Errmmm...
 

I don't think anyone said they bounced 150 ft. If that source is valid, one has to assume the climbed there albeit briefly. Without bouncing.

The same source claims the wheels were down. That doesn't really add up looking at the wreckage.

But a toga at low level (bounce) and pitch up 15 degrees is likely to end in a tail strike. SOP at low level is toga thrust and maintain 5 degrees till you are out of there.

Another source says they bounced, tried a GA and failed (with wheels up, or on their way up).

So who to believe?

Hard landing (WS), bounced, wheels up and messed up the GA. Or no landing (WS?), and messed up the go around (wheels still down).

Without knowing what happened for sure, it seems churlish to speculate. Too much conflicting information from "inside sources" that we second guess the wrong scenario.

That said, we can take some lessons (even from erroneous scenarios).

If you push toga, make sure that you have toga. And if you bounced before you call GA, leave the wheels down.

This might have helped but....

Might not be news to others but I only recently discovered that if you run LiveATC with Flightradar you can see approximately where the transmissions to and from the aircraft are made. Tried the same thing with archived outputs including 521 crash only to find that Flightradar plays back at X 12 so cannot be matched to ATC. If anyone else wants to investigate further, today is probably the last day you can replay 3rd august on Flightradar.

A quick push of a toga button then a pull on the yoke with both hands while focusing on pitch w/o any visual verification or confirmation by either pilot using the engine readouts that GA thrust is being produced is a major breakdown in fundamentals. No engine performance = no climb performance. It would be like not checking T/O power while taking off, and I believe most SOPs call for doing the same during a GA. FMAs and auto-settings to go up, up and away are rendered meaningless without it so ensuring/confirming thrust is being developed/increasing is as high a priority as pitching up. Pitch up without thrust, you're boned. The prospect that thrust verification by engine readouts during a GA wouldn't be incorporated and prioritized, or if auto is lost both pilots not recognizing and reverting to manual means to achieve it, is disconcerting.

Wouldn't the failure of the thrust levers to move under the PF's hand when TOGA was selected have provided instant feedback?

Only if he actually had his hand on the thrust levers. I see too many pilots think they need two hands on the control wheel.

The two hands on the wheel at rotation so beloved of Boeing pilots, goes back in history where it was purely started by some operators as a symbolic movement to indicate V1 had been attained and to avoid the temptation of a startled pilot to abort after V1 while his hand was still on the throttles.

Symbolism has no place in the cockpit but nowadays if the PF does a one hand rotation (happens all the time with an Airbus side stick of course), in a Boeing all hell breaks lose in the simulator with most checkies. One excuse given by pilots who have spent their entire airline career using two-handed rotations, is that a one handed rotation tends to pull down the wheel and thus cause an unwanted turn. Even if that happened momentarily it is easily corrected.

The current tendency for the PF to press TOGA in a GA and rely on the autothrottles to do their thing, without keeping his hand on the thrust levers to ensure required thrust is set, needs to be reviewed - especially if it is found to be a factor in the Emirates go-around crash. After all, it is nothing more than basic airmanship. There have been at least two accidents in the distant past that I recall, (one a 737 and the other an A310?)where an autothrottle clutch motor was defective and only one throttle went forward for the commanded high thrust level. In both cases the crew failed to take instant corrective action and the aircraft rolled and went in.

1 " GO AROUND FLAPS 20 "

2 " POSITIVE CLIMB/RATE "

3 " GEAR UP "

1 happened for a reason (if it was called). Bounced landing? Minor/significant windshear?

2 With 145 kts (ish) Vref you can easily establish a positive rate of climb, so the question is was TOGA hit and was the thrust supplied.

3 As PF this is an automatic response whether positive climb is established or not (or not for the V1 cut when PM forgets to call it!)


Regards

Sounds like an entirely reasonable idea to me.

Rotate with both hands and after the gear is selected up place one hand back on throttles. Pretty simple, I would have thought. "Encourages" you to keep it in trim, too.

So they assumed they had thrust because they were climbing and by the time they realized otherwise it was too late?

Would two hands on the control wheel be a hang over from the early days of large transport aircraft where you needed the strength of both arms to get the nose off the ground ?

So much discussion on other threads regarding EK rosters and fatigued crew and now a 2nd accident happens involving a UAE carrier and the chatter amongst pilots is on auto-throttle and TOGA buttons...are we missing the bigger picture here? The investigations may prove pilot error or system error but it won't quantify the effect of fatigue on the crew to trap the error. EK and FZ pilots have been screaming fatigue and **** rosters for years and nothing has improved. Now two accidents have occured. Fatigue is always a factor. Every airline in UAE has fatiguing rosters. It's the way the entire nation likes to operate. Abuse your workers. So f*** you management for not making any improvements.

