lesser abilities residing in the rest of us) may well be able to fly after losing both wings, all engines, etc., etc., most of us are just plodders trying to do our best on the day .. and we do better if we load the dice in our favour.
.. abandoned just after V1... Something went 'BANG!'... They stopped. Subsequently discovered that only 'D' hydraulic system remained. 'D' system didn't do very much.
Hardly the basis of a well executed decision process. The history, on this occasion, says "thank heavens for that". However, on any sort of rational risk managed approach to life, the decision probably was grossly flawed if the story is as presented.
The important thing is to compare the historically based probability of successful versus unsuccessful outcomes in the situation where the reject is initiated late.
The common thinking in aviation is to find answers, post crash, and use those answers as a preventative to future similar problems
exactly the situation .. providing that we are working to a probabilistic gameplan rather than generalising from the exception to a rule.
The myopic view of aviation is to look at ..
The SOP view of things is that we should accommodate the average sort of capability. While the superhero pilot (and these folk exist - a frustration to the lesser abilities residing in the rest of us) may well be able to fly after losing both wings, all engines, etc., etc., most of us are just plodders trying to do our best on the day .. and we do better if we load the dice in our favour.
Join Date: Jul 2011
Location: Somewhere
Age: 42
Posts: 55
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
John, well maybe because I have command experience, that I can't work on probabilities...a bang in the tail after V1, with 6000 feet ahead gives me the choice of stopping a rolling aircraft with twice my landing distance ahead, or taking it up in the air, and hoping I have a flyable aircraft...
Now if we get to brass tacks and have a big stadium full of pilots discussing this...I would move to exclude all the pilots who don't have 10,000 hours, who work for airlines who push V1 down the runway with Flex and such, for airlines who purposely run around with 30000 hour engines...exclude high time FOs and Flight Engineers that never had the wherewithal to be captain...
Now what are we left with...guys who have command of a ship and say...'what the heck, let's fly it up there and see what the problem is?'
Fat chance.
Now if we get to brass tacks and have a big stadium full of pilots discussing this...I would move to exclude all the pilots who don't have 10,000 hours, who work for airlines who push V1 down the runway with Flex and such, for airlines who purposely run around with 30000 hour engines...exclude high time FOs and Flight Engineers that never had the wherewithal to be captain...
Now what are we left with...guys who have command of a ship and say...'what the heck, let's fly it up there and see what the problem is?'
Fat chance.
Moderator
Good sir,
One can only suggest that we should agree to disagree.
The whole Industry is based on probabilities - in general, there are few certainties, if any, about aircraft. That's the nature of distribution curves and probabilities of failure.
with 6000 feet ahead gives me the choice of stopping a rolling aircraft with twice my landing distance ahead
Of course it does.
Now, whether such a decision, on a routine basis, is sound or not is a matter for standardisation debate.
As an aside, what do you do in the case where you have, say, 300 - 400ft spare pad in front at V1 with tiger country in the overrun ?
One can only suggest that we should agree to disagree.
The whole Industry is based on probabilities - in general, there are few certainties, if any, about aircraft. That's the nature of distribution curves and probabilities of failure.
with 6000 feet ahead gives me the choice of stopping a rolling aircraft with twice my landing distance ahead
Of course it does.
Now, whether such a decision, on a routine basis, is sound or not is a matter for standardisation debate.
As an aside, what do you do in the case where you have, say, 300 - 400ft spare pad in front at V1 with tiger country in the overrun ?
Join Date: Jul 2011
Location: Somewhere
Age: 42
Posts: 55
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Looks like I caught your inexperience John...
Run any Part 25 aircraft you want, your choice...and tell me where you can in any way possible be at V1, using legal balanced field numbers and only have 3-400 feet ahead.
It illustrates my point that you guys are purposefully de-rating the thrusts so far back where your balanced field isn't even on the runway, and extends into the weeds somewhere.
Discussion over.
