AF 447 Thread No. 6
How interesting, the response to a jest.
This if off topic, but, in the course of the jest, please recall that there was NO visual ID in the Vincennes / AB300 incident, and while there was a VISUAL ID in the KAL 007. Given that we were talking about pictures, do you wonder at why I said it thusly? "since our Russian readers might not recoginze a commercial aircraft" (again, this is a jest) which might imply actually looking at an aircraft with a Mk 1 Mod 0 eyeball.
By the way, Zorin, you will find that KAL 007 was a Boeing aircraft- a 747. (Does it occur to you that this is why I put, in parens, the bit about it not being an A330?) Your attempted riposte might have worked better with an understanding of the facts.
In any case, Clandestino posted nice pics, so off we go, back to the discussion about ... an Airbus 330 that tied the low altitude record over the Atlantic Ocean. (And perhaps setting a record for negative altitude?
)
This if off topic, but, in the course of the jest, please recall that there was NO visual ID in the Vincennes / AB300 incident, and while there was a VISUAL ID in the KAL 007. Given that we were talking about pictures, do you wonder at why I said it thusly? "since our Russian readers might not recoginze a commercial aircraft" (again, this is a jest) which might imply actually looking at an aircraft with a Mk 1 Mod 0 eyeball.
By the way, Zorin, you will find that KAL 007 was a Boeing aircraft- a 747. (Does it occur to you that this is why I put, in parens, the bit about it not being an A330?) Your attempted riposte might have worked better with an understanding of the facts.
In any case, Clandestino posted nice pics, so off we go, back to the discussion about ... an Airbus 330 that tied the low altitude record over the Atlantic Ocean. (And perhaps setting a record for negative altitude?
)
Nice pics. Best-looking jet I ever flew. And PLZ note the lack of a "PNF" or the ability to leave the cockpit and take a nap.
The Viper could not enter a stall in the conventional sense due to the AoA versus Gee pitch command implementation. The AoA limit was intentionally placed at 27 degrees to allow full roll commands at that value without fear of a departure. That's with A2A configuration. With bombs and such it was a different story and our AoA limit was reduced to about 18 deg and roll command was also reduced.
So the way you got to the "deep stall" was to be clever, or stoopid, and command a max roll rate when slow, but not necessarily "riding the limiter". So you could "rate" the pitch thru the limiter and also introduce some roll-coupling for added measure. However, several of the first "deep stall" incidents resulted from climbing at a high pitch attitude while holding the one gee basic trim command. If you slowed down quickly enough, then the stabilators ran outta nose down authority - about 50 deg AoA, and the pitch moment coefficient was such that you could not lower the nose.
The Airbus deep "stall" ( can't say it's a "deep stall" such as the Viper had or the T-tail airliners) is still not clearly defined. We don't have a good graph of the pitch moment coefficients or the amount of control authority with the THS in full nose down position at extremely high AoA. What we DO HAVE is one test point that implies the A330 can remain in a stalled condition when the THS is positioned for a full nose up command AND the pilot is commanding nose up - AF447.
The AF447 maneuver closely resembles the Viper entry conditions I described. Fly nose up with decreasing airspeed and then add the THS movement to full nose up command and Voila! Fly thru the AoA protection and you're there. And I am still not convinced that the AoA protection was working normally.
I still maintain that AoA inputs can be of value even at very slow speeds. In the Viper, you hit the gee limit before the AoA limit at cruise speeds and higher. This was based on the dynamic pressure at the time. So we could get 9 gees at about 360 KCAS and 15 degrees AoA. If you "rode the limiter" down to one gee, you were at 27 deg AoA. You were also very slow, maybe 140 knots or so.
That's all for now, and thot we went thru this before.
The Viper could not enter a stall in the conventional sense due to the AoA versus Gee pitch command implementation. The AoA limit was intentionally placed at 27 degrees to allow full roll commands at that value without fear of a departure. That's with A2A configuration. With bombs and such it was a different story and our AoA limit was reduced to about 18 deg and roll command was also reduced.
