Risk of air accidents up in UK after CAA cost cutting
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Risk of air accidents up in UK after CAA cost cutting
Guardian: Leaked CAA report
Ouch.
Cost-cutting and an overstretched workforce at the Civil Aviation Authority have increased the risk of air accidents in Britain, according to a leaked internal report drafted by the air safety regulator but never released.
Inspectors at the CAA, which oversees flight safety, warned bosses that they did not have the resources to do their job properly, the draft report shows.
There were “significant weaknesses” in the CAA’s safety division, including the monitoring of flight training and the licensing of pilots, the report said.
The provisional report – produced by the CAA’s head of strategy and safety assurance at the request of senior directors but never published – warned that the problems it identified were “those most likely to feature as contributory causal factors in aircraft accidents”.
Inspectors at the CAA, which oversees flight safety, warned bosses that they did not have the resources to do their job properly, the draft report shows.
There were “significant weaknesses” in the CAA’s safety division, including the monitoring of flight training and the licensing of pilots, the report said.
The provisional report – produced by the CAA’s head of strategy and safety assurance at the request of senior directors but never published – warned that the problems it identified were “those most likely to feature as contributory causal factors in aircraft accidents”.
Folks,
I am surprised they didn't claim that unlimited resources would eliminate aviation accidents, that is close to what CASA/AU claimed in recent times.
Have you ever come across any government regulatory authority that does not say it need more money??
Sir Humphrey would be proud.
I am surprised they didn't claim that unlimited resources would eliminate aviation accidents, that is close to what CASA/AU claimed in recent times.
Have you ever come across any government regulatory authority that does not say it need more money??
Sir Humphrey would be proud.
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I disagree. The oversight was in existence but it failed to prevent the accident because it was looking more on the paperwork rather than the flying and operational aspects.
The same is true of ramp inspections. The inspectors focus on niff-naff and pointless trivia rather than big picture stuff. They also appear to be totally paranoid about the cockpit door and people who might be terrorists in the cockpit rather than how many hours rest you have had, roster disruption, reporting culture, flying ability, management of deferred defects and so forth. If their oversight budget was reduced to zero I don't think we would notice.
My experience of ramp inspections is based in being checked in France, Germany, Finland, Poland, Italy, Belgium (where I told the muppets to to get off) and of course the U.K.
The same is true of ramp inspections. The inspectors focus on niff-naff and pointless trivia rather than big picture stuff. They also appear to be totally paranoid about the cockpit door and people who might be terrorists in the cockpit rather than how many hours rest you have had, roster disruption, reporting culture, flying ability, management of deferred defects and so forth. If their oversight budget was reduced to zero I don't think we would notice.
My experience of ramp inspections is based in being checked in France, Germany, Finland, Poland, Italy, Belgium (where I told the muppets to to get off) and of course the U.K.
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We too have the "Muppets" claiming that any reduction in staffing at Transport Canada will result in mayhem , the general feeling of the troops in the trenches is that their absence will not make a whit of difference to safety in the industry! There are some "good guys" in the ranks of TC, but they are far outnumbered by the rest of the drones collecting their paychecks and indexed pensions!
A safety management reality check for regulators
A maintenance engineer friend recently remarked on a visit he had had from an CAA inspector. After some discussion it became evident the inspector effectively knew nothing of wood and fabric aircraft at all. He was competent on large metal structures - standard airliner type construction - but not on either wood or (yet) composites.
It appeared the CAA no longer considers that knowledge essential in their inspectors. Eventually, that limits someone. The ability to extrapolate, to compare systems and processes is important in engineering, especially at a strategic or legislative level. In the long run that cannot be good for safety, I'd suggest.
It appeared the CAA no longer considers that knowledge essential in their inspectors. Eventually, that limits someone. The ability to extrapolate, to compare systems and processes is important in engineering, especially at a strategic or legislative level. In the long run that cannot be good for safety, I'd suggest.
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Historically Viscount G-OHOT. and B737 G-OBME were in part a failure of the regulator and the FOIs.
More recently the fatal accidents involving ex military air such as the Hunter and Gnat accidents were in part a failure on behalf of the regulator.
