WIZZ AIR Skiathos vid
Definitely had the 50' RA while still over the water. Had to level off, and the AT would (if on) have increased the power substantially. I'm actually amazed they didn't float more. IMNSHO absolutely should have been a GA.
But hey, it's Greece - plus there's a 3-way junction and even a car park in line with the runway.
Reading the brief is mandatory for all CAT C training/sign offs. You obviously showed competency in all areas, but if you feel that you would like more emphasis on short field techniques then tell the instructor next time you're in the sim. Or why not speak to someone from training management? I'm sure that they would appreciate constructive feedback.
There is only one way of landing a jet transport and that’s the one in the FCTM that you use every flight, irrespective of the runway dimensions. Yes, at the briefing stage you discuss the reduced margins and the importance of discontinuing the approach at any point up to reverser deployment, should any parameters be outside the limits you have set. This does not change the technique, just the focus you have in ensuring that you execute it as specified.
Not aimed at you at all Confusious, but “short field techniques” are for getting light aircraft in and out of farm strips: pushing the tail into the trees, full power on the brakes, watching the windsock, clipping the hedge on the way in, etc.
There is only one way of landing a jet transport and that’s the one in the FCTM that you use every flight, irrespective of the runway dimensions. Yes, at the briefing stage you discuss the reduced margins and the importance of discontinuing the approach at any point up to reverser deployment, should any parameters be outside the limits you have set. This does not change the technique, just the focus you have in ensuring that you execute it as specified.
There is only one way of landing a jet transport and that’s the one in the FCTM that you use every flight, irrespective of the runway dimensions. Yes, at the briefing stage you discuss the reduced margins and the importance of discontinuing the approach at any point up to reverser deployment, should any parameters be outside the limits you have set. This does not change the technique, just the focus you have in ensuring that you execute it as specified.
Absolutely. The interesting thing is that overruns don’t just happen on short runways; in fact medium to long ones appear to have a larger showing. Add a 10kt tailwind with medium braking action to a 2,500m runway and if you don’t get it in the TDZ at the right speed it could become the wrong sort of exciting - the effective LDA has been reduced to something like that at JSI by environmental conditions.
Maldives have a good airport at GAN/VRMG and Malé/ VRMM, Tahiti, NTAA, also has a pretty good airport with G/S on at least RWY04, the old VOR RWY 22 was uncomfortable for black hole in the midnight arrivals. None of those airports need special, rat cunning, sneak under the radar techniques to assure public safety. Tahiti has good pizza, great fromage and pain, and pretty average vin ordinaire. Malé is tight on ramp space, GAN is better for long stay, Maldives are beautiful.
Absolutely. The interesting thing is that overruns don’t just happen on short runways; in fact medium to long ones appear to have a larger showing. Add a 10kt tailwind with medium braking action to a 2,500m runway and if you don’t get it in the TDZ at the right speed it could become the wrong sort of exciting - the effective LDA has been reduced to something like that at JSI by environmental conditions.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Switzerland ... oh wait: Swaziland
Posts: 799
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Maldives have a good airport at GAN/VRMG and Malé/ VRMM, Tahiti, NTAA, also has a pretty good airport with G/S on at least RWY04, the old VOR RWY 22 was uncomfortable for black hole in the midnight arrivals. None of those airports need special, rat cunning, sneak under the radar techniques to assure public safety. Tahiti has good pizza, great fromage and pain, and pretty average vin ordinaire. Malé is tight on ramp space, GAN is better for long stay, Maldives are beautiful.
Join Date: Oct 2019
Location: SW1A 2AA
Posts: 210
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Sadly, boring Youtube videos of properly executed approaches don't attract clicks. Idiots showboating 6 feet above the Armco do. It amazes me that people here are willing to defend these types of antics. It only happens at JSI and not other short runways. Ask yourself why.
Join Date: Aug 2014
Location: Outer London
Age: 43
Posts: 607
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Possibly worth saying there’s airlines and crews that have been operating into JSI for years without a hitch. Wizz come along and within a couple of months they’ve managed to get themselves mainstream news coverage, a viral video and long thread on here.
