"USA Today" article about A-300 rudder problems?
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"USA Today" article about A-300 rudder problems?
A friend just told me about an article in this paper about Airbus' alleged awareness of some sort of rudder problems in the A-300 or 310 before the huge AA tragedy on Long Island, after departing JFK. Tonight I went to two gas stations, a grocery and a bookstore: all of today's copies were sold out. My understanding was that it is somewhere in today's paper, and the friend said that the article is quite interesting.
Could anyone possibly put some complete excerpts on Pprune? The intention here is not to criticize the aircraft or the manufacturer, but to find out what was printed in the article. I was impressed with the cockpit layout and have only jumpseated on it.
Could anyone possibly put some complete excerpts on Pprune? The intention here is not to criticize the aircraft or the manufacturer, but to find out what was printed in the article. I was impressed with the cockpit layout and have only jumpseated on it.
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Naughty Airbus
Indeed, a most disturbing scenario. Poor IO wildly dashing between convenience store, gas stations and bookshop in a frenzied but futile attempt to read USA Today's definitive words of wisdom on Airbus tails and corporate cover-up. Jolly good job BOAC and his mouse were at hand to save the day; Bravo! Well done the pair of them! One can only hope that the Airbus chickens come home to roost on this one.
PS.....Cannot believe that USA Today sold out because of a keen interest held by the good folk of Memphis in aeronautical matters, it's more than likely the high sales volume is attributable to a report somewhere in the 'purple section' of yet another sighting of Elvis in a Burger King.
PS.....Cannot believe that USA Today sold out because of a keen interest held by the good folk of Memphis in aeronautical matters, it's more than likely the high sales volume is attributable to a report somewhere in the 'purple section' of yet another sighting of Elvis in a Burger King.
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It's not all that fair to blame Airbus. In both incidents the pilots used full alternating left and right rudder. Now I'm not at all saying I would never do thesame, however, authorities, including the FAA do not require the rudder to be able to withstand the associated forces.
Airbus designed their aircraft to meet those requirements, and they cannot be blamed for doing so. Sure they could make it stronger to make it safer, but hey, the safest option would be to stop producing the aircraft completely. No aircraft, no crash.
I wonder if swinging a B7X7 (where x=0-7) rudder left and right a few times would keep it in one piece.
If the FAA wanted to prevent this from happening, they shouldn't have allowed an aircrafts rudder to have more power than it can withstand. They should not blame an aircraft manufacturer for not telling them the rudder wasn't able to withstand what it's not required to withstand.
Having said that, ofcourse, sharing of information is of the highest importance, and there is no excuse for not fully publishing any report. Don't blame just Airbus though.
Airbus designed their aircraft to meet those requirements, and they cannot be blamed for doing so. Sure they could make it stronger to make it safer, but hey, the safest option would be to stop producing the aircraft completely. No aircraft, no crash.
I wonder if swinging a B7X7 (where x=0-7) rudder left and right a few times would keep it in one piece.
If the FAA wanted to prevent this from happening, they shouldn't have allowed an aircrafts rudder to have more power than it can withstand. They should not blame an aircraft manufacturer for not telling them the rudder wasn't able to withstand what it's not required to withstand.
Having said that, ofcourse, sharing of information is of the highest importance, and there is no excuse for not fully publishing any report. Don't blame just Airbus though.
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Have to agree. Doesn't paint a wonderful picture of Airbus but when one looks at how Boeing have behaved after the repeated 737 uncommanded yaw crashes, or the 747 igniting centre tank or inflight breakup, or ........ Hopefully something good will come out of it all.
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If I read that article correctly, the earlier incident concerned gross mishandling by the crew who first allowed the aeroplane to stall (stick push?) and then applied massive, alternating rudder inputs to control the wing drop in the stall.
The fin did not separate and Airbus say that although it was cracked, it did not lose structural integrity.
