alexb747:

Not quite.

The evacuation checklist supercedes all others. If the crew are commencing, say, a Fire engine checklist and it becomes clear to the Capt that an evacuation is necessary, he will immediately ask for the Evacuation checklist, he will not wait for FO to finish the Fire engine checklist. The evacuation command stops all other checklists.

Having retired from looking after 77s and 74s it is refreshing to read such a factual reply from Alexb757 .I too agree with the comment about the time lag he speaks of,this crew were merely going through that check list.What comes over in this whole incident is how everybody just did their job without panicking and in an ordered way. Every person involved should be thanked on this one.Hopefully in years to come,the footage will be used in training videos.....textbook. I am not going to voice an opinion on the hand baggage,there are enough comments here already.

ETOPS
 

Doesn't count, failure before EEP.

Yes, you could be right here. It's over 5 years since my last flight and check ride, so I'm doing this from memory. Plus, I've worked for 5 different airlines on 6 different aircraft! All slightly different SOPs.

According to my old 757 Emergency Evacuation checklist, there are several conditional statements.

After the Parking Brake is set, it states IF evac MAY be necessary, when aircraft comes to a stop, announce "Remain seated, Flight Attendants prepare".

Then,

If evac IS Necessary:

All Fire Switches.......Override & Pull
All Fire Switches(if required).....Rotate
Rotate engine fire switches in opposite directions.
Announce: " EVACUATE"
Then goes in to supplementary info.

I was not in the cockpit, nor do I have intimate knowledge of BA procedures. So, I was only making an educated guess for those that have no idea about emergency checklists.

The question is, of course, at what stage did the crew realize they had a fire and that fire was NOT out and evacuation imminent. Only the CA/FOs can answer that.

I suspect now they may have started the Engine Fire Checklist and perhaps switched to the Emergency Evacuation one early on.

Perhaps a BA 777 pilot can offer further info on this.

I also notice that a lot of engine fire/severe damage/separation (but not all) checklists assume you are in flight and have the rider "land at nearest suitable airport".

Of course, this was on the ground, fire was initially there and likely for at least a minute, it was not confirmed it was out, therefore an evacuation was the right call.

Be interested in others, still flying, take. And/or check airmen/training captains.

I'm still learning and wish to know, although my wings are now hung up. Thanks.

AD published in 2011
 

Given that the AD related to the 8-10 compressor stages was published in 2011, hasn't there been plenty of time in which to redesign and fit replacement parts to eliminate the problem across the fleet?

Sure, doing so would have been expensive. However, if this had turned into a fatal accident, avoidance of that expense might now look negligent.

This raises questions as to how long a known and potentially (and in this case very nearly) fatal defect should be allowed to persist regardless of the perceived likelihood.

Now that this has happened, it is also worth questioning whether the industry has its priorities right. GE/Boeing were not in favour of the FAA's inspection regime, presumably because of the cost and inconvenience to their customers. Four years down the line the expense could have been billions in fines and compensation had the BA crew not succeeded in conducting a textbook evacuation. This sounds like penny pinching on a large scale, and the consequences might have been the lives of passengers.

Writing as a passenger, that doesn't look great to me. What would have looked great was a proactive replacement program in excess of the FAA's requirement starting 4 years ago. Writing as an engineer it is yet another example of big businesses failing to acknowledge and act on "unlikely" risks with a catastrophic outcome merely for the sake of small amounts of short term money.

GE/Boeing have just had a lucky escape; they may well end up carrying the can for this one. Thanks to the BA crew the can isn't so big. If the NTSB finds that it was indeed the 8-10 compressor that failed then that won't exactly help GE/Boeing in their sales campaigns...

Are you suggesting that the IFSD rates used to underpin ETOPS certification for a particular operator depend only on IFSDs that occur during the periods of ETOPs flight itself?

Despite what the planespotting websites say, G-VIIO has not been written off yet.

