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V1 question.

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V1 question.

Old 20th Aug 2011, 22:35
  #61 (permalink)  
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Well thanks guys. Seems my original hypothesis was about right. But who the heck is this notorious SSG? He hasn't even posted here AFAIK.
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Old 20th Aug 2011, 23:25
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Have a look at this thread.... there are many more as he changes his persona......
He asks extremely interesting questions, but he isn't willing to listen to comments from others, unfortunately
I would love if he would just start the questions and then listen to the answers, but arguing that the whole concept of reduced thrust is wrong, or aborting after V1 is a normal event are a lost cause.

Mutt
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Old 21st Aug 2011, 01:57
  #63 (permalink)  
 
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Mutt -

Your religion is crumbling...

CRM and Ab Initio new hires, are dying a well deserved death.....

It's only a matter of time when another fool who 'pulls it off no matter what at V1, then flies the unflyable to the scene of the accident' puts Flex and 30000 hour engines on the block as well.
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Old 21st Aug 2011, 13:41
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I promised myself I wouldn't do it, but here goes.....

WRH

Please post on accident report where an airliner, having an emergency of any type, continued the take-off, instead of stopping, got airborne and CRASHED. Also, please provide an accident report citing, reduced thrust take-offs, on-condition engine monitoring or a case where good CRM as causal or contributing to the event.

Do so, and expect some grudging acknowledgement.

GF
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Old 21st Aug 2011, 17:28
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JT

you are right. Of course take off can be ASD limited with VR and V1 being equal. However I have very rarely seen a runway limited case. Most of the times second segment or obstacles is the limitation. (by the way, Can that be the reason for the high V1 VR values, that the optimum speeds are sort of an improved climb?)

others

Nobody will fly a wreck if he knows that it is a wreck. It is better to stop a wreck and overrun the runway than become airborne and crash.

The problem, however, is how to determine what the airplane's status is: wreck or not wreck.

This would be difficult even if we had 5 minutes to analize the situation.

At 140 kt ground speed we are running about 70m per second, and quickly accelerating, so in a few seconds we may have "eaten" hundreds of meters. furthermore, the speed gained goes squared in the kinetic energy equation. If we have already started rotation, things are even worse because efficient braking action will be delayed for more seconds. The result is several hundred meters lost plus some other several hundred extra meters needed for stopping. If the take off was already ASD limited, or approximately, then you have a runway excursion.

We don't have time to assess, only to react. If we react instictively we can screw it totally, unless we have spiderman's arachnid sense. So we need to use other form of decision making: anticipated decision making. The flaw of this method is that you don't know all the possible scenarios. You don't know what will happen. But the good thing is that chances of choosing the correct action are much better than in the instinctive reaction. Much better, i'd dare to say. OF course we can be unlucky and choose GO the damned day that the airplane is a wreck...

Airbus policy regarding RTO is very interesting, and it leaves a lot of room for Captain's decision. The ECAM inhibit function is very helpful and ergonomic, by the way. I guess Boeing has a similar feature?
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Old 21st Aug 2011, 17:43
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Well said Microburst

Yes, the Boeing also inhibits certain warnings, fire for example, at certain speeds during the take off.

Last edited by TimeOnTarget; 21st Aug 2011 at 17:43. Reason: spelling
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Old 22nd Aug 2011, 13:42
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Another DC-10 "reject after V1" overrun at Vancouver in 1995, but with a better outcome than the Garuda accident:
The captain did not recognize the loud bang as a symptom of a compressor stall on the high bypass ratio engine and thought that the noise might have been a bomb. Consequently, he decided to reject the take-off even though the speed was above V1 (the maximum take-off rejection speed). Although the flight crew members were all very experienced pilots and had taken simulator training throughout their careers, they had not been trained to recognize a loud bang as a symptom of a high bypass ratio engine compressor stall, and none of the crew members noticed the cockpit indications of power loss on the left engine.
The captain's decision to reject was based on the fact that he did not recognize the initial sound and subsequent thumping noises, and that, because he thought the bang could have been a bomb, he had concerns about the integrity of the aircraft and its ability to fly. Also, the captain stated that, based on the rejected take-off provisions in the DC-10 Flight Manual and on a fatal DC8 accident that he had witnessed, he had developed a mental rule to not take an aircraft into the air if he suspected that there was aircraft structural failure.

