glofish
I think you getting carried away in your lament about lack real experience and lack of virtues of simulator practice. Except flying hundreds of visual and instruments approaches may be in raw data there is nothing else you do in handson flying and if any one needs decades to get the basic throttle and stick skill he may have been better off in another profession. In the days of actual OEI practice in air I know of an accident where during OEI GA due to sudden application of wrong rudder a B737 crashed in dispersal and rammed into a parked aircraft killing people in that aircraft along with it's own pilots. There are hundreds of pilots who retire without ever experiencing an engine failure, wind shear, TCAS or multiple hydraulic or electrical failures. You want to practice these in the air? That will definitely not improve the safety but give rise to avoidable accidents for which the airline would be shut down. You don't have to die to become an expert in living. Modern simulators have significantly improved safety. They are being made more and more like real aircraft like and give you fair idea about environmental conditions like wind shear etc. and feel of serious systemic failures. To enter an airliner cockpit if one has to go through the labyrinthine route as suggested by you and some others then half the travelling public may have to postpone their travel plans by some years. Experience of what? Any abnormality in modern aircraft may be the first and last you ever get. I know a manufacturer's instructor who trained some of us on another type when he himself flew in an airline rejected take off in a 747 after V1 and landed up outside the runway. Can happen.Simulators are not merely OK but the only way to experience any serious failure.

@vilas

You might have just read into the thread, i don't blame anybody for that. It however distorts some arguments that have been raised earlier. A lot of things you come up with are not exactly what i said, you are correct in a lot of things, but i had treated those earlier.
I will not bore you to death in elaborating again.

@ ruserious

With a lot of automation i thought flight safety will improve, and it did. With some sops i thought a better cooperation with the buddy and machine could happen, and it did.
But with automation coupled with sops that oblige its use, i think we went the wrong way.
Sometimes automation should only be at our disposal and basically nice to use and not need to use or we lose the skill to replace them.
Same goes with all too rigid sops.

Sim exercise, ZRH, Wind 280/40, cloudbase just above circling limit.

Landing on 14 above crosswind limit for B757 so the plan was for ILS to R14, break-off (when visual) to join downwind left hand for R28.

The new breed of base training captain (must use the automatics) had us sitting in the simulator and creating an approach using V-Nav and L-Nav. Must have taken 25 minutes of valuable sim time to create this masterpiece of height, speed and track changes.

Once finally airborne the exercise was a total waste of time, Apart from flap and gear extension we sat there and watched the automatics!!

On a lighter note I do remember this individual had his name badge made in Hong Kong... Larger than normal BA to cope with his title "Base Training Captain.......". It all changed (and was discarded) when a junior cabin crew member asked him asking if "base training" meant that he had only just joined the airline and was under training!!

Buzz, #996, :ok:
We appear to be making the same point about the technical origins and the need to rethink.
However, I disagree with the documentation / training solution as it continues to rely on the human. You cannot get all pilots, all operators, all regulators, to act the same all of the time.
Whilst the 'more training' approach has contributed greatly to the industry's success, we should now consider that this is at the limit of effectiveness (td's sim comment #998), not because the human or aircraft has changed, but that the wider operational environment has evolved, including the way we use the technology.
Hence the need for a systems approach to safety and more focus on managing the unexpected (surprise) and unforeseeable events.

The question is not why the original design was weak or not, it is why this particular design now appears to have a significant safety issue. We don't need the final report or reference to other accidents to consider the question, instead we should look at current operations; has this happened before without adverse outcome, how do pilots manage the system in a range of operational scenarios.

The so-called professional comment on the GA video is appalling, noting that this is an open forum. The explanations for the aircraft's flight path suggest wide gaps in certification and operational knowledge - what the aircraft was designed and approved to do, how it was envisaged to be used, vs how it is trained or expected to be used.
Excepting gross mishandling or weather, a GA in the flare or after touchdown should not invoke concerns of insufficient speed, power response, tail strike, climb performance, control effectiveness, etc.

Whilst some of the comment in this forum represents the real professionals in the industry, other aspects suggest that the professional quality is in decline. An emerging concern should be if incorrect or ill-informed comments are influencing the new or inexperienced pilots or unwary management.
Does the predominance of mis-informed information in social media and open forums present a risk in aviation, does it degrade the standards of communication and belief; c.f recent voting and canvassing practices (UK and US).
Just one aspect of the changing operational environment.

