Sounds good to me.

Over thirty years ago, being a frequent long haul flier in the defence industry ,ex military and married at the time to an ex-BA stewardess, I suggested a similar type of scheme .
The idea was for fit, regular, passengers from suitable backgrounds in industry to undergo a short course of airline ( e.g. B.A.) cabin training, including some "friend in the cabin" aspects for some situations, as well as being able to bodily assist in cabin evacuation.
Such individuals would be listed and identified on booking and discreetly seated by an exit, with the cabin crew being made aware of the fact during crew brief.
A poll of B.A. flight deck crew met with an enthusiastic response - provided said selected individuals abstained from alcohol during flight. Through my company into SBAC, there was a positive feedback with other companies expressing willingness to fund their participants through any such training.
Unfortunately B.A. , via a signed letter from Colin Marshall, thought such a scheme unnecessary since the airline had the fullest confidence in its current procedures - a near identical letter coming back from BALPA.
Funnily enough ,some time later on a B.A.TriStar flight back from New Delhi in rough weather, the cabin crew were very supportive of my volunteering to clamber around the cabin strapping in confused and frightened Indian passengers.
As a P.S. I do believe that it was then a policy, in some airlines at least, to preferentially seat passengers of a particular profile on certain flights, by escape exits in any event.

https://encrypted-tbn3.gstatic.com/i...b5vGyFvZVIsIpg

Some interesting posts and links here, some accurate, others not so much.
As one who was there, I'd like to share some aspects.

This was a low-speed/low-energy RTO, around 80kts IAS. Apparently, no prior warning or abnormal indication, just two "booms" followed by an immediate engine fire indication with both bottles fired, followed by the evac.

The aircraft was departing on RWY 7L from A8 intersection, which is standard for that airport configuration and for aircraft less than MGTOW, which this flight was (170 SOB).

When it came to a final stop, it was just west of A6, remaining on the RWY, left of center line and tire marks clearly visible as it decelerated. No tires blown; just one slightly deflated. No brake fire.

The main reason why the emergency services got there so quick and put out the fire in under two minutes was the location of the aircraft. It was immediately due south of the fire station crossing one, parallel taxiway, TWY B. Took about a minute to get there whereas the FAA-mandated response time is 3 minutes for the first fire truck to reach the mid-point of the emergency runway. It was less than half that time, so some luck also involved here.

Six out of a total of eight slides/doors were activated. The two NOT activated were L2 and L3 - for obvious reasons. The evacuation, when it was initiated was very quick, majority of injuries coming as a result of evacuating which seems to be common in incidents like this. The aircraft has NO over wing exits (windows).

ATC did not have to notify nor did the crew ask if there was fire or smoke - it was pretty obvious by everyone after a few moments and the fire trucks and other first responders were ALREADY on the way before any crash alarms sounded. Again, the fire station is in close proximity to that runway location, the visual impact unmistakeable, and the crew had fired both bottles with the engine fire handle still lit (hence the evacuation command).

Damage to the aircraft was concentrated to the #1 engine cowling, especially on the inboard side and underneath (Mainly smoke and fire damage), inboard leading edge of that wing, along the fuselage and some four to five windows scorched. Some of the fire went under and around and there is smoke/fire damage on the opposite side, although less intensive as you would expect from the source. Difficult to ascertain any evidence of penetration of the cowling. However, plenty of bent metal parts and pieces hanging down, still attached, again on the inboard part.

The debris field behind the aircraft depicted several engine parts including pieces of cowling, compressor or turbine blades or parts thereof, flanges, metal collars and small bolts.

Whatever the ultimate cause, the preliminary NTSB report, evidence at the scene and research of previous accidents with similar characteristics, all seem to point to a catastrophic failure of either compressor or turbine parts inside the #1 engine. As for the subsequent fire, my best guess is rupture of some fuel lines, a gearbox or the oil/fuel cooler. It is my understanding that no fuel tank was breached.

Investigation and engine tear down continuing with NTSB, AAIB, BA, GE, Boeing and FAA FSDO working in unison all week and likely in to next week also.

Lives were definitely saved, no question. Kudos to the crew, LAS ARFF and rescue units, ATCT and all the other agencies involved. It's not every day or even every year that you have an incident like this and everyone acted professionally and quickly, with the sole exception of a few passengers! Frankly, that part was not noticed in the immediate aftermath as there was a lot going on and the vast majority had already exited by then and well away from the aircraft. :ok:

Alexb757

Great post, thanks for the detail.

