Originally Posted by rudderrudderrat
Please explain how a ROD of 10,000 per min (about 98 kts) is not sufficient to validate the stall warning.
Pitot probes are fixed pointing forwards and were so ever since there were first installed on the aeroplane. They don't handle extreme AoAs well, such as were met in AF447 case. So far no one has come with a good reason why should they be swiveling or gimballed so they can detect downward speed - we use VSI's for that.
Originally Posted by gums
Worked for me and thousands of Viper pilots.
Viper is supersonic single-engine aroplane with cropped delta wing plus chines. It has 1/5 of A330 installed thrust and 1/12 of its weight. A330 and F-16 have very different mission profiles, maneuverability/stability and stall characteristics. What works for one is not necessarily useful on the other.
So the Airbus designers installed the probes that don't work so far outside the flight envelope that noone even had an idea that aeroplane is capable of going that far out. Also they meet all certification criteria but in use get clogged in conditions we don't even know what they are. Welcome to the real world.
Originally Posted by Ian W
Overload a cognitive channel and NOTHING else will be processed by it
Human beings don't have cognitive channels. You might try improving your theory by including sensory channels in it. However, I doubt that pilots "hearing channels" were overloaded with anything else when stall warning went off.
Originally Posted by Ian W
There is a famous experiment where a team of observers of a basket ball match did not notice a man in a gorilla suit on the basket ball court.
BS. It's not an experiment, it's an instructional video most pilot have seen at one or another CRM lecture.
Originally Posted by Ian W
people who disbelieve the existence of cognitive overload have been allowed to design, test and implement aircraft systems.
Nope. They really know a lot about cognitive overload, they just choose not to believe any unfounded theory about it, put forward by zealous and ignorant.
Originally Posted by GerardC
1) Does anyone know why AP disconnected at 02:10:05 ?
(...)
I do not see any discrepancy between the two recorded AS before, at least, 02:10:07.5.
Most probably because pitot2 succumbed to icing first. As the pilot in the right hand seat was designated PF, AP2 connected to ADR2 was engaged. Recorded speeds are from ADRs 1 and 3, which meets legal minima of two speeds been recorded.
Investigation of other UAS events was made easier by other crews bringing the aeroplane back unscathed to earth and with it the QAR, which records far more parameters but doesn't have to comply with survivability requirements applicable to FDR.
Originally Posted by CONF iture
Of course ... Nevertheless they do not share all the facts starting with data and won’t necessarily feel the need to share all of their analysis, with Clandestino or CONF iture.
I don't know about you sir, but I am not of such importance to be addressed direct by the investigation authorities. Rather I read their investigation reports that are made public and open to everyone's scrutiny. Their sole purpose is improving the aviation safety through disseminating information. They're not there to assign the blame or responsibility to anyone or anything and are not supposed to have any entertainment value. To understand and make good use of them, one needs to understand aeronautics well. To paraphrase Euclid: "There is no royal way to aeronautics".
Approaching accident reports with mind so open that the brains fall out is not conductive to learning anything from them. Lot of posts here remind me of an aphorism made by certain Teutonic, mustached gentleman:
Originally Posted by Friedrich Nietzsche
The worst readers are those who proceed like plundering soldiers: they pick up a few things they can use, soil and confuse the rest, and blaspheme the whole.