AMR 587 Airbus Crash (merged)
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Wino
I think the A330 crash during test at Toulouse happened partly because the engine was simulated failed after the go-around was initiated and because of the low level-off platform altitiude.
I understand that the high rate of climb caused the A330 to enter ALT* mode (alt acquire for Boeing types), and in that mode the autopilot flies a programmed parabola to level off. The problem was that the thrust loss from the simulated failure meant that the speed decayed to the point of stall and the crash resulted with loss of all on board.
I think the A330 crash during test at Toulouse happened partly because the engine was simulated failed after the go-around was initiated and because of the low level-off platform altitiude.
I understand that the high rate of climb caused the A330 to enter ALT* mode (alt acquire for Boeing types), and in that mode the autopilot flies a programmed parabola to level off. The problem was that the thrust loss from the simulated failure meant that the speed decayed to the point of stall and the crash resulted with loss of all on board.
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I am sure that the senior AA pilot gleefully pointed out that in 75 years this was the first aircraft ever to loose its tailfin. He seemed to stress that this would never happen to a boeing.
I am sure I remember a B707 loosing a tailfin in severe turbulance over Mount Fuji in the 60s, killing all on board. Does this not count because it was not an Airbus?
The whole program could have been summed up in 2 minutes. If you reverse rudder several times at speed in any aircraft be it Airbus or Boeing you will exceed max load and are likely to end up in severe difficulty! Yet they padded it out with lots of anti Airbus Rhetoric, and tried to insinuate some kind of Airbus coverup.
I am sure I remember a B707 loosing a tailfin in severe turbulance over Mount Fuji in the 60s, killing all on board. Does this not count because it was not an Airbus?
The whole program could have been summed up in 2 minutes. If you reverse rudder several times at speed in any aircraft be it Airbus or Boeing you will exceed max load and are likely to end up in severe difficulty! Yet they padded it out with lots of anti Airbus Rhetoric, and tried to insinuate some kind of Airbus coverup.
I call you back
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Rudder
I completely understand colleagues of the FO defending him, thats what friends are for. However their case doesn't really add up.
The program, while very good, ran along the current US/UK ' hate everthing francais' lines with the notable exception of the end.
The conclusion seemed to be don't input full rudder reversal repetitively on any type or you risk structural failure. That knocks the anti-Airbus argument back.
We seem to be left with two questions:
1. Is the certified ultimum load on the A300 ( indeed all types ) sufficiently high or is there reason to raise it?
2. Are training sections doing enough to ensure pilots operate to manufacturers specs and understand the procedures required to achieve this?
The program also highlighted one small point that has not been picked up on here, wasn't dealt with fully in the cockpit and if I was honest happens in my cockpit a lot;
The unfortunate FO was never happy with that TO. He was obviously uneasy about departing after a 747 even though the correct separation would be given. ........Some good advice I got years ago advised me to always track down that 'funny feeling' even if it's the FO's instincts, not yours. It might just save you.
The whole thing is a very sad business.
The program, while very good, ran along the current US/UK ' hate everthing francais' lines with the notable exception of the end.
The conclusion seemed to be don't input full rudder reversal repetitively on any type or you risk structural failure. That knocks the anti-Airbus argument back.
We seem to be left with two questions:
1. Is the certified ultimum load on the A300 ( indeed all types ) sufficiently high or is there reason to raise it?
2. Are training sections doing enough to ensure pilots operate to manufacturers specs and understand the procedures required to achieve this?
The program also highlighted one small point that has not been picked up on here, wasn't dealt with fully in the cockpit and if I was honest happens in my cockpit a lot;
The unfortunate FO was never happy with that TO. He was obviously uneasy about departing after a 747 even though the correct separation would be given. ........Some good advice I got years ago advised me to always track down that 'funny feeling' even if it's the FO's instincts, not yours. It might just save you.
The whole thing is a very sad business.
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is anyone really surprised.....?
fireflybob,
In talking with many AA pilots, both current and retired, it would appear that AA has their own ideas about upset training...indeed any training.
