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Originally Posted by silkox
Idea: lock the overhead bins when the seatbelt sign is on
People will naturally go for their property. Their property has personal value. The person behind in seat 38C doesn't. You cant educate or legislate to make it better. Its not going to happen. |
I must say that it has been time consuming & painful to wade through 14 pages where 80% or so of the posts have been about cabin baggage, etc, while trying to weed out the technical information. Perhaps it is time for two separate threads? Yes please. This admittedly difficult issue hijacks the thread every time there's an evacuation, but the same sentiments are expressed ad nauseum, usually with [RANT] on and generating lots of heat but little, if any, illumination. Reading post after post on this had me almost yearning for a METAR :yuk: |
Someone else's posted photo enhanced crudely
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Airbubba
Some airlines have the FO do the reject if he or she was the pilot flying and then hand the plane over to the PIC when stopped as seems the case with BA. Others have the captain always take control immediately when the reject is announced. At BA can any of the flight deck crew members call a rejected takeoff? Whoever is handling stops the aircraft, handover to the captain (if needed) is done after the parking brake is applied. As for recall/memory items in the QRH ...yes you're right, much reduced and rationalised over the years (and yes, in our case the move has indeed been to junk legacy procedures and align with those published by Boeing/Airbus. ). FWIW the evac checklist is now meant to be a "read and do" if circumstances permit. |
Future Gazing
D Bru quoted in post #188,
"This AD was prompted by cracks discovered on one HPCR 8-10 spool between the 9-10 stages in the weld joint. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the HPCR 8-10 stage spool, uncontained engine failure, and damage to the airplane". "Request Two commenters, General Electric Company and The Boeing Company, requested that we remove the ''Unsafe Condition'' paragraph from the AD, and reword the Summary section to resemble the Summary section of AD 2002-04-11. The commenters stated that, by their analyses, cracks in the weld joint would not develop into an uncontained failure. The commenters stated that HPCR 8-10 stage spools, P/Ns 1844M90G01 and 1844M90G02, be inspected by an enhanced inspection, similar to those parts covered in AD 2002-04-11. Answer We do not agree. AD 2002-04-11 was issued because of additional focused inspection procedures that had been developed by the manufacturer. Because cracks were discovered on one HPCR 8-10 spool between the 9-10 stages in the weld joint, this unsafe condition is likely to exist or develop in other products of the same type design. The unsafe condition could result in failure of the HPCR 8-10 stage spool, uncontained engine failure, and damage to the airplane. We determined that this unsafe condition requires mandatory repetitive inspections for cracks. We did not change the AD." After all, if the upcoming investigation finds that HPCR 8-10 has indeed failed and had been inspected as required one would have to conclude that the inspection regime is inadequate. Short of inspecting prior to each engine start, presumably the only other option is an actual design change / replacement before any further flights. Might that not result in a large number of grounded aircraft? Admittedly this is all wild speculation on my un-informed part... |
This afternoon a sailboat burned in English Bay after a battery fire. It burned fast and furious and even after the fireboat arrived and dump a load of water on it it literally burned to the waterline.
In the Vegas pictures you can see they got the flames out just before they breached the fuselage in the wing root area. Make one wonder slightly about the fire resistance of a 787. |
If this failure is indeed found to be caused by a crack in one of the combustion cans, a failure as highlighted by the current AD and the need for enhanced inspections, then this is very similar to the MAN 737 incident. That incident became a major tragedy as the application of reverse thrust put more fuel into an already failed engine. The blow torch effect of deflected gasses burnt through the fuselage.
Should consideration be given to the non application of reverse power in a STOP situation where it is obvious the a/c will stop on the paved surface. I suspect the 777 incident burnt at the wing root because of hot deflected gases from the reverse system |
Should consideration be given to the non application of reverse power in a STOP situation where it is obvious the a/c will stop on the paved surface. I suspect the 777 incident burnt at the wing root because of hot deflected gases from the reverse system If it helps though there's already a caveat in the 777 procedure that for the rejected take-off manoeuvre it's reverse idle only at lower speeds (possibly operator defined). |
"Following an RTO, well-trained flight crew are educated to ensure the park brake is set, the reverser(s) is/are stowed and clear handover of control is given to the captain, if the FO was flying the aircraft (unsure in this instance who's sector it was)."
I have been trained by 3 U.S. airlines. All of them required the Capt to make the reject decision and conduct the reject. It is the FOs job to ensure positive transfer of control to the Capt, and then call the tower ASAPractical. So, transfer of control would have been completed well prior to the aircraft getting stopped, if completing this (U.S. standard?) procedure. I just checked our Evac Checklist just to make sure: No mention of thrust reversers. Our Cabin Crew can initiate an evacuation on their own, if necessary. Most U.S.airlines don't have hats (mine doesn't)...one less thing to worry about during evac. Re memory items: about a year ago my airline ended them. Instead of memory items we have a "Quick Reference Checklist" which has all of the former memory items on one card: We read off the card and perform the steps on the checklist. It sounds like U.S. carriers do it differently than euro carriers. |
Walnut.
They won't permit a pilot to decide that 'it's obvious' that there will be enough runway to stop. That implies airmanship. Otherwise, I think it's a good point. |
No one seems to have yet noted that the starboard engine was not shut down at the time the evacuation began. The engine exhaust can be seen to be blowing smoke behind the plane in those videos that are taken from the port side |
This incident appears to have happened somewhere between 50-80KTS so reversers wouldn't have been used.
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ATP - at BA either pilot can call stop. The pilot flying maintains control (whoever that may be) until stopped and parking brake set. Then the captain takes control.
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highflyer
This incident appears to have happened somewhere between 50-80KTS so reversers wouldn't have been used. |
Originally Posted by Oakape
I must say that it has been time consuming & painful to wade through 14 pages where 80% or so of the posts have been about cabin baggage, etc, while trying to weed out the technical information. Perhaps it is time for two separate threads?
The fury over 'hand luggage' plane evacuees - BBC News BA plane fire: Pilots condemn the passengers who carried baggage from burning aircraft - Americas - World - The Independent There will be some people for whom passenger behaviour in an emergency is a technical subject though. |
it's worth mentioning again how the 787 might behave in this particular scenario If you want to be really safe, fly the A380 and sit in an area where the fuselage is made from Glare, it meets the criteria required for firewalls... |
Looking at this enhanced image of the inboard cowl, I see damage, but I don't see any holes in it. Does anyone have a better image of the inboard cowl?
http://imageshack.com/a/img910/9426/6GUFIU.jpg |
aox, Like the cartoon in your BBC link.
http://ichef-1.bbci.co.uk/news/624/c...rtoonplane.jpg er, Chris, that's a transgender hostie doing the demo, right? |
Just another thought for those criticising pax who take large amounts of luggage into the cabin. Many airlines now charge an additional fee - often substantial - for checking luggage into the hold. This system is rapidly educating customers to take as much as possible into the cabin with them free of charge. We increasingly see this as standard behaviour on all flights, regardless of the baggage policies offered by individual carriers. If the industry is enthusiastically encouraging pax to keep luggage with them - reinforced by financial penalty for checking-in hold luggage - we cannot then complain when they take their full permitted quota into the cabin with them. The industry must take the lead on this. It is a problem induced by the policies of airlines themselves, not customers. We can't blame a regular family for avoiding the expense of discretionary hold baggage charges. They WILL bring maximum cabin baggage instead if they can. It is just common sense. Airlines, take note. |
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