"USA Today" article about A-300 rudder problems?
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TWA 800, The true story covered up by the NTSB.!
Cause of TWA 800 crash: Aircraft Wake Turbulence in smooth air.!
Huge NTSB coverup.! No Missile.! NTSB removed essential data from oficial Flight Data Recorder (FDR) Chart.! Evidence proves TWA 800 experienced initial structural breakup 8 seconds prior to explosion.! FDR and cockpit clocks stopped 8 seconds after the NTSB's "End of Data time line".
Copies of before and after NTSB modified, FDR Charts, enlarged FDR chart, pictures of breakup damage prior to explosion and other irrefutable evidence available for proof.
If the true facts had been known we could possibly have saved those in the AA 587 accident.!
There are a number of other aircraft accidents, in which the NTSB has covered up the true facts, intentionally or through incompetence.
Huge NTSB coverup.! No Missile.! NTSB removed essential data from oficial Flight Data Recorder (FDR) Chart.! Evidence proves TWA 800 experienced initial structural breakup 8 seconds prior to explosion.! FDR and cockpit clocks stopped 8 seconds after the NTSB's "End of Data time line".
Copies of before and after NTSB modified, FDR Charts, enlarged FDR chart, pictures of breakup damage prior to explosion and other irrefutable evidence available for proof.
If the true facts had been known we could possibly have saved those in the AA 587 accident.!
There are a number of other aircraft accidents, in which the NTSB has covered up the true facts, intentionally or through incompetence.
Last edited by wsherif1; 3rd Jun 2003 at 03:18.
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PlaneTruth, no sooner did you compliment us all for the good discussion when a load of old nonsense started coming up about TW800 and missiles. Pur-lease.
Just to add to the discussion about the questionable logic of 'getting on the rudders' after a wake encounter, I have to ask myself how good the aviating skills of some line pilots at commercial airlines actually are. Obviously that's a contentious statement at Pprune, but I just replied to another thread in here about cruise pilots, and I was reminded of an incident that was so close to being an accident that it will make your hair stand up. To recount briefly, an engine on a UAL 744 failed on rotation at SFO. The F/O who was flying used ailerons instead of rudder to correct the yaw / drift, which turned out be almost fatal since the amount of control input required lifted the spoilers along one wing, with an engine out on the other. Even with full power on the remaining engines, the aircraft decelerated as it was fully loaded with "freight, both self-loading and the good kind", plus full tanks for the 15 hour flight to Sydney. They drifted off course as they slowed down, heading right for a hill covered in highrise apartment buildings (invisible in mist). Things really started to go wrong when they got a stall warning and a ground proximity warning at the same time, and swooped over the residential district with only feet to spare, control surfaces all pointing in the wrong directions, unable to climb. The reports of hundreds of car alarms being set off is graphic enough to give you an idea how close they came to disaster (ATC thought the plane had actually gone in).
This is a well documented case, but the reason I tell it here (as well as giving us all a vicarious shiver) is to raise once again the problem of pilots becoming mere systems managers and not real aviators. The UAL pilot at the wheel above had performed a take off the previous week, but before that hadn't done one on a real 747 for a YEAR. Maybe a good pilot can become so flabby that a routine level-off can become a stall and a simple (if unusual) stall recovery can be dangerously botched; and maybe a simple wake encounter can become a catastrophe; and a simple engine failure can almost become a precursor to 9/11.
We're edging into a discussion about automation / duty time / etc here. But these AA situations and indeed the UAL incident as well have nothing to do with Airbus or composites or whatever (let alone missiles) and everything to do with well trained, able pilots in non-threatening, routine, elemental situations taking the kind of action that would get a PPL wannabe chucked out of flight school.
Thoughts?
Just to add to the discussion about the questionable logic of 'getting on the rudders' after a wake encounter, I have to ask myself how good the aviating skills of some line pilots at commercial airlines actually are. Obviously that's a contentious statement at Pprune, but I just replied to another thread in here about cruise pilots, and I was reminded of an incident that was so close to being an accident that it will make your hair stand up. To recount briefly, an engine on a UAL 744 failed on rotation at SFO. The F/O who was flying used ailerons instead of rudder to correct the yaw / drift, which turned out be almost fatal since the amount of control input required lifted the spoilers along one wing, with an engine out on the other. Even with full power on the remaining engines, the aircraft decelerated as it was fully loaded with "freight, both self-loading and the good kind", plus full tanks for the 15 hour flight to Sydney. They drifted off course as they slowed down, heading right for a hill covered in highrise apartment buildings (invisible in mist). Things really started to go wrong when they got a stall warning and a ground proximity warning at the same time, and swooped over the residential district with only feet to spare, control surfaces all pointing in the wrong directions, unable to climb. The reports of hundreds of car alarms being set off is graphic enough to give you an idea how close they came to disaster (ATC thought the plane had actually gone in).
This is a well documented case, but the reason I tell it here (as well as giving us all a vicarious shiver) is to raise once again the problem of pilots becoming mere systems managers and not real aviators. The UAL pilot at the wheel above had performed a take off the previous week, but before that hadn't done one on a real 747 for a YEAR. Maybe a good pilot can become so flabby that a routine level-off can become a stall and a simple (if unusual) stall recovery can be dangerously botched; and maybe a simple wake encounter can become a catastrophe; and a simple engine failure can almost become a precursor to 9/11.
