Computers in the cockpit and the safety of aviation
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From: An Island Province
Peter, your post #99 touched on a key issue in that for many if not all recent accidents, a technological solution already exists. A notable exception might be runway overrun due to inadequate information about the runway condition.
EGPWS if correctly configured – software updates, database revisions, GPS nav, will provide an adequate safety boundary if the warning is heeded – terrain, landing short. Automation would replace human activity (or of increasing concern, inactivity).
Bank angle limiting / alerting is available. In those aircraft which suffered an upset with these facility, then activation of FD guidance / automatic pull-up could have prevent the accident (EGPWS last resort warnings were given). EGPWS auto pull-up was tested (Apr 2005).
Improved takeoff configuration warnings exist, not all aircraft have them. The problem here as with other safety aspects is ‘Grandfather rights’ – the industry regulators judge that we are safe enough (TM #97 !!!).
So if the human regulators are suffering weaknesses in judgement and fail to take timely action – a human condition, should we not automate them too?
EGPWS if correctly configured – software updates, database revisions, GPS nav, will provide an adequate safety boundary if the warning is heeded – terrain, landing short. Automation would replace human activity (or of increasing concern, inactivity).
Bank angle limiting / alerting is available. In those aircraft which suffered an upset with these facility, then activation of FD guidance / automatic pull-up could have prevent the accident (EGPWS last resort warnings were given). EGPWS auto pull-up was tested (Apr 2005).
Improved takeoff configuration warnings exist, not all aircraft have them. The problem here as with other safety aspects is ‘Grandfather rights’ – the industry regulators judge that we are safe enough (TM #97 !!!).
So if the human regulators are suffering weaknesses in judgement and fail to take timely action – a human condition, should we not automate them too?
Thread Starter
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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From: UK
"Perhaps a practical study of the human and the man-machine interface would be more worthwhile. "
Which is more-or-less where we came in - from post #21
"We have yet to learn to live with ‘aviation’ technology – we have to change, but in this change there may be more hazards. Combating these aspect requires thought and analysis – basic thinking.
For all of the human weaknesses, the human is still a powerful defensive aid – we can identify problems and deduce solutions. Do we teach pilots to think in these ways and adequately train them for the range of critical situations (stress, time dependent) which might be encountered?
Thus this problem is not only about technology, but the process of how to think – situation awareness, decision making – full circle back to airmanship, including skills and personal standards."
I too think we have way to go in embracing the new technology - it is STILL outstripping us as it was in the early A320 days."
Which is more-or-less where we came in - from post #21
"We have yet to learn to live with ‘aviation’ technology – we have to change, but in this change there may be more hazards. Combating these aspect requires thought and analysis – basic thinking.
For all of the human weaknesses, the human is still a powerful defensive aid – we can identify problems and deduce solutions. Do we teach pilots to think in these ways and adequately train them for the range of critical situations (stress, time dependent) which might be encountered?
Thus this problem is not only about technology, but the process of how to think – situation awareness, decision making – full circle back to airmanship, including skills and personal standards."
I too think we have way to go in embracing the new technology - it is STILL outstripping us as it was in the early A320 days."
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From: On the Beach
BOAC:
"...surely it would be more logical..." indeed it would because it would be safer, much safer than any type of low-altitude, level flight CTL maneuver.
However, taking your 4) (Airblue Islamabad) - with the technology that would permit an 'automatic' CTL, surely it would be more logical to simply produce an 'automatic' approach to R12? The only time a CTL would then be required would be in the event of a very late runway change since there would otherwise be no need for an approach at all on R30.
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would have save the day when all the "reliable" airspeed indication are gone?
Putting aside the case of multiple failures, if the problem is just a routine loss of pitot statics, surely the time honoured flight with unreliable airspeed approach (ie pitch plus thrust for the configuration) would be more appropriate ? A GPS might help as well, but appears to be rather optional ?
Putting aside the case of multiple failures, if the problem is just a routine loss of pitot statics, surely the time honoured flight with unreliable airspeed approach (ie pitch plus thrust for the configuration) would be more appropriate ? A GPS might help as well, but appears to be rather optional ?