Was therefore not the least bit surprised that IF a vertical stab was to come off an aircraft, any aircraft, than the colors painted on the side would be American Airlines.
Sky Gods' know 'better' than others, it would seem...
Beaks well above ground effect, approaching the ozone layer.
Lawyers will have a field day in the end, and that truly IS sad.
In talking with many AA pilots, both current and retired, it would appear that AA has their own ideas about upset training...indeed any training.
Was therefore not the least bit surprised that IF a vertical stab was to come off an aircraft, any aircraft, than the colors painted on the side would be American Airlines.
Sky Gods' know 'better' than others, it would seem...
Beaks well above ground effect, approaching the ozone layer.
Lawyers will have a field day in the end, and that truly IS sad.
Last edited by 411A; 10th May 2003 at 06:59.
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Wino - "On the A300-605R there is NO rudder feel mechanism".
The A300-600 manual shows the rudder as having an 'artificial feel and trim unit'.
Somebody else queried A300 rudder pedal deflection. The manual says:
"2 independent Rudder Travel Limiting Systems (RUD TRAVEL) controlled by the Feel & Limitation Computers (FLC) progressively reduce the maximum rudder travel from +/- 30 deg below 165kt .. to +/- 3.5 deg above 310 kt." I don't know what that translates to in inches because there has never been any need for me to use the rudders in 2 eng flight (- and that includes a very nasty CAT encounter).
The A300-600 manual shows the rudder as having an 'artificial feel and trim unit'.
Somebody else queried A300 rudder pedal deflection. The manual says:
"2 independent Rudder Travel Limiting Systems (RUD TRAVEL) controlled by the Feel & Limitation Computers (FLC) progressively reduce the maximum rudder travel from +/- 30 deg below 165kt .. to +/- 3.5 deg above 310 kt." I don't know what that translates to in inches because there has never been any need for me to use the rudders in 2 eng flight (- and that includes a very nasty CAT encounter).
Mistrust in Management
A Nonny Mouse
<<I am sure I remember a B707 loosing a tailfin in severe turbulance over Mount Fuji in the 60s, killing all on board. Does this not count because it was not an Airbus?>>
I believe the tragedy you are referring to involved a B.O.A.C. B.707-436.
In that case it was very strongly suspected that severe turbulence caused a total break up of the aircraft. The mainplane failed at the centre section, but whether this was the first point of structural failure or not I cannot be certain.
Regards
Exeng
I believe the tragedy you are referring to involved a B.O.A.C. B.707-436.
In that case it was very strongly suspected that severe turbulence caused a total break up of the aircraft. The mainplane failed at the centre section, but whether this was the first point of structural failure or not I cannot be certain.
Regards
Exeng
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For the record there have been a number of Boeing's lost in turbulence/thunderstorms.
Northwest 720 out of Miami Feb 12, 1963, although the tail wasn't the first to go. The aircraft broke up when the pilots started to regain control. Aircraft had flown into a violent turbulence associated with a thunderstorm line.
BOAC 707-436 March 6 1966: Tail was hit by a mountain wave off Fuji on a sightseeing diversion as weather was "perfect". The aircraft was from Tokyo to HK and captain requested ATC clearance to descend to about level with the top of Fuji. Tail collapsed to the left and took with it the horizontal stabilizer on that side, which cause a violet pitch motion that took all engines off. Front broke off in the descent.
A BAC1-11 of Braniff was also lost to thunderstorm in August 1966. The aircraft was struck by violent turbulence ahead of a thrunderstrom line in clear air.
The strong shear struck from the rear and took out the elevators and rudder, although the basic tail stayed intact initially. Stardboard wing then failed.
Geoffrey Thomas
Northwest 720 out of Miami Feb 12, 1963, although the tail wasn't the first to go. The aircraft broke up when the pilots started to regain control. Aircraft had flown into a violent turbulence associated with a thunderstorm line.