Transportation Safety Board of Canada - AVIATION REPORTS - 1995 - A95H0015

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Old 22nd Aug 2011, 15:18
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These training aids emphasize the need to adhere to the V1 decision-making concept and highlight the inevitability of an overrun if a rejected take-off is initiated after V1. In its discussion of rejected take-off situations, the Takeoff Safety Training Aid states that a take-off should not be rejected once the aircraft has passed V1 unless the pilot has reason to conclude that the airplane is unsafe to fly. As well, the study concluded that in most overrun accidents, the pilots, using visual cues, did not accurately assess the amount of runway remaining or the aircraft's ability to stop.
He also believed that he would have some time after the 164-knot V1 call to make a reject decision. FDR/CVR analysis indicated that the loud bang occurred 2.2 seconds after the V1 call. The captain called the reject 1.3 seconds later. His first action to reject the take-off, retarding the power levers, occurred at 4.3 seconds after the V1 call and as the aircraft was accelerating through 172 knots. The auto-brake system activated 6.1 seconds after V1 as the result of the second officer manually deploying the spoilers. The thrust reversers were selected 3.5 seconds after the power levers were retarded, and the reverse levers were pulled into reverse 11.1 seconds after the V1 call.
The captain's decision to reject was based on the fact that he did not recognize the initial sound and subsequent thumping noises, and that, because he thought the bang could have been a bomb, he had concerns about the integrity of the aircraft and its ability to fly. Also, the captain stated that, based on the rejected take-off provisions in the DC-10 Flight Manual and on a fatal DC8 accident that he had witnessed, he had developed a mental rule to not take an aircraft into the air if he suspected that there was aircraft structural failure.
And that last statement SSG, is exactly what you are trying to do to people.

Mutt
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Old 22nd Aug 2011, 19:06
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Report: B737-800 rejected takeoff after V1

The Dutch Safety Board published the findings of their investigtion into a serious incident at Eindhoven Airport when the takeoff was rejected after the takeoff decision speed (V1).The Boeing 737-800 operated by Ryanair was taking off from runway 04 on the 4th of June 2010 at Eindhoven Airport, the Netherlands. At the time of rotating the aircraft to takeoff, the pilot flying decided to reject the takeoff because he believed the aircraft was unsafe to fly. The decision to reject was made after the takeoff decision speed (V1). The pilot performed a so-called high speed rejected takeoff.
The aircraft was halted before the end of the runway and the aircraft was subsequently taxied back to the terminal. The aircraft sustained no damage and no passengers or crew were injured.
The Safety Board concluded:
During the takeoff at Eindhoven airport the pilot flying perceived two control issues and one speed trend vector anomaly.
  • The explanation for the control issues and speed trend vector anomaly was likely related to an outside atmospheric phenomenon. The origin of this atmospheric phenomenon could not be determined or explained with the information available.
The takeoff was rejected after the decision speed V1 and while the nose wheel was off the ground for approximately two seconds.
  • The First Officer who was the pilot flying considered the control and speed trend vector problems to be serious enough and decided to reject the takeoff.
  • According to company procedures only the Captain is authorized to make a rejected takeoff decision.
  • To reject a takeoff above V1, especially when the nose wheel is off the ground, is in principle considered to be improper and unsafe.
There is no specific guidance from the operator or manufacturer on dealing with control issues at the time of rotating the aircraft.
  • Specific guidance on rejecting a takeoff exist in case of an engine failure.
  • Review of past statistics and studies show that pilot training and requirements focus on rejected takeoffs due to an engine failure. Studies and statistical information show that this accounts for less than 25% of the reasons for rejected takeoffs. Thus 75% of the reasons they reject a takeoff is not trained for.
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Old 22nd Aug 2011, 21:29
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This incident was discussed on R&N for a while. Consider:
  • The V1 speed is artificially reduced to be below VR, as such the V1 speed is NOT the maximum or limiting speed which it is possible to reject the take-off, if the aircraft wheels are still in contact with the runway (i.e. the V1 speed used for take-off is not necessarily limited by either runway length OR brake energy limits) - that speed limit isn't calculated, but can be intuited by an experienced pilot.
  • The V1 decision is only trained for engine failure - not for control problems or un-flyable conditions. If the aircraft is considered un-flyable, then a reject at ANY speed is appropriate.
  • In the same sense that a Captain may disregard SOPs in an emergency situation when the Captain considers the aircraft is under threat - does not the same apply to a licensed and qualified FO, when the aircraft is considered under threat - and there is no time to consult with the Captain?
  • In this case - the aircraft stopped, and taxied back without problems - so 20:20 hindsight says that the FO didn't endanger the aircraft by stopping.
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Old 22nd Aug 2011, 22:00
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Thanks Checker...your right, the results speak for themselves.

