EK 231 20 December DXB IAD near crash?
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Read the earlier posts. Mis-set Alt Sel meant the FD didn't give an initial take-off pitch target, instead it was probably in Alt. Have a read of post #15!
The assumption therefore being that the PF didn't apply any significant nose-up to rotate until they got to the far end of the rwy.
The assumption therefore being that the PF didn't apply any significant nose-up to rotate until they got to the far end of the rwy.
Maybe the take off was attempted with the autopilot engaged on the ground. This has happened once before in a 777, off 12R as I recall. I believe the pitch mode was ALT and the ASR quoted the pilot as reporting "higher than usual stick force" required to rotate the aircraft. It was not a ULR flight so although they used a lot of additional runway they still didn't hit anything. Washington would be a different story. I'm not saying this is what happened but it is reminiscent of the other event and to the best of my knowledge nothing was changed to prevent it happening again.
In our case it turned out that maintenance had engaged it to do some work, and had left it engaged, and left the cockpit when we arrived before the flight.
Didn’t AirFrance attempt a takeoff with the AP engaged in Port Harcourt with a 777? Thought they did…
EDIT
Found it. A/P engaged takeoff attempt:
http://www.avherald.com/h?article=428c9bdd/0000&opt=0
Last edited by fox niner; 29th Dec 2021 at 08:15.
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The avherald article doesn’t make sense. At the rotate call the PF looks solely outside whilst rotating until the runway / horizon starts to disappear then transfers onto the FD. At this point the pitch attitude will be around 7-10 degrees, which is the single engine climb out range, 2 engine about 12-15 depending how much improved climb. So they would have had to pitch forward again to follow the FD which would be totally counter intuitive unless you encountered severe windshear. If the FD was commanding a pitch down you would instinctively check the airspeed. If it was still increasing you wouldn’t push forward. If it was decreasing then either windshear or airspeed unreliable (like the lufthansa cargo 777 crew who had exactly this recently and did a great job recognising and recovering from it). If there’s any doubt then 10 degrees pitch and 85 % N1 will achieve a safe climb out. And as PM if the PF started pushing forward it would feel horrible and immediate intervention would surely occur?
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With the Triple 7 on ground, selecting the first FD ON activates ALT pitch mode if selected MCP Altitude is within 20 feet of displayed Baro Altitude.
Some pilots have the bad habit of setting 100kts, Hdg 360 and Alt 00000 after shutdown. The electrical power up sets the MCP altitude to 10,000 (intentional design feature by Boeing?)
How the entire crew missed this during instruments scan, and during the Takeoff review and then blindly following FDs after initial rotation, if in fact this is what happened, is another question altogether....
OW
Some pilots have the bad habit of setting 100kts, Hdg 360 and Alt 00000 after shutdown. The electrical power up sets the MCP altitude to 10,000 (intentional design feature by Boeing?)
How the entire crew missed this during instruments scan, and during the Takeoff review and then blindly following FDs after initial rotation, if in fact this is what happened, is another question altogether....
OW
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With the Triple 7 on ground, selecting the first FD ON activates ALT pitch mode if selected MCP Altitude is within 20 feet of displayed Baro Altitude.
Some pilots have the bad habit of setting 100kts, Hdg 360 and Alt 00000 after shutdown. The electrical power up sets the MCP altitude to 10,000 (intentional design feature by Boeing?)
How the entire crew missed this during instruments scan, and during the Takeoff review and then blindly following FDs after initial rotation, if in fact this is what happened, is another question altogether....
OW
Some pilots have the bad habit of setting 100kts, Hdg 360 and Alt 00000 after shutdown. The electrical power up sets the MCP altitude to 10,000 (intentional design feature by Boeing?)
How the entire crew missed this during instruments scan, and during the Takeoff review and then blindly following FDs after initial rotation, if in fact this is what happened, is another question altogether....
OW
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I just won’t believe that the PF was not rotating because the FD didn’t move upwards.
The PF is looking out the window, initiating the rotation at “rotate” call from the PM. No-one should focus on the FD at that particular moment.
There has to be something else to it! Must be! Whether the AP was engaged or some trim/flight control issues etc. It simply can’t be just the FD’s.
Therefore don’t judge the crew to easily before the initial report comes out.
The PF is looking out the window, initiating the rotation at “rotate” call from the PM. No-one should focus on the FD at that particular moment.
There has to be something else to it! Must be! Whether the AP was engaged or some trim/flight control issues etc. It simply can’t be just the FD’s.
Therefore don’t judge the crew to easily before the initial report comes out.
