AMR 587 Airbus Crash (merged)
Join Date: Jul 2001
Location: where I shouldn’t be
Posts: 427
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
NoD,
Military airfoil and structures are indeed different from that of a civilian type.
I really have not the foggiest on what caused this accident however, should there have been a principal construction flaw I’d expect to have heard of other such incidents before. The A300 is a machine which has been introduced as the first Airbus PAX aircraft in 1974, and has an excellent construction record so far.
Early reports have indicated that the aircraft experienced a tail strike some time back, I wonder if that may have had anything to do with this accident.
Military airfoil and structures are indeed different from that of a civilian type.
I really have not the foggiest on what caused this accident however, should there have been a principal construction flaw I’d expect to have heard of other such incidents before. The A300 is a machine which has been introduced as the first Airbus PAX aircraft in 1974, and has an excellent construction record so far.
Early reports have indicated that the aircraft experienced a tail strike some time back, I wonder if that may have had anything to do with this accident.
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Location, Location
Posts: 642
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
BBC TV programme
BBC2's "Horizon" (BBC's flagship popular science program, for our overseas visitors) is screening "Flight 587" next Thursday evening (27th March at 21:00 GMT). I imagine that events in the Gulf could well change this schedule, however.
The programme listing reads:
"... the investigation revealed that the tail fin of the Airbus A300-600 had simply snapped off in mid-air - how could there have been such a catastrophic failure of a critical structure?"
The programme listing reads:
"... the investigation revealed that the tail fin of the Airbus A300-600 had simply snapped off in mid-air - how could there have been such a catastrophic failure of a critical structure?"
Join Date: Apr 2001
Location: Mars or was it Venus
Posts: 61
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Maybe this will bring about a requirement for FDR sensors on the flight deck controls so the investigators can see if the crew moved the controls or the control moved on its own....(FBW airbuses already have this) 
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Fantasy Island
Posts: 555
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
N380, I think the argument goes that only the A300-600 has the rudder system in question, so if you are discussing length of service vs. incidents then you have to take that into account. I believe the first -600 EIS was the mid eighties?
However, I agree with you that if this is such an obvious flaw in the design of the aircraft (as is being proposed by certain member) then why hasn't it caused a serious accident before? Obviously there's a first time for everything, but I'm still interested. There are two operators in my neck of the woods that fly/have flown the -600, and I'd be interested to hear their and other operators views on this event - which I guess will happen in any court case.
However, I agree with you that if this is such an obvious flaw in the design of the aircraft (as is being proposed by certain member) then why hasn't it caused a serious accident before? Obviously there's a first time for everything, but I'm still interested. There are two operators in my neck of the woods that fly/have flown the -600, and I'd be interested to hear their and other operators views on this event - which I guess will happen in any court case.
Join Date: Dec 2001
Location: England
Posts: 1,389
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
> BBC2's "Horizon" (BBC's flagship popular science program, for
> our overseas visitors).
It used to be a good science program but recently it seems to be more like a bad disaster movie. These days the art director seems to have the upper hand. It seems to consist of 90%, moody, atmospheric, shock-horror, human interest shots and about 10% science. Remember how the Airport series of films always began? First you spend a lot of time introducing the cast, explain how they all come to be on the plane etc, then just as you get to the end of the show you pull off a dramatic rescue. I suspect we already know how it will end.
> our overseas visitors).
It used to be a good science program but recently it seems to be more like a bad disaster movie. These days the art director seems to have the upper hand. It seems to consist of 90%, moody, atmospheric, shock-horror, human interest shots and about 10% science. Remember how the Airport series of films always began? First you spend a lot of time introducing the cast, explain how they all come to be on the plane etc, then just as you get to the end of the show you pull off a dramatic rescue. I suspect we already know how it will end.
Join Date: Sep 2002
Location: Los Angeles,CA,USA
Posts: 266
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A300-600
Wino's comments are appreciated. He knows his aircraft well.
My questions are still related to not only A300-600 rudder sensitivity, but AA advanced manuever training in this specific type. What was this AA F/O taught to do when recovering from unusual attitudes? Why did another AA Captain relate a story of this specific F/O improperly handling a wake-turbulence encounter in a B-727? Was this relevant?
