vovachan

The report's purpose if obviously to deflect blame from the ATC, so it goes into unsupported speculation and questionable psychoanalysis

SadPole

Under pressure of the VIPs the aircrafts were brought in against the law


Note to yourself. Do not say anything. It is so mean to crash all these theories about Russian ATCs screwing up or pilots being complete morons. Oooops. Shutting up.

geirha75

The military radar at Smolensk was a typical old fashion PAR or Precision approach radar.

Precision approach radar - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


Using this kind of radar requires a close cooperation/communication with the ATC. With no effective communication with the ATC like during that flight I'm not surprised the plane hit the ground.

geirha75.

liider

So if there is nothing else to do, why not try to crash another plane

jcjeant

Hi,

I wonder if the VIP's from the actual polish government will be aboard ?

RatherBeFlying

The round and round maundering about what ATC should and should not have done is crushingly tedious and irrelevant to any instrument trained pilot.

I will try to explain an instrument pilot's view of this accident to those unfamiliar with the discipline of instrument flying.

During a pilot's instrument training, he makes repetitive approaches under the hood with an instructor to MDA and goes around to do the next one; so, yes, pilots during their instrument training do many times more missed approaches than approaches to landing, which typically are only the last approach of the training session.

Pilots do not crash on practise instrument approaches during their training as the instructor makes it perfectly clear to never go below MDA when not visual.

The only thing you need from ATC to safely fly a non-precision approach is the altimeter setting.

You go down to the MDA and, if not visual, go around.

If you go below the MDA not visual, you are gambling you won't hit an obstacle before your wheels hit the runway.

Lots of pilots take the gamble; many get away with it (at least for a time) -- and a bunch don't.

Alice025

"Poland intends to use their second Tu-154 for an experiment..."

That's not "intends to use", that is "is already experimenting". The first news was a guy in Poland who commented on the Smolensk blog that that TU is wooshing by his house, did seven approaches and cuts them every time at what seemed to him to be "about 80 metres height."

I am proud of our TU :o))))))))) it survived already 5 days of trials :o))))))))))
But then that's a twin brother of that first TU, made to order, fixed to order, all spare parts genuine factory made, not those old planes USSR times that have shortage of everything when are to be fixed (USSR being no more suppliers of TU parts are also, in larger part, non-existant) - that others have to be content with.

I trust in that second TU and think if they will skip the fog and Kachinsky on board and Northern aerodrome "conveniences" to be on the safe side - it might survive the tests :o)))))))))))

Alice025

PS
Though some think that if Poland FINALLY bought in Russia at least one TU154 flight simulator to train and experiment on it - that won't be a bad idea either. :o)

RetiredF4

The read back of altitude is a safety feature, but has no influence on the accuracy of the displayed radar return and no influence on the information from ATC. Let´s compare that with the ATC clearance. When you get that on the radio, you read it back. It just makes sure, that you understood it correctly, but it doesn´t influence the clearance itself.

A readback of the altitude could have shown that the crew was following a wrong altimeter indication, and corrective action could have been implemented. So the question is, why did ATC not ask for the altitude, if it were that important?

The glidepath error of the landing radar according MAC report is
at 10 km 90 meters
at 4 Km 35 meters
at 1 Km 10 meters.

With other tolerances the published minimums would not be possible, And those minimums and tolerances have nothing to do with the readback.

If they could have expected it, then there schould have been even a earlier warning than the horizon101 call. A warning at impact does not help anybody.


Comparing the service the IL 76 received with what happened later could lead to the assumption, that the TU154 was not liked at all, but they could not do anything to prohibitthe approach. Why did they not offer the PAR talkdown, although it was available?

franzl

RegDep

After reading RockShock's post #1222 and and SadPole's post #12226 a thought occurred to me:

Please note that the point below is strictly non-normative (not how things should have been but how things were)

1. If shown to be true, that at 8:37:36 a person in the cockpit said to the effect of 'it is quite murky out there' instead of saying 'things may get pretty bad (if we do not land there)', and .....

2. If shown to be true, that landing in weather that was below minima was, if not SOP, alt least a usual/acceptable/accepted practice at the PAF unit flying VIPs,...

... it follows that the crew likely was not under more than normal/usual stress than on VIP flights in general, and that no overly / undue / unbecoming / extra pressure needs to be assumed to have been exerted, nor was such felt by the crew (at least there is no proof that such was felt).

This seems to me to satisfy the facts in the report, and to conclude that the accident was caused by "a scud run gone bad" because of the terrain that was different than thought/expected by the crew.

I addition, this would allow to do away the second paragraph of the Immediate Cause in the report (reference to Blasik's influence in the cockpit) and replace it with a short statement of non-sterile cockpit environment, and the first paragraph in the Contributing Factors (reference to the discussions with Protocol Director), and especially the last sentence mentioning the Main Passenger. This could be replaced with a general statement of the stress in VIP flights of this caliber.

One consequence would also be that the ATC role at the final stages of the flight would be next to moot, because the crew was on the landing mode (a bit like the Yak-40 had been somewhat earlier: they were told several times to go around, only to be found on the runway by the ATC!)

The above would also help do away some of the problems between the Russians and Poles: It would remove some of the irritating statements of the Russians and "allow" the Poles to let loose of the ATC.

I stand to be corrected.

