sailor
As the technology advances certain cautions and precautions become superfluous. Engine failure statistics show the sixties jet engine had a failure once every two years while now it is once in thirty years. The engine ignition that was put on at the drop of a hat will cause a frown now. All the temperatures and pressures that needed to be memorised are better handled by flight warning computers. Even the hand eye coordination/talent required to fly the old aircrafts is not required to fly stabilised platform aircraft like Airbus. All you do is operate not fly the equipment by the user manual within the design philosophy. But world has always become better. Human mind is very selective it only cherry picks happy hours of the past. Nobody from today's generation would want to live those days. Considering the amount of flying that is done safety has tremendously increased. But for automation all weather and the extra long range flying was impossible to even think of. So if you haven't flown the modern aircraft then giving advice to those who do is a waste of time. There were good and bad pilots then and there are now. The accidents that keep getting discussed are generally due to poor piloting. That will not bring in better pilots but brings more and better automation. Profit greed? Sure! Isn't it called commercial aviation? When an airline doesn't think of profit it doesn't improve safety it merely shuts down

Dear langleybaston,

I am currently tasked to do a safety research on windshear and wake turbulence issues. Your experience from Nicosia seems to be relevant. Therefore I would appreciate if you could contact me on [email protected]

Regards, Heinz

That all depends in which part of our world you crash in. The Western attitude is to ask why the pilots did what they did. That is because we believe that only when you understand why can you prevent reoccurrence. As you move further east, the blame and punishment stick comes out of the box. It does simplify investigations because the guilty parties were in the flight deck. That saves a lot of work looking for causes. Also, we don't want to start blaming others like the training department, the management, the oversight authorities or the shareholders; especially if they are the same person or related. That would mess up an otherwise very tidy investigation.

PM

There have been many posts about the value of manual flying skills and experience. Many years ago, some military air forces valued, if not required, glider experience. Even today, I understand that the U.S. Naval Academy and U.S. Coast Guard Academy teach sailing to their midshipmen.

Vilas, you're being a bit harsh there. The leading cause of accidents nowadays, as you say, is poor piloting. The likes of Sailor and Sully are not poor pilots and undoubtedly would not have crashed in the many LOC prangs that have recently occurred. What a wonderful world it would be if we could have automation and good pilots. Unfortunately, so many have become "children of the magenta" that the skill is rapidly being lost, probably for ever. Acceptable to kill a few hundred occasionally? The bean counters may say yes. The relatives would so no, but they don't have a say.

Most of your stuff is very good but events over the last few years show that this is nonsense.

I wouldn't be so sure about that...

A training Capt. once asked our Sim. detail what was the first thing to do in the event of an engine failure ?

All answers from the assembled candidates were considered incorrect, eventually he said "Sit on your hands and do nothing but think, too many instances of the wrong engine being shut down through precipitous action"

I thought the saying was " Shiny side up, rubber side down ?"

No matter, same result.

Any word when, or if, they are going to release the flight recorder info?

Believe it or not, I actually "verified" the wrong engine in a light twin BFR (earned me another check flight the next day).

Reading through all these posts I'm almost detecting a vibe from some along the lines of "we don't need to think anymore because we have SOPs and automation". I'm kinda concerned about that.

Is thinking a dying part of aviation?

Is thinking a dying part of aviation?

Yes. Well, it is until you blindly follow an unsuitable SOP up a blind alley and then the CP will ask, "for gawd's sake what were you thinking?"

Capn Bloggs
You may read my post on thread Young ATPL FO 200hrs TT. In Airbus FBW at FL350 you never yank the stick back, what is the average pitch and bank used at FL350 you don't need a genius to know or teach this nor dozens of hour required to practice in the SIM. You have to switch both FDs to get airbus ATHR in speed mode should be taught in a classroom.You don't fly an approach without monitoring your speed, Vapp-27kts in A320 at Bangalore, Vapp-31kts in B777 at SFO, good visibility, no clouds, serviceable aircraft, people who were involved had thick log books. In airbus thrust levers don't move and yet they do so in B777 but the result is same. You tell me why? The biggest tragedy/comedy is that at that time these pilots were under check. What does the check captain write in the report when he himself doesn't know what the speed was? Without automation there will be no CAT3, no long range flying. The industry will find solution through technology by better automation so the human factor is not allowed to come in. Hasn't it dawned on you that this is commercial aviation means it's sole purpose is to make money and not give pleasure or sense of adventure to employees who sit in front. Without profit everybody goes home in utmost safety, pilots included.

