Interview I talked about.
Very Long 4 pages. (In Polish) Buttons 1,2,3,4 at the bottom. Pretty much all questions that were discussed here at PPRUNE are answered as far as that pilot is concerned.
http://wyborcza.pl/1,97863,8004393,Katastrofa_smolenska__Nie_mieli_zgody_na_lad owanie.html
I will copy the machine translations of the most important points, while correcting some of the obvious machine translation screwups:
Smolensk disaster. They had no permission to land
Col. Stephen Gruszczyk, former pilot 36th Special Air Transport Regiment *
last modified 2010-06-11 18:13
From start to 3 thousand. meters and landing on the level of 3 thousand. meters to the ground pilots cabin must be clean, quiet. There is no right for anyone to be there outside the crew.
Organizer flight [in this case, Chancellery of the President], the 36th command Regiment commander, and above all pre-flight crew must know what to do at the destination airport if conditions do not allow the landing. Will we return to Warsaw - you can take the appropriate amount of fuel. Do you fly to the alternate where the services will be waiting for the delegation. Such a plan should exist especially in the case of a flight with the President and the delegation, which are waiting - as in Katyn - hundreds of people. It can be allowed that the crew flies without any consultation and frantically decides what to do.
I say this from my own experience of service in the 36th Pułku. Regiment. Even in LOT Airline one calls to the coordinator and asks where to fly, because at the destination airport weather prevents landing: whether to the alternate or to any other, where you can provide passengers with accommodation and transport.
On April 10 that it was not the case because the transcript shows that only during the flight they were trying to determine how to act.
This verbal agreements or on paper?
No need to write them down. But all should know exactly what will happen - including the most important passenger, in order for him not to worry – in case the weather prevents landing. I am not talking about the delay of departure, although in this case, it is very important 36 Sopecial Air Regiment proposed takoff at 6.30, Chancellery of the President postponed the departure time to 7,00, the plane took off about 7.27, because, inter alia, Lech Kaczynski and Maria were late]. At this point they should have already signaled: OK, we will get there, though perhaps not in time. We may even delay the departure by two hours, the weather will improve and we will start. After all, it's no problem to move the ceremony for two or three hours [the weather in Smolensk actually improved]. And here what happened? Nothing.
Do you remember a similar critical situation?
- Of course. Pressures such as: "You have to go there and land." But everything was done before the flight, not during the flight.
Once upon a time I flew senior military commanders after the conference in Warsaw - the same as that CASA, which crashed into Mirosławiec in January 2008. On board was, among others, chief of the Air Force. I flew to Wroclaw, and then to Poznan. At Ławica [weather] conditions did not allow landings. Before the flight the commander of the regiment and the Air Force chief were told about the situation. Commanding officer says, "you fly to Wroclaw, where you'll see what the conditions will be in Poznan." I landed in Wroclaw, I went to the meteo office to find out about the weather. There, they say that that it got even worse. I went back to the machine and say to General: "Because of the conditions we cannot fly." Of course, in such situations, the main passenger behaves rather calmly. But the colonels ... As they began to threaten me: "You will see, we find a way to get to you ..". I say again: "There are no conditions [for flying], I do not fly." They got off, cars were provided for them and they drove away.
I quickly returned to Warsaw, I reported to the commander, also reported the threats. And he, he was calm, takes it upon himself. The way it should be. Well, we are alive.