So the way you got to the "deep stall" was to be clever, or stoopid, and command a max roll rate when slow, but not necessarily "riding the limiter". So you could "rate" the pitch thru the limiter and also introduce some roll-coupling for added measure. However, several of the first "deep stall" incidents resulted from climbing at a high pitch attitude while holding the one gee basic trim command. If you slowed down quickly enough, then the stabilators ran outta nose down authority - about 50 deg AoA, and the pitch moment coefficient was such that you could not lower the nose.
The Airbus deep "stall" ( can't say it's a "deep stall" such as the Viper had or the T-tail airliners) is still not clearly defined. We don't have a good graph of the pitch moment coefficients or the amount of control authority with the THS in full nose down position at extremely high AoA. What we DO HAVE is one test point that implies the A330 can remain in a stalled condition when the THS is positioned for a full nose up command AND the pilot is commanding nose up - AF447.
The AF447 maneuver closely resembles the Viper entry conditions I described. Fly nose up with decreasing airspeed and then add the THS movement to full nose up command and Voila! Fly thru the AoA protection and you're there. And I am still not convinced that the AoA protection was working normally.
I still maintain that AoA inputs can be of value even at very slow speeds. In the Viper, you hit the gee limit before the AoA limit at cruise speeds and higher. This was based on the dynamic pressure at the time. So we could get 9 gees at about 360 KCAS and 15 degrees AoA. If you "rode the limiter" down to one gee, you were at 27 deg AoA. You were also very slow, maybe 140 knots or so.
That's all for now, and thot we went thru this before.
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From looking at the data in the latest report, sure looks to me like the pilot pulling nose up (and the THS at full nose up) were not enough to keep the aircraft in the nose-high attitude and thus, the full stall.
Notice the ENGINE THRUST traces vs. attitude during the stall. Every time the pilots pulled back on the throttle, the nose fell through as it should. The engines (thrust) was what kept them in the nose up attitude and in the stall, not the pilot sidestick commands OR the THS.
Notice the ENGINE THRUST traces vs. attitude during the stall. Every time the pilots pulled back on the throttle, the nose fell through as it should. The engines (thrust) was what kept them in the nose up attitude and in the stall, not the pilot sidestick commands OR the THS.
Originally Posted by gums
The Viper could not enter a stall in the conventional sense due to the AoA versus Gee pitch command implementation.
Originally Posted by gums
And I am still not convinced that the AoA protection was working normally.
Loss of protections is not such a stark condition as its name would imply. Airbus protections don't interfere with flying as long as one stays well within the envelope and are only very seldom met during regular flying. When they're gone, one can rely only on one's own wits to keep him from transgressing outside the flight envelope but that's what pilots have been doing since there were first pilots.
All the talking about three different aeroplanes in three different control laws is pretty non-sensical. Aerodynamically and performance-wise, it is the same aeroplane and flight controls feel is not much different. At least it is so in level D sim and I yet have to come across level D that doesn't closely match the aeroplane's behaviour - within the territory where test pilots dared to go.
Originally Posted by PuraVidaTransport
The engines (thrust) was what kept them in the nose up attitude and in the stall, not the pilot sidestick commands OR the THS.
Mach effects and AoA
Trust me, I am very familiar with mach and AoA. I also appreciate a design of the fly-by-wire control laws that takes into account of all the aero crapola.
Until you have supersonic flow over the entire wing, then the basic AoA works like we expect. Once supersonic, we have a different shock wave flow pattern, hence the "diamond" configuration of some fighters' wings. We no longer have a "normal" shockwave front and have different pressures on the bottom and top and even parts thereof. The diamond airfoils have at least two shockwave "fronts" on top and bottom. So moving the wing or the stab changes the pressures and we get pitch authority. Ailerons have a more serious problem, but the clever engineers have figured that out.