Also,is it me, but are tailstrikes on the A319/A320.A321 on the increase, if so why?
More recently the fatal accidents involving ex military air such as the Hunter and Gnat accidents were in part a failure on behalf of the regulator.
Also,is it me, but are tailstrikes on the A319/A320.A321 on the increase, if so why?
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Lookingforajob..... It's been a while since I read the reports in full, regulation or lack of it, was a factor in both accients.
(a) The Kegworth disasater, the CAA and/or FOI did not insist that BM did sufficient conversion and training to convert B737 pilots onto B737 glass cockpits, in part due to a lack of knowledge in Ergonomic. The CAA were dragging their feet on the impementation of CRM/LOFT/LOS and MCC, not least as they had virually not internal expertise in Human Factors.
(b) The Viscpunt accident, which involved multiple flameouts and restarts of Dart turboprops in severe icing over the peak district,. The report identifified the FOI had not ensured that there were sufficient checklists/QRH. Again the MEL was defficient, I think it allowed up to two of the four generators to be unservicable on departure. I think the RR darts on the Viscount had icing when in service with BEA. It is of note that this accident happened only about twenty miles from an Shamrock SD-360 (turboprop), which crashed on approach to EMA about ten years earlier, due to severe ice. Again I think there was and issue with contract pilots not having enough training or experience in UK weather and icing over high ground.
(a) The Kegworth disasater, the CAA and/or FOI did not insist that BM did sufficient conversion and training to convert B737 pilots onto B737 glass cockpits, in part due to a lack of knowledge in Ergonomic. The CAA were dragging their feet on the impementation of CRM/LOFT/LOS and MCC, not least as they had virually not internal expertise in Human Factors.
(b) The Viscpunt accident, which involved multiple flameouts and restarts of Dart turboprops in severe icing over the peak district,. The report identifified the FOI had not ensured that there were sufficient checklists/QRH. Again the MEL was defficient, I think it allowed up to two of the four generators to be unservicable on departure. I think the RR darts on the Viscount had icing when in service with BEA. It is of note that this accident happened only about twenty miles from an Shamrock SD-360 (turboprop), which crashed on approach to EMA about ten years earlier, due to severe ice. Again I think there was and issue with contract pilots not having enough training or experience in UK weather and icing over high ground.
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There is no doubt whatsoever that in the engineering and maintenance areas of the UK CAA things have deteriorated over the last decade (or longer) to the point where compliance is largely a matter of box-ticking, with Surveyors rarely seen in person, and when they are seen they are more often than not unfitted for their job; incompetence and ignorance are commonplace. I have observed sufficient Surveyors (Part 145 and Part 147) in the last 10 years to know that it is fair to generalise that with one or two exceptions (no more) they are there because they are unemployable in a maintenance organisation in any capacity except, possibly, unlicensed mechanics.
The management in Gatwick has long consisted of time-servers with no particular ability; they are in thrall to the larger operators and would no more dare to come in with a Level 1 and enforce it than they would give up their pension rights.
The good guys left the building long ago; look no further than Baines Simmons or Avisa for most of them.
To revert to the OP's question; the reason that the CAA is unlikely to prevent an air accident, at least one due to maintenance error, is far more complex than simple cost-cutting, although cost-cutting plays its part. As an enforcer of EASA regulations it is hardly going to attract the highly-skilled, forward-looking people it needs. Low pay is not the reason its present staff are low-grade; they are paid well. Staff reductions, removing regional offices and so on are the effects of cost-cutting and must take some of the blame.
Strangely enough, I now believe that if the UK leaves EASA after Brexit, or as part of it, things could improve in the medium-long term. Given the motivation to run its own show, and the money to do it properly (no more expensive, all in all, than with EASA) there are enough good people around to give it the leadership it needs to get back to the
pre-eminent position it had at one time. But the present management would need to be cleaned out first, starting with the Board, where aviation knowledge and experience is in very short supply among the rag-tag of rail "experts" and others, especially the non-Execs, who appear to have no qualification whatsoever to be there.