Run any Part 25 aircraft you want, your choice...and tell me where you can in any way possible be at V1, using legal balanced field numbers and only have 3-400 feet ahead.
It illustrates my point that you guys are purposefully de-rating the thrusts so far back where your balanced field isn't even on the runway, and extends into the weeds somewhere.
Discussion over.
Join Date: Sep 1999
Location: ME
Posts: 5,505
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Your question doesn't make sense, we operate a LOT of FAR25 aircraft, some with a MTOW of 16,000 lbs and others with about 870,000 lbs. Almost all of these use Balanced Field takeoff calculations. It is very easy to get a Balanced Field Length Required which is 300-400 feet less than the Available Runway Length. So what's the issue.
As for the second question, where do you get the idea that your balanced field isn't even on the runway, and extends into the weeds somewhere. Do you understand the concept of DERATE at all? Do you know the difference between calculating a takeoff at 40C OAT or assuming that the temperature is 40C?
You need to jumpseat from somewhere in a 747 classic when it really is Field Length Limited, especially if the clearway is used
You might end up having a different perspective on things 
J_T....with tiger country in the overrun ?... So true, I wonder how many pilots know what lies right at the end of the runway, case in point look at Surabaya Indonesia, nothing on the airport charts shows that there are massive drainage ditches off the end of both runways, large enough to take your undercarriage off
Mutt
As for the second question, where do you get the idea that your balanced field isn't even on the runway, and extends into the weeds somewhere. Do you understand the concept of DERATE at all? Do you know the difference between calculating a takeoff at 40C OAT or assuming that the temperature is 40C?
You need to jumpseat from somewhere in a 747 classic when it really is Field Length Limited, especially if the clearway is used
You might end up having a different perspective on things J_T....with tiger country in the overrun ?... So true, I wonder how many pilots know what lies right at the end of the runway, case in point look at Surabaya Indonesia, nothing on the airport charts shows that there are massive drainage ditches off the end of both runways, large enough to take your undercarriage off
Mutt
Join Date: Aug 2003
Location: Sale, Australia
Age: 80
Posts: 3,832
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Looks like I caught your inexperience John...
maybe because I have command experience
Posted least anyone should contemplate giving any credence to his ravings.
Join Date: Aug 2005
Location: fl
Posts: 2,525
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
V1 is a very critical speed at balanced field length airports. It means as we all know we can stop before and go at it. If you don't abide by it you get in big trouble or maybe die with your passengers. True, longer runways you can probably still stop but you are still in trouble. If nothing happens and you reverse to lower speed before brakes you still have the explaining to do if it gets reported. Safety is #1 so use that to decide what you are going to do. The AA DC10 at ORD would have been just fine if they hadn't followed company procedures and slowed down to V2. They might have been in trouble but they would have been alive with their passengers. Just a thought.
Join Date: Aug 2003
Location: Sale, Australia
Age: 80
Posts: 3,832
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
They might have been in trouble
1. The accident scenario had been considered during design, but considered to be so highly improbable as to be not worth worrying about, and the FAA agreed.
2. No instrumentation to inform crew of slat asymmetry
It's all those little holes in the cheese, the crew were blameless.
Join Date: Jul 2011
Location: Somewhere
Age: 42
Posts: 55
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Mutt - You don't get a seat at the table to discuss if at the end of the day, your running de-rated departures, flying around on 30000 engines, and packing the cockpits with kids.
Begs to ask the question how many other areas of safety your cutting corners on.
Begs to ask the question how many other areas of safety your cutting corners on.
Join Date: Sep 1999
Location: ME
Posts: 5,505
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Looks like I caught your inexperience John...
You don't get a seat at the table to discuss if at the end of the day
As someone who has read J_T's real resume, I would suggest that you might actually learn something from him, IF you had enough common sense.
your running de-rated departures
Oh yea, we will also do them on the 787 and 747-8.....
your flying around on 30000 engines,
and packing the cockpits with kids.