Thanks, suninmyeyes......it sure was surreal watching it happen but our respective autopilots ( pun intended!) kicked in and we did what we are trained and expected to do. So glad it was a good outcome and I'm sure it will be fully followed up in what we can all learn from it and do differently next time.

https://clyp.it/jrvdzhrw

At 00:54 - Stopping message from BA2276 which crosses with ATC who have obviously seen what is going on and are already telling a Delta to go around. The DAL requires confirmation of go round instructions as the transmission is garbled by the cross with the stop message

At 01:09 - ATC transmission saying fire services on the way stepped on by BA 2276 reporting a fire and requesting fire services

01:17 - ATC confirm RFFS on the way

01:53 - aircraft reports evacuation.

02:01 - someone (RFFS?) cleared all the way down 7 Left

A little more info to help explain.......and I've listened to the tapes, spoken to the ATCT supervisor on duty and was part of the "action" on the day.

First, and as you can imagine, the controller was VERY busy and kept her cool with at least two go-arounds in quick succession and a major incident developing. Also, being a dynamic situation, there is the inevitable stepping on transmissions.

By the time anyone could get a word in edgewise, both controller and pilots KNEW there was a fire, no question. Therefore, there was little point in taking up valuable R/T time with the obvious. In fact, the pilots did eventually call for fire services and the controller confirmed on the way. You are not going to get a picture perfect or textbook response every time to an emergency situation. They both did exceptional, in my opinion.

Cannot say for sure what the third pilot was saying/doing in the cabin prior to evacuation but in any event, one uses CRM (Crew Resource Management or whatever your airline calls it). An extra set of eyes and comms is always good.

The evacuation command would come at the end of the engine fire checklist, once it's established the fire is not out. That's why there's a "longish " gap.

The sequence of actions in any abnormal situation during the start of the takeoff roll is:

1. Stop aircraft.
2. Assess the situation.
3. Do the necessary drills per the checklist and verify all complete.
4. Make the evac decision - if required.
5. Make the PA call.
And get out using nearest exit........

Hopefully, this explains any or all gaps in R/T and what some have described as a long time to evacuate the aircraft. The crew were also VERY busy!

The almost indecipherable transmission near the end is the airport operations vehicle requesting approval to enter the runway. Like police and other emergency services vehicles, they all have vehicle call signs, big numbers on the side and roof and a full iComm radio set up with ATC and aircraft plus a lot more!

I haven't read this entire thread, but if what alexb757 says is correct, then I'm staggered. Are there REALLY people suggesting that 60 secs is a 'long' time, to bring a 300 tonne jet, from 100mph to an unexpected stop, run methodically through the Fire Eng checklist. (to give the extinguishant a chance!) whilst running in parallel a continuous situational assessment. Before carefully and methodically reading through the Evacuation Checklist, and finally commanding an evacuation!

60 seconds to methodically, AND ACCURATELY run through that lot, seems remarkably swift to me. That's why there are so many professionals here, who believe the actions of the crew in an exceptional situation, saved many lives.

As was once said to me. Pilots (and in this case, crew too) don't get paid for what they do. They get paid for what they CAN do! And these most definitely drew heavily on their bank of experience and top quality training!

Well done all.

Well, they mention "all belongings" but people tend to interprete things differently these days... If they do not say "bags" explicitly, bags are fine. It is like (no)smoking and e-cigarettes...

Basically the rate of uncontained failures is about the same, but as numbers are low, statistics are not very mature. Of course there are subtle differences, if you split your compressor in 3 (LP, IP, HP) each of them is smaller and hence stiffer, so critical speed (resonance of bending and rotation) or margin to critical speed is higher, hence more tolerance for cracks or manufacturing flaws. On the other hand your lubrication system gets more complicated if you have 3 spools, so that creates additional failure cases.
Compared to 50 years ago, jet engines are incredibly reliable.

Insurance question
 

Where a hull loss (as here) is caused by the direct failure of an engine (admittedly not proven in this case) would the engine manufacturer/maintenance organisation be liable for the loss?


Here it would appear that the flight deck crew did all they could to deal with the emergency and to mitigate the damage, the AFS got there as fast as might be reasonably expected but still the fire penetrated the fuselage and cause what is likely to be damage beyond economic repair.