Mass tourism at current levels won’t be sustained if people are flown into Volos with a coach and ferry transfer. More so for those that transfer on to Skopelos. In turn the island’s fragile economy tanks. Politically closing or restricting JSI is a non-starter. Discussing it is a waste of time.
Mass tourism at current levels won’t be sustained if people are flown into Volos with a coach and ferry transfer. More so for those that transfer on to Skopelos. In turn the island’s fragile economy tanks. Politically closing or restricting JSI is a non-starter. Discussing it is a waste of time.
Flight Detent, #102
decoding message; as most things depends on context.
The ‘RNAV’ point was addressed primarily to those in their armchairs.
RNAV re this approach is a valuable non precison aid, but use it within its capability - no more, i.e. inappropriately following FD to low altitude (below DA) as an ‘aid’, but not appreciating the potential corrupting influence of ‘aids’ in safety; a low integrity systems shows a good picture (like the thread video), but not ‘accurate’ or reliable in the sense being proposed by some views.
RNAV as a safety backup; if pseudo DME to touchdown is available - great; ideal, height (RA over sea) v distance cross checks, whilst looking out, forming and remembering the mental picture.
The video favoured the latter.
PAPI - sunlight surprises me - having been on the ground flood at their conception, test, use.
Perhaps an inferior (cheap?) version; safety report to EASA ha.
Re PAPI u/s; what mitigations, who. e.g. Operator, no night landing, day special cat; airport / regulator - ‘oh the pilot will managed’ (heard that somewhere before, re accidents).
Stop operations; radial, commercially harmful; but an attention getting incentive for the airport to fix the issue - safety is not cheap. A strongly worded ‘threading’ letter from operator to airport might help, even in Greece (pilot safety report to raise awareness of issue - push the responsibility back upwards).
Alternatively, misplaced faith in training, not all of the people, all of the time … HF suggests otherwise; so fix the environment, clarify the situation, change the system - oh but the pilot will manage … not always; need of a Safety-II viewpoint.
Variable performance (TCH) - an indication of normal human performance, or as an indictor of degrading safety margins?
Which, when, and what is the point of demarcation for changeover; who decides, which metrics.
Safety never stops.
decoding message; as most things depends on context.
The ‘RNAV’ point was addressed primarily to those in their armchairs.
RNAV re this approach is a valuable non precison aid, but use it within its capability - no more, i.e. inappropriately following FD to low altitude (below DA) as an ‘aid’, but not appreciating the potential corrupting influence of ‘aids’ in safety; a low integrity systems shows a good picture (like the thread video), but not ‘accurate’ or reliable in the sense being proposed by some views.
RNAV as a safety backup; if pseudo DME to touchdown is available - great; ideal, height (RA over sea) v distance cross checks, whilst looking out, forming and remembering the mental picture.
The video favoured the latter.
PAPI - sunlight surprises me - having been on the ground flood at their conception, test, use.
Perhaps an inferior (cheap?) version; safety report to EASA ha.
Re PAPI u/s; what mitigations, who. e.g. Operator, no night landing, day special cat; airport / regulator - ‘oh the pilot will managed’ (heard that somewhere before, re accidents).
Stop operations; radial, commercially harmful; but an attention getting incentive for the airport to fix the issue - safety is not cheap. A strongly worded ‘threading’ letter from operator to airport might help, even in Greece (pilot safety report to raise awareness of issue - push the responsibility back upwards).
Alternatively, misplaced faith in training, not all of the people, all of the time … HF suggests otherwise; so fix the environment, clarify the situation, change the system - oh but the pilot will manage … not always; need of a Safety-II viewpoint.
Variable performance (TCH) - an indication of normal human performance, or as an indictor of degrading safety margins?
Which, when, and what is the point of demarcation for changeover; who decides, which metrics.
Safety never stops.
Flight Detent, #102
decoding message; as most things depends on context.
The ‘RNAV’ point was addressed primarily to those in their armchairs.
RNAV re this approach is a valuable non precison aid, but use it within its capability - no more, i.e. inappropriately following FD to low altitude (below DA) as an ‘aid’, but not appreciating the potential corrupting influence of ‘aids’ in safety; a low integrity systems shows a good picture (like the thread video), but not ‘accurate’ or reliable in the sense being proposed by some views.
