AMR 587 Airbus Crash (merged)
Union Goon
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Both could be overpowered as I recall. That was one of the points where "I don't understand the question" started to rear its head.
I can't screen capture like you can Picky, but the next reversal, before the bang and tail departed had both exceding the movment limits.
Also the traces have the yaw damper doing its thing ontop of the movements...
As to Captain states, every time I flew with him he always followed along on the controls. The problem is that even if he was on the controlls as there is no indicator to point to the reduced rudder pedal travel available. So Ed would have seen or felt the rudder pedal moving 1.3 inches or so, not the 4 inches when they did the rudder check right before take off, so the movements would APPEAR to be quite restrained. Without stepping on the pedals with additional force himself, there is no way he could know that pedal progess was stopped by the load limiter rather than restraint on the flying pilot's part.
I would guess that about 60-70 percent of pilots follow along on the controls. I know I do when the other guy is flying, and the majority do the same, though not all. Oddly enough it is something that is not possible in later Airbus aircraft where the controls are not back driven or interlinked.
You are correct, they were not yet in a turn for the first wake encounter, I over looked that in my far closer focus to the second wake encounter. Good catch.
Ratherbeflying.
That is a manufacturer problem unfortunately. You can't just willy nilly alter an aircraft design without certification which requires the cooperation of the manufacturer. As Airbus feels they have never made a mistake, I doubt they would cooperate.
Cheers
Wino
I can't screen capture like you can Picky, but the next reversal, before the bang and tail departed had both exceding the movment limits.
Also the traces have the yaw damper doing its thing ontop of the movements...
As to Captain states, every time I flew with him he always followed along on the controls. The problem is that even if he was on the controlls as there is no indicator to point to the reduced rudder pedal travel available. So Ed would have seen or felt the rudder pedal moving 1.3 inches or so, not the 4 inches when they did the rudder check right before take off, so the movements would APPEAR to be quite restrained. Without stepping on the pedals with additional force himself, there is no way he could know that pedal progess was stopped by the load limiter rather than restraint on the flying pilot's part.
I would guess that about 60-70 percent of pilots follow along on the controls. I know I do when the other guy is flying, and the majority do the same, though not all. Oddly enough it is something that is not possible in later Airbus aircraft where the controls are not back driven or interlinked.
You are correct, they were not yet in a turn for the first wake encounter, I over looked that in my far closer focus to the second wake encounter. Good catch.
Ratherbeflying.
That is a manufacturer problem unfortunately. You can't just willy nilly alter an aircraft design without certification which requires the cooperation of the manufacturer. As Airbus feels they have never made a mistake, I doubt they would cooperate.
Cheers
Wino
Wino, between AA's engineering department and the FAA I believe there's enough expertise to develop an AD.
Having made my own changes to OEM computer code, I do understand that modifications, even those that bring the product to published specification, generally receive a cold reception from the OEM.
Having made my own changes to OEM computer code, I do understand that modifications, even those that bring the product to published specification, generally receive a cold reception from the OEM.
Union Goon
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Not so easy.
If the manufacturer pulls their support, your aircraft are effectively grounded. Airbus had threatened to do that to the 12 Airbuses 340s that boeing bought back from Eva Air, but thought better of it at the last minute because of the larger number of Boeings they buy back in their deals.
Unfortunately we are not talking about an AD here. We are talking about a modification (An AD is usually an inspection or a repair) which would require an STC (Supplemental Type Certificate) If airbus doesn't play ball then the aircraft are grounded forever.
CHeers
Wino
If the manufacturer pulls their support, your aircraft are effectively grounded. Airbus had threatened to do that to the 12 Airbuses 340s that boeing bought back from Eva Air, but thought better of it at the last minute because of the larger number of Boeings they buy back in their deals.
Unfortunately we are not talking about an AD here. We are talking about a modification (An AD is usually an inspection or a repair) which would require an STC (Supplemental Type Certificate) If airbus doesn't play ball then the aircraft are grounded forever.
CHeers
Wino
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Somewhere in the middle Picky, but you get the momentum of your leg plus all the machinery to overcome breakout again, so basically it goes right through. Since you get a running start at it, it doesn't have a chance to stop you.
