When will airlines start preparing safety cases?
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SM - you can wind your neck in now. You personally have saved the world and there will now be no more incidents or accidents because every airline will now have their SMS boxes ticked by 8 April, 2012 as required by ICAO Annex 6 Part 1. So you can now have a proper sleep. You'll also find that since the start of this month, every airline will have started spending millions putting yet another system in place, the specification of which will undoubtably change because plonkers keep meddling with the specs.
And I really wouldn't start suggesting that the failure of Qantas's A380 engine and associated damage was due to a lack of SMS systems without understanding how either Qantas or Rolls Royce operates. I wouldn't be the least surprised if they had already had highly credible and efficient safety systems in place.
PM
And I really wouldn't start suggesting that the failure of Qantas's A380 engine and associated damage was due to a lack of SMS systems without understanding how either Qantas or Rolls Royce operates. I wouldn't be the least surprised if they had already had highly credible and efficient safety systems in place.
PM
Last edited by Piltdown Man; 6th Nov 2010 at 16:18.
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Shell invented these techniques in the early 1990s in response to Piper Alpha.
The Herald: Shell failed to learn Piper Alpha lessons – Royal Dutch Shell plc .com
SM, “Since that Flight article was published their have been yet more fatal accidents and a series of engine accidents with Qantas, so the rate is worsening.” (#57)
You appear to misunderstand the term ‘rate’; in the same period there have been vastly more successful operations; rate depends on the ratio.
“SMS is the solution that will get the airline industry again making year on year safety improvements.” (#57)
You avoid or fail to comprehend the point in my post #56 – “If the very low accident rate is an indication of an ‘almost totally safe transport system’”
If so, then ‘SMS’ or any other ‘conventional’ safety system is unlikely to achieve a measurable year-on-year improvement.
A risk of applying a rigid SMS to a operational system in equilibrium (almost totally safe) is that it will be disturbed. See Amalberti‘s conclusions –
“… it is also important to recognise that these systems are nearing the end of their life and should not be placed off balance by requiring operations to take place within unreachable performance and safety objectives.”
Thus an innovative view should consider how much if any of current SMS thinking should be applied (a flexible response), and if SMS’s are at the end of their life, what should replace them.
You appear to misunderstand the term ‘rate’; in the same period there have been vastly more successful operations; rate depends on the ratio.
“SMS is the solution that will get the airline industry again making year on year safety improvements.” (#57)
You avoid or fail to comprehend the point in my post #56 – “If the very low accident rate is an indication of an ‘almost totally safe transport system’”
If so, then ‘SMS’ or any other ‘conventional’ safety system is unlikely to achieve a measurable year-on-year improvement.
A risk of applying a rigid SMS to a operational system in equilibrium (almost totally safe) is that it will be disturbed. See Amalberti‘s conclusions –
“… it is also important to recognise that these systems are nearing the end of their life and should not be placed off balance by requiring operations to take place within unreachable performance and safety objectives.”
Thus an innovative view should consider how much if any of current SMS thinking should be applied (a flexible response), and if SMS’s are at the end of their life, what should replace them.
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Your pretty little graph shows how little an understanding you have. Statistics can be massaged to prove any argument a person wishes to put. The records are for aircraft certified to carry 13 or more passengers. You don't need to be an Einstein to understand how the number of wide body versus Beech 1900 type aircraft accidents in any one year can skew the data.
Aviation Week & Space Technology, Monday, March 19, 2007
Making "Safe" Safer
The NTSB Relishes The Recent Air Record
The unfortunate fact of our existence upon this good earth is that there will always be accidents -- otherwise, they could stop building trauma centers in hospitals. Some years ago, an ICAO official was asked by a reporter (when a zero rate in some aviation accident statistic had been reached): "I guess you'll be breaking out the champagne then?"
The ICAO official's cynical (albeit ungrammatical) retort: "No. We consider it to be a statistical aberration that we don't ever expect to see repeated again." Perhaps he was just trying to emphasize the fickle nature of statistical conclusions.
From the Report Card submitted by the National Transportation Safety Board last week, the industry as a whole has an outstanding record of which we can all be proud, but that doesn't mean we can rest on our laurels and not strive for that elusive zero rate in spite of the ICAO assessment.
After all, the oft-repeated "that could've easily been me" runs through our minds each and every time we turn on the television and see the ruinous aftermath of yet another seemingly inexplicable accident. The other sobering aspect of any such record is that it's necessarily historical and that the only thing that counts for you, and those you hold dear, is what's coming down the pike to change it all -- "for better or for worse" as they say in that other commonplace disaster. More on that gloomy perspective later.