BOAC 707-436 March 6 1966: Tail was hit by a mountain wave off Fuji on a sightseeing diversion as weather was "perfect". The aircraft was from Tokyo to HK and captain requested ATC clearance to descend to about level with the top of Fuji. Tail collapsed to the left and took with it the horizontal stabilizer on that side, which cause a violet pitch motion that took all engines off. Front broke off in the descent.
A BAC1-11 of Braniff was also lost to thunderstorm in August 1966. The aircraft was struck by violent turbulence ahead of a thrunderstrom line in clear air.
The strong shear struck from the rear and took out the elevators and rudder, although the basic tail stayed intact initially. Stardboard wing then failed.
Geoffrey Thomas
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Airbus- I remember the pictures of the B52- there were a lot of jagged edges where the fin separated including a large bit sticking up. Enough to provide a little basic directional control. The AA lost everything.
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I feel that if the previous Airbus incident at Moscow had happened to a Boeing, the fact that the pilot was unaware that rudder reversal could result in loss of the fin would have been acted on, and the manufacturers' notification would have been issued shortly afterwards. Boeing is far more pilot oriented that Airbus, which tends to be engineer driven. Airbus non moving throttles, which are almost universally disliked by pilots, are a classic example of this. A comparison of the design philosophies of the B777 and the Airbus fbw series shows many examples of these differing approaches.
Re the AA upset training video - I have watched that video (and the other four associated with it) some 30-40 times and there is NOTHING in it which advocates rudder reversals. There IS an extremely well presented case for the appropriate use of CO-ORDINATED rudder and one specific caveat regarding the MD11 (hugely over powerful). It was specified as an appropriate response for upset recovery under particular conditions. The emphasis was necessary because of the repeated fatal results of the 737 crossover problem. That problem was discussed and demonstrated in a particularly accessible way and the illustrations left no doubts about the problem or the importance of rudder when below crossover speed.
In addition to the apparent misunderstanding of the AA training video contents there would appear to be a continuing (deliberate?) misunderstanding of the causes of the various Airbus accidents - particularly Habsheim. If you try to carry out a manoeuuvre for which you have not been trained in circumstances where the most basic prudence would suggest it was stupid to do so, the aircraft protection systems, which keep you and most of those on board alive rather than killing everybody in a 'stall and burn', should be praised rather than villified.
In addition to the apparent misunderstanding of the AA training video contents there would appear to be a continuing (deliberate?) misunderstanding of the causes of the various Airbus accidents - particularly Habsheim. If you try to carry out a manoeuuvre for which you have not been trained in circumstances where the most basic prudence would suggest it was stupid to do so, the aircraft protection systems, which keep you and most of those on board alive rather than killing everybody in a 'stall and burn', should be praised rather than villified.
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I hope your last comment was not directed at what I said as i was the only one to refer to Habsheim recently:
"Any way you design flight control software to restrict one thing, somebody will find a way around it. So design must very carefully cater to what is being protected for- i don't think you can ever get it 'right'. Remember the A320 that flew into the trees restricting the pilot inputs because speed was too low to allow a pull up?"
Read it carefully- is there a 'misunderstanding' there. The Airbus has more 'protection from pilots' features than any aeroplane flying. Sure enough, no pull up was allowed by the system (quite correctly as a stall would have been the immediate result). So a crash ensued. But Habsheim is not the issue here- that reference was to answer a query of 'why can't everything that can go wrong be catered for in system design' query.
"Any way you design flight control software to restrict one thing, somebody will find a way around it. So design must very carefully cater to what is being protected for- i don't think you can ever get it 'right'. Remember the A320 that flew into the trees restricting the pilot inputs because speed was too low to allow a pull up?"
Read it carefully- is there a 'misunderstanding' there. The Airbus has more 'protection from pilots' features than any aeroplane flying. Sure enough, no pull up was allowed by the system (quite correctly as a stall would have been the immediate result). So a crash ensued. But Habsheim is not the issue here- that reference was to answer a query of 'why can't everything that can go wrong be catered for in system design' query.
