Originally Posted by
Lyman
GY
Are you at all interested in what PNF meant: "What was that?" How about PF: "I think we have some crazy speed".....
I am more (or at least equally) interested in "je suis en toga, hein ?" and "On a pourtant les moteurs qu’est-ce qui se passe (…) ?" [I'm in toga, no? But we've got the engines, what's going on ?]
"crazy speed" - crazy high or crazy low ? They never acknowledge stall,
unless the toga comment is reference to that, so maybe they thought they were overspeed - but they engaged toga,
to respond to overspeed. Really ???
You are satisfied with the presumption that the THS stayed where it was due lack of loiter at NU with the Stick?
I am satsified that from basic aerodynamics, the control surface movement required to achieve the same climb demand at high airspeed (initial climb) will be less than that required at low airspeed (later), and hence the likelihood that THS will need to move to unload it will also differ. Further, I am sure that the sims have data to replicate that. Finally, I'm sure BEA haven't faked the sim data lining up with the real data - too easy to get found out, and why not just fake the FDR data at issue if you are going to fake stuff...
I am no longer trusting of the folks who are charged with Public Duty.
Those in industry are not necessarily any more trustworthy. The biggest and most suspicious missing information for me, is in the actions of AF. My consipiracy theories ? - below:
AF released new UAS procedure days after the crash - with what changes and why ? - we are not told. Think we'll ever be ?
Rumour posted on these threads was that based on the ACARS info only (all they had at the time) they threw the scenario at line crews in the sim, and they crashed. Where are the reports of those sim tests ? What could the industry be learning from the debriefs ? Silence. Information suppressed. Clearly no lessons to learn... or just too embarrassing for AF ?
Which airlines pushed back against the AI recommendation for pitot change - was it just AF or others too ? Did others put pressure on Airbus
via AF ? Where was the regulator in all that - just letting them sort a safety mod out amongst themselves when the cash flow was convenient ? Think we'll ever find out ?
AF pushed back against the pitot change because they wanted proof the new ones were better. Maybe that doesn't hang them, but in the meantime
they flew on with known-bad pitots. Who signed off on that risk and decision ? Where is the risk assessment for
not replacing the pitots ? Does it say "procedures and crew will handle UAS" ? Did they quality check said procedures and crew in assessing that risk ? [the crews that allegedly failed to handle UAS in sim afterwards, and the procedure so well written that pilots on here with all the time in the world to analyse it
can't even agree what it meant]. You reckon we're going to see that assessment from AF ? Ya think maybe it might be otherwise engaged in a meeting with Mr Shredder (if it ever existed) ?
Then there's that cross-industry working group on stall. Conveniently reporting just after BEA (but maybe not the public) find out that 447 was another stall - so not to worry, look we've already found and fixed the problem... But
look at that document. Target audience - line pilots. Content - pretty diagrams showing what AOA is. WTF ??? You mean line pilots don't
know that ??? Repeated statements that stall is an AOA problem, not airspeed. WTF ??? You mean line pilots have been trained that stall is purely about
speed ?? And conditioned not to lose altitude in stall for fear of failing the check ?
Pilots:
a) not trained to know what AOA is (hence no need for airlines to order the AOA display option)
b) trained that stall is about airspeed (going too slow)
c) trained not to lose alt in stall (pull up)
Result:
"stall stall". "I'm in TOGA". "We've got the engines". [Pulls back. Why aren't we going up?]
Oh, and after all that rant, yes, there was something wrong with the plane too. The pitots were a bit s**t in bad weather. As we've known for 2 yrs, remedial action taken,
and as AF already knew before the event - because Airbus told them, proactively. Also, if you take the plane so far outside the envelope that no mfr engineer or test pilot or sim can tell you what will happen... some of the warning logic turns out to be screwy. And, er, that's it. No control reversal or controls ineffective (actually I'm not 100% sure on those), no departure into spin, no bits falling off... In fact following stall, plane did better than might be expected.
End of the day, AF litany is "the pilots did as they were trained". Yep. That's because, in response to a
single instrument failure,
you trained them to crash.
And that, sir, is the real scandal, that's what needs fixing - way before looking at stall warning logic at 30deg+ AOA. And by all acounts it is an industry wide problem, not just AF.