No it isn't, actually. Increasingly, pilots are becoming disconnected from their machines: not enough Sim training, poor design, and refusal of the powers in charge to let them hand-fly. This is not simply a case of "fundamentally it's the responsibility of the crew to fly the aircraft correctly", which is of course very true. But if we aren't given the training and currency to maintain the skills we need in these sort of situations, then it's not our fault alone. Incredibly, it appears that not even Boeing has a procedure for a Go Around after a bad bounce in all it's manuals. What hope has your average line driver got to get it right when it happens perhaps once in a lifetime?

Very interesting post - thanks.

Would most agree that in terms of responsibility, it falls somewhere between pilots and their airlines though? (as opposed to "somewhere between the pilots and the automation").

Follow-up question Mr. Speaker. In GA aircraft - after a bad bounce - pretty much the immediate priority is to get the power on (the more the better) - is that not also the case with the heavy metal (a little simplistic I know, but it's starting to look like this was perhaps the critical thing that wasn't done here).

According to the B777 technical training manual (my emphasis):
Consequently, the speedbrakes should retract as soon as the aircraft becomes airborne again, even if the thrust levers are not at the take-off position.

1.- anybody knows why Captain Ibrahim Alseouni had only 7000 hrs?
Being staff number 202xxx, how is that possible?
I estimate not less than 17 years in EK.

Another UAE prominent family Golden Boy?

2.- EK Media centre

http://www.emirates.com/media-centre...rd-august-2016

OPERATIONAL INCIDENT??? Aircraft crashed and burnt and it is an OPERATIONAL INCIDENT???

get out of there guys, you might be the next one...and you do not know it, because fatigue don't let you think about it...

Hmmm, Sheik Ahmed failed to clarify that too...If the Captain has OVER 7000 hours Total, why he did not mention more precisely the total flying hours from both Pilots?

Everybody knows that EK has highly UNEXPERIENCED FO's with less than 2000 hours, flying wide bodies...scary

If they have over 7000 hours but, say, 7500 or 8000, the release would say 'over 7500'. It is a bit like these people who say ' we are now in the top 6 companies..'. In other words, they are sixth. In other words, these guys have 7000 hours only.
The release says the y are cooperating with the authorities - I should hope so since they are one and the same.
The end result of this will be to blame Boeing, the weather and the co-pilot. Simple

Maligno, you estimate wrong. By a long way. 11 is the answer you're looking for.

Full Wings is on to something..

The flightradar data shows a long flare as they encounter the positive shear. Perhaps they realise they are coming to the end of the tdz and give it away, or perhaps whilst trying to get her on the ground they hit nose wheel first causing the bounce..

Positive climb, (150'? possible..) gear up.. Now they've gone back up into the negative shear.. IAS drops, the aircraft starts to sink..

11 years??? NO WAY! this would be my 11th Anniversary in HELL (EK)

and i was 3xxxxx

This Habibi has been at least 17 years in EK...but, why only OVER 7000hrs?

I think 'over 7000' is a reasonable statement. It is saying in effect that the FO was not a newly qualified pilot, the likelihood is that the captain had more but that doesn't need saying as this is a 'good news' message about how well they did.

Shame they forgot to pay credit the firefighter who lost his life, but I guess that would have spoiled the 'good news'

I think 'over 7000' is a reasonable statement. It is saying in effect that the FO was not a newly qualified pilot, the likelihood is that the captain had more but that doesn't need saying as this is a 'good news' message about how well they did.

No it isn't. If they had more why would they not say so? Is 7000 some kind of magic number?
When this type of statement is made it usually means they have LESS.

Sorry, this is a con

Numerous possibilities.

Getting to be too many pages to read back thru so this may have been mentioned; just a small thought, but why did ATC feel an urgency to transmit GA instructions to an aircraft that's in a dynamic maneuver at a critical phase approx 100' agl, and why did the PNF feel an urgency to reply?

How about....

1. "GO AROUND, CHECK THRUST"

2. FLAPS xxx

Etc etc.

Just saying because it's what our manufacturer advocates.

All the best

I'm not sure where because I have only seen that occur on the very, very rare occasion and when a pilot does it, it stands out out like the proverbial dogs......

If they are taking their hands off the thrust levers during the G/A to perform the manoeuvre then they are doing it wrongly. The thrust levers should be guarded when the flaps are out of up. The only reason the hand comes of them during the take off is to ensure the Capt doesn't reject after V1. As soon as the the jet is airborne, the PF's inboard hand should be placed back on the thrust levers to guard the movement.