The Airbus AoA versus mach equation seems very conservative, and I would bet my life on the AoA before the overspeed warnings and whatever "laws" and warnings that are implemented. I seriously doubt you could rip the wings off of the A330 if you exceeded the "protections"/"warning" values by .05 mach or 30 or 40 knots EAS/CAS/IAS. You might get some wing "flapping" as the shockwaves got in the way of the ailerons and spoliers, but big deal.
The shockwaves over the THS would be more of a concern to me, and I have provided Yeager's war story and the design changes to all fighters that resulted in all-moving horizontal stabilizers ( not the 'bus with a conventional elevator and the THS).
In all defense of the basic Airbus aero design, the sucker looks like an outstanding platform without all the FBW protections and plethora of alternate laws and such. i would take that beast and wring it out any day even in the "direct law". OTOH, I fully understand the FBW control surface movements and rate and mechanical/aero limts that are implemented. I would not like to fly the beast with a simple electric command of the control surface position and rate of movement. But I could!!!
As all know here, I have an extreme problem with all the "autopilot" functions and "protections" that Airbus has implemented that can get in the way of basic airmanship by the pilots and the basic aero characteristics of the jet. The jet appears to be well-designed.
Until you have supersonic flow over the entire wing, then the basic AoA works like we expect. Once supersonic, we have a different shock wave flow pattern, hence the "diamond" configuration of some fighters' wings. We no longer have a "normal" shockwave front and have different pressures on the bottom and top and even parts thereof. The diamond airfoils have at least two shockwave "fronts" on top and bottom. So moving the wing or the stab changes the pressures and we get pitch authority. Ailerons have a more serious problem, but the clever engineers have figured that out.
The Airbus AoA versus mach equation seems very conservative, and I would bet my life on the AoA before the overspeed warnings and whatever "laws" and warnings that are implemented. I seriously doubt you could rip the wings off of the A330 if you exceeded the "protections"/"warning" values by .05 mach or 30 or 40 knots EAS/CAS/IAS. You might get some wing "flapping" as the shockwaves got in the way of the ailerons and spoliers, but big deal.
The shockwaves over the THS would be more of a concern to me, and I have provided Yeager's war story and the design changes to all fighters that resulted in all-moving horizontal stabilizers ( not the 'bus with a conventional elevator and the THS).
In all defense of the basic Airbus aero design, the sucker looks like an outstanding platform without all the FBW protections and plethora of alternate laws and such. i would take that beast and wring it out any day even in the "direct law". OTOH, I fully understand the FBW control surface movements and rate and mechanical/aero limts that are implemented. I would not like to fly the beast with a simple electric command of the control surface position and rate of movement. But I could!!!
As all know here, I have an extreme problem with all the "autopilot" functions and "protections" that Airbus has implemented that can get in the way of basic airmanship by the pilots and the basic aero characteristics of the jet. The jet appears to be well-designed.
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It's the engine thrust...nothing more
Clandestino - If you will look at the FDR traces in the latest report, you will notice that at 2:11:45 the pilot had full nose-up sidestick inputs, the THS was in the process of moving to full nose up and the aircraft was fully stalled with a nose-up attitude of about 15 degrees and an AOA greater than 30 degrees. A few seconds later, the N1 falls off, bottoming out at about 2:12:07 around 60%. During this time, PF had the sidestick full back and the THS was almost full nose up BUT the attitude decreased from 15 degrees nose up to 10 degrees nose down in about 10 seconds.
Later, at around 2:14:05, with both sidesticks in full back (nose up) and the THS at full nose up, a decrees in N1 reduced the pitch from 20 degrees nose up to 5 degrees nose down. For me, this proves what was keeping the nose pitched up was the thrust not any flight control inputs or the THS because EVERY time thrust was reduced, the nose fell despite the PF actions (inputs and THS).
Every other instance where the nose started to fall were control inputs showing even with the full thrust, there was enough control to get the nose down.
Later, at around 2:14:05, with both sidesticks in full back (nose up) and the THS at full nose up, a decrees in N1 reduced the pitch from 20 degrees nose up to 5 degrees nose down. For me, this proves what was keeping the nose pitched up was the thrust not any flight control inputs or the THS because EVERY time thrust was reduced, the nose fell despite the PF actions (inputs and THS).
