@atpcliff

I don't know if Boeing ever said that, or if they ever recommended flying visual circuits/approaches in FLCH mode, which is some stupid idea!

Which brings me to the comment of Mr. Mouse

Spot on. Basically there's no further comment to add.
XAAs take note or be oblivious!

I don't think they are at all. Any modern aeroplane that has a serviceable autothrottle that will not wake up when the aeroplane is 30kts below Vmin is not "fine".

Any modern aeroplane that has TOGA buttons that won't work at any point (within reason) is not "fine".

They're just like cars and software. Each has good points and bad points but the humans that design them are too pig-headed to incorporate the best bits into one design because "we know better".

Certification requirement is that go-around thrust be available in 8 seconds from approach idle. That of course assumes they actually moved the throttles (my money says they didn't).

Bloggs, so you're comfortable with the idea that if the pilot accidently bumps the TOGA switch while reaching for the reverse levers after touchdown, you should get full forward thrust?
A fellow you may have heard of by the name of Wernher Von Braun put it quite well:
"There is no such thing as a foolproof system, because fools are too ingenious"

Part of my standard certification flight test profile is to do a 'simulated' go-around, so I've witnessed dozens. The PF always leaves his hand on the throttles until go-around thrust is obtained. Of course, flight test pilots are competent. Apparently not all pilots the SLF trust their lives to have that advantage...

My point precisely, TDracer. Why are the TOGA buttons anywhere near the reverser levers? On other aeroplanes, the GA buttons are on the back of the throttles; no chance of bumping them when pulling Reverse. :ok:

Those guys did not go flying that day to not bother to check TOGA when they needed it (if indeed that is what happened). Don't slip into the group of "they stuffed it up, no more to see, move along please".

Given that the Boeing TOGA buttons have been in the same place for over 50 years, moving them could easily cause more problems than it solves :rolleyes:


It's called training for a reason. As I noted previously the 777 autothrottle is not considered or certified to be flight critical system. No, I repeat NO training program should tell or teach pilots to trust their and their passengers lives to a system that's not flight critical. The pilot needs to have his hand on the throttle to push go-around - just how hard is it to teach/train them to make sure the throttles actually move? When I select cruise control on my car, I always look to make sure it actually is controlling to the selected speed - why shouldn't I hold a so-called professional pilot to that same standard?

Precisely my point...

The VERY BEST TO/GA button location is in the elbow and its controlled by the brain!!!

Lift is a gift but Thrust is a must!

Yes, a la airbus
3 clicks to freedom

tdtracer

If I remember correctly the 757/767 have the GA switches on the rear of the thrust levers, easier to use and more logical. Perhaps moving them on the 777 was a mistake.

Let's face it, most of us would love to be more "engaged" but we're not allowed to be. That is the cold hard fact. We're expected to perform with imperfect equipment when we are not allowed-to or given the opportunity to get-to/stay at a level where we can perform.

B777 Auto throttle has come in for some criticism by FAA after SFO accident. Off course you don't fly an approach without looking at your speed but In throttle hold it is supposed to wake up when speed drops but it didn't . Aeroplane may be fine but some systems may not be that ingeniously designed .

If I remember correctly the 757/767 have the GA switches on the rear of the thrust levers, easier to use and more logical.

B732 if I remember had palm switches for GA?????

That statement is not correct. On the 757/767 TO and GA modes are engaged by seperate switches. The GA switch is to the side/rear of the thrust levers (where your thumb naturally rests), to engage GA mode you push forward with your thumb. On the 744 (and I presume the 777) TO and GA mode engagement is combined in the TOGA levers located forward of the thrust levers. To engage GA you push down with your forefingers.

Interestingly, the 757/767 GA switches are still there on the 744, but are instead used to disconnect the A/T. On conversion from the 767 to the 744, the instructors repeatedly warned us about this difference. They also said it will not be if, but when, we will incorrectly push the A/T disconnect switch when we mean to GA. (High workload, cognitive overload, revert to 'muscle memory' etc.) I did it once in an early sim session.

It's much easier...
 

GA is a normal maneuver.
It's just like a takeoff.
Power , pull, gear up.