Woodpecker;

As Monty Python would have said -" Luxury! ". I remember one sim session in a previous outfit where we performed low vis taxi around AMS to the deicing pad where we carried out full de-ice procedures (including reading it all out from the FCOM Supplementary before doing it). One hour from start up to getting airborne.

What a waste of valuable sim time. I believe a wiser training management team has since got rid of that stuff. They have even introduced more raw data/manual flying exercises. Excellent.

As has already been discussed, SOP's are essential for safe operations, but they have to be reasonable , practical and simple (KISS?). I always remember the old saying--" Rules are made for the guidance of the wise and the obedience of fools ".

Fortunately, bad SOP's usually don't last too long , although it unfortunately takes an incident/accident to highlight the flaws.

PEI3721, that all sounds a bit iffy to me.
Actually, less training is resulting in less and less success. Cut to the chase: we're auto dependent. Fullstop. When we get thrown into a situation which cannot be handled by the automatics, we fail, or should I say almost all situations we fail in are when the autos can't help us. Pilots can no longer fly, It's that simple. "Pilot" training (not button-pushing) hasn't peaked, it (hopefully) has just about bottomed. Maybe a few more prangs/runway excursions/handing mishaps will be needed before the powers that be wake up.

We don't fail in almost all situations when the automatics fail. We actually succeed in almost all of those situations. We hear about, read about, or have the accidents when guys screw up the automation and DON'T revert to basic flying skills. And then we're left with a situation that is commented on in many of these posts "WTF were they doing?!?"

A large US airline probably has several G/A's every day. Some at 1,500', some at 1,000' and some below 20'. We usually don't hear about them unless there's a screwup, which is often the triggering event for the g/a and the g/a itself is a non-event.

Capn, may be more qualification required than iffy.
What was in mind is how to build on what has been achieved without discarding the useful bits.
First we have to consider where we are or think we are on the horizontal axis in fig 3.1. Approaches toSafety: One Size Does Not Fit All
Whilst some areas of the industry may appear to be ultra safe, perhaps they are not, i.e. the industry requires a range of safety activities.
What helps best to manage risk.

Whilst there are plenty of fixed base simulators (Flight Training Devices, or FTD), the regulatory requirements dictate that Full Flight Simulators (FFS) are used for zero flight time training/testing and most types of recurrent training/testing. In my experience, FTDs are mainly used during aircraft conversion courses, where they are useful for teaching pre-flight and checklist procedures, and for demonstrating the effects of the cockpit controls on aircraft systems.

My big gripe is that FFS are not being used effectively during recurrent training, where they are mainly used to train 'canned' exercises. In many airlines, recurrent training events have become a 'box ticking' exercise where there is huge pressure to complete as many items as possible in a limited amount of time. That satisfies the various regulatory authorities, but does little to prepare pilots for the unexpected events that occur in the real world. That aspect is slowly changing with the introduction of Advanced Qualification Programs and Evidence Based Training by some airlines, but it remains to be seen if they have much of an effect on safety outcomes.

How about showing us which quotes you feel are incorrect so that the inexperienced will know what not to believe.

Has always been a problem on pprune, separating those who really do sit in the front row, and those who are, at best, flight simmers. If you remember our famed SSG he presented himself as a highly credentialed aviator, whereas the reality was the nearest he got to a real aircraft was as a pax in 45C. His views on V1 were a case in point, where an upcoming lad/lass may have taken on board his ludicrous notions because of his self proclaimed "expert" status. Avid flight simmer, and sucked a lot of people in, even professionals. Sois a bit difficult when even the professionals can have widely disparate views at times on a particular subject.

It's the whole system that is the problem....
 

I doubt that new or inexperienced pilots are that foolish or easily influenced (unless they read PPRUNE! :}) but what I do believe is that they are probably a combination of first 'big jet' job so still 'living the dream' but secondly, bullied by management (directly or indirectly) and also locked in by bonds which puts them all in a Hobson's choice position.

The most worrying thing is that if you believe in SMS principles particularly the James Reason culpability decision tree , we have an awful lot of 'professional' pilots out there knowing and willfully doing stuff which, while legal, is fundamentally unsafe (fatigue/rosters etc.) and by not saying 'no' they become negligent/reckless as a result - before anyone jumps all over me, I am not pointing fingers and I understand the pressure and reasons that lead to this - the root cause analysis points at management, airlines, company culture, regulators and ultimately ICAO (the toothless tiger!) - unfortunately, the guys sat down the front are the ones at the sharp end who bear the brunt and might pay with their lives in doing so!