Given that we are certified under FAR91/121/129/135 with ISO Certification, LOSA and IOSA certifications...... why would you think that we are cutting safety corners on aircraft performance?
Mutt
Join Date: May 2002
Location: Permanently lost
Posts: 1,785
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
@whenrealityhurts
No sir, you have been hoisted on your own petard.
What J_T wrote was;
To which you responded with the derogatory comment above and continued with;
This shows that you completely misunderstood what you were replying to. If you read it properly, John's hypothetical was postulating the case where there is only 300 to 400 feet IN ADDITION to the distance required to stop the aircraft from V1. The critical word is "spare".
A little more thought and less posturing might have led to you having a better understanding here.
Looks like I caught your inexperience John...
What J_T wrote was;
what do you do in the case where you have, say, 300 - 400ft spare pad in front at V1
Run any Part 25 aircraft you want, your choice...and tell me where you can in any way possible be at V1, using legal balanced field numbers and only have 3-400 feet ahead.
A little more thought and less posturing might have led to you having a better understanding here.
Moderator
Aside - for those who might have any concern as to my delicate ego .. have no angst, for I have a thick skin and broad shoulders ...
Inexperienced I may be in many matters .. but in respect of a few I have a passing knowledge. The secret, as most older chaps have come to understand, is to refrain from comment on the former and be prudent in the latter. Occasionally I fail to observe my advice in respect of the former .. there is always the expert who, gently or otherwise, draws my impertinent ignorance to my notice ...
The AA DC10 at ORD would have been just fine if they hadn't followed company procedures and slowed down to V2
While not being at all critical of the poster's observation, it is pertinent to note that, at the time, Industry standard teaching was to fly V2 OEI which the crew did. This was one of those rare out of left field events where the then current rulebook item needed to be ignored .. had the crew had any clue as to the true nature of the failure.
As I recall, it was this mishap, specifically, which led to a revision in thinking to adopt the current approach whereby one holds the present speed at the failure (unless that be excessively high, typically in excess of V2+20-30 or thereabouts).
If you want to play with the big dogs - don't pee like a puppy.
Priceless. Do you claim rights for this observation or may anyone use it on occasion ?
Inexperienced I may be in many matters .. but in respect of a few I have a passing knowledge. The secret, as most older chaps have come to understand, is to refrain from comment on the former and be prudent in the latter. Occasionally I fail to observe my advice in respect of the former .. there is always the expert who, gently or otherwise, draws my impertinent ignorance to my notice ...
The AA DC10 at ORD would have been just fine if they hadn't followed company procedures and slowed down to V2
While not being at all critical of the poster's observation, it is pertinent to note that, at the time, Industry standard teaching was to fly V2 OEI which the crew did. This was one of those rare out of left field events where the then current rulebook item needed to be ignored .. had the crew had any clue as to the true nature of the failure.
As I recall, it was this mishap, specifically, which led to a revision in thinking to adopt the current approach whereby one holds the present speed at the failure (unless that be excessively high, typically in excess of V2+20-30 or thereabouts).
If you want to play with the big dogs - don't pee like a puppy.
Priceless. Do you claim rights for this observation or may anyone use it on occasion ?
Join Date: Feb 1998
Location: Formerly of Nam
Posts: 1,595
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Looks like I caught your inexperience John...
before you were even a hardon in your old man's pants, and
even back then what he didn't know on the subject did not
bloody matter!
And from what I just read I agree with Unhooked - your lack
of knowledge re reduced thrust TOs stands out like dogs balls.
JT,
Re my story about abandon after V1.
I did not wish to present it as a suggested mode of operation but as an exception.
I'd probably have continued - that captain, on the day, did not. I've mulled that one over for years. Will publish when I come up with an answer.
I've met top rate pilots with a LOT less than 10k - and a couple of prats with more.
