Generally agree, however, some machines can be a "handful", esp on one engine, that may require a few seconds of "two hands". Better then, IMO, to hit TOGA, feel the throttles advancing than push 'em up and hope TOGA engages while temporarily hands off.

With tailored procedures, we do look at balked landing, but other than for the validation in the sim, I have not seen it practised. While we do validate EO procedures in the ac, we do not validate balked.
What I will say is balked performance is typically dismal, especially in the conditions that were at Dubai. You had very hot temperatures, with the ac bleeds on, max flaps, landing thrust, all with windshear conditions.
Forget all of the rubbish on the certified climb gradients, the conditions at Dubai were far different, and if you look at BCOP, you would probably see double digit climb grades under those conditions.

I fly the B744 and in my airline we used to do a lot of checking of those 'canned' manoeuvres and very little training of more likely 'events'. To be fair to the airline though, it's hands were tied by our government regulator. Thankfully reason has prevailed and we have now moved to an 'Evidence Based Training' (EBT) philosophy where there is still some essential checking, but a lot more realistic training based upon topical events. Of particular note my last simulator session included the following training sequence:
Since this is one of the first of our EBT sequences, that suggests that this is an area that is causing some issues. I suspect following the EK accident we will be revisiting this training sequence.

Bleve, interesting sim work! You with Rocky's group?

I think it would be very interesting for pilots to actually work these scenarios on the actual ac. I can certainly attest to the performance and abilities of the ac in conditions. I think it would surprise most to see how the ac actually performs with engine out. The flight val would simply 'simulate' EO by pulling one engine to idle, and that was enough, let alone a dead one, not windmilling.

Underfire, that is a silly idea. First, it would cost a bomb, and second, you'd probably end up pranging a good number of aeroplanes. That is exactly why Sims were invented. The problem here is not the difference between Sim and aeroplane, it's that the Sims are not being used properly.

Totally agree. Most airline training/checking is driven by the regulatory requirements. In some areas those requirements haven't changed since the 1960s or earlier. Some regulators need a good kick up the rear to bring them into the 21st Century!


It would be interesting but it's never going to happen, for the reasons Capn Bloggs stated.

Certainly agree, as I stated, it would be interesting. On the validation flights, the check pilots, many of them the respected airlines chief, were surprised with the ac performance with these validations activities, such going EO anywhere close to the DA. Even calling for a GA at the DA and not busting the 50 foot momentary descent.

As noted in the posts, why there many comments from pilots on this forum referencing ac certification performance is the issue. Certification performance has nothing to do with actual performance.

Qatar Airways has gone the 'Evidence Based Training' route this year.
So far, I think it's a welcome change. Same training sequence as Bleve
has talked about. From what the TRE said, they will move farther away from conventional checking, and concentrate on events that are happening around the industry.

BDD

Emirates, Cathay Pacific, Virgin Australia, and Qatar Airways have gone EBT.

EBT has been outlined since 2010...ICAO even has a doc 9995 http://www2010.icao.int/SAM/Document...%209995.en.pdf



good to see it is finally making some ground.

I would not rule that out completely. Especially in a bounce the accelerations felt in the sim are not the same you feel in an aeroplane, there simply is not enough space around the sim to do the movement necessary to fully simulate this. People are different, some are more optical oriented, some are more motion sensitive. Although an IFR pilot should be able to ignore both and just work according to instrument indications, in fact especially in a sritical situation you may fall back to your subconsciousnous trained reflexes, and the sim may just train you to feel the wrong thing, finally confusing a bounce with positive climb.
Additionally the criteria used to evaluate sim checks may not be very useful in real life, many feel under time pressure in sim checks, feel they get better marks if they react quicker, are afraid to get poor marks if they carefully analyse the situation. This trained immediate response may not be useful in rare events.

The problem is not the difference between sim and aeroplane, the problem is not to understand this difference and what this means. It is perfectly fine that the sim is not 100% like a real aeroplane, your landing yesterday was not 100% like that today, this is life. We schould just not make the sim the standard.