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I am not an expert in Aerodynamics so I will not speculate on that topic. I did, however, fly with a captain the other day who was one of the first AA pilots to go to France for 300-600R training. Among other things, he told me that the Airbus rudder is not actually burried in to the airframe it is simply glued and bolted on. That doesn't sound good to me.
Also, through various publications and books that I have read lately regarding, among other things the shoot down of TWA 800, the NTSB has about 0.0% credibility with me and I am sure that the final report will convey what is considered politically expediant. What is politically expediant is that Sten Molin caused the airplane to crash through excessive use of rudder. Weather or not that is the truth is irrelevant.
Also, through various publications and books that I have read lately regarding, among other things the shoot down of TWA 800, the NTSB has about 0.0% credibility with me and I am sure that the final report will convey what is considered politically expediant. What is politically expediant is that Sten Molin caused the airplane to crash through excessive use of rudder. Weather or not that is the truth is irrelevant.
Raas767
The B737 fin is not "buried" inside the fuselage either. Most of the airliners I have worked on for the last 20 years have very similar construction in this department. A handful of trunnions and lugs on the top of the fuselage attach to a handful of similar fixtures on the fin.
Can someone please just clear one thing up.
The A300-600 rudder pedal movement at high speed (ie not take off or landing speed) of about 1". Does this really give full scale deflection of the rudder control surface?
When I heard this on the Horizon program I nearly threw the cat at the telly!
Tell me it aint so please.
Thanks to everyone who has expressed a view on this thread. It is what PPRUNE should be all about, professional informed opinion, not the slanging matches that have dominated some topics.
The B737 fin is not "buried" inside the fuselage either. Most of the airliners I have worked on for the last 20 years have very similar construction in this department. A handful of trunnions and lugs on the top of the fuselage attach to a handful of similar fixtures on the fin.
Can someone please just clear one thing up.
The A300-600 rudder pedal movement at high speed (ie not take off or landing speed) of about 1". Does this really give full scale deflection of the rudder control surface?
When I heard this on the Horizon program I nearly threw the cat at the telly!
Tell me it aint so please.
Thanks to everyone who has expressed a view on this thread. It is what PPRUNE should be all about, professional informed opinion, not the slanging matches that have dominated some topics.
NSF
I referred to Habsheim because it was (as far as I can recall) the first of these 'investigative' TV programmes. Its 'conclusions', for want of a better word, appear to have influenced a number of contributors to this and other threads. I did not see the latest Horizon programme - from comments it would seem to have been as technically irrelevant as the Habsheim rubbish.
ALL aircraft manufacturers have problems with their products at times and Airbus are no better or worse than the others - their 'crime' would appear to be having the audacity to produce an innovative aeronautical design.
I have far more experience with the Lockheed and Boeing products than those from Toulouse but that limited experience has produced more plaudits than grumbles.
BTW, the A320 flew into the trees at Habsheim because the pilot was doing something for which he was not authorised, competent or briefed, with passengers on board, whose survival was down to the aircraft's ability to protect its occupants from the worst efforts of its operator.
I referred to Habsheim because it was (as far as I can recall) the first of these 'investigative' TV programmes. Its 'conclusions', for want of a better word, appear to have influenced a number of contributors to this and other threads. I did not see the latest Horizon programme - from comments it would seem to have been as technically irrelevant as the Habsheim rubbish.
ALL aircraft manufacturers have problems with their products at times and Airbus are no better or worse than the others - their 'crime' would appear to be having the audacity to produce an innovative aeronautical design.
I have far more experience with the Lockheed and Boeing products than those from Toulouse but that limited experience has produced more plaudits than grumbles.
BTW, the A320 flew into the trees at Habsheim because the pilot was doing something for which he was not authorised, competent or briefed, with passengers on board, whose survival was down to the aircraft's ability to protect its occupants from the worst efforts of its operator.
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TURIN and all,
From the NTSB docket on AA 587…..
