Ptkay

And he called GA few seconds later.

But nothing happened. His buddy, PF, went on,
and C/O did nothing to stop him.
Managed only another few seconds later to say "K... mać!"

David K-M

Curious remark at 10:38:00, a short while after the captain told ATC the Tu-154 was turning onto final:


“Wkurzy się, jeśli jeszcze…[unintelligible]”

"He's going to go mad, if still..."


The voice isn't identified, and the sentence is frustratingly incomplete. But the third-person remark clearly refers to someone who's not in the cockpit.

Anyone want to venture an opinion on who exactly was 'going to go mad'?

criss

Singapurcanac, and who do you expect to work as an ATCO at a military airfield if not a soldier? This is normal not only for Russia, but for many other countries. If you fly to such an aerodrome, you have to accept that fact and their procedures. There is a trend to send such a military personnel for training in accordance with ICAO, so they can work according to civilian procedures, allowing to designate the airspace as MTMAs and MCTRs as per ICAO, but it's just a tren, not a rule.

BTW, I don't understand why you keep talking about "no TL". TL is usually published, and you rarely hear it in RT. Approach and landing clearance is in fact given, maybe not by the ICAO book, but like they do on Russian and many Polish military bases - this crew was surely familiar with this.

ARRAKIS

9 seconds.

By the way. For all heights are given just numbers. At 10:40:41 there is a "100 meters" from an Anonymous person. Gen. Blasik for me.

It's not, but it's irrelevant.

Arrakis

Ptkay

If you compare the simulation I posted with the CVR,
you can assume, that the call 300m was still on barometric height on QFE.

If you assume that, it would confirm that they were still on GP.

The call out 250m is double, by two persons, one not positively identified.
Maybe the General corrected the navigator and suggested 250 from RA,
because then the navigator repeated 250m.

At this moment ATC still confirms "on course and glide path".

This is where the trouble started IMHO, although the simulation shows
they were really on the GP.

Tagron

On the basis of liider's translation of the CVR transcript I would say this was a well flown, properly stabilised PAR approach right down to Decision Height. 100m.

Note, three times between the Outer Marker and DH, a period of 50 seconds, the ATC transmission is "on course, on glideslope."

Then it went wrong from DH.

Kulverstukas

One of key point "where the trouble started" is on 10:23:01,8 till 10:23:08,3 U: Pan Capitan, when you will land after all (...), if i can know?

criss

Kulverstukas, your translation is incorrect - it should be "if", not "when".

Kulverstukas

Criss, in russian (MAK) transalation it "when", not "if". In Polish, as far as I can understand (and I only read a little), czy jak juz mean something like "how long I will wait till".

criss

Not really.

Part of the phrase is missing. The meaning is "when/if we finally land [...], can you tell me?" - and [...] was probably "can we do something" or something like that. Anyway, the meaning of that is "can we do something/will something happen [we don't know what, as it's missing from the CVR] after we land?", not asking "when will we land?"

RetiredF4

Imho it should have been a PAR approach and the crew might have fallen to the same conclusion, that it was a stabilized PAR approach.

However, check the commnication, if it is correct (ATC highlighted)