BugSmasher1960 and RAT 5
In your dislike for procedures or over confidence in your own innovations you don't notice how ridiculous and dangerous the above statement is. When engine fails on take off if you sit on your hands and think then rest of the work will be only at your funeral. When Engine fails you don't think, you instantly react and maintain control the aircraft. Identifying the correct engine before shutting down is very much part of the SOP you don't need to think for that. Somebody smarter than you has put it in the SOP. Rat come on! Can there be a suitable SOP for a person who has visceral hatred for any procedures except his own irrelevant innovations? I think manufacturer's test pilots deserve more respect than that.

So based on what we know so far from the accident and the culture of the region, airline and regulator, who or what is going to be found to BLAME. This is not an analysis of who is to blame! :}

Latent factors:
Weak regulator that lets the airline do pretty well whatever it likes.
Local Chief Pilots and EVP Flt Ops who think maximum automation is the safest philosophy, although both manufacturers think otherwise.
Training Department that is seriously under Fleet managements thumb
Airline that treats all FTL limits as targets and as negotiable.
Boeing A/THR mode subtleties that can confuse
Regulator and Airline both agree burying head in sand on bad things is best philosophy, so as not to damage country's reputation.
To ensure this the regulator is allegedly using two of the airline's staff on secondment to help with the investigation :eek:

On the Day factors:
Local Captain, who has only been a Capt for about a year
F/O relatively new to airline.
Although rested, flight and landing took place at circadian low.
Summer wind conditions that can be fluky causing direction shifts close to ground.

Blamestorming Analysis:
Boeing and Rolls Royce will get minimal blame otherwise they will demand a proper investigation. The airline and country brand must be protected at all costs, so the airline will get minimal blame, maybe a little placed on the training department. The Capt will receive little blame, as he is a local and you do not want to question the quality of local pilot training and skills, or the command upgrade process. The Aussie F/O might get some blame for not supporting the Capt properly, unless the Qantas unions can protect him. ATC likewise may get some of the blame for confusing the pilots by giving them an instruction during the G/A, but that won't stick very well. Only solution BLAME Mother Nature, as plainly severe windshear caused this accident to happen. There, everybody happy now.

One thing we are never likely to know is the Truth

Building Induced Windshear
 

Alphaprot,

Good summation..however...

I would add Density Altitude (DA) and Building Induced Windshear/Turbulence to the mix....

Note the proximity of the Emirates maintenance hangars (A380 capable) to the Runway...less than 450m!....

Further, note that in general, Automated Weather Stations (AWS) globally, round 'wind direction' to the nearest deca degree (nearest +/- 10 deg)...

Speed is also recorded +/- a margin.....

The density altitude (DA), given the adverse combination of OAT and air pressure at the time was SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER than ISA for Dubai....

Unfortunately, this crew were subjected to a multitude of adverse environmental conditions (vertical windshear, possible building induced Windshear/Turbulence and an elevated DA) which SHOULD be highlighted by the accident investigation team, if they are on the ball....

DATUM

Prima facie it appears that although not catastrophic but there was a wind shift, initially head wind shear then changing to tail wind. The head WS part caused excess energy situation leading to IAS increase and float that made the crew initiate a GA. Excess speed converting to height may have given the crew indication of +climb leading to retraction of the gear but wind shift to tail and increased drag from open doors of retracting gear made the aircraft contact the runway. With unlocked gear collapsing fuselage took the impact and was destroyed. If the gear was not retracted the aircraft would have survived. The only question that remains to be answered is whether the crew retracted the gear prematurely? From available information it is not possible to say that.

