infrequentflyer789

I am more (or at least equally) interested in "je suis en toga, hein ?" and "On a pourtant les moteurs qu’est-ce qui se passe (…) ?" [I'm in toga, no? But we've got the engines, what's going on ?]

"crazy speed" - crazy high or crazy low ? They never acknowledge stall, unless the toga comment is reference to that, so maybe they thought they were overspeed - but they engaged toga, to respond to overspeed. Really ???

I am satsified that from basic aerodynamics, the control surface movement required to achieve the same climb demand at high airspeed (initial climb) will be less than that required at low airspeed (later), and hence the likelihood that THS will need to move to unload it will also differ. Further, I am sure that the sims have data to replicate that. Finally, I'm sure BEA haven't faked the sim data lining up with the real data - too easy to get found out, and why not just fake the FDR data at issue if you are going to fake stuff...

Those in industry are not necessarily any more trustworthy. The biggest and most suspicious missing information for me, is in the actions of AF. My consipiracy theories ? - below:


AF released new UAS procedure days after the crash - with what changes and why ? - we are not told. Think we'll ever be ?

Rumour posted on these threads was that based on the ACARS info only (all they had at the time) they threw the scenario at line crews in the sim, and they crashed. Where are the reports of those sim tests ? What could the industry be learning from the debriefs ? Silence. Information suppressed. Clearly no lessons to learn... or just too embarrassing for AF ?

Which airlines pushed back against the AI recommendation for pitot change - was it just AF or others too ? Did others put pressure on Airbus via AF ? Where was the regulator in all that - just letting them sort a safety mod out amongst themselves when the cash flow was convenient ? Think we'll ever find out ?

AF pushed back against the pitot change because they wanted proof the new ones were better. Maybe that doesn't hang them, but in the meantime they flew on with known-bad pitots. Who signed off on that risk and decision ? Where is the risk assessment for not replacing the pitots ? Does it say "procedures and crew will handle UAS" ? Did they quality check said procedures and crew in assessing that risk ? [the crews that allegedly failed to handle UAS in sim afterwards, and the procedure so well written that pilots on here with all the time in the world to analyse it can't even agree what it meant]. You reckon we're going to see that assessment from AF ? Ya think maybe it might be otherwise engaged in a meeting with Mr Shredder (if it ever existed) ?

Then there's that cross-industry working group on stall. Conveniently reporting just after BEA (but maybe not the public) find out that 447 was another stall - so not to worry, look we've already found and fixed the problem... But look at that document. Target audience - line pilots. Content - pretty diagrams showing what AOA is. WTF ??? You mean line pilots don't know that ??? Repeated statements that stall is an AOA problem, not airspeed. WTF ??? You mean line pilots have been trained that stall is purely about speed ?? And conditioned not to lose altitude in stall for fear of failing the check ?

Pilots:
a) not trained to know what AOA is (hence no need for airlines to order the AOA display option)
b) trained that stall is about airspeed (going too slow)
c) trained not to lose alt in stall (pull up)

Result:
"stall stall". "I'm in TOGA". "We've got the engines". [Pulls back. Why aren't we going up?]


Oh, and after all that rant, yes, there was something wrong with the plane too. The pitots were a bit s**t in bad weather. As we've known for 2 yrs, remedial action taken, and as AF already knew before the event - because Airbus told them, proactively. Also, if you take the plane so far outside the envelope that no mfr engineer or test pilot or sim can tell you what will happen... some of the warning logic turns out to be screwy. And, er, that's it. No control reversal or controls ineffective (actually I'm not 100% sure on those), no departure into spin, no bits falling off... In fact following stall, plane did better than might be expected.


End of the day, AF litany is "the pilots did as they were trained". Yep. That's because, in response to a single instrument failure, you trained them to crash.

And that, sir, is the real scandal, that's what needs fixing - way before looking at stall warning logic at 30deg+ AOA. And by all acounts it is an industry wide problem, not just AF.

Lyman

infrequentflyer789

Without exception, exactly so. We knew all that, and the lack of redress/mitigation is another hole in the ground. My expectations are far too high.

If the numb, led by the greedy, supported by the regulator can keep those chain saws juggled, how can anyone expect to see actual improvements in the logic/airframe? One can't.

By the way, I have been trying to herd as many as I can back to the 20 seconds around a/p drop, mostly without success. So I completely agree that the interminable wheel action of the STALL, TOGA, "SUPERSTALL" brigade is an abject waste.

Are we truly in that deep?

Whether 447 oversped or no, we see it in action elsewhere, and it debriefs as some form of "best guess" remediation, by those who are demonstrably unclear on the concept.

We should be encouraged: Airbus did "Consult with Pilots"......

philip2412

a few weeks ago i have ask a question,meant to be answered by lyman.
did he answer it ?
no
am i surprised he did`nt ?
yes,because he reacts to every post immediatley and the anwer was only "yes" or "no".
no,because he had his reason not to answer.


soonce again:

do you think every commercial pilot on the whole wide world would have put AF447 into a climb to the stars ?