RNAV as a safety backup; if pseudo DME to touchdown is available - great; ideal, height (RA over sea) v distance cross checks, whilst looking out, forming and remembering the mental picture.
The video favoured the latter.
PAPI - sunlight surprises me - having been on the ground flood at their conception, test, use.
Perhaps an inferior (cheap?) version; safety report to EASA ha.
Re PAPI u/s; what mitigations, who. e.g. Operator, no night landing, day special cat; airport / regulator - ‘oh the pilot will managed’ (heard that somewhere before, re accidents).
Stop operations; radial, commercially harmful; but an attention getting incentive for the airport to fix the issue - safety is not cheap. A strongly worded ‘threading’ letter from operator to airport might help, even in Greece (pilot safety report to raise awareness of issue - push the responsibility back upwards).
Alternatively, misplaced faith in training, not all of the people, all of the time … HF suggests otherwise; so fix the environment, clarify the situation, change the system - oh but the pilot will manage … not always; need of a Safety-II viewpoint.
Variable performance (TCH) - an indication of normal human performance, or as an indictor of degrading safety margins?
Which, when, and what is the point of demarcation for changeover; who decides, which metrics.
Safety never stops.
decoding message; as most things depends on context.
The ‘RNAV’ point was addressed primarily to those in their armchairs.
RNAV re this approach is a valuable non precison aid, but use it within its capability - no more, i.e. inappropriately following FD to low altitude (below DA) as an ‘aid’, but not appreciating the potential corrupting influence of ‘aids’ in safety; a low integrity systems shows a good picture (like the thread video), but not ‘accurate’ or reliable in the sense being proposed by some views.
RNAV as a safety backup; if pseudo DME to touchdown is available - great; ideal, height (RA over sea) v distance cross checks, whilst looking out, forming and remembering the mental picture.
The video favoured the latter.
PAPI - sunlight surprises me - having been on the ground flood at their conception, test, use.
Perhaps an inferior (cheap?) version; safety report to EASA ha.
Re PAPI u/s; what mitigations, who. e.g. Operator, no night landing, day special cat; airport / regulator - ‘oh the pilot will managed’ (heard that somewhere before, re accidents).
Stop operations; radial, commercially harmful; but an attention getting incentive for the airport to fix the issue - safety is not cheap. A strongly worded ‘threading’ letter from operator to airport might help, even in Greece (pilot safety report to raise awareness of issue - push the responsibility back upwards).
Alternatively, misplaced faith in training, not all of the people, all of the time … HF suggests otherwise; so fix the environment, clarify the situation, change the system - oh but the pilot will manage … not always; need of a Safety-II viewpoint.
Variable performance (TCH) - an indication of normal human performance, or as an indictor of degrading safety margins?
Which, when, and what is the point of demarcation for changeover; who decides, which metrics.
Safety never stops.
Pilots don't 'manage' in that sense, they do their job professionally in accordance with set procedures. Licencing of Airfields, Airlines and Pilots is not a grey area, it's black or white. All three must operate professionally with no compromise to achieve the desired outcome, flight safety.
In the case of this event, the pilots did not operate without compromise. Departed the correct and hopefully briefed profile, yet failed to execute a Go-Around. It's the latter that's inexcusable. Sorry, but you can't blame the airline or the airport for the pilots not going around.
If you believe that the airline or airport compromised safety then do what you should do as a professional, file a report.
Last edited by Confusious; 13th Aug 2022 at 14:36.
Confusious, perhaps you overlooked my ‘hidden’ 
Re back and white; the nature of modern ‘rule based’ operations, is that reality requires all shades of grey. If not, then actual operations will continue to be constrained with mind numbing cognitive dissonance.
The alternative is to have open-minded flexible thinking, ability (and authority) to adjust, adapt; which requires the change in management style, regulation, with delegated authority to those who face reality.
People don't fail; an alternative perspective is that they are doing their best in the circumstances as they understood at the time - awareness; perception + influencing factors (rules, regulation).
‘Failure’ is our admission that we don't have the same view which the crew had, and that we do not understand the crews awareness, or why their choice of action was not as required for the situation.