The problem I see is that tons of pilots, instructors pilots, check airmen, see it as a an " emergency procedure" to escape of the unknown or near disaster.
This triggers the normal response of the trainee( during training fase or recurrent) that all has to be done in a rush , expediuos and impressive way.
Then ATC with their stupid habit to give new instructions,ask the reason of the GA,combined with the stupid habit of responding to stupid questions right away by PF...
Think about the take off.
Step by step in a calm manner , no rush,no to much taking, no ATC intervention...PF, PM FOUCUSED ON THE MANOUVER. GA IS JUST LIKE A TAKEOFF AND SHOULD BE PERFORMED THE SAME WAY AND PHILOSOPHY !
Aviate Navigate Comunicate.
And of course pilots need to learn to fly( newies) and old ones practice and recover their lost skills.
Thousand of procedures and automation can change , but with the basic fundamentals not in place, another accident is waiting to happen again, unfortunately.

Incorrect. It is part of the syllabus I teach for both B787 and B777 where we demonstrate that it is the one of the two situations where the Autothrottle system will not 'wake up'.

Hamish McBush

Many years ago, a Britannia Airways 737-200 carried out an approach in poor visibility into Leeds Bradford. The crew consisted of a very junior and inexperienced Second Officer, with a highly experienced Captain, ex RAF and a reputation for abruptness and high autocracy on 'his' flight deck. The Captain went below minimums and the Second Officer called G/A twice. The Captain then initiated a G/A and called for gear up. He then saw the lights and proceeded to dive for the runway after initiating a pull up and even after calling for the retraction of the undercarriage. The aircraft landed hard, very hard, and many panels opened within the cabin including masks and luggage bins. What saved them, was under the huge stress of the event, the S/O had selected OFF instead of UP and the gear had remained down.

Never, ever try to predict human behaviour in unplanned and stressful situations. The only thing that's certain is uncertainty.

Harry

M.Mouse
I am not 777 guy but in the SFO case pilots stated something similar to what I said and later FAA asked Boeing to have a look at the auto throttle design. I am interested to know why is that? What does it exactly mean?

And as a result BY changed its ops manual to state that once a go around had been called it will not be countermanded (unless the safety of the aircraft is at risk) Very sound.

I won't speculate on the cause of this accident but a number of issues I have read on this thread really worry me:
The suggestion that the climb performance of the 777 was poor at MLW on TWO engines, is nonsense. After all, all twins can produce a climb on ONE engine at RTOW. On two engines at MLW climb performance is excellent even at plus 50 c, at least on all the twins I have flown. Can't imagine the tripler is any worse.

Any competent pilot should monitor that, even if AT is engaged and TOGA or any other mode is active at a critical phase of flight, that the thrust levers are moving to give the required thrust ! Hand on thrust levers and if you need a lot of thrust in a hurry, firewall the levers, the ECUs will handle the acceleration and the engines can take it !Even the old hydro mechanical AFRCUs would always control engine acceleration, and as QFI I have seen a lot of that after slams !

Still can't understand the hostility towards hand flying when the environment and workload allows to maintain handling skills and instrument scan.



My company SOP was "centre to command " at 1000 feet. Sometimes in a quiet ATC environment I would hand fly to/from say, 20,000 ft or so. I was sometimes asked why. My answer to this was that one day, I might, just might, have to fly a manual, single engine, non precision approach to minimums at 3 am in the morning after significant systems and,/or engine failure. I was not going to be unable to cope, and hand flying kept up my flying skills, just like my manual flying days on Canberras. ( no ap or at). Autopilots don't get out of practice, human pilots certainly do !

I make these comments, long since retired, but after almost 40 years of flying on 3 four jets and 5 twin jets so shoot me down if you wish !

Actually it's not a 'normal' manoeuvre! It rarely happens on the line compared to taking off. Go Arounds are often also poorly briefed compared to a take-off safety brief; if they are briefed at all!

And not knowing what you fly VONKLUFFEN but a take-off on my current type may be 180 tonnes heavier than a go around at max landing weight; The performance differences exacerbated by generally taking off with reduced thrust and going around with full attainable thrust! Makes the machine a TOTALLY different beast!

The Go Around also may come at the end of a tiring ULR 15 hour sector. Just another wee difference...

Harry the Cod, post #900
"The crew consisted of a very junior and inexperienced Second Officer, with a highly experienced Captain, ex RAF and a reputation for abruptness and high autocracy on 'his' flight deck."
Ex RN, in fact

What would be the average number of times such a crew use TOGA by pushing the levers forward in, say, a year?

