"USA Today" article about A-300 rudder problems?

[arcniz]

If one steps back from this topic a few meters and looks at it from the (imagined) perspective of a lucid but mostly uninvolved observer, what seems very prominent is the reluctance of Airbus to put the facts about A300 tail strength vs rudder capability on the record. Although there are claims that the French told appropriate (FAA, CAA, etc ) authorities the bad news about the very tangible and ever-present potential for "partition de l'empennage" on the A300 , documentary evidence of this is not in view. IF statements admitting this problem were ever made by Airbus, they were certainly done at the level of a whisper, rather than a shout. It seems very clear that no methodical effort was made to document this unpleasant tendency in the training materials and in aircraft manuals that pilots rely upon. Certainly it would have been REASONABLE to do so, since pilots depend on these manuals for operational guidance and are trained to not make suppositions that go beyond the content of the manuals.

So - even if they were not covering up, the French seem to have been much less than forthright about this deadly flight characteristic.

Then there's the matter of the rudder limiter design - which seems to have some of aviation history's worst ergonomics when viewed in the context of the "partition de l'empennage" risk. It has been stated by multiple sources that the A300 rudder pedal limiter mechanism reduces "feel" and travel distance with increasing speed -- to the point where the breakaway force (to initiate any rudder movement) becomes nearly equal to the force required to achieve full travel of the rudder. Given that even the best-trained pilots will operate controls less gingerly when they realize deep down inside that they are losing control of the aircraft, this rudder actuation mechanism feature might well be labeled the "moyen pour l'ejection de l'empennage". The combination of the knowledge of the rudder pedal characteristics and the tail strength limits and the actual experience of Miami 903 would have further emphasized the importance of communicating these thoughts to all responsible parties - if Airbus were being genuinely forthright about the critical safety issues pertaining to the A300 in this sticky area.

Then there's the matter of the A300 yaw damper design, operation, reliability, and behavior in service. The design is novel in various regards. Novelty, by itself, is inherently neither good nor bad, except where problems are demonstrated by observed malfuctions. A fair number of anecdotal reports of oscillating A300 rudder and uncommanded rudder actuations have been cited here and in other public records, so one can infer that probably there is some regular incidence of 'hiccups' in the A300 rudder/yaw-damper systems. By itself, this would not necessarily be anbnormal or worrisome. Many aircraft have peculiar idiosyncracies and balky systems that require some special maintenance and attention. But the instabilities of the yaw damper system become much more ominous when taken in connection with the poor ergonomics of manual rudder actuation in the A300, the
ability of the big tail to tear itself off after n-many hard oscillations, the lack of very accessible technology and competence to ground inspect the non-metallic A300 tails for progressive deterioration from overstress, and the lack of freely available information about any of these to the people responsible for policy on safety and for day-to day aircraft operation.

Since Airbus management and their technical people are the only ones who had all of this information, we can expect that after the Miami 903 incident they would have undertaken some very intensive efforts to double-check the integrity and the possible failure modes of the yaw damper / rudder system, n'est ce pas? Did this happen? Have problems in the Airbus rudder / yaw damper system been diagnosed and resolved with the degree of seriousness appropriate to the proximity of catastrophe that accompanies each flight due to this pastiche of interacting weaknesses? Je crois non!

All the details behind this story should be made a matter of public record. We can hope the FAA will begin to do some serious digging - not to bury the problems but to uncover them. If Airbus does not cooperate fully, then FAA should pull their certificates.