So what was good in that NTSB summary? First, the overall accident rate dropped again in 2006, although marginally. Passenger and cargo carriers operating larger aircraft under 14 CFR Part 121 continued, as expected, to have the lowest accident rates in civil aviation. In 2006, they carried 750 million passengers more than 8 billion miles while logging more than 19 million flight hours.
The cost was 31 accidents, a more than 20 percent drop from 2005. Only 2 of those 31 accidents were fatal, resulting in 50 fatalities. It equals .01 accidents per 100,000 flight hours or .018 accidents per 100,000 departures. For those who like their statistics mirror imaged, this translates to, on average, only 1 accident every 266 million miles, 630,000 hours flown, or 368,000 departures. The odds are that everybody has a much better than even chance of not making one of those unfortunate TV appearances.
On-demand part 135 operators had 54 accidents, down almost 20 percent from 2005, with 10 of those accidents resulting in 16 fatalities (or 1.5 accidents and .28 fatal accidents for every 100,000 hours flown). Part 135 covers air taxi, air tour and air medical operations. Scheduled Part 135 (commuter) operators experienced only 3 accidents, one of them fatal, resulting in two fatalities.
In General Aviation there was a total of 1,515 accidents, 303 of them fatal, resulting in 698 fatalities. Even though GA accounts for half of all civil aviation flight hour activity, it should be noted that the claimed drop-off in accidents is partly related to a decline in GA activity. Since 1990, according to NTSB, GA activity has declined by 20 percent and the rate has thus remained stable at 7.5 accidents per 100,000 flight hours.
What are the factors in the looking glass that could reflect or inflict future changes in our presently stable stats? Disregarding security concerns, there are a dismal myriad of these:
a. Looming pilot shortages and some of the measures being taken to address the situation (ICAO's MPL or Multi-crew Pilot's License).
b. Outsourcing of maintenance as driven by the need to pare costs and boost profit margins.
c. New technologies (including the next generation air traffic control system).
d. The rise in low-cost minimalist operations under deregulation worldwide.
e. Directly related to d., a marked trend toward tasking pilots up to the legal limits.
f. The Very Light Jet swarm (and the manning of those fleets).
g. The increasing popularity of sports aviation.
h. A denser air traffic environment.
i. Diminishing experience levels among air traffic controllers, some of which will be related to their perceptions of their longer term prospects in a different ATC environment (NextGEN).
We've not mentioned the new age limit of age 65 retirement, because that is extremely unlikely to blip any statistic anywhere. And we'll not even stand by to eat our words on that claim. To borrow a phrase from that well-known non-aviator Forrest Gump: "Safety is as Safety Does". Only the really dumb take chances.
Aviation Week & Space Technology, Monday, March 19, 2007
Making "Safe" Safer
The NTSB Relishes The Recent Air Record
The unfortunate fact of our existence upon this good earth is that there will always be accidents -- otherwise, they could stop building trauma centers in hospitals. Some years ago, an ICAO official was asked by a reporter (when a zero rate in some aviation accident statistic had been reached): "I guess you'll be breaking out the champagne then?"
The ICAO official's cynical (albeit ungrammatical) retort: "No. We consider it to be a statistical aberration that we don't ever expect to see repeated again." Perhaps he was just trying to emphasize the fickle nature of statistical conclusions.
From the Report Card submitted by the National Transportation Safety Board last week, the industry as a whole has an outstanding record of which we can all be proud, but that doesn't mean we can rest on our laurels and not strive for that elusive zero rate in spite of the ICAO assessment.
After all, the oft-repeated "that could've easily been me" runs through our minds each and every time we turn on the television and see the ruinous aftermath of yet another seemingly inexplicable accident. The other sobering aspect of any such record is that it's necessarily historical and that the only thing that counts for you, and those you hold dear, is what's coming down the pike to change it all -- "for better or for worse" as they say in that other commonplace disaster. More on that gloomy perspective later.
So what was good in that NTSB summary? First, the overall accident rate dropped again in 2006, although marginally. Passenger and cargo carriers operating larger aircraft under 14 CFR Part 121 continued, as expected, to have the lowest accident rates in civil aviation. In 2006, they carried 750 million passengers more than 8 billion miles while logging more than 19 million flight hours.