And I have cleared many many aircraft to land using the same mantra of 'Land - surface wind' - but the anemometer was not by the TDZ. Indeed in many airports it can be half a runway away from the TDZ. If you go back in the thread to the description of the winds at DXB you will see that they have a sea breeze front at certain times of day when the ambient wind is in a particular direction. So the tower provided surface wind may be totally misleading. I don't know perhaps they have LIDAR to provide a precise TDZ surface wind - but normally giving one surface wind for a 4km runway is a little misleading.

Archie no problem - be harsh this should be an egoless discussion :ok:

Unless there was an engine malfunction the power was not applied probably/possibly because of TOGA button inhibit. I was just hypothesizing (without apportioning error) how an aircraft could apparently have sufficient positive rate of climb for the crew to believe it was safe for gear to be selected up.

I do not wish to divert this thread but the SFO incident was quite extraordinary. You cannot legislate for lack of knowledge, training or incompetence.

that it is the one of the two situations where the Autothrottle system will not 'wake up'.

I'm assuming that like all Boeing the FMA's will annunciate THR HLD!

Actually it's not a 'normal' manoeuvre! It rarely happens on the line compared to taking off.

It should be a normal manoeuvre. It should not be complicated. It is rarely a surprise, knowing the Wx. On this occasion there seems to be a surprise element. Therefore, IMHO, a GA should be a simple profile. Thus it should be a similar to a 'normal' takeoff procedure. Following my philosophy any approach is a GA until TR's are selected. This helps reduce some of surprise element. Why make an easy job difficult. There are 4 basic associated manoeuvres: takeoff, all eng GA, eng fail on takeoff, eng fail GA. The more similar you can make these the more likely the accuracy of the crews performing calmly and accurately. Why oh why did Boeing make the B737 NG all eng GA different from the other 3 in that you accelerate by moving the flap lever. Where did that come from? There is also written that the flaps can start to be retracted at 400agl. What's the rush? Not must, but can be. I have watched a crew doing this at 400' with great stress (SOP's) placed on retracting the flaps ASAP. Guess what; >50% screw ups. WTF is the rush? It's a F15 takeoff starting above the ground. If acceleration on a F15 takeoff is OK at 1000' why change it on a higher stress manoeuvre like a GA? Why close the MCP speed window on a rarely performed possibly unexpected manoeuvre. From a human performance perspective it doesn't seem the smartest idea.
I found GA's were briefed in the same robotic manner as a takeoff brief. PF is a cassette player and PM is yawning. When the Wx predicted a likely GA my brief was was made with a little more emphasis. It then included what would happen next regarding a hold or diversion or 2nd approach. Was there radar or not etc. etc. Both of us touch drilled the GA. There was no doubt who would do what & when. In the heat of the moment I found the B757/767 was the same as a takeoff, so why complicate B737?

Unless it caused by slack, disinterested crew that don't care about their own lives and those of their pax, you certainly can! Legislate more training!

Unless it caused by slack, disinterested crew that don't care about their own lives and those of their pax, you certainly can! Legislate more training!

You can take a horse to water, but..............

I understand your sentiment, but...........

Retired BA/BY,
I agree 100% with your reasoning about handflying to 20,000ft.

RAT 5,
Also your mindset that every approach was to a go-around until the thrust reversers were selected.

A very good piece of advice I was given early in my flying career was - 'Never let your aircraft go where your mind has not been before.'

You can't be too careful.

I was once told by a UK CAA Training inspector to ensure crews covered the thrust levers and Control Column below MSA during my debrief after a TRE revalidation.

Having now moved to a ULC carrier, I get a bollocking from a line trainer for covering the thrust levers and control column below MSA.

Didn't argue with the LTC, no point, but I found the SOP in question in the Line Training notes, apparently they are worried about cadets freezing and overpowering the flight controls.

This is the problem, the guidance cadets are given is appropriate for their level of experience, the trainers use this guidance for all pilots in a one size fits all training programme.

Useless.

Arguably the wisest dozen words on this website, Bergerie1.

Gear down until 500...and you even bothered to distinguish between agl and msl. Well done Captain Armchair. Keep the new regulations flowing. Maybe you can help with changing all those pesky and outdated single engine climb segments that they so ackwardly imposed.

'Never let your aircraft go where your mind has not been before.'

It's been quoted many times by one of the senior NTSB investigators on Air Crash Investigation and should be on the door of every training dept & crew room.

