Originally Posted by
safetypee
Flight Detent, #102
decoding message; as most things depends on context.
The ‘RNAV’ point was addressed primarily to those in their armchairs.
RNAV re this approach is a valuable non precison aid, but use it within its capability - no more, i.e. inappropriately following FD to low altitude (below DA) as an ‘aid’, but not appreciating the potential corrupting influence of ‘aids’ in safety; a low integrity systems shows a good picture (like the thread video), but not ‘accurate’ or reliable in the sense being proposed by some views.
RNAV as a safety backup; if pseudo DME to touchdown is available - great; ideal, height (RA over sea) v distance cross checks, whilst looking out, forming and remembering the mental picture.
The video favoured the latter.
PAPI - sunlight surprises me - having been on the ground flood at their conception, test, use.
Perhaps an inferior (cheap?) version; safety report to EASA ha.
Re PAPI u/s; what mitigations, who. e.g. Operator, no night landing, day special cat; airport / regulator - ‘oh the pilot will managed’ (heard that somewhere before, re accidents).
Stop operations; radial, commercially harmful; but an attention getting incentive for the airport to fix the issue - safety is not cheap. A strongly worded ‘threading’ letter from operator to airport might help, even in Greece (pilot safety report to raise awareness of issue - push the responsibility back upwards).
Alternatively, misplaced faith in training, not all of the people, all of the time … HF suggests otherwise; so fix the environment, clarify the situation, change the system - oh but the pilot will manage … not always; need of a Safety-II viewpoint.
Variable performance (TCH) - an indication of normal human performance, or as an indictor of degrading safety margins?
Which, when, and what is the point of demarcation for changeover; who decides, which metrics.
Safety never stops.