The cost was 31 accidents, a more than 20 percent drop from 2005. Only 2 of those 31 accidents were fatal, resulting in 50 fatalities. It equals .01 accidents per 100,000 flight hours or .018 accidents per 100,000 departures. For those who like their statistics mirror imaged, this translates to, on average, only 1 accident every 266 million miles, 630,000 hours flown, or 368,000 departures. The odds are that everybody has a much better than even chance of not making one of those unfortunate TV appearances.
On-demand part 135 operators had 54 accidents, down almost 20 percent from 2005, with 10 of those accidents resulting in 16 fatalities (or 1.5 accidents and .28 fatal accidents for every 100,000 hours flown). Part 135 covers air taxi, air tour and air medical operations. Scheduled Part 135 (commuter) operators experienced only 3 accidents, one of them fatal, resulting in two fatalities.
In General Aviation there was a total of 1,515 accidents, 303 of them fatal, resulting in 698 fatalities. Even though GA accounts for half of all civil aviation flight hour activity, it should be noted that the claimed drop-off in accidents is partly related to a decline in GA activity. Since 1990, according to NTSB, GA activity has declined by 20 percent and the rate has thus remained stable at 7.5 accidents per 100,000 flight hours.
What are the factors in the looking glass that could reflect or inflict future changes in our presently stable stats? Disregarding security concerns, there are a dismal myriad of these:
a. Looming pilot shortages and some of the measures being taken to address the situation (ICAO's MPL or Multi-crew Pilot's License).
b. Outsourcing of maintenance as driven by the need to pare costs and boost profit margins.
c. New technologies (including the next generation air traffic control system).
d. The rise in low-cost minimalist operations under deregulation worldwide.
e. Directly related to d., a marked trend toward tasking pilots up to the legal limits.
f. The Very Light Jet swarm (and the manning of those fleets).
g. The increasing popularity of sports aviation.
h. A denser air traffic environment.
i. Diminishing experience levels among air traffic controllers, some of which will be related to their perceptions of their longer term prospects in a different ATC environment (NextGEN).
We've not mentioned the new age limit of age 65 retirement, because that is extremely unlikely to blip any statistic anywhere. And we'll not even stand by to eat our words on that claim. To borrow a phrase from that well-known non-aviator Forrest Gump: "Safety is as Safety Does". Only the really dumb take chances.
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Organizations that are focused on the next quarter’s results must somehow find the time and energy to deal with these long-term challenges.
It is clear we lack the systems to prevent hiring the wrong people, and to remove them when they can’t perform.
that are focused on the next quarter’s results
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This message is hidden because Shell Management is on your ignore list.
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Fully agree with your sentiments SNS3Guppy, but some of us do like a dose of comedy in our lives. I think I'll refrain from eating any more bait though, communicating with idiots in the end only drags you down to their level.
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'safety is our biggest priority' bla bla bla ....
does anyone seriously believe this rubbish any more?
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ is the number 1 priority!
How many more innocent people have to die ??????????
does anyone seriously believe this rubbish any more?
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ is the number 1 priority!
How many more innocent people have to die ??????????
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Today's News.
Transocean oil rig suffered blow-out in North Sea | Environment | guardian.co.uk
Over to you SM.
Drilling company Transocean had an incident on one of its North Sea rigs similar to that which caused the biggest oil spill in US history earlier this year, it emerged today.
An internal company report obtained by the BBC shows that four months before the US disaster the Sedco 711 rig in the North Sea, which is leased by Shell and operated by Transocean, experienced similar problems.
In this case, however, the blow-out preventer – which is believed to have failed on the Deepwater Horizon – worked effectively, preventing oil and gas from spurting uncontrolled up the rig's pipe.
An internal company report obtained by the BBC shows that four months before the US disaster the Sedco 711 rig in the North Sea, which is leased by Shell and operated by Transocean, experienced similar problems.
In this case, however, the blow-out preventer – which is believed to have failed on the Deepwater Horizon – worked effectively, preventing oil and gas from spurting uncontrolled up the rig's pipe.
Over to you SM.
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Hey SM;
As a pilot who has flown all over the world on Shell contracts can you tell me why Shell spout safety and then behind the scenes bully and cajole aircraft operators?
Can you tell me why when Shell moved a North Sea contract in the mid '90s the pilots "losing" the contract sent a condolences card to the pilots "gaining" it?
