Computers in the cockpit and the safety of aviation

[BOAC]

Alf - many thanks for your time and effort in a well-thought out post.

I think the core of your post can be summed up in the word 'airmanship' you use. I too believe strongly in the capability of the human brian to reason its way through an unexpected situation, often with success where 'systems' would fail. I recall the period in BA when we were informed that the word 'airmanship' was not to be used, as the great god DODAR was the correct expression. With that thoughtless directive died a lot of 'airmanship'. I always remember one of my first QFIs telling me that 'airmanship was the ability to avoid a situation where you have to use airmanship'

As you accurately put it, there is a lack of emphasis/motivation/direction/incentive - call it what you will - to encourage new pilots to improve their skills as I feel we were brought up to do. Reliance on the 'magenta line' is encouraged to the point that when it fails, they are effectively confused, if not lost. Many times I have said "young man/woman - look at this solution to the situation" to be met by a puzzled "why should I bother" look?

I think the most appropriate paragraph of yours is

"We have yet to learn to live with ‘aviation’ technology – we have to change, but in this change there may be more hazards. Combating these aspect requires thought and analysis – basic thinking.
For all of the human weaknesses, the human is still a powerful defensive aid – we can identify problems and deduce solutions. Do we teach pilots to think in these ways and adequately train them for the range of critical situations (stress, time dependent) which might be encountered?

Thus this problem is not only about technology, but the process of how to think – situation awareness, decision making – full circle back to airmanship, including skills and personal standards."

I too think we have way to go in embracing the new technology - it is STILL outstripping us as it was in the early A320 days.

[hexboy]

BOAC - airmanship

Having read this thread after reading a number of others about various recent tragic accidents, it is good to see that some thought/comments can be posted without the poster being shot down by the "other" side. (Aren't all pilots on the same side?)
The 2 sides being - older pilots who have converted from cables/hydraulics to flybywire in their careers , and younger pilots who have only flown flybywire after receiving the correct training for this equipment as required by their management and aviation authorities.

As you rightly said - we owe it to the passengers and also to all the crews who do such a magnificent job day after day and night after night.

As a lot of the discussion seems to centre around computers - which are essential - and the inability of flight crew to cope when these are not working correctly for whatever reason, I would like to ask whether it would not be practical for an airline to include in its training schedule, a module where each pilot is required, on an annual basis, to do a certain number of hours in a basic, single engine, cable operated training aircraft.
It could be done at a GA field and all kinds of situations including go arounds, engine failures etc. could be included.

Yes, a large number of airline pilots fly/own small planes, gliders, aerobatic planes etc. and with proof, these could be exempted from the annual requirement.
It would be interesting to know, where an accident is proved to be mainly due to pilot error, whether the PF has any ongoing experience with small basic aircraft.

With a young son who is just starting out on a flybywire aircraft for a large airline, it would make me very glad to know that his training included some ongoing basic flying skills as well as all the electronics.

[BOAC]

Hex - thanks for your (obvious) interest. Personally I do not think basic flying skills are in question, more are they being given the right emphasis in the training and testing on modern a/c? As I have said, I perceive the problem as being one of dimininishing emphasis on these. Even in the 90's I saw command checks being failed on 737's following a runway change to a parallel runway at about 10 miles, where the 'candidate' went head down to programme the computer for the new runway, thereby messing up the approach - probably because of the training mentality' which existed which was that the flight management system should be used at all times rather than just flying the a/c onto the new runway. It is very easy to be distracted by all the button pushing and electronic messages away from the primary task which is to fly the a/c. Concomitant with that we must ensure that there is enough information to enable this primary task.

[flipster]

Good questions and answers all,

I'm with BOAC on this one!

In my limited recent experience - Boeing, AB and other passenger carrying aluminium tubes all have 'standby' AIs in the shape ISIS/ISI or a Stby AI plus an RMI (or sommat similar) and they are usually have independent power supplies for gyros and air data feeds etc.
However, the question is - when was the last time we practiced using said standby instruments? Its a bl**dy tricky scan - even to maintain S and L at height. Furthermore, SA can be difficult to acheive without RMIs/BDHI and DME/ILSs etc. Loss of any power/thrust indications only makes matters worse.

Sadly, I don't think there there is any requirement to practice/test any sort of skill on these rudimentary insts - I'm not sure it was even part of the Boeing/Airbus initial training (and it did not crop up in some previous companies' recurrent trg)- surely this is wrong? However, in a previous life and although there was no legal/staff/company requirement to do so, I used to get myself, and our pilots/ FIs to practice a descent, arrival and an SRA/ILS on standby insts once a year - it always produced some interesting debrief points!