Did it not occur to the airline that they might like to inspect something to a greater degree than the minimum, regulatory standard? Rules are rules and a minimum standard is set - but no-one says that you have to work DOWN to the minimum.
Remember, following the minimum schedule gave us the Aloha Airlines 737 convertible - so it's not one way traffic from Toulouse, Seattle does it too!
The fin did not separate and Airbus say that although it was cracked, it did not lose structural integrity.
Did it not occur to the airline that they might like to inspect something to a greater degree than the minimum, regulatory standard? Rules are rules and a minimum standard is set - but no-one says that you have to work DOWN to the minimum.
Remember, following the minimum schedule gave us the Aloha Airlines 737 convertible - so it's not one way traffic from Toulouse, Seattle does it too!
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Phoenix X,
During frequent visits to Edwards Air Force Base in California, crews would experience test flights by Test Pilot students where they would work the rudder stop to stop generating max yaw (yaw damper off) to visit the rudder limits. On an FCF (Functional Check Flight -post heavy MX) it was routine to get maximum rudder excursion stop-to-stop and then turn the yaw damper on. The book said the yaw cycles had to stop within 2 swings for the yaw damper to pass. Never lost any rudder parts.
These were in a 737-200 Advanced (T-43)
The aircraft reportedly barrel rolls quite nicely.
We also did stalls right through the stick shaker to the break on FCF flights. Flies like a Cessna 150 with minimal loss of altitude. More flap out = more roll. Every pilot should get the opportunity to experience a series.
PT
During frequent visits to Edwards Air Force Base in California, crews would experience test flights by Test Pilot students where they would work the rudder stop to stop generating max yaw (yaw damper off) to visit the rudder limits. On an FCF (Functional Check Flight -post heavy MX) it was routine to get maximum rudder excursion stop-to-stop and then turn the yaw damper on. The book said the yaw cycles had to stop within 2 swings for the yaw damper to pass. Never lost any rudder parts.
These were in a 737-200 Advanced (T-43)
The aircraft reportedly barrel rolls quite nicely.
We also did stalls right through the stick shaker to the break on FCF flights. Flies like a Cessna 150 with minimal loss of altitude. More flap out = more roll. Every pilot should get the opportunity to experience a series.
PT
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Are todays generation of aircraft too stable...
Transistioned to jet transports on the B707-320B (advanced), then moved on to older 707 designs, -138B, -300 (JT4 powered) etc, where the yaw damper fitted was of the parallel type, not series. Had to be switched OFF on final.
Boot the rudder, big time trouble, the yaw occillations set up were someting to see...to be AVOIDED.
Somewhere along the line, the older guys who flew these machines retired, aircract designs got better, yet the same LARGE boots to the rudder which were avoided in older designs, apparently (with some companies anyway) became more-or -less standard practice.
The results were there for all to see, poor AirBus design or not.
The advice from the 'oldtimers' is as valid today as yesteryear...NO big boots to the rudder at higher speeds...period.
Boot the rudder, big time trouble, the yaw occillations set up were someting to see...to be AVOIDED.
Somewhere along the line, the older guys who flew these machines retired, aircract designs got better, yet the same LARGE boots to the rudder which were avoided in older designs, apparently (with some companies anyway) became more-or -less standard practice.
The results were there for all to see, poor AirBus design or not.
The advice from the 'oldtimers' is as valid today as yesteryear...NO big boots to the rudder at higher speeds...period.
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Fin design.
If I interpret the article correctly, it is saying that if a pilot uses incorrect flight techniques which exceed the certified/design loads of a fin, then the fin will be structurally damaged and may even break off. The fin did it's job by remaining structurally intact until it's design limit was exceeded. There is nothing wrong with the fin, therefore.
Stating the obvious, is'nt it ? Just like saying that a car engine has a rev limit of 7000 rpm, and being surprised that it then blows up when a driver exceeds 7000 rpm. Why should it be a surprise. Imagine the headlines "Engine blows up. Engine weakness found ! Engine a danger to road users !"