We're edging into a discussion about automation / duty time / etc here. But these AA situations and indeed the UAL incident as well have nothing to do with Airbus or composites or whatever (let alone missiles) and everything to do with well trained, able pilots in non-threatening, routine, elemental situations taking the kind of action that would get a PPL wannabe chucked out of flight school.
Thoughts?
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Cedarjst,
Ahhh, The Untied incident!
I talked to a UA guy who had a buddy on the jumpseat (there were two jumpseaters reportedly onboard that day.) The hill was actually covered by one and two story homes. As the stickshaker was wailing the jumpeaters were yelling "PUSH!! PUSH!!" at the Captain who was flying but it was unclear whether they could see the close proximity to the hillside. Reportedly, some 70 windows were damage due to noise and jetblast along that street. Guesstimates were that the radar altimeter would have been below 100 feet had anyone noticed.
The first question is why didn't the guy use rudder. The United ALPA folks initially came out with an statement that United does their engine-out procedure differently than other airlines. When this hit the streets, they quickly changed their story. Obviously their method was inept. Or, their story was.
The main question I have is: Where was the Captain during the first 45 degrees of yaw off course? No doubt about it, he waited far too long to exercise his authority to take the jet.
I think there is a definite propensity to loose piloting skills as automation becomes the norm. At my company, we will never hook up VNAV because it requires that we stay in the loop. We have computer VNAV path information available in the form of a glideslope indicator but we actually hand fly the climbs and descents. It definitely keeps you involved.
Having only worked at this airline I cannot speak for others. I flew five legs today and six yesterday, for a total of 15 for the three-day. With that kind of frequency, you either get up to speed quickly or you are a dolt and we don't have too many of those here. I have heard from buds at other carriers (and observed on jumpseats) that many pilots first instinct is to start typing when things need attention. My first inclination is to punch off the autopilot and operate the plane.
Cheers,
PT
Ahhh, The Untied incident!
I talked to a UA guy who had a buddy on the jumpseat (there were two jumpseaters reportedly onboard that day.) The hill was actually covered by one and two story homes. As the stickshaker was wailing the jumpeaters were yelling "PUSH!! PUSH!!" at the Captain who was flying but it was unclear whether they could see the close proximity to the hillside. Reportedly, some 70 windows were damage due to noise and jetblast along that street. Guesstimates were that the radar altimeter would have been below 100 feet had anyone noticed.
The first question is why didn't the guy use rudder. The United ALPA folks initially came out with an statement that United does their engine-out procedure differently than other airlines. When this hit the streets, they quickly changed their story. Obviously their method was inept. Or, their story was.
The main question I have is: Where was the Captain during the first 45 degrees of yaw off course? No doubt about it, he waited far too long to exercise his authority to take the jet.
I think there is a definite propensity to loose piloting skills as automation becomes the norm. At my company, we will never hook up VNAV because it requires that we stay in the loop. We have computer VNAV path information available in the form of a glideslope indicator but we actually hand fly the climbs and descents. It definitely keeps you involved.
Having only worked at this airline I cannot speak for others. I flew five legs today and six yesterday, for a total of 15 for the three-day. With that kind of frequency, you either get up to speed quickly or you are a dolt and we don't have too many of those here. I have heard from buds at other carriers (and observed on jumpseats) that many pilots first instinct is to start typing when things need attention. My first inclination is to punch off the autopilot and operate the plane.
Cheers,
PT
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PlaneTruth...there were not 2 jumpseaters on board that UAL 744 flight, they were F/Os assigned to the trip as "International Relief Officers", or as UAL calls them---"bunkies". UAL normally assigns 1 Captain and 3 F/Os to their long-haul 744 flights (over 12 hours). These 2 pilots sitting on the jumpseats were members of the crew and rightfully spoke up during the GPWS terrain warning and subsequent stick-shaker activation. They helped save the aircraft, and are to be commended. For some reason, the Captain just sat there, until the airplane was under control and climbing away from the hills.
Any company with long-haul flights that staff relief pilots can learn from this incident. Pilots that never fly and have to re-qualify in the simulator are obviously rusty and over time lose their proficiency in skills such as engine-out climb.
Also, you referred earlier to the Air France A320 accident at Habshiem, in 1988, as a revenue flight. Not true. It was a fly-past for demonstration purposes to show off the new Airbus, and obviously resulted in a fatal accident. 3 fatalities and 27 injured, but all onboard were joyriding for the fly-past at the airshow.
Any company with long-haul flights that staff relief pilots can learn from this incident. Pilots that never fly and have to re-qualify in the simulator are obviously rusty and over time lose their proficiency in skills such as engine-out climb.
Also, you referred earlier to the Air France A320 accident at Habshiem, in 1988, as a revenue flight. Not true. It was a fly-past for demonstration purposes to show off the new Airbus, and obviously resulted in a fatal accident. 3 fatalities and 27 injured, but all onboard were joyriding for the fly-past at the airshow.
