EK 231 20 December DXB IAD near crash?
Air NZ plane nose-dive under investigation (behind paywall)
"UPDATED: Air New Zealand says the climb guidance system was involved.
The Civil Aviation Authority has confirmed its safety investigation unit is looking into an incident involving an Air New Zealand Boeing 777, which nose-dived soon after take-off from Rarotonga."
"UPDATED: Air New Zealand says the climb guidance system was involved.
The Civil Aviation Authority has confirmed its safety investigation unit is looking into an incident involving an Air New Zealand Boeing 777, which nose-dived soon after take-off from Rarotonga."
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Your naivety is refreshing. To suggest such a sweeping cultural change after working there means you have much more faith in humanity in general, and Arab dictatorships in particular, than anyone else I know. But if they were not so messed up, they would not need us, would they? A dictatorship runs on fear and punishment countered against special privileges for the compliant and connected.
For those who actually trained people there, this is no surprise. Female captain, local FO-flying a perfectly good plane into the ground because the F/D points down? Sure, totally credible to me. Saying nothing as someone drives the plane into the buildings? Hell, yes! Totally expected. Staring straight ahead, glazed look in the eyes, slack jaw, locked out of this world, not responding to a single radio call, not a single SOP, after a minor incident? Hell, yes! It happened to me. Single pilot on a 777. And, to be fair, whacked out of my mind with 50 time zones a month, maybe that guy will be me next time.
Standby for the next one.
For those who actually trained people there, this is no surprise. Female captain, local FO-flying a perfectly good plane into the ground because the F/D points down? Sure, totally credible to me. Saying nothing as someone drives the plane into the buildings? Hell, yes! Totally expected. Staring straight ahead, glazed look in the eyes, slack jaw, locked out of this world, not responding to a single radio call, not a single SOP, after a minor incident? Hell, yes! It happened to me. Single pilot on a 777. And, to be fair, whacked out of my mind with 50 time zones a month, maybe that guy will be me next time.
Standby for the next one.
Last edited by VThokie2; 30th Dec 2021 at 19:59.
The UK's Exercise CYGNUS, was a pre pandemic simulation, the result of which was largely ignored. Professional medics warned the Government of the consequences of mass infection. Here we are on a pilot forum looking at the warning signs of systemisation and no-one is listening.
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Didn't have the strength to pull.
This one crossed my mind as well. I have personally experienced something like this in a 777. AP was engaged all the time at the gate, and we found out it was engaged when we did the flight controls check after engine start. This disengaged the AP due to the control forces needed, and the wailer went off when it disengaged.
In our case it turned out that maintenance had engaged it to do some work, and had left it engaged, and left the cockpit when we arrived before the flight.
Didn’t AirFrance attempt a takeoff with the AP engaged in Port Harcourt with a 777? Thought they did…
EDIT
Found it. A/P engaged takeoff attempt:
Incident: Air France B773 at Lagos on Jan 12th 2010, rejected takeoff
In our case it turned out that maintenance had engaged it to do some work, and had left it engaged, and left the cockpit when we arrived before the flight.
Didn’t AirFrance attempt a takeoff with the AP engaged in Port Harcourt with a 777? Thought they did…
EDIT
Found it. A/P engaged takeoff attempt:
Incident: Air France B773 at Lagos on Jan 12th 2010, rejected takeoff
No pilot would carry on belting down the runway at 200+ knots without pulling like mad. Something was physically stuck and it took precious time to overcome.
"The captain explained later, that he rejected takeoff because he felt the elevators were blocked when he pulled for rotation."
"On February 24th 2009 Boeing had advised operators about the possibility of the manual but unintentional engagement of the autopilot, which significantly increases control pressures needed to achieve rotation of the aircraft. On January 22nd 2010 released a service bulletin advising of a new autopilot software version, which prevents the engagement of the autopilot during the takeoff run. Air France has since applied the service bulletin to all their Boeing 777s. The FAA issued an airworthiness directive mandating the new software to be installed within 90 days following April 1st 2010."
"On February 24th 2009 Boeing had advised operators about the possibility of the manual but unintentional engagement of the autopilot, which significantly increases control pressures needed to achieve rotation of the aircraft. On January 22nd 2010 released a service bulletin advising of a new autopilot software version, which prevents the engagement of the autopilot during the takeoff run. Air France has since applied the service bulletin to all their Boeing 777s. The FAA issued an airworthiness directive mandating the new software to be installed within 90 days following April 1st 2010."