Flight techniques.
As I read the article, Airbus issued a reminder regarding unsafe flight techniques. That such techniques are unsafe was known to me when I started flying commercial aircraft over twenty years ago. Why, then, blame them if it's eventually proven that the same unsafe flight techniques caused the New York incident ?
It all seems ridiculously simple to me !
If I interpret the article correctly, it is saying that if a pilot uses incorrect flight techniques which exceed the certified/design loads of a fin, then the fin will be structurally damaged and may even break off. The fin did it's job by remaining structurally intact until it's design limit was exceeded. There is nothing wrong with the fin, therefore.
Stating the obvious, is'nt it ? Just like saying that a car engine has a rev limit of 7000 rpm, and being surprised that it then blows up when a driver exceeds 7000 rpm. Why should it be a surprise. Imagine the headlines "Engine blows up. Engine weakness found ! Engine a danger to road users !"
Flight techniques.
As I read the article, Airbus issued a reminder regarding unsafe flight techniques. That such techniques are unsafe was known to me when I started flying commercial aircraft over twenty years ago. Why, then, blame them if it's eventually proven that the same unsafe flight techniques caused the New York incident ?
It all seems ridiculously simple to me !
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Officials with manufacturer Airbus understood that losing a tail fin would prove catastrophic. Even so, they kept their concerns to themselves...
As BGPM says: stop the presses! Airbus engaged in sinister cover-up over shocking news that aircraft don't fly very well without tail fins. Elsewhere, Ford Motor Company under investigation for suspected suppression of information about cars that stop running after being driven off a cliff.
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PlaneTruth,
Thanks for that -- it's good to hear that some rudders will withstand the force.
However, the point that they're not required to still stands, and that's where the real problem lies: Pilots mishandle the aircraft beyond its limits, and are in this rudder case not usually even aware that they're exceeding rudder design limits.
Thanks for that -- it's good to hear that some rudders will withstand the force.
However, the point that they're not required to still stands, and that's where the real problem lies: Pilots mishandle the aircraft beyond its limits, and are in this rudder case not usually even aware that they're exceeding rudder design limits.
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If one steps back from this topic a few meters and looks at it from the (imagined) perspective of a lucid but mostly uninvolved observer, what seems very prominent is the reluctance of Airbus to put the facts about A300 tail strength vs rudder capability on the record. Although there are claims that the French told appropriate (FAA, CAA, etc ) authorities the bad news about the very tangible and ever-present potential for "partition de l'empennage" on the A300 , documentary evidence of this is not in view. IF statements admitting this problem were ever made by Airbus, they were certainly done at the level of a whisper, rather than a shout. It seems very clear that no methodical effort was made to document this unpleasant tendency in the training materials and in aircraft manuals that pilots rely upon. Certainly it would have been REASONABLE to do so, since pilots depend on these manuals for operational guidance and are trained to not make suppositions that go beyond the content of the manuals.
So - even if they were not covering up, the French seem to have been much less than forthright about this deadly flight characteristic.
Then there's the matter of the rudder limiter design - which seems to have some of aviation history's worst ergonomics when viewed in the context of the "partition de l'empennage" risk. It has been stated by multiple sources that the A300 rudder pedal limiter mechanism reduces "feel" and travel distance with increasing speed -- to the point where the breakaway force (to initiate any rudder movement) becomes nearly equal to the force required to achieve full travel of the rudder. Given that even the best-trained pilots will operate controls less gingerly when they realize deep down inside that they are losing control of the aircraft, this rudder actuation mechanism feature might well be labeled the "moyen pour l'ejection de l'empennage". The combination of the knowledge of the rudder pedal characteristics and the tail strength limits and the actual experience of Miami 903 would have further emphasized the importance of communicating these thoughts to all responsible parties - if Airbus were being genuinely forthright about the critical safety issues pertaining to the A300 in this sticky area.