Union Goon
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experience. You get the 32 pounds of force at the opposite stop pushing the stuff back towards center plus the weight of your leg moving in that direction. Put your leg on the scale and see what it weighs. Once it gets moving, it will go right through the center pretty easily (as compared to breaking it out in the first place) and allow you to get to the opposit stop.
The Sims did not represent that too accurately before. They do now. Its shocking.
If you take your feet off both pedals it will stop at the stop. If you try and go back and forth, you lose the center position pretty quickly. Going from Full left to Full right is much easier in feel than going from neutral and getting the pedal moving.
Cheers
Wino
The Sims did not represent that too accurately before. They do now. Its shocking.
If you take your feet off both pedals it will stop at the stop. If you try and go back and forth, you lose the center position pretty quickly. Going from Full left to Full right is much easier in feel than going from neutral and getting the pedal moving.
Cheers
Wino
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---------
Wino I can't screen capture like you can Picky, but the next reversal, before the bang and tail departed had both exceding the movment limits.
---------
Technically you are right, the rudder is shown in the Reconstruction video (Rv) immediately before the fin separates as being a bit outside the limits.
Above are two frames taken within the same second at 09:15:58, the top one before the fin separates and the lower after the fin has separated. The rudder is shown as being just outside the limits in the top frame, and gone in the bottom frame.
However, looking at the (unfiltered) FDR trace, I am not sure that we really know that it did go out of limits.
Here is the FDR rudder position trace during the second wake encounter. Positive (downward) deflections on this graph correspond to deflections of the rudder to the right on the a/c. The first point outside the limit is at a rudder deflection of -115º, and hence is clearly during/after the fin separation. The three later points are all at zero, presumably representing a disconnected circuit. Since the point before the -115º reading is also zero, it may also represent a disconnection and not be valid. All the other points are at or within limits.
So I don’t see any evidence that the rudder really went out of limits in this case.
Curiously, you can see above that the last points on the (unfiltered) FDR trace before the -115º point are at about 6º right and zero, whereas the last frame of the Rv before fin separates shows the rudder deflected to the right limit (or slightly more). I imagine the Rv uses estimated unfiltered rudder positions, so that to some extent the Rv rudder positions are synthetic (and of course the FDR readings are “wrong” because they are filtered).
I think that this all adds up to there being no evidence that the rudder really went out of limits in this case.
I have a question: did the process of estimating the unfiltered rudder positions ASSUME that the limiter worked?
If anyone has a transcript of the NTSB hearing, I would be interested to hear Airbus’s exact words on overpowering the rudder and/or its pedals.
BTW, I can’t screen capture video either. All these video frame illustrations are digital photos of the monitor screen.
I agree with your comments about Airbus’s attitude at the hearing. One of the most disturbing impressions I got listening to parts of the NTSB hearing was the complete satisfaction of the Airbus engineering test pilot with the present rudder system. He was completely happy with it. There was also a complete conviction expressed that anything not specifically required by the FAR’s wasn’t necessary. (Like displays if you are out-of-the-envelope in a 65º bank?) Guess he was wearing the company hat that day.
Wino I can't screen capture like you can Picky, but the next reversal, before the bang and tail departed had both exceding the movment limits.
---------
Technically you are right, the rudder is shown in the Reconstruction video (Rv) immediately before the fin separates as being a bit outside the limits.
Above are two frames taken within the same second at 09:15:58, the top one before the fin separates and the lower after the fin has separated. The rudder is shown as being just outside the limits in the top frame, and gone in the bottom frame.
However, looking at the (unfiltered) FDR trace, I am not sure that we really know that it did go out of limits.
Here is the FDR rudder position trace during the second wake encounter. Positive (downward) deflections on this graph correspond to deflections of the rudder to the right on the a/c. The first point outside the limit is at a rudder deflection of -115º, and hence is clearly during/after the fin separation. The three later points are all at zero, presumably representing a disconnected circuit. Since the point before the -115º reading is also zero, it may also represent a disconnection and not be valid. All the other points are at or within limits.
So I don’t see any evidence that the rudder really went out of limits in this case.