Take this, for example;
I'm sure he's a jolly good fellow, but is he someone who can lead the aviation industry into the future? How exactly did he get a job on the CAA Board? By climbing Kilimanjaro? Both Centrica and Royal Mail are notorious for their appalling communications, customer service and PR; no wonder the CAA is joining them.
The management in Gatwick has long consisted of time-servers with no particular ability; they are in thrall to the larger operators and would no more dare to come in with a Level 1 and enforce it than they would give up their pension rights.
The good guys left the building long ago; look no further than Baines Simmons or Avisa for most of them.
To revert to the OP's question; the reason that the CAA is unlikely to prevent an air accident, at least one due to maintenance error, is far more complex than simple cost-cutting, although cost-cutting plays its part. As an enforcer of EASA regulations it is hardly going to attract the highly-skilled, forward-looking people it needs. Low pay is not the reason its present staff are low-grade; they are paid well. Staff reductions, removing regional offices and so on are the effects of cost-cutting and must take some of the blame.
Strangely enough, I now believe that if the UK leaves EASA after Brexit, or as part of it, things could improve in the medium-long term. Given the motivation to run its own show, and the money to do it properly (no more expensive, all in all, than with EASA) there are enough good people around to give it the leadership it needs to get back to the
pre-eminent position it had at one time. But the present management would need to be cleaned out first, starting with the Board, where aviation knowledge and experience is in very short supply among the rag-tag of rail "experts" and others, especially the non-Execs, who appear to have no qualification whatsoever to be there.
Take this, for example;
Richard Stephenson joined the CAA in January 2015 as Communications Director. Prior to joining the CAA, Richard held senior communications roles in high profile and leading FTSE businesses, including as Group Strategic Communications Adviser at Centrica plc, Corporate Affairs Director at AXA and Director of Public Relations at Royal Mail Group. A postgraduate of Cardiff Journalism School, Richard is non-executive chairman of a fledgling public relations agency, non-executive director of Coventry University London Campus and a Director of County Hall Management Company Ltd. He has been a prolific charity fundraiser, climbing Kilimanjaro and traversing New Zealand and the Arctic for good causes, is currently chairman of a youth charity and has undertaken political work, in four continents, for over 20 years.
Last edited by Capot; 5th Jul 2017 at 18:34.
Interesting discussion. Another area which worries me somewhat is that it is extraordinarily difficult to get clear information from the CAA as to what they want from us.
No doubt the information exists, in most cases, but trying to find anything definitive on their website is a major challenge as is, if you have time and money to spare, talking to them by phone. Once you find the right person or the right page, often things are much better, though caveats and CYA get-outs are still likely to be well scattered.
That can't be good for safety, surely, though I accept that in our increasingly litigious society, everyone needs to watch their backs.
It is clear that, as LookingForAJob says, some people run their area like a 'private fiefdom'. That is OK - sometimes that makes best engineering sense, PROVIDED you explain why, and are consistent about the rules.
That's not always the case; there are some areas where clearly the CAA themselves are confused and uncertain. It would be nice if they were more willing to take advice form those more expert in some areas; that may be beginning to happen in some cases. Fingers crossed.
No doubt the information exists, in most cases, but trying to find anything definitive on their website is a major challenge as is, if you have time and money to spare, talking to them by phone. Once you find the right person or the right page, often things are much better, though caveats and CYA get-outs are still likely to be well scattered.
That can't be good for safety, surely, though I accept that in our increasingly litigious society, everyone needs to watch their backs.
It is clear that, as LookingForAJob says, some people run their area like a 'private fiefdom'. That is OK - sometimes that makes best engineering sense, PROVIDED you explain why, and are consistent about the rules.
That's not always the case; there are some areas where clearly the CAA themselves are confused and uncertain. It would be nice if they were more willing to take advice form those more expert in some areas; that may be beginning to happen in some cases. Fingers crossed.
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Mind you, the problem, if there is one, is not entirely the CAA. By coincidence, I got an email today from someone who has to know and understand EASA Regulation, as mandated by the EU Commission. Here's just a short extract from the whole diatribe.....enjoy....