Wino---did you agree with the article in "Vanity Fair" on the A300 accident, and Jason Goldberg's comments?
thanks
My questions are still related to not only A300-600 rudder sensitivity, but AA advanced manuever training in this specific type. What was this AA F/O taught to do when recovering from unusual attitudes? Why did another AA Captain relate a story of this specific F/O improperly handling a wake-turbulence encounter in a B-727? Was this relevant?
Wino---did you agree with the article in "Vanity Fair" on the A300 accident, and Jason Goldberg's comments?
thanks
Union Goon
Join Date: Feb 2000
Location: New Jersey, USA
Posts: 1,097
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I agreed with 95 percent or so of Jason's comments. The only real problem I had with the vanity fair article is who the**** shopped it to Vanity fair? It aint where I get my aviation info from generally...
Sten was taught by AA to use COORIDINATED RUDDER to keep the blue side up. (As was I)
The captain in question had a personal beef with Sten. The Engineer on that flight told a different story. But interestingly, even if it is 100 percent true, Howcome the Boeing survived and the AIRBUS didnt?
BAHRAIN LAD,
There is something else that isn't common to all the A300s. Not all the A300s have fuel in the tail like that A300605Rs. Thats a lot of weight on a long lever arm.... Many other A300600s don't have the stab tank... The manual says to get that fuel out of there before entering turbulence... I believe the gulfair a300600s don't have the stab tank.
Cheers
Wino
Sten was taught by AA to use COORIDINATED RUDDER to keep the blue side up. (As was I)
The captain in question had a personal beef with Sten. The Engineer on that flight told a different story. But interestingly, even if it is 100 percent true, Howcome the Boeing survived and the AIRBUS didnt?
BAHRAIN LAD,
There is something else that isn't common to all the A300s. Not all the A300s have fuel in the tail like that A300605Rs. Thats a lot of weight on a long lever arm.... Many other A300600s don't have the stab tank... The manual says to get that fuel out of there before entering turbulence... I believe the gulfair a300600s don't have the stab tank.
Cheers
Wino
Join Date: Sep 2002
Location: Los Angeles,CA,USA
Posts: 266
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I agree Vanity Fair does'nt really have credibility when it comes to aircraft accidents. The thing that disturbed me about Goldberg's comments were that he made these derogatory remarks about the Airbus that AA operated in a public forum---a magazine. Why would an AA pilot basically tell the public that the aircraft AA flew were'nt safe? I see he's on the 767 out of LGA now, but I'm just curious.
I also hold Airbus responsible for assuring the aircraft was safe, including the tail striking the ramp at Toulouse during a windstorm before it was delivered. How much do we really know about composites incorporated in aircraft structures? How much damage could they incur if things like tail-strikes and severe turbulence encounters (or inflight upsets) happen?
AA training must have some responsibility also, if F/O Molin was doing something AA taught. Advanced or rapid manuevers in transport category jets just are'nt smart and certainly could lead to fuselage/flight control damage. Seems to me AA kind of has radical procedures in some areas, including having Captains make PA announcements while he/she taxiies the airplane, and re-briefing approaches (both pilots' heads down) below 10,000 feet, and that ridiculous PA announcement the FO makes approaching the gate when he/she should be watching the ramp for equipment. Would you trust those wing-walkers, Wino?
FAA would have some responsibility also, if lack of oversight caused these AA procedures to be approved without some sort of research/review/dialogue.
I also hold Airbus responsible for assuring the aircraft was safe, including the tail striking the ramp at Toulouse during a windstorm before it was delivered. How much do we really know about composites incorporated in aircraft structures? How much damage could they incur if things like tail-strikes and severe turbulence encounters (or inflight upsets) happen?
AA training must have some responsibility also, if F/O Molin was doing something AA taught. Advanced or rapid manuevers in transport category jets just are'nt smart and certainly could lead to fuselage/flight control damage. Seems to me AA kind of has radical procedures in some areas, including having Captains make PA announcements while he/she taxiies the airplane, and re-briefing approaches (both pilots' heads down) below 10,000 feet, and that ridiculous PA announcement the FO makes approaching the gate when he/she should be watching the ramp for equipment. Would you trust those wing-walkers, Wino?
FAA would have some responsibility also, if lack of oversight caused these AA procedures to be approved without some sort of research/review/dialogue.