Curiously, you can see above that the last points on the (unfiltered) FDR trace before the -115º point are at about 6º right and zero, whereas the last frame of the Rv before fin separates shows the rudder deflected to the right limit (or slightly more). I imagine the Rv uses estimated unfiltered rudder positions, so that to some extent the Rv rudder positions are synthetic (and of course the FDR readings are “wrong” because they are filtered).
I think that this all adds up to there being no evidence that the rudder really went out of limits in this case.
I have a question: did the process of estimating the unfiltered rudder positions ASSUME that the limiter worked?
If anyone has a transcript of the NTSB hearing, I would be interested to hear Airbus’s exact words on overpowering the rudder and/or its pedals.
BTW, I can’t screen capture video either. All these video frame illustrations are digital photos of the monitor screen.
I agree with your comments about Airbus’s attitude at the hearing. One of the most disturbing impressions I got listening to parts of the NTSB hearing was the complete satisfaction of the Airbus engineering test pilot with the present rudder system. He was completely happy with it. There was also a complete conviction expressed that anything not specifically required by the FAR’s wasn’t necessary. (Like displays if you are out-of-the-envelope in a 65º bank?) Guess he was wearing the company hat that day.
Last edited by PickyPerkins; 14th Nov 2002 at 16:34.
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Unfortunately, I don’t think a written transcript has been published on the net yet, however, the audio/video can still be played. Germaine to the above posts is the testimony of Capt Armand Jocob, test pilot for AirBus. On the salient points raised here, his comments and reply, to me, boarded on being arrogant, evasive, and totally protective. If you have the time, go to the
archives section, and you can check out his testimony here:
http://www.ntsb.gov/Events/2001/AA587/agenda.htm
archives section, and you can check out his testimony here:
http://www.ntsb.gov/Events/2001/AA587/agenda.htm
Before the investigation of this accident, I had never encountered the concept that control reversals might break an aircraft even at less than the manoeuvring speed, and had the mistaken impression that this theme was a relatively new concern.
I was browsing some NACA reports last night and came across Consideration of dynamic loads on the vertical tail by the theory of flat yawing maneuvers.
It concludes that a sinusoidal deflection of the rudder reaches the design limit of the aircraft much more easily than step or impulsive deflections. It was written more than 55 years before AA587 lost its fin.
I was browsing some NACA reports last night and came across Consideration of dynamic loads on the vertical tail by the theory of flat yawing maneuvers.
It concludes that a sinusoidal deflection of the rudder reaches the design limit of the aircraft much more easily than step or impulsive deflections. It was written more than 55 years before AA587 lost its fin.
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Bookworm - NACA "Consideration of dynamic loads on the vertical tail by the theory of flat yawing maneuvers"
I found the underlinings in another version of the report interesting!
This report does not seem to be amongst the NTSB on-line documents. I wonder if the NTSB/NASA were aware of it. Full rudder "fishtailing" was described at the NTSB hearing as having happened and discussed at length, but no mention of this report.
If I understand the last para before the conclusions correctly, a prevoius US Army Air Force report had already studied the effects and dangers of "fishtailing" the elevator. As I mentioned in a previous post, a current Boeing document warns against "fishtailing" any of the controls.
It was common in the 1940's for large a/c to have twin or triple fins. Was that done for structural reasons? What about current twin-finned fighters?
Once again, a great find!
Last edited by PickyPerkins; 16th Nov 2002 at 04:30.
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During the NTSB hearing on AA587 last November, the NTSB Investigator-In-Charge Robert Benzon included the following in his opening statement:
---- Start quote ---
Opening Statement of NTSB Investigator-In-Charge Robert Benzon
Flight Data Recorder problems
…….. In 1994, the Safety Board recommended to the FAA that such filtering systems be removed from information sent to flight data recorders, and yet in 2001 this investigation was hampered by totally unacceptable filtering of FDR data. In addition, the sample rates of data are not adequate. Staff and the Board are addressing these issues separate from this hearing.
---- End quote ---
Can anyone tell me:
(a) Has the FAA since required such filtering systems to be removed?
(b) If not, to what extent have airlines, aircraft manufacturers, or FDR manufacturers voluntarily removed them (particularly from Airbus a/c)?
