Quote: gstaniak
... because they should be well aware that this kind of approach procedure only makes sense when they report back their altitude? I just cannot imagine them not knowing that in an RSL approach they can expect a margin error of 100 m with respect to altitude. And they knew how old and imprecise the aerodrome equipment was.
The read back of altitude is a safety feature, but has no influence on the accuracy of the displayed radar return and no influence on the information from ATC. Letīs compare that with the ATC clearance. When you get that on the radio, you read it back. It just makes sure, that you understood it correctly, but it doesnīt influence the clearance itself.
A readback of the altitude could have shown that the crew was following a wrong altimeter indication, and corrective action could have been implemented. So the question is, why did ATC not ask for the altitude, if it were that important?
The glidepath error of the landing radar according MAC report is
at 10 km 90 meters
at 4 Km 35 meters
at 1 Km 10 meters.
With other tolerances the published minimums would not be possible, And those minimums and tolerances have nothing to do with the readback.
If they could have expected it, then there schould have been even a earlier warning than the horizon101 call. A warning at impact does not help anybody.
Comparing the service the IL 76 received with what happened later could lead to the assumption, that the TU154 was not liked at all, but they could not do anything to prohibitthe approach. Why did they not offer the PAR talkdown, although it was available?
franzl