Union Goon
Join Date: Feb 2000
Location: New Jersey, USA
Posts: 1,097
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Virtually the entire investigative group of 587 bid off the aircraft based on what they learned (including Jason Goldberg). A huge number of others did as well. These guys were not stupid. They really did their homework talking to engineers, structures peoples, composit people etc...
For many of them it just doesn't pass the wife and kids test anymore.
The Airbus at AA is a VERY small tight comunity. There were only 35 aircraft total in the fleet. In NY there were about 90 captain and 90 copilots. We all knew each other quite well and had flown with everyone. It was a stable community with no turnover. People stayed on the aircraft often till they retired. No one but no one thinks that Sten Molin or Ed States could have ever reversed the rudder 5 times in any circumstance.
Now compare that to the 727 community where when STen was on it we had 180 727s or so... So one idiots characterization of sten's flying doesn't hold a lot of water...
The only reason that I stayed on the aircraft is that I felt that the alligator that is closest to the boat are Islamic terrorists with knives, and they are more likely to go after another 757/767 because of the ease of getting sim time in those planes (this goes to whether you think 9/11 is really over, and I got to say, I think nothing has really been done to prevent another one)
As to AA procedures, I don't agree with all of em, but they are written in blood. The arrival announcement is to get the slides (to prevent killing someone in the gate area with an accidental deployment) just before the aircraft stops. It doesn't really distract me. All aircraft are required to have boom mikes, I just configure it before I enter the ramp and use the toggle. I am still lookin out the window, yet making my announcement. With my feet over the brakes, I guarantee even if I develope a stutter we aint gonna hit my wingtip...
I don't view the captain making an anouncement while he taxies as a big deal either. We got brakes on my side of the airplane for that problem as well. And I haven't seen anyone brief below 10 on my aircraft either. Don't know where you saw that, but I have spent almost my entire career in the Airbus community and we don't do it.
And as to maneuvering a Jet. Do what it takes to keep the blue side up, You get upside down and you got bigger problems. That doesn't mean we were taught to go out and break the aircraft. We haven't had any problems with that sort of thing in the other 800 or so jets that were in the fleet, but somehow the Airbus community got a bunch of busted tails.
Sure seams like an airbus problem to me.
Cheers
WIno
For many of them it just doesn't pass the wife and kids test anymore.
The Airbus at AA is a VERY small tight comunity. There were only 35 aircraft total in the fleet. In NY there were about 90 captain and 90 copilots. We all knew each other quite well and had flown with everyone. It was a stable community with no turnover. People stayed on the aircraft often till they retired. No one but no one thinks that Sten Molin or Ed States could have ever reversed the rudder 5 times in any circumstance.
Now compare that to the 727 community where when STen was on it we had 180 727s or so... So one idiots characterization of sten's flying doesn't hold a lot of water...
The only reason that I stayed on the aircraft is that I felt that the alligator that is closest to the boat are Islamic terrorists with knives, and they are more likely to go after another 757/767 because of the ease of getting sim time in those planes (this goes to whether you think 9/11 is really over, and I got to say, I think nothing has really been done to prevent another one)
As to AA procedures, I don't agree with all of em, but they are written in blood. The arrival announcement is to get the slides (to prevent killing someone in the gate area with an accidental deployment) just before the aircraft stops. It doesn't really distract me. All aircraft are required to have boom mikes, I just configure it before I enter the ramp and use the toggle. I am still lookin out the window, yet making my announcement. With my feet over the brakes, I guarantee even if I develope a stutter we aint gonna hit my wingtip...
I don't view the captain making an anouncement while he taxies as a big deal either. We got brakes on my side of the airplane for that problem as well. And I haven't seen anyone brief below 10 on my aircraft either. Don't know where you saw that, but I have spent almost my entire career in the Airbus community and we don't do it.
And as to maneuvering a Jet. Do what it takes to keep the blue side up, You get upside down and you got bigger problems. That doesn't mean we were taught to go out and break the aircraft. We haven't had any problems with that sort of thing in the other 800 or so jets that were in the fleet, but somehow the Airbus community got a bunch of busted tails.
Sure seams like an airbus problem to me.