I do think the regulators are way behind the times. At CX, some of the Recurrent Training (RT) sessions were more about getting through the 'required items' than any kind of real training or consolidation. Also, if the 'box ticking' were to include some more complex requirements then more pilots would fail checks and that would start to cost Airlines money ( heaven forbid!). "Profits are our Number One priority" rules as usual.

BA have been training LOFT (Line Orientated Flight Training) for quite a few years now, each tailored to specific flight critical and flight safety events that have occurred in the industry over the previous few years. Over-runs, deep landing, high altitude jet upsets, fires, jammed flaps/slats, single engine hot and high, go-arounds etc. etc. etc.

Personally I think it is an excellent tool. Day 1 is LOFT and day 2 is looking at all of the scenario's that have been deemed critical by the CAA and the training department.

Whilst all of the above is a welcome departure from the 'tick box' exercises that used to be run they still don't allow time for consolidation. When there is time at the end of the sim the likelyhood of the crew 'requesting' to look at certain scenarios is slim. Whether that be jeopardy, time, fatigue or rostering I don't know but it is extremely rare to get a crew to agree on some form of extended training under a 'look and see'.

It all comes down to cost. What is the risk factor of having an accident like the Emirates flight at Dubai? Does it run within the remit of the insurance cover? Is the cost of insurance change less than that required to increase the training remit?

Welcome to the world of the spreadsheet airline!

I totally agree. Many years ago, Nicosia departure on a hot day, British built three engined aircraft (can't mention the actual type) with water injection, having got airborne we climbed away at around 200ft/min. Took almost ten minutes to get to 2000 feet!

A week later at the end of two days on the sim we had finished early and that well known phrase "that's it gentlemen, anything else you would like to practise?" was uttered by the Training Captain.

I suggested we set up the sim for the Nicosia departure of a week earlier and complete the take-off. Once airborne, throttle the engines back to give 200 ft/min, noting the rpm's/thrust. Then complete the exercise again with an engine failure after V1 but setting the thrust levels recorded from the previous take-off on the two remaining engines.

Perhaps, realising the consequences of such an exercise the training captain declined the request.

"Head in the sand" approach? Stick to all the standard sim check exercises and ignore the real world? Most certainly yes!

Is there a T word ban on here as well!!!! :eek:

:E

The performance described by Woodpecker sound pretty sprightly for a Trislander. :O

"Many years ago, Nicosia departure on a hot day, British built three engined aircraft (can't mention the actual type) with water injection, having got airborne we climbed away at around 200ft/min. Took almost ten minutes to get to 2000 feet!"

Early 747's on a hot day out of LHR were still struggling upwards below gliders around Birmingham IIRC

JAL B777 go-around after touchdown & spoiler deployment.

https://www.facebook.com/FlyingHuman...1329647440071/

That JAL B777 Go-Around was scary.

Maybe looked scary, but they kept the pitch attitude until full thrust before pulling up and waited with the gear, just as the book says.

An they finally had climb power.

Sim training is ok, no doubt. But let's face it: The sim is programmed with the performance of tables and manufacturer's values. With such given parameters it will always give you a success, if correctly executed. So there is only some value to training for situations we are debating.

In real life it sometimes looks and feels quite different. All the armchair pilots and optimists who never came close to a RRT7, take it from someone who has flown many years in the pit and on the ship involved: It is not rare that we doubt the tables and pray to (set in your favourite) that no donkey gets stubborn .....

We will never be able to simulate and fully train every situation that might arise. What helps is experience, and that is what you get climbing the ladder, as it has been around for some time. From a underpowered piston twin to a not very much better equipped TP, then single aisle jets on many, many multiple legs for some years.
Today there are a lot of pilots who might have hours (:\), but not that many sectors. Too much penny pinching and a lot of local pride puts bums on heavy seat too quickly.
Extreme situations are a tad more survivable and/or easier to hide on smaller equipment. It's trial and error with a better chance of a good outcome, but it gives you invaluable experience that helps once you fly some heavier and less forgiving metal.

It might just be that the insurance companies will have a look into this matter, just as they did after the Gulf Air accident in BAH some years ago.
Money matters and we might see some change to the better if the cutting back in training and experience and some national pride suddenly start eating into the holy grail of profits.

