@JenCluse - that was a very well-written and emotive post. I want to make it clear to everyone here that I do accept that there is a valid argument for force-feedback. However I also believe that there are valid arguments against, especially when the Airbus control philosophy as a whole - including human factors and training - is taken into account. See my previous post on CRM and handling discipline if you like.
Originally Posted by
BarbiesBoyfriend
Re your point 1. yep, having a yoke didn't save them. Perhaps these two F/Os might have been saved by the intervention of their Captain though, if he could have quickly grasped what was occurring?
He would have grasped it more clearly if he could have SEEN what inputs PF was making. Agree?
"Might"? Yes. "Would have"? I don't know, but possibly not. If we accept the possibility that it might have made a difference, we must also be prepared to accept the possibility that it wouldn't - based on previous accidents where aircraft with conventional control layout met similar fates, as well as the human factors in this incident - the Captain having been summoned to the flight deck from his rest period, for example.
Surely 'piloting skills' ought to be valued in an aircraft pilot?
Of course, and I've never disputed that. Convincing me isn't the issue - convincing the industry *is*, and the ones in the best position to do it are yourselves. But (and this is my opinion only, for all that's worth), you have to convince them with focused and well-reasoned arguments. Going off into tangents about sidesticks, yokes and force-feedback won't do you any favours in the eyes of the hard-nosed financiers who for better or worse call the shots in most of our industries in this day and age.
Sometimes, as I'm driving to work, I think...'why am I flying this thing? what makes me the pilot instead of, say, an engineer- or that guy who taught me 'flat-panel'?
What right do I have to call myself the 'grand fromage' pilot?
Because you're undoubtedly good at your job (all other things being equal, it's hard to end up in the LHS of an airliner if you're not), and more than that you are legally expected to carry the can for everything that goes on on board your aircraft. It's a rare case in aviation where a design flaw is so egregious that an engineer will be expected to take responsibility in a legal sense (though a good engineer in my book will take personal and emotional responsibility for everything he or she was worked on).
Originally Posted by
Lonewolf_50
To serve man ... that is the purpose of the machine.
But "to serve man" (...and the sci-fi lovers on here will know how hard I'm fighting the urge to yell "It's a cookbook!") and "doing it the way we've always done it" is not the same thing. MountainSnake makes a very good point that yokes and force-feedback are not "must-haves" on a FBW aircraft. The argument for and against has effectively split the piloting community into two camps - I'm not a pilot, but I know that the "pro-feedback" argument is not unanimous no matter how some may try to portray it thus.
Originally Posted by
Gretchenfrage
Love your post and agree completely. Nice to see that more and more FBW experienced pilots (read this Safety?) admonish the absence of a vitally fundamental in Airbus cockpits.
Not meaning to be facetious, but do you have any evidence that the number is growing? I haven't seen any as yet - the Tech Log thread in particular demonstrates that the divide is as clear and as balanced as it ever was.
Or what it does not and what the consequences are in terms of safety, stubborn denial from the lobby or not.
It's not just "the lobby" - many pilots who have as much skin in the game as yourself do not see the lack of force feedback as a big deal, and as I said before, you have only to look at the various threads on this subject for proof. Just as I do not have the right to label all Airbus FBW sceptics as, say, stubborn old-timers (nor would I!), what right do you or anyone else on your side of the fence have to dismiss their opinions as irrelevant?
SC:
Originally Posted by
Safety Concerns
Designers will be continuously monitoring operation and performance for improvements including of course accident causes. The aircraft are different, the way flying is conducted today is different yet there really is a valid argument about training and time "hands on". Is it sufficient?
There isn't however, yet at least, a valid argument about the technology. The industry remains driven by cost and safety. Until you can present a case that meets one of those criteria nothing will change.
That is a useful and well-reasoned argument.
Originally Posted by
Safety Concerns
Someone has finally grasped the direction design is moving in (bold text).
The technology is in tune with humans but the ultimate or primary goal may not be to serve pilots interests. We are in a transition phase to pilotless aircraft. The significant influence which will determine how quick or how slow this is implemented will be public perception
That is unhelpful and unsubstantiated rot, and on a piloting forum I would say it is also borderline inflammatory and/or inciteful.
As a techie - one who tries to understand the logic behind the systems and knows well the calibre of the average person that designs and puts those systems together, I still fervently hope that there'll be at least one Mk.1 human brain at the controls of any aircraft I fly until I shuffle off this mortal coil - and I see no evidence that any less than two at any one time would be safe, given the present state-of-the-art. Yes, human error has led to accidents, crashes and the inevitable deaths - but human ingenuity has equally saved lives when the situation has appeared completely hopeless based on layman's logic alone (UA232, BA038, the DHL A300 in Iraq to name but a few).
Originally Posted by
odericko2000
@Dozzy i think you are missing the point or deliberately trying to push peoples buttons, it had been earlier explained very clearly that the NWA 727 crew didnt push nose down though they had a yoke, simply because they both believed that their actions were correct trying to recover from a percieved overspeed as opposed to the AF PF who had no clue what he was doing and his PM had no way of seeing his control column inputs.
Er, the AF447 PF very clearly states (according to my learned Francophone fellow posters on this board) that he believed he was in an overspeed "crazy speed" situation, as did the Birgenair 757 Captain (who also believed that all ASI's were unreliable when in fact it was only his own).
Anyways, apologies to all for the long post, but I've been building up thoughts for the last 48 hours that I wanted to get off my chest - before I sign off for a bit I want to quote a section from a PM that I sent to a pilot I recently disagreed with, but respect a great deal nonetheless.
Originally Posted by DozyWannabe
I'm not saying there isn't a safety case for backdrive - but I can tell you that retrofitting it to the Airbus systems would not be a simple or cheap task. Look at it from a systems perspective - first they would have to develop it, then get it certified, and then they would have to physically modify thousands of aircraft in service (costing billions). They would also have to completely reconsider and rework their training programme and ground most of their aircraft while these processes happen. The result would mean many airlines facing bankruptcy and in all likelihood would bankrupt Airbus as well - thousands of pilots and engineers (among others) would lose their jobs and the airline industry would take the largest hit it has ever experienced. Would it be worth risking that for a design change that hasn't even been proven to make things safer?
Some people argue that if the PNF or Captain of AF447 had seen or felt the PF's inputs then "maybe" they could have resolved the situation - in fact some argue that it's a certainty, but the history of LOC incidents due to stall doesn't bear this out (e.g. NWA, BEA548, Birgenair - all of them had yokes, none of them recognised and/or corrected the situation - in fact all of them had at least one flight crew member who was convinced that their stall warning and protection systems were in error). I'm happy to accept that it *might* have helped to have backdrive, but I'm not convinced that it *would*. I'm certainly not convinced that it's worth risking the future of European civil aviation over that "might" or "maybe".
In the end I leave it to you to choose how seriously to take what I'm saying, as I do with everyone, but don't think for a second that I haven't done my homework and don't respect the opinions of those who disagree with me - I do, and I especially respect those who provide statistical or anecdotal evidence to back up their arguments. But you'll have to cut me some slack if I don't accept "no pilot would do xxx" or "I just don't like the idea of non-moving thrust levers and passive sidesticks" as more than an opinion as opposed to a proven fact. We're human beings and we adapt to our changes in environment pretty well - but change is something that we have to work to accept psychologically, bringing with it as it does reminders of age, obsolescence and eventual death.