Cheers
WIno
Join Date: Jul 2001
Location: where I shouldn’t be
Posts: 427
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Any A 300-605 driver:
The A 310 manual states -
In the event of loss of both systems switching circuits located in each FLC provide a signal to retract the variable stop actuator to low speed position.
Does this hold true for the -605, and could the systems have failed and no announcement was produced on the flight deck?
The A 310 manual states -
In the event of loss of both systems switching circuits located in each FLC provide a signal to retract the variable stop actuator to low speed position.
Does this hold true for the -605, and could the systems have failed and no announcement was produced on the flight deck?
Join Date: May 1999
Location: london
Posts: 53
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
N380UA
To quote the a300-605R flight manual:
"2 independant rudder limiting systems controlled by the FLC, progressivly decrease the maximum rudder travel from +/- 30 below 165kt to +/- 3.5 above 310kts. If both systems fail, whatever the aircraft speed, the mechanism returns to the low speed position( +/- 30 rudder travel available).
If the system does not return to the low speed position, an ECAM warning (indicating the rudder travel system is jammed in the high speed range) is activated when flaps are at 20 or more."
don't know if that answers your question.
To quote the a300-605R flight manual:
"2 independant rudder limiting systems controlled by the FLC, progressivly decrease the maximum rudder travel from +/- 30 below 165kt to +/- 3.5 above 310kts. If both systems fail, whatever the aircraft speed, the mechanism returns to the low speed position( +/- 30 rudder travel available).
If the system does not return to the low speed position, an ECAM warning (indicating the rudder travel system is jammed in the high speed range) is activated when flaps are at 20 or more."
don't know if that answers your question.
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Fantasy Island
Posts: 555
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thanks for the info Wino.
Excuse me for not reading all the relevant information, but with regards to the stabiliser tank, was this particular aircraft so equipped and what was the level in the tank at the time of the accident?
And, FYI Gulf Air have never operated the A300. However, Kuwait Airways (605R), Qatar Airways (622R), Emirates (605R) and Saudi Arabian Airlines (620) have all operated the -600, at one stage or another.
Excuse me for not reading all the relevant information, but with regards to the stabiliser tank, was this particular aircraft so equipped and what was the level in the tank at the time of the accident?
And, FYI Gulf Air have never operated the A300. However, Kuwait Airways (605R), Qatar Airways (622R), Emirates (605R) and Saudi Arabian Airlines (620) have all operated the -600, at one stage or another.
Join Date: Sep 2001
Location: 38N
Posts: 356
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Each airframe series has unique systems comprised of sensors, sensor data transmissson and / or filtering processes, flight system control computers, hydraulic actuators, and the software / electronic / mechanical glue that makes all those things sing together. Even if these are highly similar across related airframes, individual designs can have their own idiosyncratic problems.
The documented reports of tail-wiggling oscillations and eccentric responses to in-flight control actions suggest a real design problem might exist in the 600 rudder controls.
I would suggest that it is incumbent on Airbus to prove that they have designed to prevent such oscillations and tested to verify the correctness of the designs under all plausible flight conditions and maintenance scenarios. Can Airbus prove this? Almost certainly -- if it is true.
The documented reports of tail-wiggling oscillations and eccentric responses to in-flight control actions suggest a real design problem might exist in the 600 rudder controls.
I would suggest that it is incumbent on Airbus to prove that they have designed to prevent such oscillations and tested to verify the correctness of the designs under all plausible flight conditions and maintenance scenarios. Can Airbus prove this? Almost certainly -- if it is true.
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: Obvious
Age: 78
Posts: 301
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Just another AA587 Theory
Quote: The A 310 manual states -
In the event of loss of both systems switching circuits located in each FLC provide a signal to retract the variable stop actuator to low speed position.
Does this hold true for the -605, and could the systems have failed with no announcement being produced on the flight deck?
To quote the a300-605R flight manual:
"2 independent rudder limiting systems controlled by the FLC, progressively decrease the maximum rudder travel from +/- 30 below 165kt to +/- 3.5 above 310kts. If both systems fail, whatever the aircraft speed, the mechanism returns to the low speed position (+/- 30 rudder travel available).
If the system does not return to the low speed position, an ECAM warning (indicating the rudder travel system is jammed in the high speed range) is activated when flaps are at 20 or more."