Then there's the matter of the A300 yaw damper design, operation, reliability, and behavior in service. The design is novel in various regards. Novelty, by itself, is inherently neither good nor bad, except where problems are demonstrated by observed malfuctions. A fair number of anecdotal reports of oscillating A300 rudder and uncommanded rudder actuations have been cited here and in other public records, so one can infer that probably there is some regular incidence of 'hiccups' in the A300 rudder/yaw-damper systems. By itself, this would not necessarily be anbnormal or worrisome. Many aircraft have peculiar idiosyncracies and balky systems that require some special maintenance and attention. But the instabilities of the yaw damper system become much more ominous when taken in connection with the poor ergonomics of manual rudder actuation in the A300, the
ability of the big tail to tear itself off after n-many hard oscillations, the lack of very accessible technology and competence to ground inspect the non-metallic A300 tails for progressive deterioration from overstress, and the lack of freely available information about any of these to the people responsible for policy on safety and for day-to day aircraft operation.
Since Airbus management and their technical people are the only ones who had all of this information, we can expect that after the Miami 903 incident they would have undertaken some very intensive efforts to double-check the integrity and the possible failure modes of the yaw damper / rudder system, n'est ce pas? Did this happen? Have problems in the Airbus rudder / yaw damper system been diagnosed and resolved with the degree of seriousness appropriate to the proximity of catastrophe that accompanies each flight due to this pastiche of interacting weaknesses? Je crois non!
All the details behind this story should be made a matter of public record. We can hope the FAA will begin to do some serious digging - not to bury the problems but to uncover them. If Airbus does not cooperate fully, then FAA should pull their certificates.
So - even if they were not covering up, the French seem to have been much less than forthright about this deadly flight characteristic.
Then there's the matter of the rudder limiter design - which seems to have some of aviation history's worst ergonomics when viewed in the context of the "partition de l'empennage" risk. It has been stated by multiple sources that the A300 rudder pedal limiter mechanism reduces "feel" and travel distance with increasing speed -- to the point where the breakaway force (to initiate any rudder movement) becomes nearly equal to the force required to achieve full travel of the rudder. Given that even the best-trained pilots will operate controls less gingerly when they realize deep down inside that they are losing control of the aircraft, this rudder actuation mechanism feature might well be labeled the "moyen pour l'ejection de l'empennage". The combination of the knowledge of the rudder pedal characteristics and the tail strength limits and the actual experience of Miami 903 would have further emphasized the importance of communicating these thoughts to all responsible parties - if Airbus were being genuinely forthright about the critical safety issues pertaining to the A300 in this sticky area.
Then there's the matter of the A300 yaw damper design, operation, reliability, and behavior in service. The design is novel in various regards. Novelty, by itself, is inherently neither good nor bad, except where problems are demonstrated by observed malfuctions. A fair number of anecdotal reports of oscillating A300 rudder and uncommanded rudder actuations have been cited here and in other public records, so one can infer that probably there is some regular incidence of 'hiccups' in the A300 rudder/yaw-damper systems. By itself, this would not necessarily be anbnormal or worrisome. Many aircraft have peculiar idiosyncracies and balky systems that require some special maintenance and attention. But the instabilities of the yaw damper system become much more ominous when taken in connection with the poor ergonomics of manual rudder actuation in the A300, the
ability of the big tail to tear itself off after n-many hard oscillations, the lack of very accessible technology and competence to ground inspect the non-metallic A300 tails for progressive deterioration from overstress, and the lack of freely available information about any of these to the people responsible for policy on safety and for day-to day aircraft operation.
Since Airbus management and their technical people are the only ones who had all of this information, we can expect that after the Miami 903 incident they would have undertaken some very intensive efforts to double-check the integrity and the possible failure modes of the yaw damper / rudder system, n'est ce pas? Did this happen? Have problems in the Airbus rudder / yaw damper system been diagnosed and resolved with the degree of seriousness appropriate to the proximity of catastrophe that accompanies each flight due to this pastiche of interacting weaknesses? Je crois non!