Reg

ARRAKIS

RetiredF4,
According to a former commander of the Polish vip transport unit, when he was flying, the second time in the row he forgot to readback the altitude as answer to the distance information from the controller, it was a GA without further questions.
It was just a tv interview, and I have not found so far any actual Russian military regulations to back it up.

Regarding the controllers professional experience you were asking, you can find it in the tables, starting page 22 of the English MAK report.
One more thing. The controllers were not from XUBS, but were dispatched to Smolensk from Tver.

According to the transcript shown last Tuesdey by the Polish Investigators (some new elements), the crew knew about the terrain.

Arrakis

RegDep

ARRAKIS, was it Tver where the unit from Smolensk was moved to, or was it completely disbanded?

Maybe I should have cut my statement short by saying "scud run gone bad" period.

BOAC

For 'sad pole' and all the other 'sad' poles - this was dreadful loss of important people for you in a clouded politico-historic environment.

It really is time to let go of the ATC/PAR/General this and that/autopilot etc etc chase. Of course things could have been done better by both sides.

The FDR and CVR show descent below 100m, whether that was radio or baro does not really matter - that was the 'minimum'. The only time you should do that is when you are visual with elements of the approach lights or runway. If the crew was 'visual' it was not with either of those - they may have seen other lights which they confused with the runway lights, or they just could have done this 'scud run' thing and been caught out by the rising ground. Either way the approach was not flown properly and that ultimately is down to the person with hands on the controls - and the Captain.

Despite all the other 'bits' there was ultimately one person only who crashed this a/c. I'm afraid you will have to accept that.

RetiredF4

Who shows, that this is true?

The weather-forecasters view:
He looks at his charts, radar and other stuff and has to make a forecast for the next hour or next few hours. That gets puplished as aerea forecast and / or as aerodrome forecast. This forecast is used for flightplanning.

The weather observers view:
He observes the present weather by checking landmarks and using some gadgets. It is the view looking from the ground into the sky, simplified spoken. That´s the weather, the pilot receives when checking in with the local ATC or which is published via ATIS.

The pilots view when landing:
He looks out the window from above to the ground. It is influenced not only by the moisture in the air, but also by the background he is looking at. It is also dependent on the lighting system of the aerodrome, like Approach lighing, approach flashers, Runway lighting and so on.


So the forecast may allow the planning to an aerodrome, the weather there on arrival might be worse and according to the numbers unsuitable for landing.
But looking out the window, perfectly lined up on centerline approaching the minimum the pilot might see enough of the airfield environment, enough of the approach lighting or enough of a dark runway in a otherwise snowy landscape, that he can land without problems.

Now fog is even a more special thing. It can come fast, and it can disappear even faster. It can be thick, it can be thin. You can´t see the sky from the ground, but you might see the ground from above.

Why do i tell all this? Because most landings in those weather conditions would be named landing below minimum, and the nonprofessional reader would see it as dangerous and illigal. But if the Pilot flew down to the published minimum, identified the field and landing environment before leaving the published minimum, everything is legal and normal. It happens any day in civil and military world.

So i would not dare to believe, that busting minimus is a procedure of polish pilots with VIP´s on board or any other pilots at all. But if somebody can prove otherwise, go ahead. BTW, rumors are no prove.

franzl

RegDep

Franzl

Agree completely. Just "If (and only if) shown to be true.."

Reg

ARRAKIS

Yes, the unit at Smolensk was disbanded, so controllers were send from another unit/town just for the flights (07 and 10 of April). Dates of specific orders are given in MAKs report.

Arrakis

SadPole

Absolutely. And I have agreed with it all along and said so multiple times. Regardless if PIC did it on his own or because of the pressure, it still makes it his responsibility because being able to assert control where necessary and refuse criminal orders is as important skill of a pilot/soldier as knowing all the technical aspects and skills.

So why would all this nonsense about ATCs being at fault being pursued?

Again, I am pretty sure that everyone is sick and tired of all of this – and it would be great for it to finally go away. Problem is – the official line from Poland now is that it was ATCs who caused the crash. In view of Kaczynski (given today at a press conference), Russia is 100% to blame for the crash, in view of the politicians opposed to Kaczynski, Russia shares some 50% of the blame. And this is nuts, because to all thinking people the sole purpose of this nonsense is to shift attention from criminal orders being given to Russia and the ATCs.

As the problem is now purely political (not technical), I agree that PPRUNE is probably not the right place to discuss it any further. But, if the ATC spin is treated seriously, the attempt at understanding of what is behind it should also be treated seriously.

BOAC

- yes, that is what I was suggesting - not that you should all give up the 'battle' but that we should be focussing on the flying side here.

jcjeant

Hi,

Now I finally understand everything.
This aircraft was an RC plane and was in charge of the tower that handled the transmitter

Kulverstukas

It's not right. It'a about safety, and it's like with cars. You can take fast car, go to the Nürburgring and drive himself into the wall. It's OK, because you sign the paper before. You even can hire driver, pay him a lot of money and sign papers and you both drive yourself into the wall.

But for bus driver on civil roads it's not an option. There in Russia we blame "people of power" who drive overspeed on the wrong lane with blue strobes and kill innocent people and, sometimes, themself.

This case with 101 flight is exactly the same thing - vechicle with blue strobes on the wrong lane. Unfortunately, gravity don't take bribes.

PS: some example. Man, who shot this, died two days ago on the this same road.