---- Start quote ---
Opening Statement of NTSB Investigator-In-Charge Robert Benzon
Flight Data Recorder problems
…….. In 1994, the Safety Board recommended to the FAA that such filtering systems be removed from information sent to flight data recorders, and yet in 2001 this investigation was hampered by totally unacceptable filtering of FDR data. In addition, the sample rates of data are not adequate. Staff and the Board are addressing these issues separate from this hearing.
---- End quote ---
Can anyone tell me:
(a) Has the FAA since required such filtering systems to be removed?
(b) If not, to what extent have airlines, aircraft manufacturers, or FDR manufacturers voluntarily removed them (particularly from Airbus a/c)?
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FDR Limitations
Interesting observations and comments about FDR interpretations and video graphics. Nevertheless, I believe that it's imperative not to get overly affixiated about the tiniest recorded parameter of control surface position indication. I'm almost sure that the recorder does not record control surface position every nanosecond.
I'm not a Bus driver, but does the A300 FDR get its rudder data from the surface position indicator? What tolerances does the mechanical or digital surface position instrument have?
Is it conceivable that "limits" could have been exceeded within a fraction of a second that was "skipped" by the FDR?
It's as if one were taking a magnifying glass to check the graphically reproduced surface position indices...to see if ever either exceeded limits. Somewhat like debating at what point would 12 degrees Centigrade become 13 degress Centigrade.
Speaking in somewhat general terms, let me briefly recall the FDR interpretations of the COPA 737 crash in 1992, a loss of control accident in IMC.
The FDR readout had recorded one unusual attitude where bank angle went from something like 60 degrees port to 90 degrees starboard in less than one second. But the airplane could not physically make such a maneuver even in one whole second. The crux of the matter was that the FDR had recorded travel of the ADI which had tumbled.
Just one example of FDR limitations, just to make a point.
I'm not a Bus driver, but does the A300 FDR get its rudder data from the surface position indicator? What tolerances does the mechanical or digital surface position instrument have?
Is it conceivable that "limits" could have been exceeded within a fraction of a second that was "skipped" by the FDR?
It's as if one were taking a magnifying glass to check the graphically reproduced surface position indices...to see if ever either exceeded limits. Somewhat like debating at what point would 12 degrees Centigrade become 13 degress Centigrade.
Speaking in somewhat general terms, let me briefly recall the FDR interpretations of the COPA 737 crash in 1992, a loss of control accident in IMC.
The FDR readout had recorded one unusual attitude where bank angle went from something like 60 degrees port to 90 degrees starboard in less than one second. But the airplane could not physically make such a maneuver even in one whole second. The crux of the matter was that the FDR had recorded travel of the ADI which had tumbled.
Just one example of FDR limitations, just to make a point.
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Going back to the 737 problems, I'd throw in with the idea that the yaw damper is causing a 'chattering' hydraulic actuator. The damage to the A-300 rudder - versus the fin - rather suggests radical flutter, which induced the failure of the vertical fin attachments. Im guessing a case of 'deuling' actuators took place.
A number of 737 hardover events have been solved by turning off the yaw damper. While that's inconclusive, I wouldn't be too quick to discount the possibility.
A number of 737 hardover events have been solved by turning off the yaw damper. While that's inconclusive, I wouldn't be too quick to discount the possibility.
Swounger
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The NTSB has just posted updates on this: http://www.ntsb.gov/events/hearing_sched.htm#021029
Swounger
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And now airbus is suing AA over this:
http://www.nypost.com/news/regionalnews/71312.htm
Aircraft manufacturer Airbus has launched a legal claim against American Airlines, blaming it for "improper" flight operations that triggered the crash of Flight 587 in Queens.
http://www.nypost.com/news/regionalnews/71312.htm
Aircraft manufacturer Airbus has launched a legal claim against American Airlines, blaming it for "improper" flight operations that triggered the crash of Flight 587 in Queens.
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Official Legal Airbus Position on AA587
The following report was published on a local NYC radiostation website this morning.
