All those 777 crashes, if they had been occurring with Airbuses, would have been the starting point of a big media and internet campaign against those aircraft with a "French" logic.
Now, being Boeing and american aircraft, nothing of that - just talking about "aircraft pitfalls", that you have to know the automatisms better, and all that. You know, all the stuff "american pilots are basic, so we make aircraft basic.." "if it's not Boeing, I'm not going"
Taking glory about the airframe solidity because nobody was killed in three crashes in succession (BA, Asiana, EK) simply shows how desperate you are to find something positive in all that.
7000 flight "hours" for each pilot ? virtually all of them on long-range flights, looking at the motionless instrument panel when not taking control rest ? Where is the experience ? where is the experience ?

What happens to the throttles/thrust levers if you keep your hand on them?
If they advance to TOGA will you notice?
If they don't advance to TOGA will you notice?

If you disconnect the a/t's and advance the throttles will the engines accelerate?

Not exactly.
After 8 seconds enough thrust to perform a steady climb of a 3.2% gradient must be available, this does not necessarily have to be full thrust. Especially at landing weight a twin engine aircraft will be able to do much more than a 3.2% climb at go-around thrust.

recceguy - you may have a sort of point but I don't think its germane to this thread...............

Not sure if you are serious but the answer to your questions is yes to all.
In Boeing aircraft the throttle moves wether in autothrust or not, meaning manualy pushing the throttle fwd will allways give you more thrust. When autothrottle commands more thrust the throttles will equally move forward as in manual thrust. Keeping your hands on the thrustlevers will therefore always give you feedback about thrust commanded.

However although pushing the throttles fwd when autothrottle is on will increase power, it returns to previous commanded thrust when hand is taken off unless autothrottle mode is changed as well.

Not to be overly anal about it, but that's why I specified "go around" thrust rather than full thrust - for purposes of go-around calculations you can only take credit for the amount of thrust available after 8 seconds (in reality, with modern FADEC engines, 8 seconds from approach idle will result in very close to max TO).

Go arounds should be part of the retraining every 6 months, practiced in several different situations. The emphasis should be centered on what is not carried out on normal line flying, to state the obvious. Have witnessed quite a few GA's mishandled by some very experienced and competent pilots, in the sim. A GA is not normally an emergency maneuver but very quickly could become one, if not carried out correctly.

If I wasn't offered what I thought an acceptable amount of GA's at retraining I would request more.

Sleeper - I'm amazed, and dismayed, by the over-reliance on automation, especially auto throttles. There's a chance the report might be summarized in one line - button pushed, button didn't work, the plane crash without the pilots attempting to fly manually.

Power awareness, sensed by throttle position (Boeing) and verified by N1, or just verified by N1 on AB products, is one of the biggest degradation of flying skills that I've observed over the last 25 years. Must pilots use the auto throttles vs maintaining a healthy awareness of what the auto throttle is doing.

To be fair - the over reliance on Automation is a vicious circle.

A lot of carriers discourage manual flying and I know of some that will actively punish those that break such SOPs. The swing of that is, when the automation fails, its a case of crash and burn (Pardon the pun)

Truth is - to these airlines, you (Pilot), Me (PAX) don't really matter - the only time we do is when one bites the dust and lets face it - it's easier to blame the dead crew than actually get a handle on the core issues - probably cheaper too!

Training - Manual Flying - Working hours. It all stems back to a capitalist market, where profit is more important than safety. The irony is, the big carriers would rather spend millions of dollars trying to repair a Hull to avoid a write off then they would on training crew and improving safety.

What nonsense! If you can't stand the cost of safety, just try an accident!

The irony is, some big carriers would rather spend millions on expensive advertising, promoting football teams, F1, cricket, Hollywood stars etc rather than spend the money on its core business. That might include such trivia as improving training resources and budgets. It would also include ensuring sufficient engineering cover, not 'forced' overtime on days off, as well as having rested pilots and cabin crew by reducing overall monthly working hours. It would mean paying & treating it's front line staff well enough that they don't wish to leave and be replaced by lower qualified & less experienced personal.

Of course, it's not for me to say who those big airlines are, the public can decide that themselves.

Harry

That's why I Always followed through until power was set and stable before removing my hand. That way it is muscle memory and wil be done even in stressfull moments. Nowadays a lot of pilots move from cadet status to airline after 200 hrs and thus will never achieve the muscle memory since it is button pushing in the sim from day one with very little handflying. Not their fault, but the airline training regime.

This mentality might not have sprung up suddenly, but been creeping along under the carpet for years. In 90's I flew under Italian FTL's. We did long-haul duty times with 2 pilots equal to the CAP 371 heavy crew times. There was no crew rest area (only 2 pilots). The XAA considered the autopilot as the 3rd crew member. Not only that, but the rest time was always within the 18-30hr 'best to be avoided'. Sleeping on the cockpit floor over the N.Atlantic on the night return sector was the norm. The A/P was in CMD. Good game.

Maybe this should also be on the fatigue topic?

IF the accident was caused by TOGA buttons not providing the expected result, it does seem a strange decision process by Boeing to disable the function at a point in the flight where if it is selected it's obviously an oh #hit moment.