Next time you fly, imagine such an approach on a dark and dirty night with limited battery time left!

[jeanray]

Let's get back to manual controls!

Being a PPL, I do not fly glass panels, but, before 9-11, was always in the cockpit with my friends of the TAP (portugal airline), and always "horrified" by the computer controls... The pilots do not FLY anymore: they punch keys and buttons. Most of them don't even need to hold the stick or the yoke. What's the point of being a PILOT? If the computer goes, so does the plane. So why do we need a pilot?
In our small club, we have a member who is an airline Captain. He comes in when he has time, and flies the old chipmunk, the robin, the Yak or the 152.
His comment: ".. need to remember what flying is about"
Another is an Australian Airforce pilot, now 84 (and STILL flying!).
His comment: ".. too many instruments" (we are talking of the six basic!)
No comment...
Gimme wires and cables, and let me drive!

[john_tullamarine]

following a runway change to a parallel runway at about 10 miles, where the 'candidate' went head down to programme the computer for the new runway

You have to be kidding .. but I know you're not .. a sad indictment of the Industry's training programs and general understanding of flight management .. regardless of which seat is concerned.

[BOAC]

JT - I saw it happen too on an early training detail where I was 'Safety Pilot', this time into CPH. I'm sure it is/was a result of 'culture' rather than piloting skills, as ALL the pilots involved were well-hardened 'old' and traditional 'stick and throttle' men (and in CPH it was BIG CAVOK as well that day).

I well recall the introduction of the 734 into my then company (late 80's), and the whole training dept was so starry-eyed about the 'fantastic' FMC that we were told EVERYTHING had to be actioned via the CDU and 'execute' and that to use LVLCHG, V/S or (heaven forbid) manual was a black mark. This caused me to screw up a linecheck into Geneva which is/was renowned for 'shortcuts' onto the southwesterly over the lake, and my desire to disconnect and fly down to capture the g/s was negated by the ruling 'philosophy', and by the time I had entered the new altitude, checked and executed and the auto had 'thought' about a gentle throttle closing and descending.........................shortly after that the trainers recognised it was still just an aeroplane.

It is this sort of mental environment I fear now - what is known in UK as 'The King's new Clothes' from the song. Perhaps we need the 'little boy' to shout out again?

[Clandestino]

Excellent thread BOAC!

However, some misconceptions about FBW and flying the modern transport aeroplane posted here really give me creeps, because I suspect that they are so widespread and wrongfully accepted to be true that there might be some FTOs/TRTOs/CAAs/airlines basing their policies on them.

Our 'new' pilots don't really need the old-fasioned basic flying skills, since these systems prevent abuse/mishandling.

That's a folly that can turn out to be fatal too easily. From personal experience, the skills needed to fly A320 safely are not much different from skills required on ATR-42 or DHC-8 Q400. Sadly, too many lives and airframes were lost in proving that one can stay well clear of all the FBW protections and yet wreck the aeroplane. A320 FBW can prevent overbank, overspeed, overload or stall. It cannot recognize that the runway is wet and that landing fast and long is not a good idea. You still need head mounted computer to resolve that.

Lets not fool ourselves; the ultimate goal of FBW is to facilitate aerodynamically unstable passenger transports with the fuel savings that that would bring.

Hopefully not. Even if it were true, the certification requirements would have to be changed for worse. As it is, A320 is flying sweetly and handling docilely in direct law, when there are no protections, there is direct stick-to-control-displacement and trim is manual via pitch wheel. From what I've gathered about 777 and E-jets, to get them certified, their manufacturers needed to prove that they can be safely flown in degraded FBW modes, so it seems that no current FBW transport aeroplane is unstable. May it long remain so.

Pilots due their human nature were and still are the weakest link in the chain (that is not intended to be derogatory just fact).

Sometimes they are, but it is not to be taken for granted. I was unable to find a single instance where "pilot error" was not facilitated by some systemic error, like: low quality initial training, insufficient recurrent training, weak regulatory oversight, badly designed procedures, lousy cockpit ergonomics, management pressure.... just name it, there are tons of them. It's unfair for two guys/gals at the pointy end to get all the glory when all goes well. It's even more unfair to unload all the blame on them when it doesn't.

The pilots do not FLY anymore: they punch keys and buttons.