The decline in professional quality is that the whole system is going wrong and being corrupted and that SMS is being paid lip-service and flight crew are being forced into situations that they know are unsafe ( although 'legal' - just because its legal doesn't mean its right/safe, right!) but due to greed $$$ and regulatory apathy, they can do nothing about it - the ultimate Hobson's choice - 'your job or your life' - we have reached a very sad place in modern aviation :sad::{

Agree, the root cause is that said apathy, although they are very agile in reaching out their hands ....
It is more like a "Hobbs choice": The ruthless tiger in their dreams, versus the cuddly toy in reality. :{

complacency creep
 

A bit grim there, Capn'! History just might teach us that AF447 was the bellwether. And if it was, have we learned all the lessons of that perplexing series of events? I would argue that we must travel further. Irrespective of what the PF assumed the protections were at any given moment, his own logic ought to have saved him, had he been confident enough to overrule the 'infallible' bus with it. Unreliable indicated airspeed, perceived erroneous stall warnings and multiple levels of degraded auto law environments must be challenging to say the least, but unreliable physics is an entirely different prospect altogether.

Unfortunately it appears his confidence in the bus (or automatics more generally) allowed him to ignore the fundamentals of flight, which is deeply concerning and clearly needs to be more fully understood.

I'm not convinced it's quite as grim as you [jest?] above, but we might be in danger of entering a new era of 'complacency creep', ironically as a result of the very automatics we designed to enhance safety in the first place (which they indubitably have).

Just IMHO.

I agree, excessive control inputs. I see this online a lot, when the adrenaline starts to flow on a gusty approach at least half the turbulence is self induced.

You don't see it in the sim, maybe because we don't turn up the turbulence in there.

I sometimes wonder if I live on a different planet to Pprune folk. I doubt if anyone would ever get on a plane in China or India or Africa if it weren't for automation. I'm sure there are some minor issues around the margins and the concern for safety expressed here is excellent, but the idea that automation has made aviation less safe globally is patently absurd.

Adherence to SOP etc.
 

Many moons ago flying for a well-known UK based carrier flying charter and scheduled flights with a huge variety of destinations same Flight Inspector allowed us to fly all models of BAC 1-11's, yet insisted our kilted cousins fly either their 200 or 500 models, not both. One charter, the other schedules, so a much more limited variety of flying for each. Never understood that.

Company SOP across all fleets was hand fly going and coming below 10000 feet. Everyone benefited from that hands on handling experience.

My only actual not sim engine failure on the 1-11 occurred at TOD which made life much easier than had it occurred on departure.

Having completed Emergency Checklist, discussed with copilot if there was anything else beneficial we could do and it was agreed that lighting the APU would be a good thing, which surprisingly was not in the aforementioned checklist, which we did. Spare air and electrics obviously plus a teeny bit of additional thrust !! Reminiscent slightly of the Trident poke development.

UK destination CAVOK so elected visual approach which ATC OK'd.

Carried out approach higher than normal such that, in the 10 to the minus whatever likelihood the other motor chose to quit, a deadstick would be possible.

Stacks of those practised in the Hunter in my previous life and also in spare time in the sim in Dublin so felt confident it was an option. Practicality proved on a different mount by the Gimli Glider sometime later and the A300 Azores copy. Neither may I add by me.

Unsurprisingly, good motor continued as advertised, achieved stable powered approach later than normal, still capable of a deadstick should it be a late surprise event, managed the usual greaser and stopped well short of the end.

Wrote and submitted incident report; later discussed event with Fleet Manager who berated me for not carrying out the sim well-established ILS procedure, and refused to admit that the addition of the use of the APU in the Emergency Checklist would be useful. Insisted it was merely a matter of airmanship. I suggested that if it were a good wheeze and as it was quite unusual to experience this event in an average fling career it might just be useful to have in the E C as a reminder to even the top airmanship king. No - simple matter of airmanship old boy ! Fought my case with an eventual concession that the ILS might not perhaps be the only option in these circumstances, but final refusal on APU inclusion. Never did understand that, but then I was only a line pilot.

Subsequent Kegworth B737 event might have been different had they had their APU on.

Plus ca change etc. Goes back a long way and yes, I have done the Long BS Course !

Enjoying retirement but still occasional hankering to be back up there with those of you who are !