Amazing how many guys would watch a non-event RTO and still think the pilots should have pulled it off into the soup and fought the problem up there....
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Old 23rd Aug 2011, 03:11
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I thought it perhaps worthwhile to post the following from the 738 reject report, as it highlights the difficulties faced in the decision making process at an extremely critical time.

http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/docs/ra...yan_Air_EN.pdf

REJECTED TAKEOFFS IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Rejected takeoffs are not uncommon and in the past have resulted into accidents. Several studies and investigations were performed on rejected takeoffs, a general overview of these studies will follow. In 1990 a Special Investigation Report Runway Overruns following high speed rejected takeoffs was published by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) of the United States of America. The NTSB conducted this investigation to determine how the safety of rejected takeoffs could be enhanced and the rate of incidents reduced. The investigation used a variety of information on rejected takeoffs including historical accident data and airline procedures. In this special investigation report several recommendation are made to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on improving safety for rejected takeoffs. An overview of the recommendations are presented in appendix H. In 1994 the FAA in a joined effort with industry created a training tool for rejected takeoffs, the Takeoff Safety Training Aid. The main purpose of this training tool was to reduce the number of rejected takeoffs by improving flight crew decision making process, knowledge and awareness. The Takeoff Safety Training Aid describes the background of events and lays down training methods and simulator scenarios for pilot training on rejected takeoff decision making. The “Takeoff Safety Training Aid” training program is designed to facilitate flight crews in reaching and maintaining proficiency in:

• Recognising and understanding situations and factors that make high speed rejected takeoff decisions critical.

• Making appropriate Go/No Go decisions.

• Executing rejected takeoff procedures and employing techniques that maximises the stopping capability of the airplane should a high speed rejected takeoff be necessary.

• Continuing the takeoff safely should that be deemed the most appropriate course of action. In this safety training aid, data and background information on rejected takeoffs from 1959 up to 1990 is presented. It is reported that 76% of all rejected takeoffs are initiated at speeds of 80 knots or less. The rejected takeoffs at low speed almost never result in an accident. About 2% of the rejected takeoffs are initiated at speeds above 120 knots. Statistically more than half of the runway overruns or excursions have occurred when the rejected takeoffs were initiated at high speeds (greater than V1).

REJECT SPEED

80 knots or less 76%
80 – 100 knotsx 18%
100 – 120 knotsx 4%
Above 120 knots 2%

According to the Takeoff Safety Training Aid in the event the airspeed is beyond V1 a “go decision” is less hazardous and the takeoff should therefore not be rejected. The reasoning is that the problem faced by the flight crew may be handled more safely as an in-flight problem than a high speed rejected takeoff. The reasons for rejecting a takeoff vary from an indicator/light to wheel or tire failure.

REASONS FOR REJECT

Enginexxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx24.3%
Wheel/Tyrexxxxxxxxxxxx22.9%
Other and not reported 13.5%
Configurationxxxxxxxxxx12.2%
Indicator/Lightxxxxxxxxxx9.5%
Crew Coordinationxxxxxxx8.1%
Birdstrikexxxxxxxxxxxxxxx6.8%
ATCxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx2.7%