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From: UK
It is somewhat ironic that in this thread “Computers in the cockpit and safety of aviation” where the general tenor is that computers are contributing to current safety problems, that it is suggested that more computation is required (GPS # 104).
Perhaps apart from a very few (extremely rare) incidents involving multiple system failure, where either detection of preceding errors or recognition of previous incidents should have prevented the occurrence, there should be no need for further computational additions.
Why attempt to use GPS with a total speed failure when there are perfectly adequate procedures (Pitch / Power) to temporarily cope with situation until a more suitable solution can be found.
What happens to rule 1 – fly the aircraft, while you fumble with the GPS, switch to speed mode, etc, etc. This ‘computer’ is just as likely to be distracting as the failure.
No, no more computers; just fly the aircraft, deal with the situation and control the human tendency to generate fear from the latest, loudest, brightest failure by understanding the basis of certification, the availability of systems backups, and procedures required to manage these.
But foremost remember manage ‘yourself’, minimise surprise / stress, and fly the aircraft not the computer.
Perhaps apart from a very few (extremely rare) incidents involving multiple system failure, where either detection of preceding errors or recognition of previous incidents should have prevented the occurrence, there should be no need for further computational additions.
Why attempt to use GPS with a total speed failure when there are perfectly adequate procedures (Pitch / Power) to temporarily cope with situation until a more suitable solution can be found.
What happens to rule 1 – fly the aircraft, while you fumble with the GPS, switch to speed mode, etc, etc. This ‘computer’ is just as likely to be distracting as the failure.
No, no more computers; just fly the aircraft, deal with the situation and control the human tendency to generate fear from the latest, loudest, brightest failure by understanding the basis of certification, the availability of systems backups, and procedures required to manage these.
But foremost remember manage ‘yourself’, minimise surprise / stress, and fly the aircraft not the computer.
Thread Starter
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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From: UK
Well, I'm pleased to see the old thread given the kiss of life - it is relevant.
I think it should be made 'SOP' for a card with pitch and power numbers to be placed on the panel and kept updated. Simple and effective (cheap, too, for the beancounters).
I think it should be made 'SOP' for a card with pitch and power numbers to be placed on the panel and kept updated. Simple and effective (cheap, too, for the beancounters).
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From: Arizona USA
I think it should be made 'SOP' for a card with pitch and power numbers to be placed on the panel and kept updated.
No Flight Engineer?
Your tough luck.
Sorry...
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No need on the panel, our Flight Engineer has a superb copy in his QRH...always at the ready.
.. or, at the expense of speaking heresy in the current flight management environment ... if one occasionally hand flies on raw data .. then one necessarily knows the relevant numbers as a memory item ...
For folk transitioning I always made sim time to fit in practice on a total takeoff pitot static failure (plus anything else which might have been useful) with an IMC recovery off an ILS. Appeared to be useful and certainly built up the confidence after a couple of runs.
.. or, at the expense of speaking heresy in the current flight management environment ... if one occasionally hand flies on raw data .. then one necessarily knows the relevant numbers as a memory item ...
For folk transitioning I always made sim time to fit in practice on a total takeoff pitot static failure (plus anything else which might have been useful) with an IMC recovery off an ILS. Appeared to be useful and certainly built up the confidence after a couple of runs.
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From: Where the Quaboag River flows, USA
J_T
Now it is heresy to know the proper pitch and power for every flight regime! In my prior plane (Lockheed, Mr 411A), I could arrive after a NAT crossing and state exactly what power setting and pitch angle to be flown, in advance, throughout the descent and landing to Frankfurt-Main. Now, I try, but the temptation is to think it a frivolous exercise in being an old pilot.
GF
Now it is heresy to know the proper pitch and power for every flight regime! In my prior plane (Lockheed, Mr 411A), I could arrive after a NAT crossing and state exactly what power setting and pitch angle to be flown, in advance, throughout the descent and landing to Frankfurt-Main. Now, I try, but the temptation is to think it a frivolous exercise in being an old pilot.
