hexboy, I assume that you, I,
BOAC and
JT, would take an ‘older’ view (#22).
However, I had the good fortune to grow up with technology, develop, test, certificate, and see the early systems into service. Now with hindsight perhaps the training and support associated with those systems was less than that required. The manufacturers did not adequately prepare the industry for the technology change – they only ‘sold’ it.
In mitigation, most operators’ wish lists were similar to that of any computing system – ‘let’s have it all’. Pilots’, chief pilots in particular (very old) did not know what they were requesting or understand how technology was to be employed. Thus, supported by ‘marketing’, the technology was to be everything to everyone.
More recently, there are signs with the advent of second generation Airbus and FBW Boeing aircraft that this trend is reversing, and Airbus in particular has put enormous effort into operational support and human factors.
I don’t support the need for refresher flying on ‘cable’ aircraft. If pilots have been appropriately trained in the basics, which might be questionable, then these skills should not be lost even if they degrade due to lack of practice. If FBW aircraft are occasionally hand flown and the more obscure skills are practiced in the simulator, then crews’ should have sufficient capability (flying skill) to deal with most situations.
The problem that I perceive is that crew’s don’t know when to use these basic skills. This is a complex issue relating to situation awareness and assessment, and decision making – the airmanship aspects; but most of all it is the lack ‘experience’, the ‘know how’, ‘know when’, ‘know why’, that are so important in aviation. These aspects, relating to technology, would not be gained in a few flights in ‘cable’ aircraft, nor in routine operations with technology without assistance.
Crew’s flying with modern technology (in fact all crew) must be taught the thinking skills which would enable them to deal with a range of problem situations often seen as ‘emergencies’ in current operations. Also, individuals have to practice these skills and develop a wide range of tacit knowledge (know how), contributing to, and enhancing experience.
One of the most powerful tools for this is debriefing; now where’s that in modern operations?
A pilot’s whom strive for self improvement should conduct self debriefing (analysis – how did I do?), continue to learn, and seek a greater depth of information.
But herein lies another problem; many training systems qualify pilots with frozen ATPLs. These pilots ‘have the qualification’ for Captaincy, they might believe that they already have the necessary knowledge – they ‘have passed the exam’, and often there is no subsequent examination of airmanship unless the operator and the more ‘knowledgeable’ Captains encourage and develop airmanship in these pilots. But where is the time and opportunity for this in a modern high pressured operation.
In addition, I detect a growing lack of confidence in junior pilots, they wish to fall back on SOPs and seek more regulation in their operations, they like being ‘boxed in’, a feeling of security – a possible result of the current litigious society, and enhanced by over regulation and weak corporate culture.
So again, I conclude, the problem is not just technology, or in this instance flying skills, it is the human interaction with all of the many aspects in aviation and the world at large – the big system.
Therefore, solutions might reside in a broad spectrum of activities such as teaching aviation thinking skills, developing airmanship and experience, revising the regulatory structure, and reviewing organizational pressures.
A starting solution could be to ensure that all Captains mentor the newer pilots, provide time to debrief, and in the absence of guidance, explain technology related SOPs. These might simplify some of the complexities of aviation life by focusing on what is important, when, and why – small changes in professional culture, but it would be a start.
In Europe the regulatory aspects are gelling and there is focus on organizational safety; but I fear that underlying this is the belief that safety can be regulated, a consequence of an ‘administrative’ image (as FAA), opposed to an agency in which a much needed co-operative, partnership approach to safety might develop.
These are a long way from the problems of technology, yet at the workface, it’s up to us to contribute the best we can. Everyone will have to work hard to retain the current well-deserved professional status and provide guidance for future generations to achieve the same – we have to get them thinking about ‘it’ – technology too.
Airbus Safety Library.
Skybrary Human Factors – Airbus contribution.
Tacit Knowledge.
Professionalism, (for Law, read Aviation).