Every other instance where the nose started to fall were control inputs showing even with the full thrust, there was enough control to get the nose down.
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Clandestino #960
A "brave test pilot " has done some of the tests. Jacques Roysay in Airbus Safety First quotes a " practical test done in flight, and well reproduced in the simulator..." of an A340 in various approaches with the Stall Warning on, at low level, going from flight idle to TOGA.
See page 8 Para 8 ( Home ) January 2011 issue.
( I suppose that it was probably not at night, in/near a Cb. and suddenly...)
A "brave test pilot " has done some of the tests. Jacques Roysay in Airbus Safety First quotes a " practical test done in flight, and well reproduced in the simulator..." of an A340 in various approaches with the Stall Warning on, at low level, going from flight idle to TOGA.
See page 8 Para 8 ( Home ) January 2011 issue.
( I suppose that it was probably not at night, in/near a Cb. and suddenly...)
Last edited by Linktrained; 22nd Sep 2011 at 00:48.
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Hi,
Some press release ... (BEA accused by a family lawyer)
Vol Rio-Paris: des familles de victimes saisissent la juge d'instruction - Libération
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Some press release ... (BEA accused by a family lawyer)
Vol Rio-Paris: des familles de victimes saisissent la juge d'instruction - Libération
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The article (and the lawyer concerned) seems to be saying in a roundabout way that the pitot probes should have been subject to an AD rather than a service bulletin, but neglects to mention that it was AF who had chosen to delay the replacement until the next scheduled service interval - in defiance of Airbus's own recommendation that the replacement be carried out as soon as practically possible. It also neglects to mention that BUSS was a new option (that AF had elected not to fit), and the research that caused its development was also very new at the time of the AF447 crash.
It also makes the assertion that the BEA have been implicitly blaming the pilots which is not the case - if anything, the interim reports and press releases since the retrieval of the flight recorders have tended to imply a problem within Air France and the industry as a whole.
So basically it's an ambulance chaser going after bigger money by trying to get the aircraft (and it's manufacturer) blamed, or assigned more responsibility than they are already expected to share due to the pitot tube issues - they've produced no proof at all that the BEA are anything but on the level here.
This is no different than the cases where ambulance chasers in the past have tried to get manufacturers (not just Airbus) in the frame legally when the reports and evidence say there is no reason to do so as yet.
It also makes the assertion that the BEA have been implicitly blaming the pilots which is not the case - if anything, the interim reports and press releases since the retrieval of the flight recorders have tended to imply a problem within Air France and the industry as a whole.
So basically it's an ambulance chaser going after bigger money by trying to get the aircraft (and it's manufacturer) blamed, or assigned more responsibility than they are already expected to share due to the pitot tube issues - they've produced no proof at all that the BEA are anything but on the level here.
This is no different than the cases where ambulance chasers in the past have tried to get manufacturers (not just Airbus) in the frame legally when the reports and evidence say there is no reason to do so as yet.
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That certainly is a point of view, and well taken. The problem with it is that it reeks of the type of rhetoric the ambulance chaser is accused of using.
pot/kettle
Hindsight and the accusation of the use thereof cuts both ways. This accident makes painfully clear some things no one wants to look at, least of all a partisan.
As a flyer, I take note of the record. With upwards of three dozen UAS events, each handled in an ad hoc manner, the replacement of the Probes should have been an emergency AD, imo. One would hope that those in charge would have seen it that way after the first dozen or so events.
This alone frames the problem well. It also makes clear the approach used by the Line, the Manufacturer, and the Regulator: Roll with the data, modify procedures, and alert the crews.
Mixing bile with resentment does not produce a clear product.
Lawyers do what they do, and in doing so, present a kind of eeyew predictability that has an aroma of integrity.
It is such a shame that while the three principals present as having integrity, they do not, and seemingly, they have their cheering section as well.
The worst of this crowd is the supposed "independent" Investigator/Regulator. It is to laugh out loud, this hypocrisy.