Can you tell me why after the Cormorant crash of 1992 Shell introduced a "no deck landings with windspeeds over 50 knots" rule and then quietly made it go away when it caused logistical problems? In fact I was called in to fly some freight to a Shell platform after the rule was introduced and the windspeed on the deck was 72knots. During planning we quoted the rule and were told, by Shell "its not a passenger flight so there's no risk to human life. Weren't my co-pilot and I humans?
Where do Shell get off demanding to lisen to CVRs after minor incidents, when they have absolutely no right to?
I haven't flown for Shell for 10 years and don't miss them one iota. The staff offshore were great and some are still friends, Shell Management? a bunch of hypocritical, pious people, and you come across as one of the worst (if you even work for Shell)
This is a forum for Professional Pilots, I suggest if you aren't one, and with you obvious ignorance of aircraft operation you aren't then disappear !
SND
As a pilot who has flown all over the world on Shell contracts can you tell me why Shell spout safety and then behind the scenes bully and cajole aircraft operators?
Can you tell me why when Shell moved a North Sea contract in the mid '90s the pilots "losing" the contract sent a condolences card to the pilots "gaining" it?
Can you tell me why after the Cormorant crash of 1992 Shell introduced a "no deck landings with windspeeds over 50 knots" rule and then quietly made it go away when it caused logistical problems? In fact I was called in to fly some freight to a Shell platform after the rule was introduced and the windspeed on the deck was 72knots. During planning we quoted the rule and were told, by Shell "its not a passenger flight so there's no risk to human life. Weren't my co-pilot and I humans?
Where do Shell get off demanding to lisen to CVRs after minor incidents, when they have absolutely no right to?
I haven't flown for Shell for 10 years and don't miss them one iota. The staff offshore were great and some are still friends, Shell Management? a bunch of hypocritical, pious people, and you come across as one of the worst (if you even work for Shell)
This is a forum for Professional Pilots, I suggest if you aren't one, and with you obvious ignorance of aircraft operation you aren't then disappear !
SND
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Another success for the Shell safety case methodology in ensuring the hazard controls worked. Hence a non-incident.
The whole idea is to prevent these cock-ups occurring in the first place - in which Shell, once again, has failed. If you believe that relying on rescue from cock-ups by third party equipment is acceptable then Shell deserves every word of bad press it gets.
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As a one-time contractor for provision of fixed and rotary aircraft to Shell, in the form of one of its national oil companies managed 100% by Shell, although they did not own 100%, I can add a comment that my experience over 8 years was that they would demand trunkfuls of paper responding to Shell's "safety management" directions, but when operational necessity meant picking up a load (people or freight or both) and carrying it to somewhere else that operational necessity overcame all other considerations, repeat "all".
Perhaps things have improved, but I wonder. Cultures take a lot of eradicating and the oil exploration and extraction industry is not run by people who let caution and "bureaucracy" stand in their way.
Perhaps things have improved, but I wonder. Cultures take a lot of eradicating and the oil exploration and extraction industry is not run by people who let caution and "bureaucracy" stand in their way.
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As you seem a little bitter and are ignorant of Shell EPE's AWP I don't feel the need to respond to you diatribe in detail
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SM;
I'm not in the slightest bitter, I don't have to contract to Shell anymore. As for the initials/acronyms, frankly I couldn't give a s***. I'm currently involved in writing an AOC SMS and we are working to the best available material under the guidance of the CAA.
Whatever works for a company like Shell will probably not work in aviation, especially as Shell will probably ignore it as soon as it impinges on their "operational requirements"
I now don't believe you either work for/have ever worked for Shell, otherwise there is no way a man of integrity could claim that they are so perfect, and I am assuming you are a man of integrity and not a troll or dishonest.
Working on the oil patch across the world I was left amazed at the safety policies of all oil companies when they thought no-one would notice.
SND
I'm not in the slightest bitter, I don't have to contract to Shell anymore. As for the initials/acronyms, frankly I couldn't give a s***. I'm currently involved in writing an AOC SMS and we are working to the best available material under the guidance of the CAA.
Whatever works for a company like Shell will probably not work in aviation, especially as Shell will probably ignore it as soon as it impinges on their "operational requirements"
I now don't believe you either work for/have ever worked for Shell, otherwise there is no way a man of integrity could claim that they are so perfect, and I am assuming you are a man of integrity and not a troll or dishonest.
Working on the oil patch across the world I was left amazed at the safety policies of all oil companies when they thought no-one would notice.
SND
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I keep hoping for some reasonable commentary on this thread, because safety cases, arguments for attainment of the safety goals of a critical installation, are a key part of modern safety practice. So I keep coming back when a new post shows from someone other than the most frequent contributor.