He's absolutely on the button, and if aviation safety reduces EASA may well have a hand in that.
It's the Commission's way of doing things that's the root of the problem. It has ridiculously convoluted structures of Basic Regulations, Implementing Regulations, Amending Regulations, Annexes to all of the above, Appendices to the Regulations and to the Annexes, then Acceptable Means of Compliance to the Regulations, the Annexes, and the Appendices, then Annexes and Appendices to the Acceptable Means of Compliance; then there is Guidance Material to the Regulations, Annexes, and Appendices as well as to the Acceptable Means of Compliance and its Annexes, and Appendices.
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Just going bacl to lookingforajob's post.
I am very sceptical of SMS, on two grounds, do airlines have the internal or external expertise to run SMS, and isn't there a conflict of interest. For example, turnarounds, I do not believe that airlines should be in the position under a SMS to decide a minimun turn around time of say twenty minutes. It is simply not safe practice. Hence Germanwings, i can only assume the captain did not have time to use the toilet. Again under SMS, on a european flight there is no need for flight crew to leave the flight deck, again I doubt if this is ever part of SMS.
Again in terms of airlines setting their own SMS, because the regulalator just wants to save money. So acase in point, in the Grenfell Tower fire, while fire safety was regulated by the Fire Brigade and Local Authority, these days the building contractor can apparently simply use a Fire Risk Assessor. It has been pointed out by the Fire Brigade Union, that anyone can gain this qualification in three to five days!
Getting back to the original question, commercial aviation continues to become statistically safer at this stage, which is down to technology and training, but it might not continue that way, due in my opinion of a lack of manual flying skills, worst still there is an ongoing North American and European study into single crew airline operation. Incredible when in some circumstances a two or three man crew can note cope, the AF A330 comes to mind.
I am very sceptical of SMS, on two grounds, do airlines have the internal or external expertise to run SMS, and isn't there a conflict of interest. For example, turnarounds, I do not believe that airlines should be in the position under a SMS to decide a minimun turn around time of say twenty minutes. It is simply not safe practice. Hence Germanwings, i can only assume the captain did not have time to use the toilet. Again under SMS, on a european flight there is no need for flight crew to leave the flight deck, again I doubt if this is ever part of SMS.
Again in terms of airlines setting their own SMS, because the regulalator just wants to save money. So acase in point, in the Grenfell Tower fire, while fire safety was regulated by the Fire Brigade and Local Authority, these days the building contractor can apparently simply use a Fire Risk Assessor. It has been pointed out by the Fire Brigade Union, that anyone can gain this qualification in three to five days!
Getting back to the original question, commercial aviation continues to become statistically safer at this stage, which is down to technology and training, but it might not continue that way, due in my opinion of a lack of manual flying skills, worst still there is an ongoing North American and European study into single crew airline operation. Incredible when in some circumstances a two or three man crew can note cope, the AF A330 comes to mind.
CAA Leadership
There is no doubt whatsoever that in the engineering and maintenance areas of the UK CAA things have deteriorated over the last decade (or longer) to the point where compliance is largely a matter of box-ticking, with Surveyors rarely seen in person, and when they are seen they are more often than not unfitted for their job; incompetence and ignorance are commonplace. I have observed sufficient Surveyors (Part 145 and Part 147) in the last 10 years to know that it is fair to generalise that with one or two exceptions (no more) they are there because they are unemployable in a maintenance organisation in any capacity except, possibly, unlicensed mechanics.
The management in Gatwick has long consisted of time-servers with no particular ability; they are in thrall to the larger operators and would no more dare to come in with a Level 1 and enforce it than they would give up their pension rights.
The good guys left the building long ago; look no further than Baines Simmons or Avisa for most of them.
To revert to the OP's question; the reason that the CAA is unlikely to prevent an air accident, at least one due to maintenance error, is far more complex than simple cost-cutting, although cost-cutting plays its part. As an enforcer of EASA regulations it is hardly going to attract the highly-skilled, forward-looking people it needs. Low pay is not the reason its present staff are low-grade; they are paid well. Staff reductions, removing regional offices and so on are the effects of cost-cutting and must take some of the blame.