The cynics on here should reflect that they are questioning the integrity not only of Emirates and the GCAA but also Boeing, Roll-Royce and numerous other aviation bodies. There is simply no way that they would sign off their contribution to any report that did not contain the true facts. Has any ICAO-required report , ever, been found to be false or fabricated? Findings have been disputed after publication on rare occasions such as Egyptair but that is not the same. An interim report will appear around 2nd September which will cover the basics of the accident in accordance with ICAO requirements. Unlikely to include FDR data because it is not required at this stage and it is too early to expect it.

The operative word being WILL. Until then, because pilots can't fly any more (Children of the Magenta), aeroplanes will continue to crash. But who cares? Said operators will still be making money...

The cynics on here aren't just questioning the 'integrity' of companies such as Boeing and Rolls. For there to be any 'cover-up', those manufacturers would be forced to accept that the equipment was simply incapable of flying safely in the prevailing ambient conditions. If operated correctly, and after many millions of flight hours, I suspect that's a pretty unlikely scenario?

But then, money talks.

As for the 'old and bold' (read 'better!') versus 'magenta line' arguments. There are indeed very many traps awaiting the unwary in modern equipment. Apart from the most rudimentary of skills, there is a significant disconnect between what passed as acceptable in the 'halcyon days', and what is required of a modern airline pilot now. It's like comparing Stanley Matthews with Lionel Messi. There is no reason whatever to suggest that good and bad pilots occur in any different proportion these days, than ever they did. Modern pilots are simply the same people facing different problems. (For example ULH with perhaps less than one landing per month, and you'll be lucky if you can still fly like Chuck Yeager) Different coping strategies than simple 'practice', are required! To suggest anything else is just silly. Or pompous?

This is a suggestive question, but an interesting one.

You don't necessarily have to 'falsify' a report. But you can raise exaggerated attention to some minor details or protagonist (you will always find some) as to divert from the real holes in the Swiss cheese.
Has been done in the past to protect the biggies involved. It basically 'can never be' the manufacturers, the airline, the country with its regulator. Too much interest and money involved.

That leaves the active crew and the weather.
The weather has been ghastly, agreed, but it had been like that many times before and even worse, the sandpit is known for these effects. Blame it on the weather and make a fool out of yourself.
The crew has one particular component that involves the biggies' interests mentioned above. So i fear that the other component will get the major share. If you think his union will protect him, think twice ..... I don't believe it one second. Their company depends too much of the one involved and all three will gladly pick on the handy scape goat.

Not sure if you're including me in that, but I started by saying that I have no problem with SOPs - my question is - in essence - "are pilots still actively thinking once they've run the NNCL / SOP"? Or are they too trusting of the SOP / automation to handle events? (case-in-point go-arounds after pressing the TOGA button).

vilas,

Is that analysis presuming there was no thrust delivered from the engines? Isn't that the 'only' question that remains to be answered? I can't for my life believe the engines are so slow to spool up that they couldn't have arrested an impact from a bounce/wind shift (even in 49 deg C heat).

The real question, asked rhetorically by many in this thread, is if the PF pushed the TOGA switches, and thereafter followed up (as he was supposed to do) by pushing the thrust levers forward. If he did, then there would have been thrust, if not, then most likely there would have been only idle thrust, not enough to keep the aircraft flying.

Glofish, sorry but statements such as "has been done in the past"... " can never be" etc are not worth much unless backed up by evidence. There are plenty of sources to refer to, try planecrashinfo.com for worldwide figures:

A sample stat is Causes of Fatal Accidents in % from 2000 to 2010 ( aircraft with 19 pax and above):

Pilot Error 34
Pilot Error Weather related 18
Pilot Error Mechanical related 5
Other Human Error 6
Weather 6
Mechanical Failure 22
Sabotage 9

Some food for thought perhaps?

Unless TOGA mode didn't engage, and when he took his hand off the throttles to control the Go Around, they came back to Idle...