It's a misperception. People whose skills end with punching the buttons are not pilots, they are system operators and are not supposed to be allowed in the flight deck (in the perfect world, anyway). Pilots fly and continue to fly when systems fail. When computers tumble, system operators have nothing to fall back upon.

[alf5071h]

hexboy, I assume that you, I, BOAC and JT, would take an ‘older’ view (#22).
However, I had the good fortune to grow up with technology, develop, test, certificate, and see the early systems into service. Now with hindsight perhaps the training and support associated with those systems was less than that required. The manufacturers did not adequately prepare the industry for the technology change – they only ‘sold’ it.

In mitigation, most operators’ wish lists were similar to that of any computing system – ‘let’s have it all’. Pilots’, chief pilots in particular (very old) did not know what they were requesting or understand how technology was to be employed. Thus, supported by ‘marketing’, the technology was to be everything to everyone.
More recently, there are signs with the advent of second generation Airbus and FBW Boeing aircraft that this trend is reversing, and Airbus in particular has put enormous effort into operational support and human factors.

I don’t support the need for refresher flying on ‘cable’ aircraft. If pilots have been appropriately trained in the basics, which might be questionable, then these skills should not be lost even if they degrade due to lack of practice. If FBW aircraft are occasionally hand flown and the more obscure skills are practiced in the simulator, then crews’ should have sufficient capability (flying skill) to deal with most situations.
The problem that I perceive is that crew’s don’t know when to use these basic skills. This is a complex issue relating to situation awareness and assessment, and decision making – the airmanship aspects; but most of all it is the lack ‘experience’, the ‘know how’, ‘know when’, ‘know why’, that are so important in aviation. These aspects, relating to technology, would not be gained in a few flights in ‘cable’ aircraft, nor in routine operations with technology without assistance.

Crew’s flying with modern technology (in fact all crew) must be taught the thinking skills which would enable them to deal with a range of problem situations often seen as ‘emergencies’ in current operations. Also, individuals have to practice these skills and develop a wide range of tacit knowledge (know how), contributing to, and enhancing experience.
One of the most powerful tools for this is debriefing; now where’s that in modern operations?
A pilot’s whom strive for self improvement should conduct self debriefing (analysis – how did I do?), continue to learn, and seek a greater depth of information.
But herein lies another problem; many training systems qualify pilots with frozen ATPLs. These pilots ‘have the qualification’ for Captaincy, they might believe that they already have the necessary knowledge – they ‘have passed the exam’, and often there is no subsequent examination of airmanship unless the operator and the more ‘knowledgeable’ Captains encourage and develop airmanship in these pilots. But where is the time and opportunity for this in a modern high pressured operation.

In addition, I detect a growing lack of confidence in junior pilots, they wish to fall back on SOPs and seek more regulation in their operations, they like being ‘boxed in’, a feeling of security – a possible result of the current litigious society, and enhanced by over regulation and weak corporate culture.

So again, I conclude, the problem is not just technology, or in this instance flying skills, it is the human interaction with all of the many aspects in aviation and the world at large – the big system.
Therefore, solutions might reside in a broad spectrum of activities such as teaching aviation thinking skills, developing airmanship and experience, revising the regulatory structure, and reviewing organizational pressures.
A starting solution could be to ensure that all Captains mentor the newer pilots, provide time to debrief, and in the absence of guidance, explain technology related SOPs. These might simplify some of the complexities of aviation life by focusing on what is important, when, and why – small changes in professional culture, but it would be a start.

In Europe the regulatory aspects are gelling and there is focus on organizational safety; but I fear that underlying this is the belief that safety can be regulated, a consequence of an ‘administrative’ image (as FAA), opposed to an agency in which a much needed co-operative, partnership approach to safety might develop.
These are a long way from the problems of technology, yet at the workface, it’s up to us to contribute the best we can. Everyone will have to work hard to retain the current well-deserved professional status and provide guidance for future generations to achieve the same – we have to get them thinking about ‘it’ – technology too.

Airbus Safety Library.
Skybrary Human Factors – Airbus contribution.
Tacit Knowledge.
Professionalism, (for Law, read Aviation).

[SLFinAZ]

As an SLF....