G/A - no rejected take off possibility - so it should be one hand on the control column, one hand on the thrust levers. Always. That way they will always know that they have full thrust, without necessarily having to look.

Basic Flying Skills 101.

is this EK capt? not familiar with the name
15 yrs...

.

Could be - especially without powered controls. Rather like doing a manual reversion take off in a 737. Never done of course but just comparing arm strength :ok:

If you needed 2 hands to get a 777's nose up would that be an indication you might be a little slow ?

The current tendency for the PF to press TOGA in a GA and rely on the autothrottles to do their thing, without keeping his hand on the thrust levers to ensure required thrust is set, needs to be reviewed

Admit; don't know about B777, but could be similar to B737NG.
Manual approach call GA, advance T/L's with straight arm - 2 hands onto control column - and call for flap change, call for PM to check thrust, after +ve climb confirmed call for gear up. Hand back on thrust levers when approaching level off.
Automatic approach with A/T: call GA, press TOGA, follow through with own arm and call for PM to check thrust, after +ve climb confirmed call for gear up. after mode changes a/c reverts to single A/P and A/T remains engaged all under the watchful eye of PF/PM.
Seems to work every time (00's) I've seen it in the sim. Not seen any problem PF having 2 hands on control column, assuming PM did their job of setting correct thrust after PF's rough application of more puff. I suggest this is not a black/white or right/wrong topic. Some pilots have strong opinions, normal; some airlines have SOP's, normal. Sometimes they differ, normal. Whose is the next round?

Looks a bit like the takeoff (GA) variant of the Asiana landing accident at KSFO.

With so many experienced Captains on this thread sharing their expertise here, let me ask a hypothetical question.
Considering what we little know so far, if only the landing gear were not retracted and they did all other wrong things as we know, what could have happened?
The aircraft could have bounced along? Ran off the end of runway? Got airborne again after some distance?

I've never seen it flown like that, I know of at least one examiner who would fail an engine on you if he saw your hands come off the thrust levers during a go around ( or on approach for that matter). I guess different companies have different 'techniques' regarding where your hands are placed.

Maybe, just maybe, EK pilots should be allowed to hand fly more? I have an email, from a certain DCPB, that states ' hand flying has no value in this company' . This was from a 'ping' in the early days when I hand flew the aircraft above 5000 feet. ( What made it even funnier, was it was on a line check, and I was told by the TRE doing the check, ' the good thing about EK, as long as you brief non standard stuff, you can do it.) Learnt my lesson there.

Just my thoughts. (But DCPB I still have that email, signed by you )

In my last company the GA call was "Go Around, Flap XX, Set Go Around Thrust" - "Set Go Around Thrust" was a clear instruction to the PM to make sure GA Thrust was set.

Of course automation dependency with Autothrottles may cause pilots to assume thrust is going to GA (although as has been stated before the FMA should also be checked for annunciation).

Maybe they already anticipated that they were operating at the performance limits, and tried to reduce drag as much as possible.
According to the FedEx Narita report, it is not always easy in a bounce to understand whether you are actually climbing, or just rotating. The FedEx Pilots did probably not realize that they were climbing again, the two Emirates guys may have believed they were actually climbing, but in fact they were not.
I do also assume that the sensation of acceleration in a simulator is a bit different from what you actually feel if you rotate a long fuselage. Simulators have not that much vertical space to move.
I really hope for full recorder data becoming available.

I haven't seen them here, link to pictures showing left main gear
Attachment 762

Maligno remember that cadets get their staff number the before they go off doing their basic traning but seniority only starts when they start the conversion course so he would have started some 4 years later than his staff number indicates. Also bear in mind that as a cadet they dont fly a lot of hours the first few years during training so say 6000 in the first 10 is probably not far off then a year as a captain to make it 7000

Lonewolf, re #709 :ok:
Has the system, in trying to reduce workload, cluttered up task management in a critical phase of flight?
Yes this is a central issue in recent safety debates.
Many of the implementations of automation are, with hindsight, now seen as 'flawed'. We, the industry, design, cert, operators were unable or unwilling to consider the consequences of automation.
See 'Behind Human Error: Cognitive Systems, Computers, and Hindsight', although 'heavy' reading it does cover most to the human, machine, environment, integration issues; and remind us that trying to fix today's problems with yesterday's solutions is unlikely to be effective.