GF
Thread Starter
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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From: UK
411A has missed the point as usual - we ALL have QRHs with tables of pitch and power, the problem is that when the s hits the f there is not a lot of time to go thumbing through a QRH to look up a table to find you have actually just stalled.
I expect, like JT, gf and others, we all know/knew the numbers. It is becoming apparent that lots of others don't and hence my simple, cheap suggestion. (Cheaper than an F/E)
I expect, like JT, gf and others, we all know/knew the numbers. It is becoming apparent that lots of others don't and hence my simple, cheap suggestion. (Cheaper than an F/E)
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From: various places .....
Which is why, I suspect, most of the older folk have a view that pilots should be competent at
(a) playing a nice tune on the FMS AND
(b) raw data stick and rudder things AND
(c) all likely combinations in between.
He/she who is not able to address such requirements risks an unpleasant surprise, sooner or later, when the appropriate set of holes lines up one dark and dirty night .. and bites the offender on the tail.
(a) playing a nice tune on the FMS AND
(b) raw data stick and rudder things AND
(c) all likely combinations in between.
He/she who is not able to address such requirements risks an unpleasant surprise, sooner or later, when the appropriate set of holes lines up one dark and dirty night .. and bites the offender on the tail.
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From: Bielefeld, Germany
While I really do hesitate to disturb the sewing club's coffee hour, I do feel I should point out that there is no such thing as raw data any more (with - I should say here, so as not to offend certain sensibilities - the exception of The Greatest Airplane Ever Built, which along with other airplanes built some 40 years ago might actually have had some. I am talking here about airplanes 25 years old or less).
And if there should be any raw data around, you really don't want it. Just ask the crew of QF72. Your "raw data" is heavily computer-mediated and must be. And of course control functions have been mediated since WWII, although only in the last 22 years in-service by digital computers.
The relevant question is what critical functions should be mediated and how. Most pilots are probably not aware of the development techniques used to assess and ensure safety (in the sense of minimising and mitigating dangerous failures) of critical systems. And, I suppose, even less aware that these selfsame techniques apply to systems whose behavior is partly human.
PBL
And if there should be any raw data around, you really don't want it. Just ask the crew of QF72. Your "raw data" is heavily computer-mediated and must be. And of course control functions have been mediated since WWII, although only in the last 22 years in-service by digital computers.
The relevant question is what critical functions should be mediated and how. Most pilots are probably not aware of the development techniques used to assess and ensure safety (in the sense of minimising and mitigating dangerous failures) of critical systems. And, I suppose, even less aware that these selfsame techniques apply to systems whose behavior is partly human.
PBL
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From: UK
The relevant question is what critical functions should be mediated and how. Most pilots are probably not aware of the development techniques used to assess and ensure safety (in the sense of minimising and mitigating dangerous failures) of critical systems. And, I suppose, even less aware that these selfsame techniques apply to systems whose behavior is partly human.
My point is give us pitch and power and we can survive loss of other sensors. The job of software designers is to produce the flawless perfect system. Long way to go.
Just ask the crew of QF72. Your "raw data"
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From: Bielefeld, Germany
Originally Posted by BOAC
RAW DATA is 'un-mediated', or as close as you can get. It means NOT having complex computer programmes deciding which input to the system is the one/s we will 'accept'.
Originally Posted by BOAC
If you are suggesting that some damn wiggly amps are 'mediating' on those basic values then I think it is time to stop software development
PBL
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From: UK
the PRIMs didn't filter it, and thereby caused the altitude excursions that turned a flight into an accident.
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then most modern airplanes don't feed any raw data to either cockpit instruments
I play with mid level turboprops these days and the fleet certainly has both raw data primary and standby flight data tucked away in amongst all the gee-whizz bells and whistles, FMSs and other like bits of kit.
Do not most (all ?) larger machines still have independent standby AH, ASI and altimeter ? It is these to which we should turn when the others start to give one the discomforts ...