Final thought- BGO - no matter how clever and sophisticated the automatics are, which they definitely were in the Global Express which I was fortunate enough to pole in my subsequent aviation career, anyone in the pointy end MUST be able to handfly what they are sitting in and be able to recognise and take over capably in the event of an automatics malfunction. Or everyone could perish.

I may be the only professional pilot here thinking this, but personally, I'm very glad there are very few (if any?) pilots like you left in the airlines.

The very last person I want to be sitting next to is some astronaut, who thinks he's still in a single engined, single seat fighter!

This job is a TWO pilot operation! Both need to know EXACTLY what's coming next. Keep it SOP. Keep it simple.

Frankly, the industry can't sustain the rates of losses the 'old and bold' generation accepted. We may have different problems now, but flying is infinitely safer, for a very good reason, and it's not purely because aircraft are more reliable!

Though even I'm of an age when I'm seduced by the idea that 'the older I get, the better I was'!

4468 - exactly what dangerous actions did he undertake? Starting the APU even though the checklist didn't call for it?

That's an oxymoron if I ever read one! :}

Some comments on Checklists. B737 QRH: You have an engine shutdown and therefore a wounded bird. You may be or not under radar. Either way you would be hard pressed to respond to an RA, especially a climb. IMHO opinion selecting TA Only is rather helpful to reduce the risk. Yet, in the QRH for engine failures of all varieties it is No.9 in the checklist. It can take a long time to reach this. In other checklists it comes earlier. It seems as if this section is not considered important to Boeing. Why? Select TA by Recall takes <5secs and may avoid an undesirable moment. There are various QRH checklists where it is appropriate but not included at all. It took much persuasion to include it is the Emergency Descent QRH. Indeed some Boeing company pilots didn't understand there question.
After Sully went boating my airline included a double engine failure/ditching in the recurrence sessions. The SFI asked me why I called for 'locked' harness before splash time. I said it seemed common sense. I did not think the manufacturer included harness locks just for pilot incapacitation; which is the only time they are ever used. After checking the QRH for Ditching it does not include locking the shoulder harness. I wonder why.

What's the reason for locking the shoulder harness? Does your airline not have tension reels on the shoulder straps?

4468 View
 

4468 - fascinating response !

No astronaut me, and procedure had been practised many times not only in Hunter but twin engined heavier machine with another crewmember who did not have a pole and throttle to play with, just radar and the rest, but he did have his own means of exit/ escape which he could opt to use at any time if he did not care for what was going on.

Event I described had an experienced ex-mil co. What we executed safely was discussed and agreed beforehand, had been practised in the sim by both separately, and of course the co was entitled to take control of any situation where he considered it to be heading towards an unsuccessful outcome.

That's the scenario in more detail for you delectation; perhaps you could expand on your misgivings for me.

Your
"This job is a TWO pilot operation! Both need to know EXACTLY what's coming next. Keep it SOP. Keep it simple." first; would you really throw away the advantage of height and speed in hand in order to perform an SOP ILS approach, which not only would take longer with the good engine at a higher power setting potentially straining it so unnecessarily that it too might quit? Then what ? Is that really such a good idea? I definitely still think not.

If you really do consider that to be the better option then I am glad I flew when I did with airmanship considerations being part of everyday life rather than being constrained like you unfortunately appear to be to a blinkered, always SOP lifestyle. No need to engage brain there. Pity. God forbid !

Next your
"Frankly, the industry can't sustain the rates of losses the 'old and bold' generation accepted. We may have different problems now, but flying is infinitely safer, for a very good reason, and it's not purely because aircraft are more reliable!"

My day included the Comet crash window problems, and ADF, VOR, backbeam ILS and other interesting approaches which were often the order of the day, all hand flown without the luxury of GPS and automation to touchdown that your generation enjoys. So you can go look up on Google what some of those vintage system approaches involved, as you appear to be one of the newer generation who would probably have packed it in when faced with some of those situations. Not entirely a question of old and bold and aircraft reliability at all actually.

Finally your
"I may be the only professional pilot here thinking this, but personally, I'm very glad there are very few (if any?) pilots like you left in the airlines."

I think and hope that you are ! So be it, but you don't know what you missed.
Had you been lucky enough to have been blessed and rostered with me you would probably have learnt a lot to your benefit, being polite and respectful to your seniors and betters perhaps being one of them ! As it is I am very happy that I did not suffer that misfortune. Nothing personal of course !