In an advisory circular AC no: 120-62 the FAA recommends the use of the Takeoff Safety Training Aid to operators. It is recommended that the training aid is incorporated in the operators flight crew training and qualification programs of operators. FAA inspectors are required to check the operators manuals and training to asses if the Takeoff Safety Training Aid is used and guidelines are followed. In 2004 the pilot guide to takeoff safety (section 2 of the training aid) was updated. The study period was extended from 1959 up to 2003 and accident data was supplemented with 25 additional rejected takeoffs. The additional data showed that the rate of rejected takeoff decreased. The engine related rejecting takeoffs decreased and wheel/tire failures increased by a small percentage. In late 2006, the Flight Safety Foundation initiated a project entitled Runway Safety Initiative (RSI) to address the challenge of runway safety. An in-depth study was conducted of all runway excursion accidents from 1995 through March 2008 to investigate the causes of runway excursion accidents and to identify the high-risk factors. Data was analysed to identify the most common risk factors, both in takeoff excursions and landing excursions. The most common risk factor in takeoff excursions was a rejected takeoff initiated at a speed greater than V1. Loss of pilot directional control was the next most common, followed by rejecting the takeoff before V1 was reached. This study concludes that a mishandled rejected takeoff increases the risk of takeoff runway excursion. Operators should emphasise and train for proper execution of the rejected takeoff decision and training should emphasise recognition of takeoff rejection issues. Furthermore Cockpit Resource Management and adherence to Standard Operating Procedures are essential in time-critical situations such as rejected takeoffs. A recent study (2010) by the National Aerospace Laboratory, in the Netherlands compared rejected takeoff events for the period 1980-1993 with the period 1994-2008. The split 1993-1994 was chosen because in 1994 the Takeoff Safety Training Aid was introduced. The NLR study shows that the occurrence rate of rejected takeoffs in general has decreased, however the rate of high speed rejected takeoffs has not changed. In the NLR study the decision to reject a takeoff is also examined. The study shows that the correctness of the decision to reject a takeoff before and after 1994, the introduction of the Takeoff Safety Training Aid, has not increased. The statistical information on the correctness of the decision to reject a takeoff is based on hindsight. Pilots at the time thought they were making the right decision. The study concludes that especially in complex situations, for example a combination of engine failure with significant vibration, it is difficult to assess. Assessing a complex situation and deciding to reject the takeoff is also not well trained. The study points out that the lack of reference as to what might make the aircraft unsafe to fly makes it difficult for crews in recognising such a situation to make an appropriate decision. It should be noted that care must be taken in comparing the positive (yes) and negative (no) decision to reject the takeoff. The undetermined reasons of correctness of the decision has increased in the period 1994-2008 versus 1980-1993.

REJECTED TAKEOFF DILEMMA

In the past industry initiatives and studies have identified that rejected takeoffs are a high risk area. Analysis of available data highlighted that after V1 and VR a runway overrun is likely and could potentially result in aircraft damage and/or loss of life. Statistics further show that the rate of rejected takeoff is declining. However the rate of high speed rejected takeoffs is not. In general past studies conclude that if procedures were followed the outcome would have been different. This conclusion it subsequently followed by the recommendation that flight crew should follow procedures and act accordingly. Despite simulator training on rejected takeoffs and instruction on the risks of (high speed) rejected takeoffs flight crews, when faced with a problem in reality, do not always react desirably and follow procedures. This is mainly due to the fact that during takeoff the interaction between the aircraft, environment and crew are tightly related. This interaction may result in a complex situation which is unfamiliar and difficult to assess. Technical monitoring and warning system were introduced into aircraft in the past which, when appropriate, would warn flight crew of a problem. This warning system monitors aircraft condition and should help flight crew in assessing situations correctly. In this event no warnings were triggered and the aircraft did not indicate there was a problem. From a manufacture standpoint the aircraft was therefore airworthy and safe to fly. The control check performed before flight is, in part, to assess the aircraft state and verify control responses. The environmental conditions like snow and rain on a runway are addressed in manuals to help flight crew in determining aircraft performance and make adjustments. This information is used to set preconditions and determine decision speeds. The fact remains that despite aircraft monitoring and managing preconditions impacting aircraft performance unexpected situation may occur. On takeoff the flight crew rely on perception and interpretation of situations. This perception and interpretation provides opportunity for errors in decision making. Guidance, procedures and training should help pilots in the decision making process in the critical phase of flight. With the current state of technology and human factors theories available, a re-evaluation of the rejected takeoff concept and procedures may be useful and warranted.
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Old 23rd Aug 2011, 05:28
  #73 (permalink)  
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I have very rarely seen a runway limited case.

Depends on Type and runway. I have worked with operators where the limitation on RTOW was just about invariably runway length.

Most of the times second segment or obstacles is the limitation.

Often the case but cannot be relied to be so. A problem is that the RTOW chart may not explicitly state the limiting case on the day.

Can that be the reason for the high V1 VR values, that the optimum speeds are sort of an improved climb?

Certainly, one wouldn't normally be looking to exploit improved climb by pushing the V1 down.

It is better to stop a wreck and overrun the runway than become airborne and crash.

All a risk management exercise. If the overrun is benign, of course. If tiger country (eg have a look at Nauru) perhaps not so clearcut. However, what is clear is that SOPs cover the reasonably routine - a well trained and educated captain gets to handle the hard ones .. presents a problem if the captain is a bit underdone.

But the good thing is that chances of choosing the correct action are much better than in the instinctive reaction.

That's the one. Run with the numbers and keep your fingers crossed that today you are not at the wrong end of the distribution curve.

It is, however, necessary to understand that there are occasions where the normal gameplan(s) won't work and, if you get it right (or at least get away with it), you get the bouquets (Sioux City, the Hudson, and a few others come to mind). If things don't work out so well (we don't need to cite instances) then folks tend to look down their noses.