The problem is that the skillset required to use them to the exclusion of the fancy stuff is quite different if these are ALL that the pilot is reasonably left with on the dark and dirty night.
However, providing that the pilot has maintained that skillset, which is becoming increasingly difficult, it is a comparatively straightforward exercise to recover the aircraft to a safe landing.
The computers are great .. but only if they are working properly.
I play with mid level turboprops these days and the fleet certainly has both raw data primary and standby flight data tucked away in amongst all the gee-whizz bells and whistles, FMSs and other like bits of kit.
Do not most (all ?) larger machines still have independent standby AH, ASI and altimeter ? It is these to which we should turn when the others start to give one the discomforts ...
The problem is that the skillset required to use them to the exclusion of the fancy stuff is quite different if these are ALL that the pilot is reasonably left with on the dark and dirty night.
However, providing that the pilot has maintained that skillset, which is becoming increasingly difficult, it is a comparatively straightforward exercise to recover the aircraft to a safe landing.
The computers are great .. but only if they are working properly.
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From: Correr es mi destino por no llevar papel
Originally Posted by BOAC
the problem is that when the s hits the f there is not a lot of time to go thumbing through a QRH to look up a table to find you have actually just stalled.
Don't ask me about 330, I've only flown 19s and 20s and then for a short while.
Originally Posted by PBL
I do feel I should point out that there is no such thing as raw data any more
IMHO QF72 has so far only proven that we have not basically moved from the DP Davies principle of acceptable statistical probability of stickpusher activating when not needed. Exact hows and whys of the QF72 is something I eagerly await too.
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From: Bielefeld, Germany
Originally Posted by Clandestino
.....Airbus, pitch and power combinations that kept you both out of stall and and overspeed long enough to find pitch/power table in the QRH were memory items; TOGA/15 to acceleration, CLB/10 to FL100, CLB/5 above.
Don't ask me about 330
Don't ask me about 330
Originally Posted by PBL
...... there is no such thing as raw data any more
Originally Posted by Clandestino
.....semantics: raw data has specific meaning for transport pilot and it's not literally raw data
There are lots of systems mediating between the physical flying environment and the control surfaces, some of whose data paths go through human eyes and brains sitting in two front seats. It used to be the case that the set of data paths from the environment to the eyes used to be well-understood; usually very reliable with known and simple failure modes. This interface was well understood and relied upon by those eyes in the front seat; the brain was the weakest point in that data path to the controls.
My point: it ain't that way any more. The path from environment to eyes has complex failure modes which the eyes sitting in the front seat cannot fathom in real time. Conversely, some of the systems which used to be relatively unreliable, for example navigation, based on reception of ground-based signals, have become far more reliable, as have systems such as the flight director. The question of what the eyes in the front seat can rely on, and should retain wariness of, has changed radically in the last two decades, with the explosion of avionics mediating everything. The answer is not necessarily that one is best off relying on the interface on which one has traditionally relied, and on which the low end of GA still does.
People flying modified forty-year-old designs are likely thinking appropriately when they think that, when things go pear-shaped, they want to see and use the good old traditional interface, which one calls "raw data". But one should be aware that that is on more modern kit as much an artificial, algorithm-mediated construction as flight director guidance. Witness some recent ADs from EASA.
Concerning QF72, the accident happened because the flight control was being driven by "raw data". Exactly how and why that data was generated has, to my knowledge, not yet been answered, despite dissection of the box through which it passed. Similar things have happened to analogue data-mediated flight control systems, such as the accident to the X31 16 years ago, but in that case the pathways are well understood.
The question is: which filtered data, of what sort and at which stage, are of most use to the eyes in the front seats when there are problems with the veridical operation of all systems? Maybe the most useful data is in fact a data range: the system "thinks" that the actual value of crucial parameters lies in range X-to-Y, with "here" (say, on the FD) the "most recommended" course of action. That is often what a good hazard&risk analysis of data corruption would suggest is the best information to provide to the eyes in the front seat. And you don't get around that Hazan simply by wishing for the same things you have in your weekend Cessna.
PBL