“On the A300-600, for example, at airspeeds lower than 165 knots (when rudder travel is unrestricted by the airplane’s rudder limiter system) the rudder can travel +/-30°, requiring a pilot force of about 65 pounds to move the rudder pedals about 4.0 inches. However, at 250 knots, when the limiter restricts rudder travel to about +/-9.3°, a pilot force of about 32 pounds is required to move the rudder pedals about 1.3 inches. The rudder system on the A300-600 uses a breakout force6 of about 22 pounds. Thus, at 250 knots, the rudder can reach full available travel (9.3°) with a pedal force of only 10 pounds over the breakout force”.
A description of this bizarre rudder limiting system can be found at:
http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2001/AA58...its/241835.pdf
From the NTSB docket on AA 587…..
“On the A300-600, for example, at airspeeds lower than 165 knots (when rudder travel is unrestricted by the airplane’s rudder limiter system) the rudder can travel +/-30°, requiring a pilot force of about 65 pounds to move the rudder pedals about 4.0 inches. However, at 250 knots, when the limiter restricts rudder travel to about +/-9.3°, a pilot force of about 32 pounds is required to move the rudder pedals about 1.3 inches. The rudder system on the A300-600 uses a breakout force6 of about 22 pounds. Thus, at 250 knots, the rudder can reach full available travel (9.3°) with a pedal force of only 10 pounds over the breakout force”.
A description of this bizarre rudder limiting system can be found at:
http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2001/AA58...its/241835.pdf
The B52 fin/rudder loss was not a straight forward failure. My B757 Instructor at Seattle in 83 was the pilot of the said B52. When showing me photos of the damage, he said they were searching for turbulence in the rockies as part of an underslung cruise missile mounting test when the incident occured. They certainly found what they were looking for! The B52 entered a vicious mountain wave, the rudder came off cleanly and the vertical stabilizer snapped off leaving about a quarter of it's area sticking up from the fuselage. He found it hard to control the airplane, expecially in pitch. An F100 was scrambled as a chase plane and confirmed the detached part of the fin was still lying across the horizontal stabiliser. Several violent manoeuvres succeeded in detaching the fin and they made a high speed emergency landing at Edwards AFB.
Just a numbered other
Raas 767 said:
Sadly that is also the true cause in my opinion.
More 'politically expedient' for USA plc might be to blame Airbus.
Freeze framing the telemetry from the FDR shows aggressive rudder inputs from the onset of the minor upset. The aeroplane was cross-controlled on many occassions, and most viloent rolling manouvres were induced by the clumsy application of rudder.
Any piolot whose training manuals contained a graphic of an inverted airliner in the wake of another, and the scary and inaccurate video imploring early use of rudder to control the situation was more than likely to be nervous before take off, and pre-conditioned to mis-handle the situation.
'Sky Gods' know 'better' than others, it would seem...
Beaks well above ground effect, approaching the ozone layer.'
At last I seem to be agreeing with 411A.........should I get out more?
What is politically expediant is that Sten Molin caused the airplane to crash through excessive use of rudder.
More 'politically expedient' for USA plc might be to blame Airbus.
Freeze framing the telemetry from the FDR shows aggressive rudder inputs from the onset of the minor upset. The aeroplane was cross-controlled on many occassions, and most viloent rolling manouvres were induced by the clumsy application of rudder.
Any piolot whose training manuals contained a graphic of an inverted airliner in the wake of another, and the scary and inaccurate video imploring early use of rudder to control the situation was more than likely to be nervous before take off, and pre-conditioned to mis-handle the situation.
'Sky Gods' know 'better' than others, it would seem...
Beaks well above ground effect, approaching the ozone layer.'
At last I seem to be agreeing with 411A.........should I get out more?
ENTREPPRUNEUR
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Why did it crash?
I've read most of the posts on this thread but I can't remember if anywhere it has been explained why the plane actually crashed. As I recall it plummeted. I can see it going into a directional oscillation that became uncontrollable but I don't think that happened did it? I can only assume that weight loss was more than the elevator could correct but that seems difficult to believe.