The captain is called on to make a decision and implement it. The important thing is that a rational decision be made .. longterm fence sitting generally doesn't cut it. The outcome often involves a bit of planning, a bit of skill, and a LOT of luck.

ssg to follow

... that's a bit cruel ?
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Old 23rd Aug 2011, 07:09
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V1

I guess V1 is limited by all of the following factors
* Vstall speed
*Vmcg
*Vmca
*Vmu
and the runway length should also be a limiting factor , guys just correct me if I am wrong in any points
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Old 23rd Aug 2011, 12:38
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Originally Posted by Unhooked
I accept that a Citation pilot may have a different thought process to a quad driver with 300 tons + more inertia. But then again, should they??
I don't see any reason why they should. Smaller airplanes have smaller wheels, brakes and tires to go along with their diminutive mass. And they routinely operate into much shorter runways. In the bizjet types I've flown, we run up against most of the same performance limitations as any other transport category airplane does. The same analytical approach to takeoff performance planning is required and the same penalties for any miscalculation or ham-fisted execution apply. Do it wrong and you might not like the results.

So no. I don't think the thought process is or should be all that different. Except that nobody does it for you. You have to know how to do it yourself.
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Old 24th Aug 2011, 00:13
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Hand on T.R.

Centaurus,
One of the reasons for removing the hand from the thrust levers at V1 is to prevent the TRs from going to idle should the seat slide back on rotation with your hand on them. Would be fatal !!

Galaxy flyer,
I remember a DC8 crash where on a severe bounced landing the go around was initiated with the wing on fire. It crashed 2 miles from the airport after the wing burnt off and it went in. I'm sure there are others if we look for them.
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Old 24th Aug 2011, 06:08
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Pilots that have a preconceived idea that should they feel that the aircraft is not fit to fly, that they will stop even after V1

The general rule is along the lines that the pilot has to have a conviction that the aircraft is not going to fly .. unless the wingtip is dragging on the ground, the aircraft is blazing away on fire, three engines have failed after going through the flock of birds .. or something of like ilk, that's a big call.

The exception should never be used to argue a rule .. rather, in just about every case, we are better off running with the SOP .. if we die, it just wasn't our day to go flying. He who runs on a wing and a prayer and acts capriciously .. probably will end up dying far earlier than the rest of us.

I accept that a Citation pilot may have a different thought process

Long time since I looked at a Citation AFM but, as I vaguely recall, it has a very low Vmc and overall pretty good field length figures ?
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Old 24th Aug 2011, 06:12
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It's only a matter of time when another fool who 'pulls it off no matter what at V1, then flies the unflyable to the scene of the accident'
Amazing how many guys would watch a non-event RTO and still think the pilots should have pulled it off into the soup and fought the problem up there....
Things are not always as clear cut as you would like us to believe. Read the human factors section on this,

http://www.fomento.es/NR/rdonlyres/2...x_English1.pdf

And another,

http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/recletter...10-046-059.pdf

Perhaps they would have fared better had they pulled it into the soup and fought the problem up there. But hind sight is always 20/20 heh SSG. (No criticism implied or intended of the crews).
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Old 24th Aug 2011, 12:58
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In a rare exception to following SOPs, a GF colleague flying a TriStar in the eighties abandoned just after V1.
I'm sure this will be read by those who remember a bit better than I but, IIRC:
Something went 'BANG!'
They stopped.
Subsequently discovered that only 'D' hydraulic system remained.
'D' system didn't do very much.
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Old 25th Aug 2011, 20:42
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The common thinking in aviation is to find answers, post crash, and use those answers as a preventative to future similar problems...this is of course a hypothetical solution to a real problem.

When an aircraft simply pulls the throttles back post V1, only to taxi back to a hangar, find a mechanic...it's not even an incident, never makes the NTSB reporter, much less an FAA call...and how many times has this happened...more then you realize.

The myopic view of aviation is to look at all the accidents, typically performed by pilots at their worst, then somehow find consensus with those sad folks, rather then look at the pilots who took a potential newsworthy accident, turned it into a non issue...the answer therein lies with those that have successfully found outcomes to the problem at hand, not trying to find answers in the rubble of idiots who couldn't.

I'm not saying we shouldn't look at accidents, but why should I be held to a SOP because some moron crashed the plane, because he made a bad decision, or by some airline that hires from the bottom of the resume pile, using 'Flex to the Fence, etc etc.???
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