This is a pleasant and informative read and the website has many more good reads. Food for thought for all pilots;
https://www.innerairmanship.com/blog...ow-gain-pilot/
https://www.innerairmanship.com/blog...ow-gain-pilot/
The comments here about looking outside the window vs being on instruments I suspect is from non jet flying pilots. I recall a quick survey being done on where people look for rotation and it was 50:50 inside vs outside. HOWEVER, those who do look outside for the initial rotation quickly look back inside to the PFD to see where their initial rotation has come to and adjust according to the degree graduations, as opposed to the FD. Almost all said this is as the gear is unsticking or has just become airborne. So really, most people are rotating on instruments because they quickly look inside to see here they are - particularly important on the 777 with regard to tail scrapes.
The use of the FD for rotation I have to admit is incongruous. It moves to a pre determined and fixed attitude until airborne and so is a waste of time initially. Rotate towards 15degrees, get established in the climb and then start following FD cues WHEN IT CATCHES UP. So the point is - those rotating purely based upon head inside aren’t using the FD, they are using the PFD to rotate to an angle and checking speed, then checking to see what the FD is doing. If there are Boeing jet pilots that are rotating solely on the movement of the FD I’d be very surprised, and to be honest anybody who is is very poorly trained (I’d find it hard to believe they’d been trained) and has rocks in their heads.
The use of the FD for rotation I have to admit is incongruous. It moves to a pre determined and fixed attitude until airborne and so is a waste of time initially. Rotate towards 15degrees, get established in the climb and then start following FD cues WHEN IT CATCHES UP. So the point is - those rotating purely based upon head inside aren’t using the FD, they are using the PFD to rotate to an angle and checking speed, then checking to see what the FD is doing. If there are Boeing jet pilots that are rotating solely on the movement of the FD I’d be very surprised, and to be honest anybody who is is very poorly trained (I’d find it hard to believe they’d been trained) and has rocks in their heads.
There are posts on this thread about looking out of the window during rotation, and then transitioning to focus on the FD.
This doesn't work if a) it's foggy ; or b) if you're taking off over water, at night, with no external light sources for reference.
Boeing occasionally send test pilots to airlines who operate Boeings. They hand out Boeing pens and other goodies to crews, and also suggest the best methods they've found of operating the aircraft. These methods might occasionally conflict with the information in the Boeing FCTM.
The ones I've listened to recommend looking at the PFD at the rotate call, and if you have an engine failure, look at the (inertial) slip indicator.
This doesn't work if a) it's foggy ; or b) if you're taking off over water, at night, with no external light sources for reference.
Boeing occasionally send test pilots to airlines who operate Boeings. They hand out Boeing pens and other goodies to crews, and also suggest the best methods they've found of operating the aircraft. These methods might occasionally conflict with the information in the Boeing FCTM.
The ones I've listened to recommend looking at the PFD at the rotate call, and if you have an engine failure, look at the (inertial) slip indicator.
The PF should start the rotation by looking out the window and then transition to the PFD when the horizon is no longer visible. That's the way that is has always been, and it is the way it will continue to be.
Particularly important during an EFATO as eyes at the end of the runway to the last minute prevents that journey off the side of the pavement. Centerline is a much better que of where you are going, and much lower workload to interpret then a slidslip indicator at the top of a PFD
It's also transition to the PFD not FD. Set the attitude you need, and then let the FDs catch up.
In fog, or on a black hole night departure, the transition may occur a bit earlier, but the technique is the same.
There are several posts now stating that concentrating on the TV screens when hearing the word rotate is a solid technique. I am guessing this has been introduced from the modern airline pilot doing the majority of his/her Training in a simulator and not an aircraft.
The PF should start the rotation by looking out the window and then transition to the PFD when the horizon is no longer visible. That's the way that is has always been, and it is the way it will continue to be.
Particularly important during an EFATO as eyes at the end of the runway to the last minute prevents that journey off the side of the pavement. Centerline is a much better que of where you are going, and much lower workload to interpret then a slidslip indicator at the top of a PFD
It's also transition to the PFD not FD. Set the attitude you need, and then let the FDs catch up.
In fog, or on a black hole night departure, the transition may occur a bit earlier, but the technique is the same.