Hindsight should destroy this practice; can there be agreement?
pot/kettle
Hindsight and the accusation of the use thereof cuts both ways. This accident makes painfully clear some things no one wants to look at, least of all a partisan.
As a flyer, I take note of the record. With upwards of three dozen UAS events, each handled in an ad hoc manner, the replacement of the Probes should have been an emergency AD, imo. One would hope that those in charge would have seen it that way after the first dozen or so events.
This alone frames the problem well. It also makes clear the approach used by the Line, the Manufacturer, and the Regulator: Roll with the data, modify procedures, and alert the crews.
Mixing bile with resentment does not produce a clear product.
Lawyers do what they do, and in doing so, present a kind of eeyew predictability that has an aroma of integrity.
It is such a shame that while the three principals present as having integrity, they do not, and seemingly, they have their cheering section as well.
The worst of this crowd is the supposed "independent" Investigator/Regulator. It is to laugh out loud, this hypocrisy.
Hindsight should destroy this practice; can there be agreement?
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Hi,
To see on France 5 TV network this Sunday
Guide des programmes - France 5
To see on France 5 TV network this Sunday
Guide des programmes - France 5
52 'documentary directed by Fabrice Amedeo and Veronique Préault and produced by Galaxy Press, with the participation of France Televisions and Planet.
Air France is one of the largest companies in the world, but it displays in aviation safety, a poor track record with three major accidents in less than ten years. The crash of the Rio-Paris in June 2009, which caused the disappearance of 228 people, the explosion of an aircraft landing in Toronto in 2005, which has miraculously no one was injured and the accident Concorde takeoff in 2000, which was 113 dead. They made the French company plunged into the depths of the world ranking security. How to explain this series of disasters? Could they be avoided? Do you always expect the worst to react? Aviation Safety at Air France is one of the biggest taboos of French industry. With this documentary, for the first time, people start to speak, witnesses speak, retired from the company whistleblowers. The investigation goes back to the track unreported incidents in recent months, where we came close to disaster. For the first time, Air France has played the game of transparency. The company has agreed to allow filming Focus on the drivers, which symbolize the company's thinking on the major changes necessary for safety. From internal documents and testimony shocks, this film breaks the silence, of setting in the aviation industry.
(Programme for teletext subtitles for the deaf and hard of hearing)
Air France is one of the largest companies in the world, but it displays in aviation safety, a poor track record with three major accidents in less than ten years. The crash of the Rio-Paris in June 2009, which caused the disappearance of 228 people, the explosion of an aircraft landing in Toronto in 2005, which has miraculously no one was injured and the accident Concorde takeoff in 2000, which was 113 dead. They made the French company plunged into the depths of the world ranking security. How to explain this series of disasters? Could they be avoided? Do you always expect the worst to react? Aviation Safety at Air France is one of the biggest taboos of French industry. With this documentary, for the first time, people start to speak, witnesses speak, retired from the company whistleblowers. The investigation goes back to the track unreported incidents in recent months, where we came close to disaster. For the first time, Air France has played the game of transparency. The company has agreed to allow filming Focus on the drivers, which symbolize the company's thinking on the major changes necessary for safety. From internal documents and testimony shocks, this film breaks the silence, of setting in the aviation industry.
(Programme for teletext subtitles for the deaf and hard of hearing)
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As a flyer, I take note of the record. With upwards of three dozen UAS events, each handled in an ad hoc manner, the replacement of the Probes should have been an emergency AD, imo. One would hope that those in charge would have seen it that way after the first dozen or so events.
To re-state the facts as they were prior to this accident is not "partisan" in any way - facts are facts. To state that there was no emergency situation beforehand is not cheerleading, it is just honesty.
Put another way - before this happened, if I as a mere software engineer had suggested that a 2-man relief crew with a combined number of hours in excess of 6,000 was unable to identify - let alone recover from - a high-altitude stall, I'd have been pilloried and laughed off the forum for impugning the abilities of professional airline pilots. Now we know that if the training is inadequate, that can indeed happen and the ripples of that revelation will be doing their work throughout the industry for some time to come.