I mean the take off part of the TOGA is pretty standard, most flight start like that, and you can understand there maybe hundreds of systems and functions that are checked, up to and including the handbrake being off and the in flight service trolleys being parked properly - before all hell lets rip.

but if the plane is in the landing phase and TOGA is pressed that isn't something open to a committee of electronics to discuss is it? PIC wants to get the hell out of here, lets go.

I can understand it would be disabled once airspeed drops below 50kt or so to avoid speeding into the terminal, but it seems to me Boeing added an extra rule to prevent inadvertent use, that may well be very 'advertant'.

(I'm not saying the crew shouldn't check the aircraft was responding as expected)

It's starting to look like one of those accidents where a number of opportunities existed to "fix the immediate problem":

1. If the TOGA function is inhibited due to A/C being on ground then get an automated voice to call out "MANUAL THRUST REQUIRED" or some other warning.

2. Or "Don't inhibit TOGA operation if nose wheel isn't on the ground" (or would that be more dangerous if hit accidentally at the wrong time?)

3. Pilots change SOP to shadow thrust levers

Probably a few more minor variations as well.

How many times a year does a b777 pilot select TOGA by firewalling the thrust levers?

And how many times a year does that same pilot select TOGA from the switches?

When you have had an unexpected go around (and it must be last second, otherwise the wheels wouldn't touch) and muscle memory kicks in for TOGA, is there not a danger that the "wrong" procedure is applied, as it's the one always used?

In other words, in a procedure that is seldom performed and unexpectedly required at the last second you have to apply a different procedure to achieve the same outcome as the procedure that you follow on a near daily basis.

Muscle memory shouldn't be 'click TOGA'. It should be - power up, pitch to target attitude, drag reduction(g/a flap setting), PRGU, heading, altitude.

Yes, TOGA, and the autopilot if engaged, make it very simple *IF* they're working. Blind reliance on automation leads to tears. Not doing timely, and correct, increase or decreases to the level of automation leads to floundering.

looking at all of the responses, it will be interesting to sort through the coding and track the sequencing if/then when weight on wheels is detected.

Zero? Sim included? As in manual thrust...

Is it time to change the title of this thread? Is gear collapse still the best description?

I bet most airlines' SOP already have a requirement for both the flying pilot, and the non-flying pilot, to each verify that sufficient go-around thrust is set.

Here are two examples:

Yes, but the issue is how to achieve that power up. In the heat of the moment you have to power up in a way you probably have not done for a very long time. My argument - and I'm happy to be corrected - is that people may react in a way that is most familiar to achieve the TOGA outcome.

It seems to be a link in the chain that has contributed to the accident when linked alongside wind-shear, possible fatigue, etc

Compressor stall - I agree. I use - 'advance throttles, click TOGA' instead of 'click TOGA, verify throttles advance'.

Lost In Saigon, fundamentally flawed procedure because there is no call to either command the setting of, or checking that GA thrust has actually been set. At least, if all else fails, a blurted-out call that tells the PM to set (or check) that GA thrust has been achieved will (hopefully) save the day. Similarly, if the PM has to make a call "Thrust set" then there is a better chance he/she will actually do it. I assume you do it on every takeoff; why not on a GA?

Hmm, clicking and verifying movement definitely confirms TOGA has been engaged; pushing up then clicking doesn't confirm TOGA unless you also refer to the engine instruments/thrust limit. If you remove your hand (for, say, controllability) the throttles might come back if TOGA did not engage...

I remember a story,recounted to me by one of the protagonists,many years ago.Reminded me to ALWAYS keep my hands on the thrust levers,during commanded thrust changes,and I have passed it on,time and again.

Boeing 757,white hat brigade,take off phase...

Just after climb thrust called for,the PM called "engine failure",the PF confirmed and began the memory item procedure...When he arrived at the thrust lever,he found it already closed.:confused:
I believe,at that time,FLCH was the preferred method,for climb thrust,and before speed increase for flap retraction.(!).
The left hand thrust lever had remained at takeoff thrust due some FADEC or physical obstruction problem,resulting in the speed mode of FLIGHTLEVEL CHANGE,commanding the only moveable thrust lever to adjust the overall thrust to maintain the FMC speed command...BINGO!!!!!

A better demonstration of the wisdom of the hands-on approach,I can't imagine.

RAT 5.. I think we were neighbours..130 hours in one month,?.FTLs, where provision of IRS allowed the 8 hour limit to be extended somewhat,and then some!

Perhaps there is need for Gear-Up Inhibit logic.
If ( on 2 engine) if not at least one engine spooled up and producing 90% thrust, stop gear from coming up.
If 4 engines, at least 3 engines not at nn% thrust stop gear from coming up....

Well, something like that just might help next time.

Just WHY do some carriers discourage manual flying, surely an essential element to maintain flying skills to enable them to deal with the unexpected, but possible.

It seems bizarre to me that one major, at least, prohibits manual thrust operation BUT allows despatch with AT
Inop. The captain of the A320 which lost its cowls, had never, according to the AAIB report, flown the ac with manual thrust and then had to resort to split, PF PNF, speed control.