Mar 20, 2003 5:43 am US/Eastern
(AP) (NEW YORK) Airplane manufacturer Airbus says in court papers that American Airlines is to blame for "improper" flight operations that caused the 2001 crash of Flight 587 in Queens, which claimed the lives of 265 people.
"American Airlines failed to operate the aircraft in the manner that was foreseeable and normal or intended by Airbus," Airbus said in court papers filed this month in Manhattan federal court, the New York Post reported in Thursday editions.
"Nothing Airbus did or failed to do caused the accident or any harm or injury to the plaintiffs," the court papers say, referring to the victims of the crash.
An Airbus A300-600 crashed on Nov. 12, 2001, minutes after taking off for the Dominican Republic, killing all of 260 people on board and five people on the ground in the Queens neighborhood of Belle Harbor.
More than 200 legal suits from victims' families have since been filed against American and Airbus.
American Airlines spokesman John Hotard told the Post that Airbus' position was "ridiculous."
The National Transportation Safety Board is still examining why the plane's rudder suddenly began swerving violently, causing the tail fin to break off and the plane to crash.
At a Washington hearing last year, the NTSB presented evidence suggesting the co-pilot moved the rudder back and forth after encountering turbulence from a jet five miles ahead. But it is also investigating whether there was a problem with the rudder itself.
It said it may reach some conclusions by this spring.
http://wcbs880.com/topstories/topsto...079054436.html
Mar 20, 2003 5:43 am US/Eastern
(AP) (NEW YORK) Airplane manufacturer Airbus says in court papers that American Airlines is to blame for "improper" flight operations that caused the 2001 crash of Flight 587 in Queens, which claimed the lives of 265 people.
"American Airlines failed to operate the aircraft in the manner that was foreseeable and normal or intended by Airbus," Airbus said in court papers filed this month in Manhattan federal court, the New York Post reported in Thursday editions.
"Nothing Airbus did or failed to do caused the accident or any harm or injury to the plaintiffs," the court papers say, referring to the victims of the crash.
An Airbus A300-600 crashed on Nov. 12, 2001, minutes after taking off for the Dominican Republic, killing all of 260 people on board and five people on the ground in the Queens neighborhood of Belle Harbor.
More than 200 legal suits from victims' families have since been filed against American and Airbus.
American Airlines spokesman John Hotard told the Post that Airbus' position was "ridiculous."
The National Transportation Safety Board is still examining why the plane's rudder suddenly began swerving violently, causing the tail fin to break off and the plane to crash.
At a Washington hearing last year, the NTSB presented evidence suggesting the co-pilot moved the rudder back and forth after encountering turbulence from a jet five miles ahead. But it is also investigating whether there was a problem with the rudder itself.
It said it may reach some conclusions by this spring.
http://wcbs880.com/topstories/topsto...079054436.html
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I completely agree with Airbus American is responisble for the overall condition of the aircraft not Airbus however if this is a general problem with all the production A300 aircraft Airbus will be at fault.
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A300
I see it as a pilot induced problem. Have flown that type for many years and never heard of a rudder malfunction. Most probably a recent ex- military pilot reacting correctly to a military aircraft.
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Catch22,
Did you fly the A300-605R or the A300b4?
I fly the A300 for AA, and knew the pilots in question. The copilot who was flying the aircraft was civilian background. The Captain was x military (C 141s) Both had been at American for years and years and were consumate aviators. Neither was in the slightest bit ham handed.
The A300 605r rudder becomes progessively more sensitive the faster the aircraft gets. once you pass 230 knots or so the force required to reach the stop is less than the breakout force. At that point the only choice you have is full application of Rudder. Furthermore more the outboard ailerons were removed as part of the aerodymanic cleanup from b4 to 605R, further limiting roll authority laying the ground work for the Rudder trap.
Other aircraft were found to have damaged tails from similar incidents, even though AIRBUS insisted that visual inspections were good enough.
The A300-605R is THE ONLY AIRCRAFT IN THE WORLD that uses a blocker time (constant ratio) rudder load limiter that does not depower the rudder. So the pedal throws become shorter and shorter making the rudder exponentially more sensitive the faster you go. Most pilots will go their career without needing rudder after they leave the runway. IF you suddenly try and use it in the A300 605R you may kill yourself.