There's got to be a better way than 'hoping' in a GA...

Lonewolf, #960, again no disagreement.
... what has changed more ... The total aviation system?
We have the same 'reliable' aircraft, same 'unreliable' human, and an evolving operational environment. The intensity and complexity of modern operations defy simple understanding, accidents are rare, and few have a single cause or solution, yet public and professional expectation is for increased safety with more fights and lower cost.
In many ways we are operating too close to the edge of safety boundaries(*), there are more unforeseen interactions, and there are new societal effects on the human operator.
Perhaps if we considered all aircraft as potentially unreliable, humans as an asset, capable of rescuing situations, then we might learn more from normal operations than attempting to train and constrain them with more SOPs.

Buzz, #962, just because a 20 yr old design was approved does not mean that the assumptions made then hold true today. Operators and individuals are very good at adapting to 'small problems', and formalise their workarounds with more training.
The danger is that with more and more adaptions and training demands on memory, the more likely that the human will encounter resource limiting situations, combinations of 'challenging factors' (surprise, unexpected, low experience, or infrequently trained), then the risk of crossing a safety boundary increases.

'Small problems' are the essence of safety reports, yet few of this type are made because humans would rather adapt than report an 'error' (the opportunity of finding out why vs avoiding embarrassment); when we identify a mistake we infer that we will not suffer the the same one again, we can cope, etc. But error-inducing-situations are rarely the same, even though the small problem is, and with increasing operational pressures the human is unable to detect these new situations (context), and the situation escalates to a safety incident.
The safety task is to identify these small problems, relate them to the complexity of modern operations by reviewing previous assumptions and considering new contexts.
And for the assessors (operators and regulators) to be aware of the human weakness that because they knew of the problem, they managed, so it won' be a problem for anyone else, thus do nothing.

(*) page 20 http://ihi.hamad.qa/en/images/Keynote_Haraden.pdf

Yeah, I guess it is too much to ask pilots to monitor three simple things. pitch, power, airspeed. Much easier to blame the machine...

Much much easier to blame the pilots in the absence of some real details of what occurred.

BBK:

All of which was surely well recorded.

Trouble with that the data recorders are in possession of a country with an "over vested" interest in this airline.

Every guy who's had an engine failure said the plane was easier to fly than the simulator. We assume it's the slight pitch, roll and yaw forces you can feel that a simulator cannot completely replicate.

For risk and cost reasons simulators are the way to go.

"Generally agree, however, some machines can be a "handful", esp on one engine, that may require a few seconds of "two hands". Better then, IMO, to hit TOGA, feel the throttles advancing than push 'em up and hope TOGA engages while temporarily hands off."

A need for two hands typically goes along with inadequate rudder use or not having a steady rudder input. It's a standard debriefing item - "'if you push enough rudder, and freeze it, the aileron inputs will stop."

And the 777 compensates for engine out with the TAC system.

The JAL 777 go-around appears to show that their intention was to ensure proper clearance prior to rotating to the go-around attitude to reduce the chance of a tailstrike.

We do EBT as well but a long as two years ago, we were doing go-arounds in the sim due to vis going to zero at the moment of touchdown.

The JAL GA shows across (effectively) 36 seconds of picture.

1. First wheel touch (Right main) after 14 seconds of observation. Spoilers deploy but (as far as I can see) no reverse.
2. Between 4 and 5 seconds later, the GA has been called as the nose lifts.
3. There are some 10 seconds of maintaining height whilst thrust builds as (probably) throttles had been fully retarded at WOW.
4. Some 15 seconds after first wheel touch, the nose pitches up as GA power has been fully established.
5. The video ends before the gear starts to move, althougfh fairing doors may be moving.

From the pax perspective, it looks well handled but we have no idea what happened in the preceeding four minutes. The amount of available thrust to get them up is substantial, to say the least.

To a pilot it looks well handled as well!
And who knows what made them make the g/a. Might be aircraft training (touch and go's with the occasional wave off), could have been a runway incursion, could have been anything but it was wave off at a challenging moment with probably thrust levers closed and it looks certainly well done!
And what is scary about this one?:confused: Only the subject of the thread is!