I suspect that there will be claims (and counter claims) between BA and GE to sort this one out; does anyone know what happens in reality? In motor insurance there is a "knock for knock" approach does the same apply to aviation?


A curious MB.

Thanks alexb757 for filling in a bit of background; in these situations there's always a lot going on that would not be obvious to people who weren't there. And as you say, in a dynamic situation there will inevitably be stepping on transmissions.

It looks to me to be a textbook example of how it should be done, so congratulations to crew, ATC, RFFS and other airport personnel.

Excellent handling of a serious incident
 

Thanks so much for your posts alexb757.
Training and experience are absolutely essential during any crisis situation, but alone these two factors are rarely sufficient if we look back and carefully analyse past serious aviation incidents.
Common sense can be very helpful but it is especially the ability to remain as calm as possible during extreme "crisis" pressure that can make the difference in between success and failure, simply because our brain does not function properly in "panic mode", whatever the experience and training, if we panic our assessment capabilities are seriously deteriorated.
This incident has shown how important is to remain calm under pressure, this concept applies to all parties involved.
This skill is reinforced through training and experience but there is also an element of "having the right person in the right job", this is why we must urgently stop the greedy aviation trend to indefinitely reduce costs (lower salaries, longer hours, etc) because the end result will be catastrophic.

No doubts that the very complex response to this incident was fantastic: pilots, cabin crew, atc and fire services all did an incredible job.
This is different from the Hudson river where the hero was basically only one.
I have learnt again that we need well trained and experienced people in aviation, we cannot make the mistake on focusing only on pilots, ATC and firemen are also essential, as it is the cabin crew staff, e.g. too often CC are seen as simple "cabin service" employees when the reality is that they are absolutely essential to achieve a successful evacuation which means saving many lives through a very quick escape.
Evacuations do not happen very often, but they do happen indeed, next time could be any of us either as passengers or on duty, this incident could have killed many people if mishandled hence we must continue to reiterate how important it is to establish good working conditions in aviation because this simply means good safety:mad:

I don't know. I assume it will be a matter of some complicated negotiation between the companies and their insurers, and depending on the investigation report, whether liability is incurred by negligence or not.

Whatever they end up doing with that aircraft, even just the loss of use can be expensive. While talking to a loss adjuster some years ago I said this must be small beer compared to what you are used to. He mentioned a catering truck had driven into a nose leg at Heathrow. £7 million.

Gizmodo US just posted this article;

The FAA Warned Boeing About the Flaw That Caused a 777 to Explode in Las Vegas

Refering to this document;

https://www.documentcloud.org/docume...011-15-06.html

Detailing an AD published in 2011 reference HPCR 8-10 stage spool for cracks.

How does this play out for ETOPS certification?

@lomapaseo (#421), I am still curious, although indeed the matter which is the subject of that AD may or may not be related to this incident. I assume, in case of a positive result, it has to be fixed right away before returning it to service. Perhaps also some more extensive inspection is triggered? So in fact it would not (should not) be possible to learn how fast the cracks develop, from these inspections alone. And therefore, I do not see how to measure the effectiveness of this AD alone.

alexb757
Thank you for your excellent post, it is good to have some facts and expert opinion from someone who was there instead of endless speculation by so many non-professionals.

PAX2908

In general (not necessarily this one) That is what they do. These material have lots of tolerance to damage if inspected often enough. Some damage is always assumed (escapes from manufacturing inspections) and even with those you ought to make to even the longest overhaul interval one can imagine. However if the damage occurs in service (lots of reasons) than one needs some updated assessments of where and how much to redo it's life expectancy between specialized inspections.

In the end the expectations as approved by the regulator may not be 100% but they historically have done a very good job at preventing loss of aircraft when taken into context with the ruggedness of the aircraft to an engine failure.

So standby by for updated actions in this regard and hopefully some other aircraft type or engine model will not repeat these lessons learned.

It shouldn't have any affect - the GE90 shutdown rate remains impressively low at 1 or 2 per million hours (which is much better than what's required for even 330 minute ETOPS).
Uncontained engine failures are always considered to be potentially catastrophic independent of any ETOPS considerations (recall the close call from the uncontained turbine burst on the Qantas A380, and it still had 3 engines running).
So the focus will be on what caused the uncontained failure, and how to prevent a future occurrence.