I'd be excluded because I've never worked for a jet outfit which did not use reduced thrust.
Re my story about abandon after V1.
I did not wish to present it as a suggested mode of operation but as an exception.
I'd probably have continued - that captain, on the day, did not. I've mulled that one over for years. Will publish when I come up with an answer.
I would move to exclude all the pilots who don't have 10,000 hours, who work for airlines who push V1 down the runway with Flex
I'd be excluded because I've never worked for a jet outfit which did not use reduced thrust.
Moderator
SOPs are a two-edged sword.
They are sound and desirable to follow on the very great majority of occasions due to the probabilistic nature of our activities.
However, there are few, if any, guarantees in flying.
If/when the ducks are lined up against your interests ... on the rare occasion it may be more sensible to ignore the rule and do something different.
However, these rare exceptions ought not to be generalised into some sort of rule-based behaviour.
Two takeoff instances which come to mind -
(a) post V1 with multiple systems failure which will preclude safe flight .. for instance, I wouldn't envy a pilot with a combined engine failure and total hydraulic loss.
(b) low speed schedule with an uncontrollable yaw post V1 OEI again probably due to a systems failure
While noting that the certification paradigm safeguards against such things - in general - if we find ourselves on the wrong end tail of the distribution curve .. it was a day that we ought to have stayed in bed .. and it is then that the Captain gets to earn his/her salary in a few seconds. No necessary guarantees in many instances that the fallback gameplan will work. However, if it has a significantly higher probability of success, it has to be adopted if the main plan clearly has gone irrecoverably awry.
It is for this sort of reasoning that this type of thread is important. It makes the reader think about things ahead of potentially being confronted with something similar.
I did not wish to present it as a suggested mode of operation but as an exception.
Precisely.
They are sound and desirable to follow on the very great majority of occasions due to the probabilistic nature of our activities.
However, there are few, if any, guarantees in flying.
If/when the ducks are lined up against your interests ... on the rare occasion it may be more sensible to ignore the rule and do something different.
However, these rare exceptions ought not to be generalised into some sort of rule-based behaviour.
Two takeoff instances which come to mind -
(a) post V1 with multiple systems failure which will preclude safe flight .. for instance, I wouldn't envy a pilot with a combined engine failure and total hydraulic loss.
(b) low speed schedule with an uncontrollable yaw post V1 OEI again probably due to a systems failure
While noting that the certification paradigm safeguards against such things - in general - if we find ourselves on the wrong end tail of the distribution curve .. it was a day that we ought to have stayed in bed .. and it is then that the Captain gets to earn his/her salary in a few seconds. No necessary guarantees in many instances that the fallback gameplan will work. However, if it has a significantly higher probability of success, it has to be adopted if the main plan clearly has gone irrecoverably awry.
It is for this sort of reasoning that this type of thread is important. It makes the reader think about things ahead of potentially being confronted with something similar.
I did not wish to present it as a suggested mode of operation but as an exception.
Precisely.
Join Date: Jul 2011
Location: Somewhere
Age: 42
Posts: 55
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
JT - I suspect your vision of aviation being so chancy is relative to your ability to mitigate the risk...which in an organization where your told what to do...you can't.
Flying for the airlines is like being a soldier about to hit the beach in Normandy...'isn't there a better way to invade France?'
'Shut up and do what your told'.
Flying for the airlines is like being a soldier about to hit the beach in Normandy...'isn't there a better way to invade France?'
'Shut up and do what your told'.
Join Date: Sep 1999
Location: ME
Posts: 5,505
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
'Shut up and do what your told'.
Mutt
WRH
Please cite your FAR 121 or similar experience (Military heavy jet, JAA ops, etc.) before you state opinions on subjects you seem to know nothing.
All of certification and operational standards are based on probabilities of success or failure, safety itself is based a probability once one leaves the bed each morning, yet we do and in the die in bed.