Strangely enough, I now believe that if the UK leaves EASA after Brexit, or as part of it, things could improve in the medium-long term. Given the motivation to run its own show, and the money to do it properly (no more expensive, all in all, than with EASA) there are enough good people around to give it the leadership it needs to get back to the
pre-eminent position it had at one time. But the present management would need to be cleaned out first, starting with the Board, where aviation knowledge and experience is in very short supply among the rag-tag of rail "experts" and others, especially the non-Execs, who appear to have no qualification whatsoever to be there.
Take this, for example;
I'm sure he's a jolly good fellow, but is he someone who can lead the aviation industry into the future? How exactly did he get a job on the CAA Board? By climbing Kilimanjaro? Both Centrica and Royal Mail are notorious for their appalling communications, customer service and PR; no wonder the CAA is joining them.
The management in Gatwick has long consisted of time-servers with no particular ability; they are in thrall to the larger operators and would no more dare to come in with a Level 1 and enforce it than they would give up their pension rights.
The good guys left the building long ago; look no further than Baines Simmons or Avisa for most of them.
To revert to the OP's question; the reason that the CAA is unlikely to prevent an air accident, at least one due to maintenance error, is far more complex than simple cost-cutting, although cost-cutting plays its part. As an enforcer of EASA regulations it is hardly going to attract the highly-skilled, forward-looking people it needs. Low pay is not the reason its present staff are low-grade; they are paid well. Staff reductions, removing regional offices and so on are the effects of cost-cutting and must take some of the blame.
Strangely enough, I now believe that if the UK leaves EASA after Brexit, or as part of it, things could improve in the medium-long term. Given the motivation to run its own show, and the money to do it properly (no more expensive, all in all, than with EASA) there are enough good people around to give it the leadership it needs to get back to the
pre-eminent position it had at one time. But the present management would need to be cleaned out first, starting with the Board, where aviation knowledge and experience is in very short supply among the rag-tag of rail "experts" and others, especially the non-Execs, who appear to have no qualification whatsoever to be there.
Take this, for example;
I'm sure he's a jolly good fellow, but is he someone who can lead the aviation industry into the future? How exactly did he get a job on the CAA Board? By climbing Kilimanjaro? Both Centrica and Royal Mail are notorious for their appalling communications, customer service and PR; no wonder the CAA is joining them.
Dame Deirdre Hutton
Deidre Hutton
Dame Deirdre Hutton, DBE became Chair of the Civil Aviation Authority on 1 August 2009 and was previously Chair of the Food Standards Agency until July 2009. She has served on a number of public bodies and has considerable experience of corporate governance, risk-based regulation and consumer policy. She is Honorary Vice President of the Trading Standards Institute. She sits as a Non-Executive on the board of Thames Water Utilities Ltd and Castle Trust and is also Pro-Chancellor of Cranfield University. She was, until June 2008, the Vice-Chair of the European Food Safety Authority Management Board and was Deputy Chair of the Financial Services Authority until December 2007. For five years, until 2005, she was Chair of the National Consumer Council, having formerly chaired the Scottish Consumer Council. Prior to her appointment at the Food Standards Agency, she was a member of the Better Regulation Task Force. She has held a number of positions on bodies dealing with food issues, including Chair of the Foresight Panel on the Food Chain and Crops for Industry, Chair of the Food Chain Centre, and membership of the Policy Commission on the Future of Farming and Food (the Curry Commission). In April 2010 she was awarded a Fellowship of City and Guilds.
Executive board members
Andrew Haines
Andrew Haines
Andrew Haines was appointed as a Board Member and Chief Executive in August 2009 and for a further 5 years in August 2012. He joined the CAA after a wide-ranging career in the rail industry, latterly as Managing Director of South West Trains, and then as Managing Director of the Rail Division for First Group plc, which, under his leadership, became Britain’s largest and most profitable train operating business. He is also a Non-Executive Director of Eversholt Rail UK Ltd.