I'm pretty sure the they know exactly what happened.
They have all the information from all the recorders.
They will have flown the attempted go around many times in the sim.

BugSmasher1960 and Rat
I somehow get the feeling that both of you are not in touch with contemporary situation in aviation otherwise you would not be lamenting the demise of the thinking pilot. Rather the whole process of thinking is now well organised. When something happens you don't sit on your hands because somebody said so but Fly(establish control of the flight path or ensure it is still there), navigate(make sure you are going where you want to or make short term decision to hold or change direction) and communicate immediately if deviating from clearance, if not then when convenient. Dealing with abnormal/emergencies every important item like throttle, fuel lever is confirmed by both pilots before acting on it. Once you are finished with it a situational assessment is made like seeing the problem in its entirety, options, risks and benefits of each of them and decision taken in agreement with the other and as you execute the decision it is periodically checked that it still remains the right one. This is not the demise of the thinking pilot but even a dumb pilot is guided to think along a well thought out plans rather than leaving it to random individual brilliance or idiocy to come out with consistent results. Thinking is not dead but rather the pilot is prevented from acting without thinking like in the old days. it doesn't leave much to be unnecessarily creative unless you want to show that you are different.

portmanteau, # 1063.
One problem with using so called sources of accident data is that there is no explanation of what 'human error' means, nor how such a classification can 'cause' an accident. Thus most of what is quoted is of little use for improving safety.
For a mechanical failure, fix the mechanics, for a human 'failure', fix what, how ...

For this accident, if the GA system design contributed, is this the major contributor, or is the human because of the weakness in system operation, or jointly; or due to documentation, certification, ... etc. Like many recent accidents this one has the potential for similar complexity. It's not what caused it, it is why the contributions came together at the time, and how we can learn from this will be the important aspect for safety.

For this accident, if the GA system design contributed, is this the major contributor, or is the human because of the weakness in system operation, or jointly; or due to documentation, certification,

If there is an expectation that TOGA will activate the auto-thrust and save the day it might encourage an 'expectation' and thus less monitoring. If the thrust s always a manual application (with perhaps an auto back-up for low speed?????) would this increase better monitoring? i.e. has automation improved safety in this respect?

I understand the conundrum of the condition statement.

That's what I'm asking myself many times since it happened. Noone could tell me so far the tech details: What will happen if you touched down, pushed the TOGA switches (unsuccesful, because they're inactive), pushed the throttles and let them go: Are they staying where they are, are the going forward, are they moving backwards.

Simple question - and the most simple way to explain the accident.

Is there no 777 driver around who knows this question?

Thanks,
Dani

portmanteau:

You ask for evidence and respond with a statistic. Well, we all know what to take from statistics, don't we?
It is exactly the so called 'evidence' in airline accident reports that i was referring to, when higher 'interests' are at stake.

I was close to an accident and its investigation and report some years ago. This makes me take any report with a pinch of salt and caution .....

I believe at least 2 decades ago NASA came to the conclusion that human beings were poor monitors of automation and it was better to have the automation monitoring the humans. QED

I can't disagree.

What have NASA/airliner manufacturers/airlines done to address that conclusion??

I only ask, because I genuinely don't know.

They stay where they are.....during a manual landing.

Autothrottle disconnect occurs automatically:
• if a fault in the active autothrottle mode is detected
• when either reverse thrust lever is raised to reverse idle
• if the thrust levers are overridden during a manual landing, after the
autothrottle has begun to retard the thrust levers to idle
• when both engines are shut down

Dani, they'll stay where they are. Inshalla!

It is always frustrating when some blowhard comes onto a thread with statements like the above and then when is asked to clarify, has disappeared with no further response, probably because they can't back up their claims.

So here is what Boeing says about tailstrikes on go-arounds...