10:39:49,9 - 10:39:52,3 ATC: Approaching outer marker, on course, on glideslope.
10:39:50,2 - 10:39:58,0 Sound. F=845Hz. Outer Marker.
10:39:52,2 - 10:39:53,7 U: Outer.
10:39:54,1 - 10:39:55,0 Capt: (...)
10:39:57,1 - 10:39:59,3 U: 400 meters.
10:40:02,6 - 10:40:15,6 U: (...)
10:40:06,7 - 10:40:06,8 TAWS: TERRAIN AHEAD:
10:40:13,5 - 10:40:14,6 ATC: 4 on course, on glideslope
10:40:16,7 - 10:40:17,6 Capt: On course, on glideslope
10:40:18,6 - 10:40:20.1 U: (...)
10:40:19,6 - 10:40:21,1 Nav: 300.
10:40:22,8 - 10:40:25,6 U: (250 meters)
10:40:24,6 - 10:40:26,7 (Nav): (250).
10:40:26,6 - 10:40:27,8 ATC: 3 on course, on glideslope
10:40:29,6 - 10:40:30,3 U: (...)
10:40:31,2 - 10:40:32,4 ATC: Turn on the lights.
10:40:32,4 - 10:40:33,5 TAWS: TERRAIN AHEAD.
10:40:32,9 - 10:40:33,6 Nav: 200.
10:40:34,0 - 10:40:34,8 Capt: Turned on.
10:40:37,1 - 10:40:38,1 Nav: 150.
10:40:38,7 - 10:40:39,9 ATC: 2 on course, on glideslope
10:40:39,4 - 10:40:42,0 TAWS: TERRAIN AHEAD, TERRAIN AHEAD.
10:40:41,3 - 10:40:42,6 U: 100 meters.
10:40:42,6 - 10:40:42,7 Nav: 100.
10:40:42,6 - 10:40:44,1 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:44,5 - 10:40:46,1 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:46,6 - 10:40:49,2 TAWS: TERRAIN AHEAD, TERRAIN AHEAD.
10:40:48,7 - 10:40:49,4 Nav: 100.
10:40:49,2 - 10:40:49,6 (FO): Normal.
10:40:49,6 - 10:40:50,1 Nav: 90.
10:40:49,8 - 10:40:51,3 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:50,0 - 10:40:51,3 Nav: 80.
10:40:50,5 - 10:40:51,2 FO: Go around.
10:40:51,5 - 10:40:58,0 Sound. F= 400Hz. Decision Height.
10:40:51,7 - 10:40:53,4 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:51,8 - 10:40:52,4 Nav: 60.
10:40:52,3 - 10:40:53,1 Nav: 50.
10:40:52,5 - 10:40:53,4 ATC: Horizon 101.
10:40:53,0 - 10:40:53,6 Nav: 40.
10:40:53,7 - 10:40:55,5 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:54,5 - 10:40:55,2 Nav: 30
10:40:54,7 - 10:40:56,4 ATC: Height control, horizon.
10:40:55,2 - 10:40:56,0 Nav: 20.
10:40:56,0 - 10:40:58,2 Sound. F=400 Hz. Autopilot disconnect.
10:40:56,0 - 10:40:58,1 Sound. F=800 Hz. Inner Marker.
10:40:56,6 - 10:40:57,7 Sound. F=400 Hz. Autothrottle disconnect.
10:40:56,6 - 10:40:58,2 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:58,6 - 10:41:00,2 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:59,3 - 10:41:04,6 Sound of the collision with obstacles.
10:41:00,3 - 10:41:01,4 FO: (censored)
10:41:00,5 - 10:41:01,8 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:41:02,0 - 10:41:03,4 ATC: Go around!
10:41:02,7 - 10:41:04,6 U: Scream (censored)
10:41:05,4 End of the transcript.

If it was an PAR, then the the controller had no actual idea where they had been in relation to the centerline and in relation to the glidepath. The talking is not enough, normaly you get a nearly continuos talkdown. In this case prior to the call "horizon" there is a pause of 14 seconds. And this being in the critical timeframe before decision height, which is, if i remember a previous post correct, the term "horizon".
According to the callouts the aircraft should have been on centerline and on glidepath at that point, which is higly doubtfull due to the outcome and due to the height-callouts in the cockpit. If those height callouts were real RA, than they had been way below the glidepath approaching the point "horizon".

The non standard callouts with too long pauses are typical with unexpierienced PAR controllers being unsure of the true position of the aircraft. So they continue talking .... on course on glidepath......
I was there in similar situations, but thanks god in good weather.

It might be possible that the crew relied on a PAR-approach and the information from the ATC controller, and the RA callouts had been used as backup. When the call "horizon" or DH came, ground was probably in sight, but no runway, no runway enviroment and a lot closer than they sought. It was too late to recover. The still decreasing height callouts are due to the fact, that the terrain was rising faster than they could climb. They probably already had leveled off at DH.

I know, its still speculation, but for me it would explain a lot.

franzl

ARRAKIS

That simulation is totally wrong, especially the timescale.