I have pointed out that aviation does have safety cases. For aircraft, they are the documentation that justifies the airworthiness certificate. For airlines, they are the documentation that justifies the operators certificate.
The person called "Shell Management" is unfortunately providing a lot of misleading information on safety-case matters. I do suggest that the best way to find out about safety cases is reading up on them oneself, or corresponding with someone like me who really knows.
Just to show my point, let us take:
A quick look at the Cullen report, and consequent legislation, will show that companies started performing safety cases because that was recommended by Cullen and turned into UK law.
Cullen's recommendation did not come out of nowhere. It is not true that Shell invented safety-case techiques. Question, for those really interested in serious discussion of these matters: who (which organisation or organisations) did?
BTW, loci classici for safety-case methodology are to be found at the UK MoD, at the company Adelard, and at the University of York computer science department.
PBL
I have pointed out that aviation does have safety cases. For aircraft, they are the documentation that justifies the airworthiness certificate. For airlines, they are the documentation that justifies the operators certificate.
The person called "Shell Management" is unfortunately providing a lot of misleading information on safety-case matters. I do suggest that the best way to find out about safety cases is reading up on them oneself, or corresponding with someone like me who really knows.
Just to show my point, let us take:
Originally Posted by Shell Management
safety case methodology and SMS ...... Shell invented these techniques in the early 1990s in response to Piper Alpha.
Cullen's recommendation did not come out of nowhere. It is not true that Shell invented safety-case techiques. Question, for those really interested in serious discussion of these matters: who (which organisation or organisations) did?
BTW, loci classici for safety-case methodology are to be found at the UK MoD, at the company Adelard, and at the University of York computer science department.
PBL
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Originally Posted by PBL
I do suggest that the best way to find out about safety cases is ... corresponding with someone like me who really knows.
Originally Posted by Shell Management
How modest and self-deluded of you.
For people who had thought about maybe paying attention to some of what our friend says:
I was invited by the German standards committee on functional safety of systems with programmable components last year to prepare guidelines for Germany on software assessment and documentation regarding such systems, in other words guidelines for software safety cases.
I have been invited to talk about this work at the 16th International Conference on Reliable Software Technologies, otherwise known as Ada-Europe, which is meeting jointly with the Ada-UK conference in Edinburgh in June 2011.
Suffice it to say that, if the person self-identifying as "Shell Management" really had much to do with safety cases, heshe would likely have known. Certainly none of my real colleagues would think of abusing me in public quite like this.
PBL
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myoptic??
I think you meant myopic.
I'm glad to say by eyesight is 20/20!
I think you meant myopic.
I'm glad to say by eyesight is 20/20!
Also you might do a bit of background checking on folks such as PBL before taking to them with a cane. You have NO credibility on these pages, despite your continued advancement of how Shell has lead the way in the cause of safety. Which it hasn't.
That funding did also help invent the swiss cheese model too!
Last edited by Brian Abraham; 25th Dec 2010 at 10:16. Reason: swiss cheese
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SM
How do you explain Shell's poor safety record in your own back yard (Sumburgh BV234, Brent Spar S-61, Cormorant Alpha AS332L [mentioned above] and Leman S-76 to name just 4 Shell fatal accidents in the last 25 years in the North Sea resulting in 73 deaths)? In fact, in the last 30 years in the UK, 5 of the 7 fatal offshore accidents have involved Shell contracted aircraft AFAIK.
A crude estimate is that Shell fly 12,000 hours in the North Sea (UK, No, Dk, Nl) each year (out of 80-90,000 hours per annum worldwide). So with a fatal accident on average every 6 years or so, thats a fatal accident rate of about 14 per million flying hours, which is pretty dreadful.
How do you explain Shell's poor safety record in your own back yard (Sumburgh BV234, Brent Spar S-61, Cormorant Alpha AS332L [mentioned above] and Leman S-76 to name just 4 Shell fatal accidents in the last 25 years in the North Sea resulting in 73 deaths)? In fact, in the last 30 years in the UK, 5 of the 7 fatal offshore accidents have involved Shell contracted aircraft AFAIK.
A crude estimate is that Shell fly 12,000 hours in the North Sea (UK, No, Dk, Nl) each year (out of 80-90,000 hours per annum worldwide). So with a fatal accident on average every 6 years or so, thats a fatal accident rate of about 14 per million flying hours, which is pretty dreadful.