The PF should start the rotation by looking out the window and then transition to the PFD when the horizon is no longer visible. That's the way that is has always been, and it is the way it will continue to be.
Particularly important during an EFATO as eyes at the end of the runway to the last minute prevents that journey off the side of the pavement. Centerline is a much better que of where you are going, and much lower workload to interpret then a slidslip indicator at the top of a PFD
It's also transition to the PFD not FD. Set the attitude you need, and then let the FDs catch up.
In fog, or on a black hole night departure, the transition may occur a bit earlier, but the technique is the same.
Paxing All Over The World
I am Pax of 56 years experience. I am just reading the autoiography of Dr Alan Diehl, legendary of the NTSB and FAA for the Human Factors training programmes.
He is fascinating and one of his earliest success' as an ASI was to reveal the illegal rulings of the the owner of Downeast Airlines (Robert Stenger) and the culture he had, causing the deaths of crew and passengers. The crash that revealed publicly what was already known in private, was in May 1979. That was a tiny regional in the new days of deregulation.
Now, with a major world carrier, 40 years on, here we are again. Unfortunately, too many countries do not want to upset the ME. As we know from The Tombstone Imperative, not enough people have died - yet.
He is fascinating and one of his earliest success' as an ASI was to reveal the illegal rulings of the the owner of Downeast Airlines (Robert Stenger) and the culture he had, causing the deaths of crew and passengers. The crash that revealed publicly what was already known in private, was in May 1979. That was a tiny regional in the new days of deregulation.
Now, with a major world carrier, 40 years on, here we are again. Unfortunately, too many countries do not want to upset the ME. As we know from The Tombstone Imperative, not enough people have died - yet.
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This is a simple black of basic flying skills, during take off, you are supposed to take off.
That's it.
on all Boeing fctm you're told to rotate at whatever ac type deg/second to accomplish rotation at V2+15, and when at initial climb attitude with gear up , follow FD.
2 points
Both Cessna 150 and Airbus A380, B777/747 whatever plane, flies for the same reason: pitch plus power.
If a four stripe lady signing the techlog on a B777 still didn't get it, I would question Emirates rosters, fatigue involved and overall selection criteria.
Some people just CANNOT be pilots, that's exactly the case.
The part in which colleagues are talking about FMA, balanced field, V speeds etc is way out of the cognitive capacity of the '"crew" involved.
Sadly it's much easier than that, we are facing what low skill people can do with an airliner.
The fact that they flew back to DXB doesn't surprise me. Would you expect monkeys to be pilots or monkeys?
That's it.
on all Boeing fctm you're told to rotate at whatever ac type deg/second to accomplish rotation at V2+15, and when at initial climb attitude with gear up , follow FD.
2 points
Both Cessna 150 and Airbus A380, B777/747 whatever plane, flies for the same reason: pitch plus power.
If a four stripe lady signing the techlog on a B777 still didn't get it, I would question Emirates rosters, fatigue involved and overall selection criteria.
Some people just CANNOT be pilots, that's exactly the case.
The part in which colleagues are talking about FMA, balanced field, V speeds etc is way out of the cognitive capacity of the '"crew" involved.
Sadly it's much easier than that, we are facing what low skill people can do with an airliner.
The fact that they flew back to DXB doesn't surprise me. Would you expect monkeys to be pilots or monkeys?
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Totally agree with fulminn on basic flying skills
This is when children of the magenta line meet culture of fear……
If you create a system of punishing deviations from SOPs, procedures and rules then some people will act in strange ways. No one said rotate so I won’t, the flight director hasn’t moved so I can’t deviate from it….
Thankfully only a very, very small number of pilots would act in this way. As Fired 600 alludes to it is rather unfortunate that they got rid of so much experience last year.
This is when children of the magenta line meet culture of fear……
If you create a system of punishing deviations from SOPs, procedures and rules then some people will act in strange ways. No one said rotate so I won’t, the flight director hasn’t moved so I can’t deviate from it….
Thankfully only a very, very small number of pilots would act in this way. As Fired 600 alludes to it is rather unfortunate that they got rid of so much experience last year.
Simple
fulminn; heed the words of Von Clausewitz - “Everything in war is very simple. But the simplest thing is difficult.”
And the longer we persist with a simple view, the more likely we do not understand the issue.
And the longer we persist with a simple view, the more likely we do not understand the issue.