"OVER-ROTATION DURING GO-AROUND
Go-arounds initiated very late in the approach, such as during flare or after a bounce, are a common cause of tail strike. When the go-around mode is initiated, the FD immediately commands a go-around pitch attitude. If the PF abruptly rotates into the command bars, tail strike can occur before a change to the flight path is possible. Both pitch attitude and thrust are required for go-around, so if the engines are just spooling up when the PF vigorously pulls the nose up, the thrust may not yet be adequate to support the effort. The nose comes up, and the tail goes down. A contributing factor may be a strong desire of the flight crew to avoid wheel contact after initiating a late go-around, when the airplane is still over the runway. In general, the concern is not warranted because a brief contact with the tires during a late go-around does not produce adverse consequences. Airframe manufacturers have executed literally hundreds of late go-arounds during autoland certification programs with dozens of runway contacts, and no problem has ever resulted. The airplane simply flies away from the touchdown".

https://www.facebook.com/FlyingHuman...type=2&theater

Can't argue with any of that - and yet, still, we have the recent example of a perfectly serviceable aircraft run by a professional crew that appears to have run out of altitude, airspeed, and thrust all at the same time.

If people really are thinking / retaining-situational-awareness why are things like this happening?

They are not maintaining situational awareness in these types of situations. The reason is because they are not monitoring the parameter that is usually automated but for some reason is now not automated.
Why? Because it is usually so well automated that the parameter drops out of the scan to a greater or lesser extent. If you fly an aircraft with no auto throttle the airspeed is a constant high priority in your scan, after years of flying with an auto throttle it has dropped down the pecking order somewhat. If asked you would probably say that it is very high on the priority list but the reality is that unless you are of unusual design, you will not be scanning it with the same frequency as you were a few years back when you had no auto throttle.
That's what the research tells us, I'd be surprised if it wasn't right.
Firefly Bobs post about automation monitoring pilots actions is spot on. In an ideal world we never would have actively automated things like auto throttles, the automation would just sit quietly watching us and waiting for a mistake. To change now is just too hard considering the relatively low accident rates v's the cost.

Actually, you can 'argue with that'. The problem lies some of the finer points. And that could be things like this are still happening.

Actually, a lot of non-thinking pilots are guided to act, rather than think, along a well thought out plan. Along the lines of 'I have an engine fire. I need to do this, then that, then that, etc & finally that & then I land the thing'. Great until one of the steps doesn't work or is inappropriate in the specific circumstances. Then it all goes pear shaped rather quickly.

On the contrary, pilots can actually be led to act without thinking. 'Just follow the SOP for the situation we have & all will be fine'. The thing is, you can't have an SOP to cover every eventuality. SOP's have a very important place & have been developed through hard-won & often bitter experience. But due to the very nature of the business, a pilot needs to be able to know when to apply them, how to apply them, when to modify them & even when to ignore them. And that takes thought & sometimes flexibility. The cookie-cutter, one size fits all, mentality has no business in this business.

As they say, 'every flight is the same & every flight is different'.

I guess - in a nutshell - QF32?

So in the world we have as opposed to the one that might have been better, what's the best solution going forward?

- Even smarter automation? Fuzzy Logic?

- Alerting to situations where the automation has been inhibited (perhaps with a "resolution advisory"?) ("TOGA INHIBITED - USE MANUAL THRUST & ATTITUDE")

- Less automation but more monitoring?

- Something else?

A problem with active automation in a case like this is that in aviation in general, we don’t want to hit the ground and/or fly too slowly but unfortunately that is exactly what we want when we land, otherwise we’d never be able to do it.

Where did the accident occur? Over a runway. There’s a fair amount of logic in modern aircraft to allow an approach and landing without setting off a load of safety systems but it is possible for the pilots and the computers to get out-of-phase, if you change your mind enough on the way in. We’re landing... No, we’re going around... No, we’re landing... No, we really need to go-around, etc. You end up in a sort of no man’s land where half the systems think you’re landing and half think you're taking off, which usually doesn’t end well.

If you really want to go flying again, push the thrust levers forward and pull back on the yoke/stick when you’ve got enough airspeed. No intervention systems required. You can sort out the automation when safely climbing away...