If an airline is employing captains who can't decide where and when to do a little hand flying to maintain skills they have the wrong people in the LHS!

......or perhaps they have the wrong people making such management decisions!

Thanks for your reply. Interesting though that - in the first example you gave - thrust only gets mentioned in the "fine print" at the bottom.

Is that the best place for it, in light of what we've just witnessed?

If any button is inhibited, you should always get a buzzer sound or something for the time you push it. Humans want to relate reaction to action. If you push a button, you expect something to happen. If it does not, you will by mistake assume it happens. Only if something different happens (in that case the buzzer) you start using your brain because you are kicked out of your trained routine.
A completely dead button is one of the least useful things on an aircraft.

How about this for a solution...call the FMA? This wouldn't of happened had there been an SOP for them to do so. I currently fly the 767...go around procedure here is "go-around...3GA (read off the FMA)...Flap 20". If there was no auto throttle you would notice very early in the piece. Seems a lot more logical to have this be standard practice than come up with some silly "keep the gear down" procedure or some of the other creative ideas I've read.

Fix the machine before attempting to 'fix' the human.
It would be difficult to change (and guarantee) the behaviour of thousands of pilots flying a particular type, but it is easier to change the logic of the auto throttle system in a few hundred aircraft, and at a lower cost (but who's cost?).
Technical cost now vs escalating damage to the product name.
Perhaps in this accident we have the one operator who has sufficient 'clout' to persuade the manufacturer to think again.

Where's the 'like' button when you need it ?
I couldn't agree more.

David Kaminsky-Morrow in Flight Global gives a useful reminder of what we know so far. It's dated 11 Aug, so apols if you've already noted it - I couldn't find it mentioned here.
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/ar...0120000000taAh

airsound

Before you start chasing "solutions" I recommend caution:

(1) Show that the landing gear were down (not up, not in transit) during the Go Around from decision point to impact with the ground.
That is as yet not determined as a fact of the case one way or the other, though the initial report of "gear collapsed" (?) may be found to have relevance ... or not.
(2) Determine whether or not the engines responded as expected and as required during the Go Around once the decision to Go Around was made.


Looking forward to the findings of the investigation.

Capn Bloggs - "Hmm, clicking and verifying movement definitely confirms TOGA has been engaged; pushing up then clicking doesn't confirm TOGA unless you also refer to the engine instruments/thrust limit. If you remove your hand (for, say, controllability) the throttles might come back if TOGA did not engage..."

Controllability? There's no need to remove your hand from the throttles at that time. HOTAS is still a concept applicable to today's flying.

Lonewolf, caution noted; there was no intent to chase solutions for this event, which may only have limited value as accidents are rarely repeated in every detail.
We can wait until the 'facts' are available, but all that might do is confirm what happened during this accident, and provide little guidance as to avoiding the next one.
However, from the discussions in this forum there appears to be strong evidence for safety concerns about the AT system.

The greater the level of safety in aviation the more the need to pay attention to 'small' issues.

Taking the pilot out of the loop has for my money reached the point of diminishing returns because the skills needed are perishable. Taking the pilots further out of the loop strikes me as creating more danger rather than less.

Lonewolf, we agree about the pilot out of the loop.
The need is to address the total man-machine-environment system.
Generally the industry has a good record with AT systems; I know of at least one other aircraft which had similar logic to that in the 777, but, now 23 yrs on, without any problems.
What strikes me as a difference is the 'recent' need to consider bounced landings, particularly in larger aircraft, and thence using automatics to trigger a simple manoeuvre (environment-design-training/behaviour).
Why a difference, what has changed, why, apparently, is this only a problem with larger aircraft ???

As W.E. Deming might suggest, chasing a "solution" is called "tampering." What I find curious is that since introduction the 777 has had a superb safety record to date as a model. I have some serious doubts that "the machine" is the issue. In the past 20 years, what has changed more: how the industry prepares pilots to fly, or the machines themselves?

Well said.

The B777's TOGA inhibit function has been with us for a long time. It was designed and certified that way for a reason, over 20 years ago. Some airlines recognised the 'problem' many years ago and have trained their pilots accordingly. My employer has been doing it for over 10 years and the associated procedures are in our B777 FCOM. Why aren't other airlines doing the same? You can hardly blame the aircraft if the pilots that fly it haven't been properly trained.

We train V1 cuts, missed approaches from the minima and other 'canned' manoeuvres until the cows come home. Perhaps it's about time airline training started to incorporate some of the other, less traditional, 'events' that are likely to catch people out? How about engine failures at other points during the take-off profile, eg during rotate, V2, thrust reduction? Missed approaches from somewhere other than the minima, eg on the runway (rejected landing), from an altitude above the missed approach altitude? The assumption has always been that a pilot who is competent at flying a V1 cut or a missed approach from the minima will be well prepared for these other types of events. That may have been true once upon a time, when aircraft were much less sophisticated. It is not true nowadays, when there is much more reliance on automatic systems and their various idiosyncrasies. Aircraft design has moved on in leaps and bounds. Have our training/checking systems kept up?