All the details behind this story should be made a matter of public record. We can hope the FAA will begin to do some serious digging - not to bury the problems but to uncover them. If Airbus does not cooperate fully, then FAA should pull their certificates.
Last edited by arcniz; 29th May 2003 at 04:37.
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Ant Carn
If a car engine is liable to disintegrate above an rpm which it is infact capable of reaching, the normal practice is to limit the engine so that it cannot reach said revs.
There are some serious and fundamental, but certainly not advanced, engineering redesigns called for by both manufacturers.
If a car engine is liable to disintegrate above an rpm which it is infact capable of reaching, the normal practice is to limit the engine so that it cannot reach said revs.
There are some serious and fundamental, but certainly not advanced, engineering redesigns called for by both manufacturers.
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bluskis,
Older aircraft designs used a limiting device...it was/is called a "properly trained and experienced pilot" (or for engine/systems limitations ) "Flight engineer."
Imagine that.... 
Older aircraft designs used a limiting device...it was/is called a "properly trained and experienced pilot" (or for engine/systems limitations ) "Flight engineer."
Imagine that....
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NTSB Report
NTSB Identification: DCA97MA049 . The docket is stored in the (offline) NTSB Imaging System.
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of AMERICAN AIRLINES
Accident occurred Monday, May 12, 1997 in WEST PALM BEACH, FL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 2/11/00
Aircraft: Airbus Industrie A300B4-605R, registration: N90070
Injuries: 1 Serious, 1 Minor, 163 Uninjured.
The flight was assigned an airspeed of 230 knots and cleared to descend from FL240 to 16,000 feet in preparation for landing at Miami. The FDR indicated that while the autopilot was engaged in the descent, the power levers moved from the mechanical autothrottle limit of 44 degrees to the manual limit of 37 degrees. As the aircraft leveled at 16,000 feet the airspeed decreased. The F/O began a right turn to enter a holding pattern and added some power, which stabilized the airspeed at 178 knots. However, the right bank and the resultant angle of attack (AOA) continued to increase, despite left aileron input by the autopilot. As the autopilot reached the maximum input of 20 degrees, bank angle increased past 50 degrees, and the AOA increased rapidly from 7 degrees to 12 degrees. At this point the stick shaker activated, the autopilot independently disconnected, the power was increased, and full left rudder was used to arrest the roll. The bank angle reached 56 degrees, and the AOA reached 13.7 degrees at 177 knots. The aircraft then pitched down, and entered a series of pitch, yaw, and roll maneuvers as the flight controls went through a period of oscillations for about 34 seconds. The maneuvers finally dampened and the crew recovered at approximately 13,000 feet. One passenger was seriously injured and one flight attendant received minor injuries during the upset. According to wind tunnel and flight test data the A300 engineering simulator should adequately represent the aircraft up to 9 degrees AOA. Unlike the accident aircraft; however, the simulator recovered to wings level promptly when the lateral control inputs recorded by the FDR were used. The roll disagreement between the simulator and accident aircraft began at 7 degrees AOA, and it appears that some effect not modeled in the simulator produced the roll discrepancy. Just prior to the upset the accident aircraft entered a cloud deck. The winds were approximately 240 degrees, 35 knots, and the ambient air temperature was approximately minus 4 degrees C. An atmospheric disturbance or asymmetric ice contamination were two possible explanations considered, but unproven.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The flightcrew's failure to maintain adequate airspeed during leveloff which led to an inadvertent stall, and their subsequent failure to use proper stall recovery techniques. A factor contributing to the accident was the flightcrew's failure to properly use the autothrottle.