In a perfect world, every incident that revealed a minor technical problem would result in an AD until the problem was fixed. But neither the world nor the aviation industry is perfect, and real politik will have to be taken into account. This situation is a million miles from the DC-10 cargo door issue (where an AD was appropriate), because the loss of pitot data results in neither structural damage nor an uncontrollable aircraft. The accusation of political machinations also rings hollow, because Airbus were not at the time in existential danger from the issue - the A330 and A340 were already a commercial success and there was little danger of jeopardising their continued success.
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When there is an "as supplied" issue, one that creates a safety problem, the standard of the industry is to recall the equipment, or arrange for a refit or replacement. Air France is not in the Airframe business, and Pitot Tubes are not "livery". Airbus is clearly in the wrong, though I see your point, I simply do not agree.
"Void if altered or modified". Ring a Bell? Even with an automobile, a conveyance that can pull over to the side of the road, the vehicle is recalled to the location of Manufacturer's representative, for an approved repair or replacement of the offending kit.
The arrangement is demonstrably full of "Oh, I thought you'd take care of that" nonsense that allows for keeping in service, equipment that has demonstrably fallen short of safety minima.
You think loss of indicated airspeed is not an emergency? The only pilot who may be surprised with a life and death issue must be in test only. UAS got to be "acceptable risk", I think it has been shown that the state of affairs shows it not to be acceptable at all. Not knowing if a STALL WARN is correct? Not knowing that re select of autopilot might initiate a wild climb? These data WERE KNOWN and the pitots sat on the Bench.
You are satisfied that Airbus is free of responsibility once AF has the SB? Two things of utmost importance are absent from that opinion.
Initiative, and Follow-up.
Regulator, Airbus, Air France:
This unholy triumvirate has killed 228 people.
So now the Overspeed Protection is the latest wiggle on the worm? The lack of forthright clarity in understanding of systems by the pilots here on thread is disturbing. Someone, somewhere must know what's up.
Do they?
ps. Be careful about constantly returning to the "ill-trained" crew meme.
We do NOT know that, and pending the accuracy and content of further data, it is a thin branch on which to stand. Saying otherwise begs the lie for BEA "Not impugning the crew" with cherry picked releases. imho.
best regards
"Void if altered or modified". Ring a Bell? Even with an automobile, a conveyance that can pull over to the side of the road, the vehicle is recalled to the location of Manufacturer's representative, for an approved repair or replacement of the offending kit.
The arrangement is demonstrably full of "Oh, I thought you'd take care of that" nonsense that allows for keeping in service, equipment that has demonstrably fallen short of safety minima.
You think loss of indicated airspeed is not an emergency? The only pilot who may be surprised with a life and death issue must be in test only. UAS got to be "acceptable risk", I think it has been shown that the state of affairs shows it not to be acceptable at all. Not knowing if a STALL WARN is correct? Not knowing that re select of autopilot might initiate a wild climb? These data WERE KNOWN and the pitots sat on the Bench.
You are satisfied that Airbus is free of responsibility once AF has the SB? Two things of utmost importance are absent from that opinion.
Initiative, and Follow-up.
Regulator, Airbus, Air France:
This unholy triumvirate has killed 228 people.
So now the Overspeed Protection is the latest wiggle on the worm? The lack of forthright clarity in understanding of systems by the pilots here on thread is disturbing. Someone, somewhere must know what's up.
Do they?
ps. Be careful about constantly returning to the "ill-trained" crew meme.
We do NOT know that, and pending the accuracy and content of further data, it is a thin branch on which to stand. Saying otherwise begs the lie for BEA "Not impugning the crew" with cherry picked releases. imho.
best regards
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Lyman, I said I wasn't going to get into this with you any more.
No, that's quoting me selectively - I said Airbus cannot be held responsible for the somewhat lackadaisical approach to replacing the pitot tubes that AF took. Airbus are still on the hook for the pitot tube problems in the first place.