Chris Tingle
Chris Tingle
Chris Tingle is currently Chief Operating Officer, a Trustee of the Air Travel Trust Fund and a Member of the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants. Chris is responsible for the management of Finance and Corporate Services and the Shared Service Centre. Chris joined the CAA in January 2016, previously having a career in a variety of financial and operational roles within the private sector, predominantly in the rail freight and consumer good industries.
Mark Swan
Mark Swan
Appointed to the Board as Group Director Airspace Policy in March 2008, Mark previously held numerous appointments in the Royal Air Force since joining as a pilot in 1979, and he was formerly Director of Operational Capability for the Ministry of Defence from 2006 to 2008. In July 2013 he was charged with merging the Airspace and Safety groups and re-structuring the combined group to focus on performance-based regulation. He is currently Director Safety and Airspace Regulation.
Richard Moriarty
Richard Moriarty
Richard joined the CAA in January 2016 as Group Director of Consumers and Markets and Deputy Chief Executive. He is responsible for the ATOL scheme, the economic regulation of airports and air navigation providers, our competition powers, and our consumer redress and enforcement activities. Before joining the CAA Richard was the CEO of the Legal Services Board, which oversees the regulation of the legal profession in England and Wales. Richard has also held senior public and private sector roles in a number of regulated sectors including water, energy, aviation, postal communications, and social housing. Richard is a non-executive Director of the Homes and Communities Agency Regulation Committee.
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lookingforajob.....really interesting post and perspective.
As for "But are you really saying that an airline cannot look at its operations identify things that could go wrong and do things to stop it all ending badly?"
YES & no, for example I would love to do an analysis of airlines turn arounds in terms of pilots and cabin crew tasks, and what margins exist. I do not think the bean counters take into account the welfare of an airline crew and how that effects operational efficiency. Ok, lets not give cabin some time for a cup of tea and a chat, stress cabin crew, end of next sector, they forget to disarm the door, how much will that cost.
As I probably said before, if the captain had used the toilet on the turnaround, the Germanwings accident could have been avoided. Likewise, internally locking flight deck doors, was predictable from the start by many but not identified by airlines. Also based on clips the forthcoming "Easyjet on the the flight" I think I'm probably going to have to ask where the sterile flightdeck fits within the company SMS.
As for "But are you really saying that an airline cannot look at its operations identify things that could go wrong and do things to stop it all ending badly?"
YES & no, for example I would love to do an analysis of airlines turn arounds in terms of pilots and cabin crew tasks, and what margins exist. I do not think the bean counters take into account the welfare of an airline crew and how that effects operational efficiency. Ok, lets not give cabin some time for a cup of tea and a chat, stress cabin crew, end of next sector, they forget to disarm the door, how much will that cost.
As I probably said before, if the captain had used the toilet on the turnaround, the Germanwings accident could have been avoided. Likewise, internally locking flight deck doors, was predictable from the start by many but not identified by airlines. Also based on clips the forthcoming "Easyjet on the the flight" I think I'm probably going to have to ask where the sterile flightdeck fits within the company SMS.
Last edited by Homsap; 29th Jul 2017 at 11:20.
For example, turnarounds, I do not believe that airlines should be in the position under a SMS to decide a minimun turn around time of say twenty minutes. It is simply not safe practice.
Cleaners: who are also responsible for security checks.
Loaders: rushing around like a bunch of startled cats, chocks not placed, loads incorrectly secured or in the wrong hold, CofG wrong.
Engineers: Trying to complete a Daily check in this time frame is a nonsense, add in a defect or two and the pressure is on. Sod it , just pen it off, it'll be reet.
Cabin and Flt crew bundled on to the aircraft while all the above is still ongoing. Not their fault, they are sent down to speed up the operation and just get in everyone's way. They can't do their pre-flight briefing or set-up. Result, items get missed and they get the 'blame' when it goes pear shaped.
I could go on.
CAA surveyor inspections have increased but it seems that they too are under pressure so they steer clear of the ones they know will cause a shed load of paperwork and ground the aircraft.
I could quote a couple of very high profile events that should have attracted the interest of the CAA. Not a bit of it. They were nowhere to be seen.