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of AMERICAN AIRLINES
Accident occurred Monday, May 12, 1997 in WEST PALM BEACH, FL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 2/11/00
Aircraft: Airbus Industrie A300B4-605R, registration: N90070
Injuries: 1 Serious, 1 Minor, 163 Uninjured.
The flight was assigned an airspeed of 230 knots and cleared to descend from FL240 to 16,000 feet in preparation for landing at Miami. The FDR indicated that while the autopilot was engaged in the descent, the power levers moved from the mechanical autothrottle limit of 44 degrees to the manual limit of 37 degrees. As the aircraft leveled at 16,000 feet the airspeed decreased. The F/O began a right turn to enter a holding pattern and added some power, which stabilized the airspeed at 178 knots. However, the right bank and the resultant angle of attack (AOA) continued to increase, despite left aileron input by the autopilot. As the autopilot reached the maximum input of 20 degrees, bank angle increased past 50 degrees, and the AOA increased rapidly from 7 degrees to 12 degrees. At this point the stick shaker activated, the autopilot independently disconnected, the power was increased, and full left rudder was used to arrest the roll. The bank angle reached 56 degrees, and the AOA reached 13.7 degrees at 177 knots. The aircraft then pitched down, and entered a series of pitch, yaw, and roll maneuvers as the flight controls went through a period of oscillations for about 34 seconds. The maneuvers finally dampened and the crew recovered at approximately 13,000 feet. One passenger was seriously injured and one flight attendant received minor injuries during the upset. According to wind tunnel and flight test data the A300 engineering simulator should adequately represent the aircraft up to 9 degrees AOA. Unlike the accident aircraft; however, the simulator recovered to wings level promptly when the lateral control inputs recorded by the FDR were used. The roll disagreement between the simulator and accident aircraft began at 7 degrees AOA, and it appears that some effect not modeled in the simulator produced the roll discrepancy. Just prior to the upset the accident aircraft entered a cloud deck. The winds were approximately 240 degrees, 35 knots, and the ambient air temperature was approximately minus 4 degrees C. An atmospheric disturbance or asymmetric ice contamination were two possible explanations considered, but unproven.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The flightcrew's failure to maintain adequate airspeed during leveloff which led to an inadvertent stall, and their subsequent failure to use proper stall recovery techniques. A factor contributing to the accident was the flightcrew's failure to properly use the autothrottle.
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I really don't live in Quebec
I will most likely get pilloried for this.
At the time the A-300 and the A-310 were certificated in Europe the certification documents were pure FAA with a DGCA cover on the manual. None of the certification requirements were JAR and there was no European content in the technical design requirements of the FARs. When the two aircraft were certificated in the United States the only thing the FAA did was to verify the two aircraft could fly on a standard commercial flight in the USA and they also tested the aircraft handling qualities. They did not question the technical aspects of the design they simply accepted everything put forward by Airbus and the DGCA.
For those of you that defend Airbus simply because it is on your side of the pond do not be so defensive. I can’t speak to the A-300 but I can on the A-310. Sometimes Airbus can not tell the certification authorities about a problem because they are not aware of the problem. When they do become aware of the problem they tell the certification authorities that the problem has been solved when it hasn’t. When Airbus is not aware of a problem it is the fault of their suppliers. Even though the supplier is mandated to inform Airbus of a problem they do not tell them because they would have to incur the cost of modification. They would rather Airbus discover the problem and write a scope change to the contract requiring modification and then the suppliers would get paid. The problem is not discovered by Airbus because they did not follow their own procedures. If they did the problem would have been discovered.
When the FAA is made aware of the problems they are like a mule as it takes a swift hit between the ears with a stick to get their attention. When the do take action they have two managers fired but the design is never changed.
One of the suppliers discovered a severe design defect on a hydraulic component that could cause runaway flap or slat movement. In stead of notifying Airbus the made a quick fix on 17 shipsets and contacted the two airlines flying the A 310 telling them that they had improved the design and would at no cost replace the two units on each aircraft.