Nothing scary I think it was handled well. The main problem with rejected landing is trying to avoid contact(or second contact) with the runway and/or aggressive rotation. Initial rotation should be enough to ensure that the nose gear won't contact before the main gear. Gear is a strong part of the aircraft but the tail or fuselage will be damaged badly. That is why there should be no hurry in changing configuration. Once the aircraft is climbing away then the standard go round procedure can be followed by rotating to GA attitude and GA flaps and then gear. At this stage no one knows what was done.

aterpster " Trouble with that the data recorders are in possession of a country with an "over vested" interest in this airline."


We are still waiting further info from FlyDubai accident, I am guessing that & the Emirates report will be "delayed" until we have forgotten it ever happened . . . . a technique that seems to have worked pretty well thus far for a European loco who trashed one (fortunately without fatalities) 8 years ago . . . and yet . . . no public dissemination of any relevant info.

The point I was trying to make is that the TOGA inhibit function and its ramifications is NOT some hitherto unidentified problem that has suddenly sprung up out of nowhere. Rightly or wrongly, the aircraft was purposely designed that way to prevent the accidental activation of TOGA after touchdown. Given that we have now had two occurrences where the inhibit function may have been a factor (SQ in Munich, EK in Dubai), then perhaps a rethink is needed.

The inhibit function is documented in the aircraft's FCOM, but it seems that some operators have procedures that cover rejected landings and some don't. Some operators train their pilots in those procedures and some don't. Why is that so? Why haven't ALL operators adopted the same procedures and trained their pilots accordingly?

It's NOT about engine failure, it's about genuine replication of the effective thrust vs. environmental conditions, leading to a (what i presume) all too favourable simulation.
I agree with the cost, but with less training in the real beast, the risk increases, no matter how much you try to simulate,

Back in the second half of the 1960's, my parents built a new house in a development on the edge of my hometown. The airport was ~5 miles away, and we could literally see it out our back window (sadly they eventually built up behind us blocking the view :(). Back then, a major US operator did pilot training there - I spent untold hours sitting on the dirt mounds behind my house watching 727s do simulated engine out approaches, go-arounds, touch and goes, etc. (the smoke trails behind the JT8Ds made it readily apparent if the engine was being used - I've always assumed the engines were at idle rather than being shutdown). Effective I'm sure, also rather expensive and undoubtedly rather risky. The landing pattern routed them directly over all four schools in my neighborhood (two elementary, junior high, and high school) as well as my house. We used to joke that if one went down, they wanted it to be sure it made headlines :rolleyes:.
We do much of our flight testing out of Moses Lake (central Washington) which used to be a SAC bomber base with a long runway. Thirty years ago, we would share the airfield with JAL, who kept at least one 747 there for crew training (during a 767 flight test/photo shoot, we very nearly had a mid-air with a JAL 747 that was coming in for a landing while we were taking off the opposite direction :uhoh:).
Of course now days, nearly all of that training is done in simulators - with obvious cost savings and it's certainly much safer (I've yet to hear of anyone getting hurt when they crashed the simulator :}). But I've also noticed that many (most?) simulators are fixed - full motion simulators being far more costly.
Have we gone too far in the simulation direction?

Not really, just too far in taking away real time training. IMHO there is a distinct difference between a simulation and live experience. The psychological influence simply can't be the same in a simulator. Deep down you know it's just a simulation. The pressure is only on session performance and eventual failure, although that pressure is big enough, i admit.

But pressure in a situation of shear disbelief ("f*ck, did this really just happen???") and fear ("holy s#it, now my bum is really under threat ....") is completely different and it this very pressure that can make a difference.

I am by no means advocating astronautical training with upsets and so on, but I am no longer sure if more automation, more techniques trained in the sim, even more sops (that mainly please managers and regulators) will help mitigating the reduced experience and hands on training. There must be a better balance than what appears lately.

Rubbish. Perfect bolter, I think you may call it?

Glofish, are you glad they didn't do a GPWS manoeuvre? I am.

Totally agree Glofish, with your post in general, but at what point were you sure that more automation, more techniques trained in the sim, even more sops were good?