Arrakis

criss

RetiredF4 - our biggest problem is we don't have official information about what type of equipment was used by ATC. It doesn't seem to be PAR, not only because of the lack of talkdown, but also because ATC asks about height and position a few times. So it seems they were performing the published NDB approach (I've posted a chart a few weeks ago, they also mention it a few times), and the ATCo only tried to provide some support using whatever equipment he had.

RetiredF4

Point accepted, however that bears the problem already. The term "on course, on glideslope" is a typical PAR used expression. It is BS to use it for any kind of assistance. Because it might be wrong, what it most probably was in this case anyway.

There are also mixed procedures used, if ASR-Radar is not available you establish yourself with a NP approach on final and being talked down by PAR the last few miles.

So either it was intended to be a PAR, than it was DS, or it was meant by the crew to be a PAR, than it even was worse.

franzl

criss

From the discussion in cockpit in last 40 minutes, they were preparing for an NDB procedure, not for PAR, and they were performing it. There are reportingly some Russian military procedures when a "talkdown" is based on crew reports, but I'm no expert in it. It's all confusing, because first there is a moment of vectoring, then they tirn according to procedure, ATC asks for height reports but then says "on glide". We'd need a formal report on what type if equipment was use.

AlexGG

oops, I got a little late with that

Alice025

? ????????? ???? ??????? • ?????????? ?????

scroll this page down, there is a glideslope map re-built, based on the spoken record published today. Green line - normal glideslope (as published by aerodrome instructions).
Blue line - plane route if the crew used barometric height meter down to 100 meters, and then it continues into red dotted line - presuming from that point on they used radio-barometer.

Additionally is mapped plane route in violet/lilac line, if the crew were using radio height meter all along.

Either way it is of course not the green line proper glide-slope look at it any way, too steep.
From crew talks record it appears they were 100 m higher above than due already at the Far Beacon (at 400 m height, not at 300m). And were catching up. Or their automated system was catching up somehow.
I didn't understand yet any thing, sorry, am watching what the Smolens chaps are trying to figure out.
They are calculating descend speeds and they are all 9-10-11-13m/sec somhow which puzzles all.

Aerodrome, from what I understood, doesn't know the plane's height. They get the plane's height from what the plane tells them about themselves.

Another thing that puzzles all is apparently the crew was doing a go away on automated system, while it can't do it being not connected to ILS. And it seems they hoped it will perform the go away, hoped down to 20 metres, and then began to manage themselves, seeing that the auto-pilot doesn't do it.
Anyway I stll don't understand nil :o)

(the records published are dated 2 May, awful old. they were working on them ever after, together with Poles, and surely better deciphered ones now exist - but are not fed to the public)

RetiredF4

Sorry to say that, but those graphs are destorted like hell. It is no sense in making the hight-line in meters and the distance line in seconds and hereby disregarding the scale according to the hight-scale. Therefore the glidepath looks like being someting like 45°. Also the fact being close to the ground during the approach gets completely lost and glidepath diviations are exagerated.

The x-line should have the same scale like the y-axis, and the timeline than overlaid on the x-axis. That way the perspective view would be more realistic.

I can´t do it better though myself.

franzl

Alice025

Yes, that's right.

SINGAPURCANAC

@criss,
O have no info about your aviation background but this case,polish ac crash,is perfect example of bad atc system
So far we have "discovered" next things:
-There is no TL,system or personal mistake that lead crew to fly "something" instead of proper vertical reference
-Ther is no approach clearance
-There is no word IDENTIFIED,
-PAR app might be done by non qualified soldier
- PAr APP done without any standard,
-PAR done without level information,generally speaking
- Half mile away from touchdown PAR still keeping approaching a/c on frequency without sending it to another frequency for landing clearance
- There is no instruction at decision point for go around
-There is more than 4 seconds between messages
and so on....

My opinion:
-50% of mistake-bad planning and organizational issues within Polish squadron and Polish Air force
- 40% of mistake - Russian military atc system,generally speaking,ATCO itself is not guilty
-10% of mistake,crew,actually cpt of a/c-at decision point omit to make go around even with f/o suggestion, to be honest it is more connected with the trainning issues someone didn't learn him to make go around at DP,so it could be easily transferred into the first group Polish air force - 60 % .
Am I surprised with initial findings?
No.
East is full of such examples.