Your method of aviation appears based on gut feeling, seat of the pants, Kentucky windage. You seem to think you can experience a failure, take a glance out the windshield and decide to stop or not. Obviously, performance theory and practice is a wasted subject on yourself. Once before, I asked if you always calculated a refusal speed (accelerate-stop speed for the runway) for each take-off you do in whatever flying machine you are trusted with, the reason being, so you would know when you could no longer stop. Never answered that one, did you?
I have known of three cases where the performance in the V1 situation was tested. Two, I personally knew the individuals involved; one I witnessed. All, straggly involved bird strikes right near V1 or in the time between V1 and Vr.
The first two, involved loss of one engine between V1 and Vr, the captains took it airborne, as recommended by the "book" and the performance data. They would have clearly overrun with 60 or more knots. The one I saw happen carried 140,000 pounds of HE for the little dustup in '91. Both had additional problems with a second engine after they got airborne with large vibration moments. Both planes landed successfully, one out of a minimums PAR. The resulting investigations upheld the decisions of the captains, one got a peacetime DFC. The point being planes will deliver the performance specified and nobody ever had a collision with the sky--planes are meant to be there.
The third case was a rejected take-off at NAS Sig, where birds struck the plane just prior to V1. No damage was noted, but the commander, who expressed similar stop orientation as you do, elected to stop. I was in the jump seat and really thought we would go off-roading. We made it with feet to spare--the end of the runway was not visible from the front seats, 34 feet above the ground. All of these incidents were thoroughly investigated, resulted in no changes to the SOP and occurred in planes weighing 600,000 pounds or more.
The point of this dreary tale is that pros do NOT merely "do as they're told", they are learned in performance planning; know that briefed SOP is a far, FAR better response to an emergency and odds are vastly more in everyone's favor if one follows it, rather than inventing responses in the "heat of the battle". If you need proof of this, sit thru some tough sims and watch guys struggle making answers up and crashing.
Mutt J_T
Besides US Mil bases where the clearance standards are exceptionally high (basically 1,000' of surfaced overrun plus level ground 500' either side of centerline and extending beyond the overrun), I have seen many, MANY more airports with very nasty terrain beyond the runway than ones with benign areas. Many have drop-offs greater than 50', highways, etc. The KTEB overrun, where the pilot did a "SSG" rejected take-off, crossed a major highway, critically injuring a motorist and smashed into a bakery. He just got sentenced to 180 days of "3 hits and a cot". SWA overran at KBUR into a gas station "eyeballing" an wildly unstable approach, as they did at KMDW, killing a child in a car. Ignoring the considered wisdom KILLS.
GF
Please cite your FAR 121 or similar experience (Military heavy jet, JAA ops, etc.) before you state opinions on subjects you seem to know nothing.
All of certification and operational standards are based on probabilities of success or failure, safety itself is based a probability once one leaves the bed each morning, yet we do and in the die in bed.
Your method of aviation appears based on gut feeling, seat of the pants, Kentucky windage. You seem to think you can experience a failure, take a glance out the windshield and decide to stop or not. Obviously, performance theory and practice is a wasted subject on yourself. Once before, I asked if you always calculated a refusal speed (accelerate-stop speed for the runway) for each take-off you do in whatever flying machine you are trusted with, the reason being, so you would know when you could no longer stop. Never answered that one, did you?
I have known of three cases where the performance in the V1 situation was tested. Two, I personally knew the individuals involved; one I witnessed. All, straggly involved bird strikes right near V1 or in the time between V1 and Vr.
The first two, involved loss of one engine between V1 and Vr, the captains took it airborne, as recommended by the "book" and the performance data. They would have clearly overrun with 60 or more knots. The one I saw happen carried 140,000 pounds of HE for the little dustup in '91. Both had additional problems with a second engine after they got airborne with large vibration moments. Both planes landed successfully, one out of a minimums PAR. The resulting investigations upheld the decisions of the captains, one got a peacetime DFC. The point being planes will deliver the performance specified and nobody ever had a collision with the sky--planes are meant to be there.