. Assume that a software(or design) glitch existed such that when large pressure transients are experienced (such as in a wake vortex) a rudder limiter system (RLS) trips itself into self-test (or hands over to the other RLS system - OR BOTH [see below]). Because their function is directly speed-related and their purpose is to progressively inhibit rudder travel, their one essential driving input must come from the CADC. But if the CADC's input data (and outputs) is in a state of flux because of transiting the wake vortex, you may see a situation where RLS1 hands to RLS2 (which is feeling the same strain about its own credibility and attempts immediately to hand-over back to RLS1 etc etc).
Now why would this occur? Some of these systems (and early systems in particular) were designed to hand-over and go into a self-test mode before declaring themselves failed (similar to a BITE check self-test on power-up). Great to have systems capable of mutual back-up - but not so great if they were to share a common glitch that could be brought about by an environmental (large short-term pressure transients) that had them swapping authority back and forth (or attempting to do so whilst simultaneously attempting to self-test). And what might be happening if they are handed and/or forced to accept authority whilst in that self-test? Why would they be? Perhaps because self-test is yet incomplete and as far as the FLC is concerned, they have not declared themselves failed or off-line and are therefore deemed available. Or perhaps they are passing their own self-test and are available (but only until back in operational authority)....
What we are talking about here is a scenario where both RLS systems are simultaneously experiencing the same "induced" failure mode (or something that is being self-interpreted as a failure - and which has them (or courtesy of the FLC) trying to hand-over to each other. In this weird interregnum you may indeed have the aircraft FLC (or pilots) trying to correct for sudden yaw but having to contend with excursions through this configuration in green [If both systems fail, whatever the aircraft speed, the mechanism returns to the low speed position (+/- 30 rudder travel available)]. Why wouldn't a failure necessarily be annunciated? In many systems, in order to stop nuisance failure alerts caused by transient conditions, failure attention-getting is latched out either for a finite period or until an “off-line” self-test mode is completed. In the scenario that I have envisaged and described here, because the failure is a commonly held susceptibility to CADC data-flux, neither system gets to complete its self-check before it is called upon [by the other] to take over authority.... therefore no alerts and RLS systems that are dangerously making excursions into and out of (+/- 30 rudder travel available). End result? Inappropriate rudder deflection travels that in turn generate a requirement for correction (but those corrections are also overtravelled….). See the destructive continuum?
With a little further examination this type of mutual excitation failure may be able to be induced by other “inappropriately sensed failure” parameters (ticking faults?) and explain the FEDEX hangar failure and other instances of tail-wag. It may indeed cause a yaw-damper system to trip in protest (before start-up - say).
In the event of loss of both systems switching circuits located in each FLC provide a signal to retract the variable stop actuator to low speed position.
Does this hold true for the -605, and could the systems have failed with no announcement being produced on the flight deck?
To quote the a300-605R flight manual:
"2 independent rudder limiting systems controlled by the FLC, progressively decrease the maximum rudder travel from +/- 30 below 165kt to +/- 3.5 above 310kts. If both systems fail, whatever the aircraft speed, the mechanism returns to the low speed position (+/- 30 rudder travel available).
If the system does not return to the low speed position, an ECAM warning (indicating the rudder travel system is jammed in the high speed range) is activated when flaps are at 20 or more."
. Assume that a software(or design) glitch existed such that when large pressure transients are experienced (such as in a wake vortex) a rudder limiter system (RLS) trips itself into self-test (or hands over to the other RLS system - OR BOTH [see below]). Because their function is directly speed-related and their purpose is to progressively inhibit rudder travel, their one essential driving input must come from the CADC. But if the CADC's input data (and outputs) is in a state of flux because of transiting the wake vortex, you may see a situation where RLS1 hands to RLS2 (which is feeling the same strain about its own credibility and attempts immediately to hand-over back to RLS1 etc etc).
Now why would this occur? Some of these systems (and early systems in particular) were designed to hand-over and go into a self-test mode before declaring themselves failed (similar to a BITE check self-test on power-up). Great to have systems capable of mutual back-up - but not so great if they were to share a common glitch that could be brought about by an environmental (large short-term pressure transients) that had them swapping authority back and forth (or attempting to do so whilst simultaneously attempting to self-test). And what might be happening if they are handed and/or forced to accept authority whilst in that self-test? Why would they be? Perhaps because self-test is yet incomplete and as far as the FLC is concerned, they have not declared themselves failed or off-line and are therefore deemed available. Or perhaps they are passing their own self-test and are available (but only until back in operational authority)....