Wirb, re # 710 as above.
However, complexity is not a simple man-machine interface, but includes the operational environment and social norms (need for instant answers, Google / Wiki mentality).
E.g. is the industry accepting more tail wind approaches, higher wind speeds, and thus higher descent rates, less time to react; whilst larger aircraft may have lower control margin, control response, or tail strike margin, due to inertia or geometry, all of which which could increase the overall exposure to the risk of an unstable approach or bounced landing, requiring a GA.

SOPs are useful for standardisation, but like automation, their effectiveness depends on how they are implemented; as a guideline, information, or as a rule.

Similarly for FMA; information and confirmation, but not for control. You cannot determine what the aircraft is doing from the FMA. The information is only feedback as to what the autopilot/aircraft should be doing, but this can only be understood by first assessing what the aircraft is actually doing, - is this what is required for the situation, and is it consistent with what you selected the auto-flight system to do.
Many FMA/SOP implementations focus on reading and calls, inferring safety, yet overlooking the hazards of 'rote' behaviour, - that a mode has been engaged or thrust level achieved but wasn't, or positive climb said but not achieved.

I find it very interesting that we as a pilot group believe that hand flying skills have eroded and become a contributing factor to accidents / incidents and thus a return to more hand flying will improve chances of correct handling of abnormal situations.

Skill training, skill retention and skill fade have not been a contributing factor to any of the recent accidents on either the Boeing or the Airbus. Recent Scientific Research points to the contrary.

Lack of understanding of Automation and how it behaves in a non normal situation is what has caused the recent accidents including the 777 accident in Dubai.

This of course is down to perhaps fatigue, lack of exposure in the simulator and or understanding of the systems. We no longer either fly or automate, rather we interact with the automation systems and just as we have spent years training CRM for Human Beings so we should for machines through HFI.

I do believe that the prescriptive simulator sessions we do add no value to understanding recognition primed decisions and or creative problem solving as instructors are now trained within the confines of the airline very quickly and with no in depth training of Human Factors, Cognitive Informatics, and NDM.

The rudder pitch and trim, instrument scan, bank and pitch angle limits detailed in CAA documents around the world do nothing more than ensure skill training and retention for very specific exercises.

If anyone really believes that hand flying a 777 for five hours across the bay of bengal, or even disconnecting the AP and A/T at an early stage to give them more exposure time will improve their skills is grossly mistaken and does not understand the way modern aircraft fly any more.

What we do need is more simulator training to understand how to integrate, interact and take over the automatics when they do not perform to our bounded understanding of the situation.

I do not know what is the route cause of the 777 accident in Dubai, nor can I say that they made the wrong decision because in aviation terms we do not judge the outcome only but the process followed.

The two chaps dealt with an unusual situation and clearly were dealt the wrong end of the stick. None of us go to work with the intent to make a mistake, or believing that this day is going to be the day we make an error which will lead to an accident.

The decision to performa a go-around and retract the gear, though in hindsight may seem odd, at the time must have appeared to them as the only rational decision.

We need to learn from this so that the rest of us do not end in a similar situation and make a similar mistake. The emirates training department needs to learn from this and start teaching and developing pilots rather than just producing compliant non effective training scenarios.

Our kids go to school and we judge and assess their teachers based on their ability to differentiate and teach to the level required.

When was the last time that any of us had a simulator instructor who differentiated his training and pitched it to the level required. Perhaps a trainee needs a little bit more work with his / her EFATO training, but just because he / she achieved the minimum level and due to time pressures we moved on to TCAS handling to tick the box when more value would have been gained by spending a little bit more time on the EFATO.

SOPS

"Maybe, just maybe, EK pilots should be allowed to hand fly more? I have an email, from a certain DCPB, that states ' hand flying has no value in this company' . This was from a 'ping' in the early days when I hand flew the aircraft above 5000 feet. ( What made it even funnier, was it was on a line check, and I was told by the TRE doing the check, ' the good thing about EK, as long as you brief non standard stuff, you can do it.) Learnt my lesson there.

Just my thoughts. (But DCPB I still have that email, signed by you ) "


The list of companies who have made, and are still making, this fundamental error is unfathonably long . . . . . the "blindness" of managers, many of whom were pilots before they sold out, should be (but isn't) incomprehensible.


As I side note, I had a former colleague in a well known loco, knew the manuals back to front, became one of the companies youngest Capts/LTC/TRI etc, he was one of the "select few" to get DEC with EK. Couldn't fly a simple visual to save himself, & he could never quite figure out why I did a face-palm whenever one of his "circling procedures" failed to put the aircraft in a position to land easily . . when what we needed was a "visual" . I doubt that the direction his former company subsequently went as regards raw data/hand flying changed anything after we parted company . . . . go figure.

Does this picture answer the wheels up or down question