The third case was a rejected take-off at NAS Sig, where birds struck the plane just prior to V1. No damage was noted, but the commander, who expressed similar stop orientation as you do, elected to stop. I was in the jump seat and really thought we would go off-roading. We made it with feet to spare--the end of the runway was not visible from the front seats, 34 feet above the ground. All of these incidents were thoroughly investigated, resulted in no changes to the SOP and occurred in planes weighing 600,000 pounds or more.
The point of this dreary tale is that pros do NOT merely "do as they're told", they are learned in performance planning; know that briefed SOP is a far, FAR better response to an emergency and odds are vastly more in everyone's favor if one follows it, rather than inventing responses in the "heat of the battle". If you need proof of this, sit thru some tough sims and watch guys struggle making answers up and crashing.
Mutt J_T
Besides US Mil bases where the clearance standards are exceptionally high (basically 1,000' of surfaced overrun plus level ground 500' either side of centerline and extending beyond the overrun), I have seen many, MANY more airports with very nasty terrain beyond the runway than ones with benign areas. Many have drop-offs greater than 50', highways, etc. The KTEB overrun, where the pilot did a "SSG" rejected take-off, crossed a major highway, critically injuring a motorist and smashed into a bakery. He just got sentenced to 180 days of "3 hits and a cot". SWA overran at KBUR into a gas station "eyeballing" an wildly unstable approach, as they did at KMDW, killing a child in a car. Ignoring the considered wisdom KILLS.
GF
Last edited by galaxy flyer; 28th Aug 2011 at 10:19.
Hey GF,
I was with ya right up to last paragraph. (see below) I agree with most of what you, John and others are saying with regard to to the proper attitude to take towards stopping beyond V1. DO otherwise at your own, your pax and any innocent bystanders peril. I adopted this attitude early, even before I understood enough to really know why.
But the corners of the statistical bell curve are there and exceptions to the rule do exist. Whether any of us as individuals will recognize that in real time during a real event is the more compelling question. Perhaps it's as postulated by JT and it just wasn't your day to go flying. But it's also possible that people sometimes make correct decisions contrary to policy without a satisfactory explanation as to why. I've seen it and you probably have too. We often call that luck. When good pilots follow procedure to the scene of the crash, we often call it fate. Or a bad day. Bad luck. Seen that too.
So about that last paragraph GF:
The guy sentenced to the pokey in the Challenger overrun at TEB was locked up for falsifying W&B and other records. There's some CFR other than 49 which covers that. I don't think the flight crew faced any criminal charges for being dumb, though I don't know what if any administrative action was taken against the crew by the FAA. They rejected because the nose failed to lift in spite of full up elevator being applied. Had the takeoff been continued, it would have either become airborne or hit the building at V1 plus whatever speed was gained since passing Vr. I don't know which would have happened and neither does anyone else. Obviously there are cases where a 60 kt overrun yields less disastrous results than a 150 kt plus overrun. But maybe anyone careless enough to get themselves into that situation by grossly misloading the aircraft to begin with has problems enough. I wonder if running the pitch trim NU might have helped? I'm glad the crooks at that company got convicted.
Sometime earlier, the exact same thing happened in another Challenger at TEB. They were lighter and had more runway beyond the BFL and so stopped successfully. Lucky dogs!
A very similar thing happened to a Falcon 900 in SBA, but it was loaded properly and the stab trim set within the takeoff range, though not in the ideal position for the CG. They ended up in a grass field with a damaged airplane and no casualties. DA-50/900 pilots have told me they would have run the trim up if that happened to them. I wonder.
SWA BUR: Nothing to do with V1, just an incredibly ill advised approach, poorly executed and completely lacking in airmanship. 182 kts at the threshold. The FO did everything but bust him in face and take the airplane. Maybe he should have.