The A300B4 had a ratio changer type rudder load limiter so in that aircraft a full throw was always the same at your feet, although the throw at the rudder would reduce. In the605R blockers come up from the floor that restrict the movement. By the time you are going 250 knots a minute after takeoff full travel is achieved by a 1 inch movement of the rudder pedals vs the 4 inch movement that it took to reach full travel while rolling down the runway.
ITS A TRAP FOR POI.
Cheers
Wino
Did you fly the A300-605R or the A300b4?
I fly the A300 for AA, and knew the pilots in question. The copilot who was flying the aircraft was civilian background. The Captain was x military (C 141s) Both had been at American for years and years and were consumate aviators. Neither was in the slightest bit ham handed.
The A300 605r rudder becomes progessively more sensitive the faster the aircraft gets. once you pass 230 knots or so the force required to reach the stop is less than the breakout force. At that point the only choice you have is full application of Rudder. Furthermore more the outboard ailerons were removed as part of the aerodymanic cleanup from b4 to 605R, further limiting roll authority laying the ground work for the Rudder trap.
Other aircraft were found to have damaged tails from similar incidents, even though AIRBUS insisted that visual inspections were good enough.
The A300-605R is THE ONLY AIRCRAFT IN THE WORLD that uses a blocker time (constant ratio) rudder load limiter that does not depower the rudder. So the pedal throws become shorter and shorter making the rudder exponentially more sensitive the faster you go. Most pilots will go their career without needing rudder after they leave the runway. IF you suddenly try and use it in the A300 605R you may kill yourself.
The A300B4 had a ratio changer type rudder load limiter so in that aircraft a full throw was always the same at your feet, although the throw at the rudder would reduce. In the605R blockers come up from the floor that restrict the movement. By the time you are going 250 knots a minute after takeoff full travel is achieved by a 1 inch movement of the rudder pedals vs the 4 inch movement that it took to reach full travel while rolling down the runway.
ITS A TRAP FOR POI.
Cheers
Wino
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catch 22
I'm glad you know exactly what happened. I'm also glad you know that "ex-military types" fly aeroplances completely differently to civil types (military aerodynamics and structures are, after all, different?).
As an aside, as an ex-military type, IF the "pilot induced" theory is correct, then nothing in my military, or civil training, would induce me to do anything like what it is alleged this crew did (that's type training on light pistons, JPs, Hawks, Harriers, A340/320, B757/767).
JB
<<however if this is a general problem with all the production A300 aircraft Airbus will be at fault>>
Not sure what you are saying here? If the crew carried out actions sufficient to detach the fin, then there is a likliehood this would happen on any A300? How does this then become Airbus' fault?
Please note, I am not in any way blaming the crew. There are 2 theories to this accident:
1. Rapid full/large rudder deflections in opposite directions exceeding the certified load of the fin. If this is the case, then there are also comments that AA had taught aggressive recovery techniques from "jet upsets", and this may have been a factor.
2. Something in the rudder / yaw control system of the aircraft went wrong.
And I suspect nothing will ever really be proved as to which it was...
NoD
I'm glad you know exactly what happened. I'm also glad you know that "ex-military types" fly aeroplances completely differently to civil types (military aerodynamics and structures are, after all, different?).
As an aside, as an ex-military type, IF the "pilot induced" theory is correct, then nothing in my military, or civil training, would induce me to do anything like what it is alleged this crew did (that's type training on light pistons, JPs, Hawks, Harriers, A340/320, B757/767).
JB
<<however if this is a general problem with all the production A300 aircraft Airbus will be at fault>>
Not sure what you are saying here? If the crew carried out actions sufficient to detach the fin, then there is a likliehood this would happen on any A300? How does this then become Airbus' fault?
Please note, I am not in any way blaming the crew. There are 2 theories to this accident:
1. Rapid full/large rudder deflections in opposite directions exceeding the certified load of the fin. If this is the case, then there are also comments that AA had taught aggressive recovery techniques from "jet upsets", and this may have been a factor.
2. Something in the rudder / yaw control system of the aircraft went wrong.
And I suspect nothing will ever really be proved as to which it was...
NoD