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Totally agree with fulminn on basic flying skills
This is when children of the magenta line meet culture of fear……
If you create a system of punishing deviations from SOPs, procedures and rules then some people will act in strange ways. No one said rotate so I won’t, the flight director hasn’t moved so I can’t deviate from it….
Thankfully only a very, very small number of pilots would act in this way. As Fired 600 alludes to it is rather unfortunate that they got rid of so much experience last year.
This is when children of the magenta line meet culture of fear……
If you create a system of punishing deviations from SOPs, procedures and rules then some people will act in strange ways. No one said rotate so I won’t, the flight director hasn’t moved so I can’t deviate from it….
Thankfully only a very, very small number of pilots would act in this way. As Fired 600 alludes to it is rather unfortunate that they got rid of so much experience last year.
Totally agree with fulminn on basic flying skills
To
This is when children of the magenta line meet culture of fear……
If you create a system of punishing deviations from SOPs, procedures and rules then some people will act in strange ways. No one said rotate so I won’t, the flight director hasn’t moved so I can’t deviate from it….
Thankfully only a very, very small number of pilots would act in this way. As Fired 600 alludes to it is rather unfortunate that they got rid of so much experience last year.
To
This is when children of the magenta line meet culture of fear……
If you create a system of punishing deviations from SOPs, procedures and rules then some people will act in strange ways. No one said rotate so I won’t, the flight director hasn’t moved so I can’t deviate from it….
Thankfully only a very, very small number of pilots would act in this way. As Fired 600 alludes to it is rather unfortunate that they got rid of so much experience last year.
The UK's Exercise CYGNUS, was a pre pandemic simulation, the result of which was largely ignored. Professional medics warned the Government of the consequences of mass infection. Here we are on a pilot forum looking at the warning signs of systemisation and no-one is listening.
I still can't believe that any crew would continue accelerating on the runway 50+ kts past Vr without having rotated or RTO'ed well beforehand, so I don't understand what could have gone wrong, but some general thoughts:
a) Today's pilots don't always go from flight school to simple turbo-prop to simple jet, then big jet; building valuable experience on the way. Thus, actual flying is not being cemented before they are faced with very comprehensive automation.
b) Prospective pilot employees now have to pass ridiculous time-limited computer tests and puzzles and psychometric tests which tell nothing about actual piloting ability.
c) A safe flying culture is one where problems and mistakes, including minor ones, are used as a learning tool for the greater good. Lessons from mistakes have been learned many times over, and some are sadly quite literally written in blood.
On a) : Having said that, even a 10hr pilot of a PA-28 knows that you pull the stick back at the appropriate airspeed to take-off !
On b) : I personally think it is high-time that HR kept their noses out of pilot recruitment. Having to pass 20 maths questions in 12 minutes for example, or do computer puzzles and word games, proves nothing about a pilot's ability to pilot, or their situational awareness, or their experience of bad weather flying.
We seem to be going backwards in aviation safety. We have seen an aircraft take off with both engine cowls unsecured, because nobody did a walk-around. We have seen botched go-arounds. We have seen a "pilot" hold full back-stick up at FL 3xx for an extended period of time.
Something fundamental appears to be being missed by airlines and HR - the fundamental ability to fly and be a pilot.
On c) : Airlines which try to suppress mistakes and errors by passive aggression, (e.g. interviews or bullying for going outside SOPs or for taking the AP out), are treading a very dangerous path. Overall safety will not improve because under that sort of regime pilots will not step outside the automation or report incidences, and therefore lessons will not be learned.
a) Today's pilots don't always go from flight school to simple turbo-prop to simple jet, then big jet; building valuable experience on the way. Thus, actual flying is not being cemented before they are faced with very comprehensive automation.
b) Prospective pilot employees now have to pass ridiculous time-limited computer tests and puzzles and psychometric tests which tell nothing about actual piloting ability.
c) A safe flying culture is one where problems and mistakes, including minor ones, are used as a learning tool for the greater good. Lessons from mistakes have been learned many times over, and some are sadly quite literally written in blood.
On a) : Having said that, even a 10hr pilot of a PA-28 knows that you pull the stick back at the appropriate airspeed to take-off !
On b) : I personally think it is high-time that HR kept their noses out of pilot recruitment. Having to pass 20 maths questions in 12 minutes for example, or do computer puzzles and word games, proves nothing about a pilot's ability to pilot, or their situational awareness, or their experience of bad weather flying.