Beware hindsight bias.
It is not possible to train crews to manage these situations all of the time (we are human); so change the situation to help them.
The above can be labeled ‘as imagined’ or ‘as done’, according to personal bias, but the list should also include awareness and action ‘as required’, for those who were actually there.
“… file a report”
… is there an ’app’ for that, linked directly to Pprune !
Re back and white; the nature of modern ‘rule based’ operations, is that reality requires all shades of grey. If not, then actual operations will continue to be constrained with mind numbing cognitive dissonance.
The alternative is to have open-minded flexible thinking, ability (and authority) to adjust, adapt; which requires the change in management style, regulation, with delegated authority to those who face reality.
People don't fail; an alternative perspective is that they are doing their best in the circumstances as they understood at the time - awareness; perception + influencing factors (rules, regulation).
‘Failure’ is our admission that we don't have the same view which the crew had, and that we do not understand the crews awareness, or why their choice of action was not as required for the situation.
Beware hindsight bias.
It is not possible to train crews to manage these situations all of the time (we are human); so change the situation to help them.
The above can be labeled ‘as imagined’ or ‘as done’, according to personal bias, but the list should also include awareness and action ‘as required’, for those who were actually there.
“… file a report”
… is there an ’app’ for that, linked directly to Pprune !
Confusious, perhaps you overlooked my ‘hidden’
Re back and white; the nature of modern ‘rule based’ operations, is that reality requires all shades of grey. If not, then actual operations will continue to be constrained with mind numbing cognitive dissonance.
The alternative is to have open-minded flexible thinking, ability (and authority) to adjust, adapt; which requires the change in management style, regulation, with delegated authority to those who face reality.
People don't fail; an alternative perspective is that they are doing their best in the circumstances as they understood at the time - awareness; perception + influencing factors (rules, regulation).
‘Failure’ is our admission that we don't have the same view which the crew had, and that we do not understand the crews awareness, or why their choice of action was not as required for the situation.
Beware hindsight bias.
It is not possible to train crews to manage these situations all of the time (we are human); so change the situation to help them.
The above can be labeled ‘as imagined’ or ‘as done’, according to personal bias, but the list should also include awareness and action ‘as required’, for those who were actually there.
“… file a report” … is there an ’app’ for that, linked directly to Pprune !
Re back and white; the nature of modern ‘rule based’ operations, is that reality requires all shades of grey. If not, then actual operations will continue to be constrained with mind numbing cognitive dissonance.
The alternative is to have open-minded flexible thinking, ability (and authority) to adjust, adapt; which requires the change in management style, regulation, with delegated authority to those who face reality.
People don't fail; an alternative perspective is that they are doing their best in the circumstances as they understood at the time - awareness; perception + influencing factors (rules, regulation).
‘Failure’ is our admission that we don't have the same view which the crew had, and that we do not understand the crews awareness, or why their choice of action was not as required for the situation.
Beware hindsight bias.
It is not possible to train crews to manage these situations all of the time (we are human); so change the situation to help them.
The above can be labeled ‘as imagined’ or ‘as done’, according to personal bias, but the list should also include awareness and action ‘as required’, for those who were actually there.
“… file a report”
… is there an ’app’ for that, linked directly to Pprune !2. https://www.caa.co.uk/our-work/make-...afety-concern/
3. https://hcaa.gov.gr/en/faq/pos-na-anaferete-stin-apa
4. https://www.easa.europa.eu/confident...fety-reporting
Beware hindsight bias.
It is not possible to train crews to manage these situations all of the time (we are human); so change the situation to help them.
Of course we're all human and have all made mistakes. It may well have been a mistake to end up low, but it wasn't a mistake not to have executed a Go-Around.
How can the situation be changed?
- Extend the runway
- Stop Wizz flying there
Can't think of any other ways.
It is not possible to train crews to manage these situations all of the time (we are human); so change the situation to help them.
Of course we're all human and have all made mistakes. It may well have been a mistake to end up low, but it wasn't a mistake not to have executed a Go-Around.
How can the situation be changed?
- Extend the runway
- Stop Wizz flying there
Can't think of any other ways.