The flap slat computer was inadequately tested and the flap slat computer reliability had never been assessed and the design defect alluded to above still exists on all of the aircraft.
The airlines are not guiltless. Air Canada suffered an uncommanded retraction of the flaps on an A 320 during takeoff and almost lost the airplane. The certification authorities were never notified and as a result other operators of the A 320 were not made aware of the problem
At the time the A-300 and the A-310 were certificated in Europe the certification documents were pure FAA with a DGCA cover on the manual. None of the certification requirements were JAR and there was no European content in the technical design requirements of the FARs. When the two aircraft were certificated in the United States the only thing the FAA did was to verify the two aircraft could fly on a standard commercial flight in the USA and they also tested the aircraft handling qualities. They did not question the technical aspects of the design they simply accepted everything put forward by Airbus and the DGCA.
For those of you that defend Airbus simply because it is on your side of the pond do not be so defensive. I can’t speak to the A-300 but I can on the A-310. Sometimes Airbus can not tell the certification authorities about a problem because they are not aware of the problem. When they do become aware of the problem they tell the certification authorities that the problem has been solved when it hasn’t. When Airbus is not aware of a problem it is the fault of their suppliers. Even though the supplier is mandated to inform Airbus of a problem they do not tell them because they would have to incur the cost of modification. They would rather Airbus discover the problem and write a scope change to the contract requiring modification and then the suppliers would get paid. The problem is not discovered by Airbus because they did not follow their own procedures. If they did the problem would have been discovered.
When the FAA is made aware of the problems they are like a mule as it takes a swift hit between the ears with a stick to get their attention. When the do take action they have two managers fired but the design is never changed.
One of the suppliers discovered a severe design defect on a hydraulic component that could cause runaway flap or slat movement. In stead of notifying Airbus the made a quick fix on 17 shipsets and contacted the two airlines flying the A 310 telling them that they had improved the design and would at no cost replace the two units on each aircraft.
The flap slat computer was inadequately tested and the flap slat computer reliability had never been assessed and the design defect alluded to above still exists on all of the aircraft.
The airlines are not guiltless. Air Canada suffered an uncommanded retraction of the flaps on an A 320 during takeoff and almost lost the airplane. The certification authorities were never notified and as a result other operators of the A 320 were not made aware of the problem
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Phoenix X,
That is a bummer. You would expect as a pilot (I sure do) that the available flight controls should be capable of operation necessary to recover the aircraft (at least a reduced departure airspeed) --and not damage anything. My overriding question is: Why did these guys get on the rudder in the first place? I have encountered many wake situations and the aircraft has never yawed appreciably enough to warrant counter rudder application.
One note: I understand the AirBus rudder is alll composite unlike other vert stabs (Boeing for example) who have a metal spar to tie structural loads into the attach point. This AirBus design relied on metalic attach points but the majority of the structure is composite.
I have never had good luck trying to glue metal to plastic.
PT
PS I understand the original A-300 design was a Boeing concept that was canned. The design team leader decided it was such a good design, he defected with plans to AirBus. This from a former Boeing engineer.
That is a bummer. You would expect as a pilot (I sure do) that the available flight controls should be capable of operation necessary to recover the aircraft (at least a reduced departure airspeed) --and not damage anything. My overriding question is: Why did these guys get on the rudder in the first place? I have encountered many wake situations and the aircraft has never yawed appreciably enough to warrant counter rudder application.
One note: I understand the AirBus rudder is alll composite unlike other vert stabs (Boeing for example) who have a metal spar to tie structural loads into the attach point. This AirBus design relied on metalic attach points but the majority of the structure is composite.
I have never had good luck trying to glue metal to plastic.
PT
PS I understand the original A-300 design was a Boeing concept that was canned. The design team leader decided it was such a good design, he defected with plans to AirBus. This from a former Boeing engineer.