I think the single biggest question I have is the amount of actual time hand flying the aircraft as a ratio. The total time and takeoff/landing data for the AF crew is posted in the other thread, with 2 or 3 takeoff and landings a month and minimal hand flying otherwise how much "feel" to you retain? Especially if all but the 1st/last minute or so is AP controlled and the AT is enabled. Recognizing the complexity involved in the diagnostics/troubleshooting I still think that some minimal % of "handflown" takeoff and approaches has to instill a degree of feel for flying the plane while dealing with complications and unexpected scenario's.

[BOAC]

Some excellent views coming in there - thanks to all. I do feel this topic needs to be looked at seriously.

I would echo 'clandestino' particularly in 2 places:

"It cannot recognize that the runway is wet and that landing fast and long is not a good idea. You still need head mounted computer to resolve that."

and

"People whose skills end with punching the buttons are not pilots, they are system operators and are not supposed to be allowed in the flight deck (in the perfect world, anyway). Pilots fly and continue to fly when systems fail. When computers tumble, system operators have nothing to fall back upon."

A good summary, I feel. I worry that the new generation of pilots have grown up with superb WII, X-box etc simulation and an understanding that the 'box' is wonderful. It cannot be far away that they will do most of their flying training with EFIS type displays and basic GPS/LNAV facilities.

The first quote from clandestino points out that we must somehow instill this basic 'airmanship'/'seat of the pants'/'anal sphincter tightening' recognition - call it what you will - in their upbringing. Calls to 'cancel' the concept of airmanship in exchange for some structured process of analysis should be discouraged. I recall an excellent (and unpopular) company article from a BA pilot pointing out that not everyone is 'comfortable' with DODAR as a panacea for all ills since THEIR perfectly acceptable logic processes were trampled on by the rigid constraints imposed.

I am pleased to hear that alf thinks that the 'trend' is reversing. What I would like to achieve here are gentle nudges in that direction.

Lastly, for SLFinAZ - things have not changed much over the years. Long-haul pilots often went a month or more between landings. All that has really changed is that pilots now-a-days fly more frequently than of old while the need for 'hand-flying' skills has reduced.

[Tmbstory]

Computers in the Cockpit and Safety of Aviation

The more "normal" types of failures can be coped with fairly quickly.

The unknown (initially) emergency takes a finite time to come to grips with.

If you have that time then good things will follow, if not, then you will be in the papers the next day.

Either with computers or manually, you have to act in the time that you have.

The posts on ' Airmanship Qualities' are good value.


Tmb

[alf5071h]

Re: "It cannot recognize that the runway is wet and that landing fast and long is not a good idea. You still need head mounted computer to resolve that."

I don’t agree with this completely. Many landing accidents have similarities with other human error accidents. In these, the crew either failed to identify the conditions, or after detecting the situation, failed to act correctly (incorrect choice of action); the latter is perhaps more prevalent in landing overruns.

Although a computer (technology), may not be able to detect the landing conditions with sufficient accuracy to calculate the landing performance, there are components of existing systems which could provide an alert of increased risk – FMS wind, +windshield wipers in use, +approach speed for FMS wt, and +flight path angle/altitude.
A simple computation (energy?) could provide an alert when a ‘risky’ situation exists – a heads up to the crew, “have you seen this”, “have you considered … “; i.e. time to start thinking.

Alerting of this form is the basis of cross crew monitoring and CRM/intervention; however, both pilots could be subject to error simultaneously, and also there are personality issues such that the alert may not be given.
The advantage of a technology based alert is that humans are biased towards it – we like to believe what computers tell us.

Now consider a higher level of alert like EGPWS. This is a highly reliable system where failure to heed the warnings could indicate irrational behavior; yet some pilots do not pull-up.
For EGPWS, the higher level of technology with auto pull-up may provide the necessary stimulus. It would be a brave or foolhardy pilot who did not allow the autopilot to pull-up, and even if it was decided to overrule the warning, there has to be a conscious effort to disconnect the autopilot and maneuver the aircraft.
IIRC this is ‘technology aided decision making’ where significant aspects of a situation are presented to a pilot as a course of action, which once in place the human is biased to agree with what is happening (The Loss Aversion Heuristic).

So its not all bad news about technology: It’s what we use it for and how we use it that matters; it has limits and understanding these is important.
In a similar approach and landing situation, technology might not be able to predict (look ahead, what if) to aspects of a situation which a humans could judge better – if only the human would ‘look ahead’.
E.g. a storm passing over the airport presents hazards of windshear, lightning, turbulence, but once clear, a landing may be attempted in relative safety, but what reminds the pilot to consider that the storm could have flooded the runway, and that outflow winds could give a tailwind – similar situation as above, different time frame – the future. Solutions to this type of problem probably require human thought, but it is that always forthcoming; are humans any more reliable than computers?