HazelNuts39

BEA no.3, Appendix 1:

Ian W

If you read my original post I proposed that you watched the YouTube video of the three crew in a landing aircraft not noticing the undercarriage up warning horn. Landing with undercarriage up is dangerous :This is why [undercarriage up] Warning quite literally trumps a whole host of others"

The crew in the YouTube video were just doing a routine landing and they had a cognitive overload. It can happen the next time you try to talk on a hands-free cell phone and drive. It is almost certain to happen immediately after an automation failure and 'automation surprise'. The reason stick pushers and shakers work better than an aural warning is that they are transmitted to the brain through the haptic channel. Just like when you are concentrating on something and you 'don't hear' someone talking to you - but you react immediately if they tap you on the shoulder.

Now the question to be addressed is _why_ did all three pilots react like this. just like the crew in that YouTube video. The fact that in both cases a full crew disregard an urgent aural warning should be an indication of a cognitive problem with aural warnings. Could it be that certain character types are more susceptible to cognitive tunneling when given more workload or in non-normal situations? Perhaps there was a lack of training in a particular aspect such as flying in alternate law at cruise level - so attention was tunneled to that task?

Whatever the reason was for them ignoring what to an observer is a warning that "quite literally trumps all others" - it shows that this type of warning can remain unnoticed by crews. This cognitive issue needs to be considered at the design stage and may result in a requirement for crew selection or specific (re)training.

Blaming the three pilots and ignoring the problem won't make it go away.

Clandestino

Pitot probes are fixed pointing forwards and were so ever since there were first installed on the aeroplane. They don't handle extreme AoAs well, such as were met in AF447 case. So far no one has come with a good reason why should they be swiveling or gimballed so they can detect downward speed - we use VSI's for that.

Viper is supersonic single-engine aroplane with cropped delta wing plus chines. It has 1/5 of A330 installed thrust and 1/12 of its weight. A330 and F-16 have very different mission profiles, maneuverability/stability and stall characteristics. What works for one is not necessarily useful on the other.

So the Airbus designers installed the probes that don't work so far outside the flight envelope that noone even had an idea that aeroplane is capable of going that far out. Also they meet all certification criteria but in use get clogged in conditions we don't even know what they are. Welcome to the real world.

Human beings don't have cognitive channels. You might try improving your theory by including sensory channels in it. However, I doubt that pilots "hearing channels" were overloaded with anything else when stall warning went off.
BS. It's not an experiment, it's an instructional video most pilot have seen at one or another CRM lecture.
Nope. They really know a lot about cognitive overload, they just choose not to believe any unfounded theory about it, put forward by zealous and ignorant.

Most probably because pitot2 succumbed to icing first. As the pilot in the right hand seat was designated PF, AP2 connected to ADR2 was engaged. Recorded speeds are from ADRs 1 and 3, which meets legal minima of two speeds been recorded.

Investigation of other UAS events was made easier by other crews bringing the aeroplane back unscathed to earth and with it the QAR, which records far more parameters but doesn't have to comply with survivability requirements applicable to FDR.

I don't know about you sir, but I am not of such importance to be addressed direct by the investigation authorities. Rather I read their investigation reports that are made public and open to everyone's scrutiny. Their sole purpose is improving the aviation safety through disseminating information. They're not there to assign the blame or responsibility to anyone or anything and are not supposed to have any entertainment value. To understand and make good use of them, one needs to understand aeronautics well. To paraphrase Euclid: "There is no royal way to aeronautics".

Approaching accident reports with mind so open that the brains fall out is not conductive to learning anything from them. Lot of posts here remind me of an aphorism made by certain Teutonic, mustached gentleman:

DozyWannabe

Again, name me a single person on this thread who is doing so. Even the BEA aren't!

OK465

(my bold)

With respect to the very different stall characteristics, you know this to be true how?

DozyWannabe

Well, for a start the A330's airframe is designed to be a stable platform under normal flight conditions, and judging by the stall profile remains relatively stable in stall conditions too. The F-16 on the other hand is not stable without computer assistance even under normal flight conditions.

Lyman

When a/c is STALLED, do the F-16's stabilators migrate to, and remain at, FULLNU?

Clandestino

F-16:




Airbus 330:



You've guessed it right... it's an aspect ratio.

Lyman

That's roll, then, what about the close couple?

OK465

Nice pictures.

Lonewolf_50

The difference I spotted immediately was ... no Frenchman at the controls of the Viper.


Nice pics.

Perhaps the A330 should have crosshairs superimposed, since our Russian readers might not recoginze a commercial aircraft without one ... (KAL 007 reference, and yes, I know it wasn't an A330 ... )

And now

Coat, hat, doorway ... Taxi!!!!!

ihg

well, that might bring back scales;
Photos: Airbus A330-322 Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net

Zorin_75

I'm not sure I'd point my finger in that direction when talking about downing civilian Airbuses...

Lyman

Very unfortunate choice wolf.

DozyWannabe

To clarify:

USA : 1 (Iran Air A300)
Iraqi insurgents : 0 (Despite an attempt on a DHL A300)

Lyman

philip2412 (re: #938)

"Does Lyman think that all commercial pilots in the world would start a climb to the stars?"

Sorry, I took that for rhetorical insult. 2nd look shows it to be a sincere attempt at insult.

No pilot would initiate such a climb, obviously. Your reference to the "intention" of 'to the stars' makes it ridiculous.......


These guys did not do so. Nor would anyone.

VGCM66

It is not the flying machines but the pilots and it is happening all over.

Accident: South East T154 at Moscow on Dec 4th 2010, two of three engines out in flight

Two assertions but only one is true:

"A good pilot is a well trained pilot."

"A well trained pilot is a good pilot."

One is not necessarily so. Can you guess which one?