Fatigue and training gaps in aviation
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Fatigue and training gaps in aviation
Interesting take on the recent crash between two naval destroyers on 21st August. Already a serious problem in aviation and going to get worse, challenges and threats very similar to the naval industry.
https://nyti.ms/2vAEOV0
Starting the thread here probably for better visibility than in the other forums.
https://nyti.ms/2vAEOV0
Starting the thread here probably for better visibility than in the other forums.
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Macro
So the ships crews work 108 hours a week just remind me what aircrew can do. What knowledge can you offer readers to compare airline duties to Naval crew please at least offer a comparison
So the ships crews work 108 hours a week just remind me what aircrew can do. What knowledge can you offer readers to compare airline duties to Naval crew please at least offer a comparison
There is no point in comparing individuals or industries.
Is it safe? Yes or No? Obviously the USN is running lean regards fatigue and training, that couldn't possibly happen in other industries could it?
Is it safe? Yes or No? Obviously the USN is running lean regards fatigue and training, that couldn't possibly happen in other industries could it?
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Reducing safety to a binary event Ike is it safe ...Yes or No is what has gotten us to where we are now. The article highlights systemic factors that are involved in eroding safety margins. Chasing production/profits by sacrificing on training, safety, recruitment, duty limits etc has grave consequences in the future.
The ambiguity of interpretation
The point is not to compare ‘safety’ with other industries, but instead use this information as opportunity to learn.
Safety is not something to have, it's what you think, and then do, It's a continuous process, never achieving the success which is imagined because the closer you get to an ideal, the ideal moves on.
The quote” the ambiguity of interpretation” is taken from a recent safety article -
Danger in the guise of safety
And don’t miss the link to Understanding and adding to the investigation toolbox or indeed any of the articles and comments in Safety Differently.
Safety is not something to have, it's what you think, and then do, It's a continuous process, never achieving the success which is imagined because the closer you get to an ideal, the ideal moves on.
The quote” the ambiguity of interpretation” is taken from a recent safety article -
Danger in the guise of safety
And don’t miss the link to Understanding and adding to the investigation toolbox or indeed any of the articles and comments in Safety Differently.
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I'll rise to your bait just once. I recently did a 22hr positioning duty, followed by minimum rest and a 10hr flight with an 8 hr time difference. All just about legal under EASA, but it was quite tiring. This sort of nonsense has become common over the last few years. Each sector of our community could come up with their own particular torture. Long term sickness rates are high.
All these things add up to people making mistakes, like the navy folk have experienced.
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very interesting article . thanks B.Bonga.
Fatigue is becoming one of the first contributing factors in most incidents/accidents nowadays. This USN example is extreme , but we find similar patterns in may others sectors. . Air Traffic Control is one of them. Compared to last decades, Staff shortages have led to overtime being institutionalized, longer periods on duty , shorter breaks, and traffic increase often means no slack periods anymore to recover.
Many employers are still on the belief that automation means you can work longer, you do not need breaks as much as before , and adding an extra day to the schedule is what people want ( for the extra money it brings) .
the result are increasing mistakes, increasing long term sickness, burnouts , and people leaving the job early, = high turnover, reducing experience, the perfect long term vicious circle..
Fatigue is becoming one of the first contributing factors in most incidents/accidents nowadays. This USN example is extreme , but we find similar patterns in may others sectors. . Air Traffic Control is one of them. Compared to last decades, Staff shortages have led to overtime being institutionalized, longer periods on duty , shorter breaks, and traffic increase often means no slack periods anymore to recover.
Many employers are still on the belief that automation means you can work longer, you do not need breaks as much as before , and adding an extra day to the schedule is what people want ( for the extra money it brings) .
the result are increasing mistakes, increasing long term sickness, burnouts , and people leaving the job early, = high turnover, reducing experience, the perfect long term vicious circle..
Last edited by ATC Watcher; 28th Aug 2017 at 09:06. Reason: typos
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The problem with fatigue is misplaced accountability. The senior managers and beancounters that make the decisions to continue with rosters that create fatigue, that use absolute limits as the target for scheduling - these people are not the ones that find themselves in front of a board of inquiry. Instead it is the front line crews that are pilloried for being fatigued and making errors. If senior directors of airlines were made personally accountable for fatigue incidents, it might concentrate their minds a little.
This type of event is a wake up call for everyone. A comparison should not be answered by ‘no, it doesn't apply to us’, and give extensive reasons why not.
The answer is ‘yes’, what might we have overlooked with regard to this aspect, or how could this situation arise in our case - then explore how, and review the defences against that particular threat.
Recheck the risk associated with these events against current attitudes and defences to help avoid them. Then given that nothing can ever be that good, what else might be done, or if the worst happens how would the recovery from the situation be managed.
The US navy has had a safety stand-down to think about safety; it's not about standing down (although that might help fatigue in the short term), the issue is what you think and how you think about it.
Exploring the previous links, the following articles also relate to this subject.
http://www.safetydifferently.com/if-...-the-managers/
And quotes for the office wall
http://www.safetydifferently.com/yog...professionals/
It's somewhat ironic that the USN - Carrier operations, has been used as a good example of an High Reliability Organisation, yet these incidents show that even ‘the best’ is not good enough, or perhaps more likely that when you are at the top there is only one direction to go.
The answer is ‘yes’, what might we have overlooked with regard to this aspect, or how could this situation arise in our case - then explore how, and review the defences against that particular threat.
Recheck the risk associated with these events against current attitudes and defences to help avoid them. Then given that nothing can ever be that good, what else might be done, or if the worst happens how would the recovery from the situation be managed.
The US navy has had a safety stand-down to think about safety; it's not about standing down (although that might help fatigue in the short term), the issue is what you think and how you think about it.
Exploring the previous links, the following articles also relate to this subject.
http://www.safetydifferently.com/if-...-the-managers/
And quotes for the office wall
http://www.safetydifferently.com/yog...professionals/
It's somewhat ironic that the USN - Carrier operations, has been used as a good example of an High Reliability Organisation, yet these incidents show that even ‘the best’ is not good enough, or perhaps more likely that when you are at the top there is only one direction to go.
“To an extent that we ourselves are only beginning to appreciate, most people at work, even in high-performing organizations, divert considerable energy every day to a second job that no one has hired them to do: preserving their reputations, putting their best selves forward, and hiding their inadequacies from others and themselves. We believe this is the single biggest cause of wasted resources in nearly every company today." Robert Kegan
‘A wasted resource’; career before safety, except that poor safety can ruin a career.
It's the judgement that's lacking, if the leadership cannot adequately judge the objectives of the second job, what does it say about the day job?
‘A wasted resource’; career before safety, except that poor safety can ruin a career.
It's the judgement that's lacking, if the leadership cannot adequately judge the objectives of the second job, what does it say about the day job?
And the USN's response to these collisions? Fire the admiral ...
U.S. Navy to relieve admiral of command after collisions
... pour encourager les autres, no doubt.
(Dans ce pays-ci, il est bon de tuer de temps en temps un amiral pour encourager les autres – "in this country, it is good to kill an admiral from time to time, in order to encourage the others" – Voltaire, Candide, referring to Admiral Byng.)
U.S. Navy to relieve admiral of command after collisions
... pour encourager les autres, no doubt.
(Dans ce pays-ci, il est bon de tuer de temps en temps un amiral pour encourager les autres – "in this country, it is good to kill an admiral from time to time, in order to encourage the others" – Voltaire, Candide, referring to Admiral Byng.)