Quote:
Originally Posted by Ian W
Unfortunately, people who disbelieve the existence of cognitive overload have been allowed to design, test and implement aircraft systems. Setting up the potential for just the type of human factors caused accident that we have seen in AF447.
Originally Posted by Dozywannabe
That is a complete falsehood. Half the reason for the somewhat arcane annunciation logic employed in modern airliners is for the precise reason that cognitive overload is so feared and to be avoided. This is why Stall Warning quite literally trumps a whole host of others.
If you read my original post I proposed that you watched the YouTube video of the three crew in a landing aircraft not noticing the undercarriage up warning horn. Landing with undercarriage up is dangerous :This is why [undercarriage up]
Warning quite literally trumps a whole host of others"
The crew in the YouTube video were just doing a routine landing and they had a cognitive overload. It can happen the next time you try to talk on a hands-free cell phone and drive. It is almost certain to happen immediately after an automation failure and 'automation surprise'. The reason stick pushers and shakers work better than an aural warning is that they are transmitted to the brain through the haptic channel. Just like when you are concentrating on something and you 'don't hear' someone talking to you - but you react
immediately if they tap you on the shoulder.
Now the question to be addressed is _why_ did all three pilots react like this. just like the crew in that YouTube video. The fact that in both cases a full crew disregard an urgent aural warning should be an indication of a cognitive problem with aural warnings. Could it be that certain character types are more susceptible to cognitive tunneling when given more workload or in non-normal situations? Perhaps there was a lack of training in a particular aspect such as flying in alternate law at cruise level - so attention was tunneled to that task?
Whatever the reason was for them ignoring what to an observer is a warning that "
quite literally trumps all others" - it shows that this type of warning can remain unnoticed by crews. This cognitive issue needs to be considered at the design stage and may result in a requirement for crew selection or specific (re)training.
Blaming the three pilots and ignoring the problem won't make it go away.