That AF 777 abort with the AP engaged during the take-off run and so hindering the PF’s attempt to rotate is somewhat alarming!
Is it possible that the EK 777 fleet haven't had the updated software from Boeing that prevents the AP being engaged on the ground, it was released over 10 years ago?
Is it possible that the EK 777 fleet haven't had the updated software from Boeing that prevents the AP being engaged on the ground, it was released over 10 years ago?
Read somewhere the capt asked for fcu to be set when she realised it was at 0000 . PM heard request and turned auto pilot on instead , which is usual sequence I’m guessing ? If auto pilot was engaged with 0000 set would it nose down ? With shock a few seconds pass before auto pilot disconnected and climb initiated ?
All my speculation and no evidence this is what happen , not a Boeing pilot just adding to discussion .
All my speculation and no evidence this is what happen , not a Boeing pilot just adding to discussion .
Nobody has yet mentioned that sometimes, if the SID initial clearance ALT is decided by ATC and is not yet known when the cockpit is being set up by PF for departure, some crews will set ALT 00000', as a reminder that the clearance ALT is not yet known. It is not uncommon to conduct a check and briefing of the SID or departure without knowing the initial clearance ALT. Time is limited at turnarounds, and crews will try to get as much done as they can, when they can. I am not saying this is safe, but I know it happens. Some crews will set a strange looking ALT, such as 4,100' or 3,999' to remind themselves.
In some places though, setting a guessed ALT that turns out to be wrong by 1,000' and which does not get corrected could be just as dangerous. It should be possible to display a red "clearance?" flag instead of any figures in the ALT window for those places where initial climb ALT is given by ATC as part of the clearance.
.
Very odd though, if none of the 4 pilots noticed the lack of pitch-up following the 'Rotate' call. They must have noticed, so was there a pitch control problem?
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In some places though, setting a guessed ALT that turns out to be wrong by 1,000' and which does not get corrected could be just as dangerous. It should be possible to display a red "clearance?" flag instead of any figures in the ALT window for those places where initial climb ALT is given by ATC as part of the clearance.
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Very odd though, if none of the 4 pilots noticed the lack of pitch-up following the 'Rotate' call. They must have noticed, so was there a pitch control problem?
.
Last edited by Uplinker; 29th Dec 2021 at 10:47.
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The standard practice at the many airlines I've worked at has been to set 9900 during the preflight. I have never seen 00000 in my life. I would never allow it. It's just instinctively wrong. The 900 signals something is wrong and needs attention. Every time I look at the FCU and I see it, I think QUICK, DO SOMETHING. Though, thankfully I've never had to rely on it. One of my company's had the R.I.S.E brief which was mandatory to conduct before the BEFORE TAKE OFF checklist. Runway, Instrument Departure, Stop altitude, Emergency turn. There are literally a hundred different ways to prevent this stupid mistake from happening. The pre-departure MCP configuration is where you translate your discussed and agreed plan into reality. If it does not reflect your plan then I would say you have zero situational awareness and probably should not be flying a passenger jet. Boeing even help you with assuring it does (Airbus does not btw)...
Last edited by Superpilot; 29th Dec 2021 at 10:56.
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There used to be an SOP for a ‘take of review’ to be called for before the take off checklist. It was a good procedure and would (should) have caught this since you checked and stated the initial altitude and checked it vs the mcp setting plus called and checked the PFD modes engaged. I always verbalised and checked it even after the review was removed and had guys comment not to do it now since non SOP.
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Frankly this has nothing to do with raw data skills. It's a procedural lapse with four pilots in front under what circumstances not known yet. They could all be very proficient in raw data flying. It's happened once before in the air with four in front involved in non-professional chat, overspeed then with speed brakes underspeed, AP tripping and altitude excursion in RVSM airspace. Another example of more the merrier in front not being true.
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Originally Posted by Uplinker
Nobody has yet mentioned that sometimes, if the SID initial clearance ALT is decided by ATC and is not yet known when the cockpit is being set up by PF for departure, some crews will set ALT 00000', as a reminder that the clearance ALT is not yet known. It is not uncommon to conduct a check and briefing of the SID or departure without knowing the initial clearance ALT.
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When four people miss something obvious there's a possibility that they were distracted. I quoted an incident of that nature how distraction happens even in benign cruise.
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I am getting some private messages that this may be false info. Can any of you who have access to news outlets or other sources see if there is anything new on this. If its not being covered its either a massive cover up or just a false FR24 trace which triggered the thread?
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Speculating is what we all do here, but we should be careful not to change rumours into facts to progress in one direction. Hammering the crew seems to be always the preferred option here nowadays,.