What's the reason for locking the shoulder harness? Does your airline not have tension reels on the shoulder straps?

Belt & braces! Would you trust yourself to a single safety item when you had a back-up and did not activate it? Why have a back-up and not use it? It is not an automatic system! Duh! Question: why is the lock lever there?

Back to the original prang of this thread. Although I have followed the full thread, I cannot recall if we learnt: Was the pilot handling, the local Captain or the Australian FO?

+1. I Concur.

Yep. You probably are:ugh::hmm:

Well...he does have a point, even if it's tone was slightly offensive.
I used the same technique as Sailor years ago but I would side with his Chief Pilot these days. The industry and aircraft have changed and (with the obvious rider that SOP can't cover all situations) stepping outside trained manouvres and checklists is unnecessary and introduces "unknown unknowns". It sometimes is counter-intuitive but simply and dumbly following procedures really does work.
For example although following a glide profile would give some protection against a kegworth scenario, but in the modern vernacular it also introduces arguably more likely hazards of an unstablised approach.
The point being that sticking to someones SOPs, even if you know a better way, does not indicate a lack of individualism or the ability to get out the skills if a really needed.

Standard in SOP means exactly that: Standard.
Its definition is: "used or accepted as normal or average", which implies that there is an abnormal or above/below average, basically acknowledges another solution.

With a mind set like yours, better replace the "Standard" "S" with "Sectarian".
If man had never known a better way, you'd be still painting cave walls.

Nothing personal of course.

RAT5

You talk rubbish and that's a nice way of putting it.

The SFI said I was the only one who locks the seat belts prior to ditching, as he rolled his eyes and dreamed of the session ending.

What do you do in your car? tie rope around the wife and kids just in case the belts don't work, belt and braces.

As for changing from RA to TA as a memory item on an engine failure, Airline manufacturers are trying to cut down on the amount of things that have to be memorised.

But email Boeing just in case, they might even send you a free pen for your brilliant for sight.

The phrase "The blind leading the blind" comes to mind. And the arrogance, nastiness & rigid mind-set of some are starting to show. And then out come the personal attacks.

There are no SOP's to cover every possible situation than can & does arise in aviation. This is an industry that requires flexibility & an ability to think outside the box. There are times to strictly follow SOP's & times when one needs to have the foresight & systems knowledge to go outside the SOP's, in order to ensure a good outcome. It takes airmanship, experience & a flexible mindset in order to know the difference. And every airline I have worked for has had that 'last line of defence' in their manuals. It is also in the Boeing Flight Crew Training manual.

One has to remember that most SOP's are there because someone messed up. In many cases, they tend to bring the operation down to the lowest common denominator. This is often a butt-covering exercise by management in today's environment of 'someone else is always to blame for my mistakes'. They are designed to give the worst pilot in the operation the best possible chance of completing the operation safely, every time they take an aircraft into the air.

Selecting TCAS by memory & locking the shoulder harness for ditching are both examples of thinking outside the box. Tips that others may not have thought of & are worthy of being passed on for us all to think about & consider. Pilots who spend time considering these things often do better when faced with difficult circumstances. If I remember correctly, Sully had spent time considering what he would do & where he would go if he had to put an aircraft down after departure from New York. It served him, his crew & his passengers very well indeed.

However, one must always remember that the buck stops with the flight crew, particularly the captain. And as such, one needs to be in a position where a particular decision or action can be justified in light of the circumstances that were present at the time. Particularly when you go outside SOP's & particularly when it doesn't end well.

I'm with Sailor.

Some of the WWII ex - Lancaster Bomber "North Atlantic Barons" (ex- Sp33db1rd guys will understand!) couldn't even fly a respectable NDB approach to save their lives - some of them - but pop out of cloud too high, too fast, and not yet properly configured, and say "the runway's over there, Sir" (never forgetting the Sir ! ) and they would straighten up and fly a magificent manual approach to a textbook touchdown.

Surely there is a case for both philosophies ? Computer controlled for the "normal" operations that occur 99% of the time these days, and the North Atlantic Baron capability when the Chips are down and the computer has been hacked by Murphy ?

One of the NAB's once suggested to me that a public transport aeroplane should be capable of being flown by the company's worst pilot on a day when he felt poorly, the one we were on couldn't - in his opinion ( name suppressed to protect me from any litigation, but he was fresh off a British designed and built aeroplane). Surely the same should be said for when the aeroplane feels poorly? Remember, computers never fail, never fail, never fail, tho' sometime suffer from User mishandling, and Murphy is always with us.