SWA MDW. Again a landing accident. But not one which was cavalier or off the cuff by any means. The data indicated it was tight, depending on which runway friction value was used. we all know (or should) how well (not!) runway condition or friction reports correlate with actual performance. In any case the performance study indicated they might have stopped had the reversers been deployed in a timely manner. Autobrake was a new procedure and he'd never done it before, so his (the PIC and PF) performance probably suffered as part of executing in an unfamiliar procedure for the first time while facing "the real thing". SWA subsequently added a fair weather familiarization period to get used to A/B landings. Read the full report, it's very interesting.
So other than picking these three examples to fortify your point, I like your post! Sorry to pick on your post like this because I respect your contributions. But I just couldn't let it slide.
My experience is with smaller jets, but it's the same process using smaller numbers.
Hey it's time for Formula one. See ya!
Best regards,
I was with ya right up to last paragraph. (see below) I agree with most of what you, John and others are saying with regard to to the proper attitude to take towards stopping beyond V1. DO otherwise at your own, your pax and any innocent bystanders peril. I adopted this attitude early, even before I understood enough to really know why.
But the corners of the statistical bell curve are there and exceptions to the rule do exist. Whether any of us as individuals will recognize that in real time during a real event is the more compelling question. Perhaps it's as postulated by JT and it just wasn't your day to go flying. But it's also possible that people sometimes make correct decisions contrary to policy without a satisfactory explanation as to why. I've seen it and you probably have too. We often call that luck. When good pilots follow procedure to the scene of the crash, we often call it fate. Or a bad day. Bad luck. Seen that too.
So about that last paragraph GF:
The guy sentenced to the pokey in the Challenger overrun at TEB was locked up for falsifying W&B and other records. There's some CFR other than 49 which covers that. I don't think the flight crew faced any criminal charges for being dumb, though I don't know what if any administrative action was taken against the crew by the FAA. They rejected because the nose failed to lift in spite of full up elevator being applied. Had the takeoff been continued, it would have either become airborne or hit the building at V1 plus whatever speed was gained since passing Vr. I don't know which would have happened and neither does anyone else. Obviously there are cases where a 60 kt overrun yields less disastrous results than a 150 kt plus overrun. But maybe anyone careless enough to get themselves into that situation by grossly misloading the aircraft to begin with has problems enough. I wonder if running the pitch trim NU might have helped? I'm glad the crooks at that company got convicted.
Sometime earlier, the exact same thing happened in another Challenger at TEB. They were lighter and had more runway beyond the BFL and so stopped successfully. Lucky dogs!
A very similar thing happened to a Falcon 900 in SBA, but it was loaded properly and the stab trim set within the takeoff range, though not in the ideal position for the CG. They ended up in a grass field with a damaged airplane and no casualties. DA-50/900 pilots have told me they would have run the trim up if that happened to them. I wonder.
SWA BUR: Nothing to do with V1, just an incredibly ill advised approach, poorly executed and completely lacking in airmanship. 182 kts at the threshold. The FO did everything but bust him in face and take the airplane. Maybe he should have.
SWA MDW. Again a landing accident. But not one which was cavalier or off the cuff by any means. The data indicated it was tight, depending on which runway friction value was used. we all know (or should) how well (not!) runway condition or friction reports correlate with actual performance. In any case the performance study indicated they might have stopped had the reversers been deployed in a timely manner. Autobrake was a new procedure and he'd never done it before, so his (the PIC and PF) performance probably suffered as part of executing in an unfamiliar procedure for the first time while facing "the real thing". SWA subsequently added a fair weather familiarization period to get used to A/B landings. Read the full report, it's very interesting.
So other than picking these three examples to fortify your point, I like your post! Sorry to pick on your post like this because I respect your contributions. But I just couldn't let it slide.
My experience is with smaller jets, but it's the same process using smaller numbers.
Hey it's time for Formula one. See ya!
Best regards,