What we are talking about here is a scenario where both RLS systems are simultaneously experiencing the same "induced" failure mode (or something that is being self-interpreted as a failure - and which has them (or courtesy of the FLC) trying to hand-over to each other. In this weird interregnum you may indeed have the aircraft FLC (or pilots) trying to correct for sudden yaw but having to contend with excursions through this configuration in green [If both systems fail, whatever the aircraft speed, the mechanism returns to the low speed position (+/- 30 rudder travel available)]. Why wouldn't a failure necessarily be annunciated? In many systems, in order to stop nuisance failure alerts caused by transient conditions, failure attention-getting is latched out either for a finite period or until an “off-line” self-test mode is completed. In the scenario that I have envisaged and described here, because the failure is a commonly held susceptibility to CADC data-flux, neither system gets to complete its self-check before it is called upon [by the other] to take over authority.... therefore no alerts and RLS systems that are dangerously making excursions into and out of (+/- 30 rudder travel available). End result? Inappropriate rudder deflection travels that in turn generate a requirement for correction (but those corrections are also overtravelled….). See the destructive continuum?
With a little further examination this type of mutual excitation failure may be able to be induced by other “inappropriately sensed failure” parameters (ticking faults?) and explain the FEDEX hangar failure and other instances of tail-wag. It may indeed cause a yaw-damper system to trip in protest (before start-up - say).
Join Date: Dec 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 361
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
There are well over 3000 airbuses up there at anytime.
Very different plane to a Boeing,but it's an airliner that does a good job.
maybe the companies a little younger , but i would worry more working on a 737 / DC10
Very different plane to a Boeing,but it's an airliner that does a good job.
maybe the companies a little younger , but i would worry more working on a 737 / DC10
Join Date: Sep 2000
Location: England
Posts: 303
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Anti-Ice
You work for Airbus or a partner firm, right?
Your job is to stifle cogent debate by injecting inanities at the appropriate point, right?
Well done. You're earning your keep.
theShadow
You work for Airbus or a partner firm, right?
Your job is to stifle cogent debate by injecting inanities at the appropriate point, right?
Well done. You're earning your keep.
theShadow
Union Goon
Join Date: Feb 2000
Location: New Jersey, USA
Posts: 1,097
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Anti Ice,
Very few of those 3000 aircraft are more than 10 years old. Aging aircraft are the issue here, and it doesn't have to be structural that doesn't age well.
Cheers
Wino
Very few of those 3000 aircraft are more than 10 years old. Aging aircraft are the issue here, and it doesn't have to be structural that doesn't age well.
Cheers
Wino
Join Date: Jul 2001
Location: where I shouldn’t be
Posts: 427
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Belgique, bigbird
Thanks for the clarification. Notwithstanding the fact that the investigation has not yet concluded, it does appear as though a RLS “failure” has contributed to this accident.
Thanks for the clarification. Notwithstanding the fact that the investigation has not yet concluded, it does appear as though a RLS “failure” has contributed to this accident.
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: Obvious
Age: 78
Posts: 301
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
N380UA
That remains MY THEORY only.
The NTSB plighted their troth to the pilot rudder input theory at the last AA587 public hearing and now refuse to be swayed from that line (being the path of least resistance). Airbus also of course subscribe to the pilot error theory - because it fits their stance so well.
So in a system where the majority (of the major players) rules, nothing is going to change - notwithstanding any evidence, history, anecdotal reputation, expert opinion or cogent hypotheticals pointed elsewhere.
Of course having a DFDR that conveniently produced nothing useful (by way of telling data) also helped.
Belgique
That remains MY THEORY only.
The NTSB plighted their troth to the pilot rudder input theory at the last AA587 public hearing and now refuse to be swayed from that line (being the path of least resistance). Airbus also of course subscribe to the pilot error theory - because it fits their stance so well.
So in a system where the majority (of the major players) rules, nothing is going to change - notwithstanding any evidence, history, anecdotal reputation, expert opinion or cogent hypotheticals pointed elsewhere.
Of course having a DFDR that conveniently produced nothing useful (by way of telling data) also helped.
Belgique