Errors in Aviation Decision Making.

Analyzing Explanations for Seemingly Irrational Choices.

Perspectives on Human Error.

[Jesper]

Im a frequent pprune reader and I sincerly think this is, by far, the best thread i'we ever read on here! Hopefully the guys with something to say in these kind of questions have a glance here now and then!
Thanks!

[Tmbstory]

Computers in the Cockpit and Safety of Aviation

There is excellent information in these posts for discussion.

However please remember that in an actual critical situation you may be faced with a decision to make and the action to take, in far less time than it takes to read an average post. It may be only seconds.


Tmb

[alf5071h]

Some more thoughts on the design of automation; – to aid thoughts and discussion.

Six design rules for human designers of automation:

• Provide rich, complex, and natural signals.
• Be predictable.
• Provide a good conceptual model.
• Make the output understandable.
• Provide continual awareness without annoyance.
• Exploit natural mappings.

Or an alternative view:-
1. Keep things simple: People have simple minds, so talk down to them.
2. Always give people a conceptual model: People have this thing about “understanding,” so give them stories they can understand (people love stories).
3. Give reasons: People are not very trusting, so make up some reasons for them. That way they think they have made the decision
4. Make people think they are in control: People like to feel as if they are in control, even though they aren’t. Humor them. Give them simple things to do while we do the important things.
5. Continually reassure: People lack self-confidence, so they need a lot of reassurance. Pander to their emotions.

Before anyone lights the flaming spears, read the source of these quotes; and don’t forget that humor has an important role in thinking as it involves more than one viewpoint.

Related link.
Don Norman's jnd.org / user advocacy and human-centered design

[jolly girl]

Apologies if this is a bit off thread (but maybe not, the thread name is "Computers in the cockpit and the safety of aviation")...

Lately I have become interested in what researchers* refer to as "disturbance management," described as when "highly complex dynamic and event-driven domains such as aviation require operators to diagnose and cope with the consequences of breakdowns in human-machine performance that interact, cascade and escalate over time while maintaining the integrity and goals (i.e. efficiency, safety) of an underlaying dynamic process."

I am looking for examples of (for a lack of a better way to put it) ineffective disturbance management in the form of open-domain incident or accident reports. (I am aware of Strasburg, Air India and Cali in the '90s, but am looking for something more recent.) If anyone could point me in the right direction I would be much obliged.

Jolly

PS - ALF5071H - reference your comment "there is always the risk that crews will focus on trouble shooting and the reinstatement of the high-tech systems," research in the sim indicates this is the case. (Sarter & Woods in Human Factors, 1997 and 2000.)

[A37575]

Humans are lousy at monitoring automated systems

I can't resist this. Back in 1990 I was flying as a contract pilot for a German 737 operator. Loved the job and a wonderful experience. The F/O's however were quite nervous about hand flying even under the best of weather and the automatics were engaged with seconds after lift off. On the other hand I was well aware of the use it or lose it principle and kept my hand in literally with hand flown SIDs and STARs using basic navaids where applicable (RMI)or the NAV selection of the HSI. Of course, it had to happen and a thoroughly alarmed first officer reported to the chief pilot that this Englishman actually hand flies this German registered 737. Tea and bikkes followed and the kindly chief pilot explained that in this airline the first officers were not trained to monitor raw data hand flying, but only trained to monitor the automatic pilot. His point taken, it was back to button pushing and knob twirling for me.

And now you tell me that humans are lousy at monitoring automatic systems!

[Tmbstory]

Hand Flying

Glad to read your post and hope you continue the hand flying whenever you get the chance.

I have retired now but used to enjoy hand flying Corporate Jets from take-off , to cruise and down to landing . I expected the pilots who I was responsible for to be able to do the same. A few stories there!

Pilots should be competent in both hand flying and autopilot / automatics operation. It gives one a lot of satisfaction.

Regards

Tmb

[BOAC]

A37575 brings us back to the topic of over-reliance in automation. Is the 6-monthly 'test' flown purely in autopilot? Is 'hand-flying' at suitable moments discouraged because the monitoring level by the other pilot is either too high or not practised?

Only if the 'automation' is completely 'fool-proof' and multiply redundant with ZERO prospect of failure can we, in my opinion, set off down this road.

Are we there yet? I don't even need 'answers on a postcard'.