Didn't argue with the LTC, no point, but I found the SOP in question in the Line Training notes, apparently they are worried about cadets freezing and overpowering the flight controls.
This is the problem, the guidance cadets are given is appropriate for their level of experience, the trainers use this guidance for all pilots in a one size fits all training programme.
Useless.

Oh dear: sounds like another case of SOP's over-rides airmanship. I've worked only for Boeing airlines. There's not a whole load of difference between B757/767/738. However, in 8 airlines with 8 different CP's there were 8 different ways to do the same thing; and definitely some better than others. Some methods incorporated more airmanship. Some incorporated more rigid SOP's and less discretion. I learnt/was told that some ways were wrong, not allowed, dangerous = rigid SOP's. Some ways were general guidance and airmanship/best practice encouraged. What amazed was the rigid SOP brigade advocated use of airmanship. I remain confused but relaxed in my retirement.

I don't disagree Rat 5 that a GA should be a 'normal' manoeuvre... But by virtue of it being rarely flown it is NOT.

The thing I saw being screwed up the most, from my TRI/TRE days once upon a time ago, was the Go Around!!!!

And I do agree with you that you should be in GA mindset until the TRs are deployed, and I also second the touch drills which is exactly as I do for the GA brief! As an aside the last two GAs I flew were actually very unexpected Baulked Landings during the flare - both times due to huge wind shifts but the brief that we did held good!

Hi White:
Yep performance is different. Don't take it literally.
When I say normal I'm thinking as part of something when we go from A-B. Takeoff, climb,descent,app and GA. And that's what happens, GA is never briefed properly assuming it won't happen. It can and eventually will.
The rest should be easy...if no rush is present. If it is , that IS the beast you are taking about...

If A/T is armed but not active ....it won't wake up for speed protection if FLCH SPD, VNAV SPD AND TOGA...
FCOM 2

And thx Rat, as you said why the rush!!! Damm!

White Knight says that when he was an IRE/TRE he saw many go-arounds mishandled on the simulator. That was my experience too but usually when the GA was unexpected, not during a ‘normal’ IR test when the trainee was expecting a GA after an ILS approach.

I believe a GA is a normal manoeuvre so far as aircraft handling goes – after all it is only a matter of changing from a descent to a climb even if it is at low level. The things that tend to catch people out during line flying are that (a) it is unexpected, (b) it is at light weight therefore the ROC is high, and (c) it might involve following a rather more difficult flight path than usual. If the GA is conducted with an engine out, the ROC is less but (c) there is the additional need for careful application of rudder.

However, the basic control of the aircraft ought still to be straight forward. I have seen too many pilots applying power in an overly aggressive way and then being caught out by the sudden pitch change from underslung engines, difficulty in applying the correct amount of rudder in the asymmetric case, and the high ROC causing them to overshoot the cleared altitude. All these problems can be controlled by applying a firm but judicious amount of power at the start of the GA.

But above all, I strongly support RAT 5’s contention that all approaches should be flown with a GA in mind right up to the point where reverse thrust is selected. I cannot emphasise too strongly that, at all times, one must have a well thought out ‘Plan B’ - whether it be the RTO on take-off, pre-thought out en-route alternates, the diversion alternate (and the initial route to get there) or a go-around on EVERY approach.

Thus, I would add to what I said before about ‘never letting your aircraft go where your mind had not been before’ by saying ALWAYS have a well thought out ‘Plan B’.

I used to fly old fashioned round-dial aircraft with only basic auto-throttles so I can’t comment on TOGA and all the other automatics you all have today. But I guess you still only have to press two buttons to make it return to a normal basic hand-flown aircraft!

Go Arounds should not be dangerous and should especially be part of the repertoire of any commercial pilot. Not only practiced in the sims regularly but perhaps it's time to practice them in real planes (without passengers) on a regular basis .

Nobody does touch and go training anymore in real planes on a regular basis?

Badly done they result in crashes. This one was badly done:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_Airlines_Flight_676


This is much better:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4M2fZ8CfDLk

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xg4SZc7zDNs

Should be a piece of cake. And if it's not it should be.

A possible go-around is not part of a normal approach briefing? :confused: :eek:

Actually, both Emirates and Qatar Airways regularly conduct "touch and go" training sorties. The latter at the now old Doha Airport. The former frequently at Dubai World Central and Ras Al Khaimah.

The erstwhile "source" websites (theqatar and theek) even post them on the day they've occurred.

Any pilot who allows his airspeed to drop 30 kts below Vmin is not 'fine' !