We seem to be going backwards in aviation safety. We have seen an aircraft take off with both engine cowls unsecured, because nobody did a walk-around. We have seen botched go-arounds. We have seen a "pilot" hold full back-stick up at FL 3xx for an extended period of time.
Something fundamental appears to be being missed by airlines and HR - the fundamental ability to fly and be a pilot.
On c) : Airlines which try to suppress mistakes and errors by passive aggression, (e.g. interviews or bullying for going outside SOPs or for taking the AP out), are treading a very dangerous path. Overall safety will not improve because under that sort of regime pilots will not step outside the automation or report incidences, and therefore lessons will not be learned.
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I still can't believe that any crew would continue accelerating on the runway 50+ kts past Vr without having rotated or RTO'ed well beforehand, so I don't understand what could have gone wrong, but some general thoughts:
a) Today's pilots don't always go from flight school to simple turbo-prop to simple jet, then big jet; building valuable experience on the way. Thus, actual flying is not being cemented before they are faced with very comprehensive automation.
b) Prospective pilot employees now have to pass ridiculous time-limited computer tests and puzzles and psychometric tests which tell nothing about actual piloting ability.
c) A safe flying culture is one where problems and mistakes, including minor ones, are used as a learning tool for the greater good. Lessons from mistakes have been learned many times over, and some are sadly quite literally written in blood.
On a) : Having said that, even a 10hr pilot of a PA-28 knows that you pull the stick back at the appropriate airspeed to take-off !
On b) : I personally think it is high-time that HR kept their noses out of pilot recruitment. Having to pass 20 maths questions in 12 minutes for example, or do computer puzzles and word games, proves nothing about a pilot's ability to pilot, or their situational awareness, or their experience of bad weather flying.
We seem to be going backwards in aviation safety. We have seen an aircraft take off with both engine cowls unsecured, because nobody did a walk-around. We have seen botched go-arounds. We have seen a "pilot" hold full back-stick up at FL 3xx for an extended period of time.
Something fundamental appears to be being missed by airlines and HR - the fundamental ability to fly and be a pilot.
On c) : Airlines which try to suppress mistakes and errors by passive aggression, (e.g. interviews or bullying for going outside SOPs or for taking the AP out), are treading a very dangerous path. Overall safety will not improve because under that sort of regime pilots will not step outside the automation or report incidences, and therefore lessons will not be learned.
a) Today's pilots don't always go from flight school to simple turbo-prop to simple jet, then big jet; building valuable experience on the way. Thus, actual flying is not being cemented before they are faced with very comprehensive automation.
b) Prospective pilot employees now have to pass ridiculous time-limited computer tests and puzzles and psychometric tests which tell nothing about actual piloting ability.
c) A safe flying culture is one where problems and mistakes, including minor ones, are used as a learning tool for the greater good. Lessons from mistakes have been learned many times over, and some are sadly quite literally written in blood.
On a) : Having said that, even a 10hr pilot of a PA-28 knows that you pull the stick back at the appropriate airspeed to take-off !
On b) : I personally think it is high-time that HR kept their noses out of pilot recruitment. Having to pass 20 maths questions in 12 minutes for example, or do computer puzzles and word games, proves nothing about a pilot's ability to pilot, or their situational awareness, or their experience of bad weather flying.
We seem to be going backwards in aviation safety. We have seen an aircraft take off with both engine cowls unsecured, because nobody did a walk-around. We have seen botched go-arounds. We have seen a "pilot" hold full back-stick up at FL 3xx for an extended period of time.
Something fundamental appears to be being missed by airlines and HR - the fundamental ability to fly and be a pilot.
On c) : Airlines which try to suppress mistakes and errors by passive aggression, (e.g. interviews or bullying for going outside SOPs or for taking the AP out), are treading a very dangerous path. Overall safety will not improve because under that sort of regime pilots will not step outside the automation or report incidences, and therefore lessons will not be learned.
Exactly Uplinker , the HR circus must be taken out from this clowns that judge a pilot regarding is ability to mentally calculate the square root of 19213 or so. It is difficult to understand why in modern “ aviation “ a cadet pilot with 200 hr is considered safe , while thousand of others with 10/20.000 hr of flying are useless just because their last flight was 12/24 months ago.
Give or take a couple of hundred feet.. this last ‘ event’ might have not been very cheap.
