It's really all about the need for routinely operating in a disciplined (ie the opposite of a cavalier winging it) way of doing business.
.. abandoned just after V1... Something went 'BANG!'... They stopped. Subsequently discovered that only 'D' hydraulic system remained. 'D' system didn't do very much.
Hardly the basis of a well executed decision process. The history, on this occasion, says "thank heavens for that". However, on any sort of rational risk managed approach to life, the decision probably was grossly flawed if the story is as presented.
The important thing is to compare the historically based probability of successful versus unsuccessful outcomes in the situation where the reject is initiated late.
The common thinking in aviation is to find answers, post crash, and use those answers as a preventative to future similar problems
exactly the situation .. providing that we are working to a probabilistic gameplan rather than generalising from the exception to a rule.
The myopic view of aviation is to look at ..
The SOP view of things is that we should accommodate the average sort of capability. While the superhero pilot (and these folk exist - a frustration to the lesser abilities residing in the rest of us) may well be able to fly after losing both wings, all engines, etc., etc., most of us are just plodders trying to do our best on the day .. and we do better if we load the dice in our favour.