It was an unfortunate situation, but there was no cover-up here, no "unholy triumvirate". This was a problem that had a procedural solution while the mechanical solution was being applied - just like the long-dormant software bug in the 747-400's control logic that the BA crew recently discovered, a fix was designed and was in the process of being rolled out without having to ground the fleet. This is not unusual, it's just how aviation works.
Anyway, enough.
It was an unfortunate situation, but there was no cover-up here, no "unholy triumvirate". This was a problem that had a procedural solution while the mechanical solution was being applied - just like the long-dormant software bug in the 747-400's control logic that the BA crew recently discovered, a fix was designed and was in the process of being rolled out without having to ground the fleet. This is not unusual, it's just how aviation works.
Anyway, enough.
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When a critical repair is delegated to others, no matter the provenance, two things:
Responsibility cannot be shrugged off, and a follow on is required for many reasons. It is not so simple as you say. Suffice to say Airbus was obviously satisfied with the protocol for replacement, and they should have been more careful.
Having identified the problem, it is not possible for Airbus to absolve responsibility for its mitigation, as we will see.
Thanks for your time and patience.
Responsibility cannot be shrugged off, and a follow on is required for many reasons. It is not so simple as you say. Suffice to say Airbus was obviously satisfied with the protocol for replacement, and they should have been more careful.
Having identified the problem, it is not possible for Airbus to absolve responsibility for its mitigation, as we will see.
Thanks for your time and patience.
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Hi,
DW
Ciel orageux sur l
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It's unfortunate that BEA took also in accounts real politik and by doing so become a not credible or independent investigation office
DW
But neither the world nor the aviation industry is perfect, and real politik will have to be taken into account
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It's unfortunate that BEA took also in accounts real politik and by doing so become a not credible or independent investigation office
Tutelle. La loi garantit son «indépendance», mais sans lui en donner les moyens, car c’est un service de la Direction générale de l’aviation civile (DGAC), elle-même sous tutelle du ministre des Transports. Or, le BEA est susceptible d’enquêter sur la DGAC, mais aussi sur Airbus et Air France, dont l’Etat est actionnaire. D’où les risques d’interventions et de conflits d’intérêts. Le crash du Concorde en 2000, à la suite d’un éclatement de pneus ayant perforé la voilure, est un cas d’école. Lors de l’instruction, un enquêteur du BEA, Michel Bourgeois, a rapporté avoir subi des pressions lors d’un incident similaire survenu sur l’avion en 1979 : «On nous a dit de rester tranquilles et de ne pas embêter Air France.» Le juge d’instruction a également constaté que les incidents de pneus «pouvaient provoquer des trous de dimensions importantes» dans les ailes, ce qui a «semble-t-il, gêné le constructeur». Effectivement : EADS (maison mère d’Airbus) a demandé en août 2000 au BEA d’ajouter dans son rapport que les trous étaient «de petite dimension». Ce que le BEA a accepté. Mais on ne l’a su que dix ans plus tard. Cet exemple et celui du Rio-Paris (lire ci-contre) mettent en cause les méthodes du BEA, souvent critiqué pour son «manque de transparence». Il envoie son rapport avant publication aux acteurs concernés, sans jamais dire s’il a pris en compte leurs observations dans sa rédaction finale. A la différence de la Cour des comptes, qui ne modifie pas ses rapports, mais publie en annexe la réponse des organismes qu’elle met en cause.
Guardianship. The law guarantees its "independence", but give him the means, because it is a service of the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGAC), which in turn supervised by the Minister of Transport. However, the BEA is likely to investigate the DGAC, but also on Airbus and Air France, which the state is a shareholder. Where the risks of interventions and conflicts of interest. The Concorde crash in 2000, following a tire burst having punctured the wing, is a textbook case. At the trial, an investigator from the BEA, Michel Bourgeois, reported being pressured in a similar incident on the plane in 1979: "We were told to be quiet and not bother Air France. "The judge also found that incidents of tires" could cause large size holes "in the wings, which" apparently he embarrassed the manufacturer. " Actually: EADS (Airbus' parent company) has requested in August 2000 to add the BEA in its report that the holes were "small." What the BEA agreed. But we did know that ten years later. This example and that of the Rio-Paris (see below cons) involved the methods of the BEA, often criticized for its "lack of transparency." He sends his report before publication to stakeholders, without ever saying it took into account comments in its final drafting. Unlike the Court of Auditors, which does not modify its reports, published in the appendix but the response of the organizations it involves.