Damage isn't as bad as first thought, although not an official word it's likely to be repaired. Problem isn't the wingbox, as previously mentioned the fuel tank wasn't penetrated. Fuel leak source was engine #1. If wing spar isn't significantly damaged, a new engine, slats, composite panelling and a repaint etc will see her fly again.

According to the latest news. One 744 and 767 from our longhaul programmes will remain for an extra few years.

fix and sell to third world airline?

would anyone buy it?

What is frame number (asking for a friend)

You would sell it for far less than you would spend getting it airworthy again. They have a large 772 fleet so take # 2, avionics, gear, brakes, apu, doors, hydraulics, rudder, spoilers, tabs, undamaged slats/flaps, panels, fuel lines, galleys, lavs etc out and use them for spares.

I know many of their 744s are self insured, not sure about the older triplers

Up to the insurer, who have people employed to crunch the numbers in fix/write off cases. However the QANTAS B744 overrun in BKK was fixed even though it wasn't economic, in order to avoid the stigma of a hull loss.

Aircraft structural aluminum alloys are heat treated/aged metal.
If the wing box was heated excessively, the metal could lose strength without being holed.

The fuel on the other side of the panels acts to absorb heat from the metal and initially will limit the temperature rise, but when the fuel gets hot enough, there may be a loss of heat transfer as boiling of fuel begins and the metal can then begin to cook.

They will probably do hardness tests of the wing skin to evaluate its strength in the heat affected areas.

A 16-year-old -200 ?

I'd put money on it being towed to a remote corner of McCarran and quietly dismantled. Time will tell.

Having looked at the seriousness of the fire in this one, if that had happened on immediate climb out, I think the odds would have been against them getting back.

The way the crew dealt with this shows such positive traits in BA's CRM culture. Hats off to pilots and cabin crew :ok::ok:

One strategy: Jack up the nameplate, install a new airframe.

Well when G-YMMM was w/o BA was left with only one spare covering LHR/LGW (based from LHR) 772 operations. Cost is irrelevant, the long-term impact of having an operation run ragged isn't cost efficient in the long-run.

What @Machinbird says, Boeing will Material test the aircraft. G-VIIO had a D Check in Cardiff last year, and B check end of last Year. According to The BA Source. But the problem isn't the wingbox, it's the wing-spar that was exposed in this case.

Windsheer:

[I]"Having looked at the seriousness of the fire in this one, if that had happened on immediate climb out, I think the odds would have been against them getting back.

The way the crew dealt with this shows such positive traits in BA's CRM culture. Hats off to pilots and cabin crew"[/I]


Whole heartedly agree with you first paragraph....

Great action from the crews, yes, but let's not forget the LAS ARFF and Airport Operations who also played a critical part in all this.

One of the key factors involved in a positive outcome for this incident was the runway being used (7L, intersection A8 - look at the airport diagram for KLAS/LAS). It is in close proximity to the fire station and that's why everyone was able to get on scene in about a minute - well inside the FAA-mandated time of three minutes. And the fire was extinguished in another 45 seconds. Where seconds matter, there is no doubt that location was a factor in the incident.

Footnote: GE engine now removed and en route to a GE facility. Airframe remains at the LAS cargo ramp............

The event aircraft shows as over 84,500 hours and 12,700 cycles.
Given the residual value of the systems, avionics, and remaining engine it wouldn't take much of a repair bill to exceed the value of the airframe.

They were stationary on the ground with a five knot prevailing wind from the left blowing the fire against the fuselage. Airborne the relative wind would have been ~150-200 knots blowing the fire aft along and through the engine. I doubt very much they would have had any fuselage damage at all. That's not to say they wouldn't have had a serious problem, just not the fuselage damage that resulted in this case.

Bleve - exactly

QANTAS went through a period of uncontained engine failures a few years ago on its RR powered B744s. A modification was unable to be carried out as they had closed their RR engine shop and every other facility in the world was busy doing work for other airlines.

Aircraft were kept flying with a known risk, could it be something similar here ?