Quote .. " when in doubt, lash out ". ( throttles, mixture, pitch, carb.heat all fully forward - fast ). Surely the same applies when one only has 2, or occasionally these days 4, levers to grab ? What's the problem ?

For what little it's worth, in my limited time at the sharp end, in any non-normal situation I was happy enough to use SOP but - having done that - it was never a case of then just sitting back "fat, dumb, and happy".

The last item of any NNCL for me was always "think think think and then think some more".

- What's happening?

- What else can I do?

- How's this working?

- Anything else I need to think of?

- Rinse and repeat until safely on the ground with all donkeys fast asleep.

There was never a point in any non-normal situation where I'd just "sit back and relax" - always something to monitor or do or think ahead to.

There's a difference between doing "things right" (management) and doing the "right thing" (leadership).

Of course SOPs are important and one of the key ingredients to safe operation. However on certain occasions good pilots need original thought and this is what has been stifled by many airline management and training departments.

It's worth remembering that physiologically the pilots of today are the same as the chaps who flew Lancasters. Given the same environment they would produce similar results. They have been raised in a different environment, one created in no small part by the chaps who flew the Lancasters and their offspring. Getting p1ssy at a generation below you is akin to admitting your generation dropped the ball .

Thread has crept out of sight now. Oh, and Bloggsy, keep it simple. I though I was an "Oxymoron" for allowing cabin crew a wiff of observers oxy after a hectic night out!

All the military types I've flown had inertia reels and the checklist called for "locked" during take off or landing. This was impressed upon us during ship board operations, that an arrested landing with an unlocked harness may see you making intimate acquaintance with the gun sight, and undergoing facial modification without the benefit of anaesthesia. Whether that ever happened or not I can't say, but seeing that the manual for the particular aircraft says 2 to 3 "g" was necessary to operate the locking function I wouldn't want to give it a test run. The average car I think brakes at about .6 g and a F1 car at 5 g, so I think the face modification story may have some merit.

Sarcasm is the lowest form of wit, Enos. Readers do not appreciate it:mad:

RAT 5
Your suggestions of adding something more to every procedure is not that benign. Firstly trying to do that you are likely to delay what is essential or forget it altogether. The thinking pilot myth cannot be carried too far. Pilots are made to practice certain situations over and over again to create mental templates and when it becomes a reality they recognise it as a, b, or c template and apply the practiced procedure. I don't think it is safe to be unnecessarily creative in the air. That should only be resorted to when something unusual happens like Hudson river because there is no readymade practiced solution. Last minute thought process that too in abnormal situation may not be correct. Memory item for TCAS is an unnecessary addition to memory items and locking harness for should the original design fails is superfluous. On route engine failure is not like emergency descent. You can turn away from the airway first, hold altitude by allowing the speed to drop to green dot/minimum manoeuvre give a PAN/MAYDAY call and only then descend and do engine fail drill. If at all an aircraft doesn't act appropriately to RA the other aircraft may get reversal or amended RA.

Sitting in the left seat means that the final decision is yours - you are responsible for the safety of your passengers, crew and aircraft. BGO. Why you get paid the big bucks; or in our case not so big as we were an independent outfit with a tightfisted attitude. You get it right - no comment; get it wrong you have to answer for it. BGO again, but that is the nub of all aviation.

Our Chief Pilot was a good egg despite his light blue background; as may be obvious I was of the sort that operated from short runways that went up and down and having a hook helped to stop - before the vertical arrival sort took over. He always said that while in the cruise and starting to get bored perhaps, or at any time , ask yourself the question "What if ?" Ask the co, get his views and discuss. That way in the event of an unforeseen problem or nasty occurring you may just have already considered it. Not a bad philosophy and one that I remember still and use when sailing. The other good egg bit was that he flew all company types of which there were many - from props to heavies - and during his career managed to bend one of each type. As a result he was aware that all pilots are human and as such are capable of making the odd mistake. Having the rudder lock(external, pole with flag ) presented to him after arrival on chocks at destination at night by the chock jock was just one of his better ! Fortunately nothing bent on that one other than the pole in the slipstream.

Thread drift not withstanding some things never change. Unfortunately incidents and accidents will continue to happen due the nature of human frailty, be it from design, materials, maintenance, environmental issues, human error or any of the myriad combinations whereby all the holes in the cheese line up.

Keep on keeping the blue side up always helps !