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Originally Posted by DW
An AD would have resulted in the grounding of all A330 and A340s
The compliance time for an AD has not to be immediate.
Originally Posted by DW
Airbus said "fix this", AF decided to delay
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@jcj - The BEA is a different institution than it was in 1979. The world learned the hard way what happens when accident investigation and repair procedures are stymied for political reasons. They were so afraid of being seen as biased following AF296 that they invited the NTSB along as impartial observers following the Air Inter crash, and to my knowledge the NTSB had nothing bad to say about thir methods. I'd like to know the source of the "large" vs. "small" argument in 2000 regarding Concorde, and I'd also like to know more details about what that means. To me, a "large" hole would imply a significant enough size to reduce lift, which never happened due to a tyre burst.
@CONF
A Service Bulletin also says "fix this" - the difference between that and an AD is that the aircraft should not be considered airworthy without the repair being done promptly (and supervised by the regulatory authority) in the case of the latter, which was not the case based on the evidence prior to AF447.
(PS. My question here : http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/3...ml#post6661648 remains unanswered - did you see it, and would you like to give it a go?)
Airbus covered as many bases as possible by releasing the Service Bulletin and advice to pilots for procedures to follow in the case of a UAS incident. These procedures were not followed in the case of AF447, whether due to human factors, poor training or a combination of the two. Whatever the outcome of the debate over the stall warning logic at low speed, the fact is that the aircraft would not have stalled in the first place had proper airmanship been applied, and no matter how many some may wish for evidence supporting the automatics being behind the initial zoom climb, that evidence does not exist. Instead there's plenty of evidence supporting manual input causing the zoom climb, followed by a failure to diagnose stall and an attempt to "power out" of the upset, and unless you're prepared to provide evidence that the BEA have somehow falsified the flight recorder traces, then that is the most likely conclusion.
The BEA are not content to "blame the pilots" and leave it at that, however and the presence of an in-depth human factors investigation proves that - so to say that they are protecting the regulator, manufacturer or airline is nothing short of a big, fat lie. As I said earlier, the A330 is a success and the project has broken even - what is there to "protect"?
@CONF
A Service Bulletin also says "fix this" - the difference between that and an AD is that the aircraft should not be considered airworthy without the repair being done promptly (and supervised by the regulatory authority) in the case of the latter, which was not the case based on the evidence prior to AF447.
(PS. My question here : http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/3...ml#post6661648 remains unanswered - did you see it, and would you like to give it a go?)
Airbus covered as many bases as possible by releasing the Service Bulletin and advice to pilots for procedures to follow in the case of a UAS incident. These procedures were not followed in the case of AF447, whether due to human factors, poor training or a combination of the two. Whatever the outcome of the debate over the stall warning logic at low speed, the fact is that the aircraft would not have stalled in the first place had proper airmanship been applied, and no matter how many some may wish for evidence supporting the automatics being behind the initial zoom climb, that evidence does not exist. Instead there's plenty of evidence supporting manual input causing the zoom climb, followed by a failure to diagnose stall and an attempt to "power out" of the upset, and unless you're prepared to provide evidence that the BEA have somehow falsified the flight recorder traces, then that is the most likely conclusion.
The BEA are not content to "blame the pilots" and leave it at that, however and the presence of an in-depth human factors investigation proves that - so to say that they are protecting the regulator, manufacturer or airline is nothing short of a big, fat lie. As I said earlier, the A330 is a success and the project has broken even - what is there to "protect"?