Boeing pilot involved in Max testing is indicted in Texas
Thanks fdr. Your post reminds me of why this forum is worth reading. All the HF experts and wannabes simply do not understand the dynamic nature of the flight deck environment when a situation outside of the normal operation occurs. All the so called experts don't experience the confusion and adrenaline surge that the flight crew are experiencing in real time. Too many people focus on the nationality of the crew to try and explain an event.
Elsewhere on Pprune fdr has stated he is giving up on Pprune, could we please as a community beg, grovel, or whatever it takes, to ask him to change his mind, a veritable font of experience and knowledge that is rare to find, covering both FW & RW.
Extract of fdr post - Good news though, I'm done with PPRuNe, you guys fly safely and keep the blue on the top and the needles in the green
Post by cavuman - fdr, I know many share my sentiments that you contributions here are invaluable. Wisdom, experience, and a sense of humo(u)r are treasured commodities, not just on this we - bsite, but in life. You bring all three. We are, after all, pilots and friends who we look forward to meeting one day! I am certain that I speak for the membership when I ask you to reconsider
Lookleft, I endorse what you say, both about fdr and the confusion and adrenaline surge when faced with a major emergency. Simulators can never induce what it feels like. We need several things on these forums. (1) More well informed words of wisdom such as those from fdr. (2) Less uninformed speculation by those with little or no experience of flying. (3) More sympathy for pilots faced with a real and totally unexpected emergency which is quite unlike anything they may have practised in the simulator.
Look left - your comments re confusion and adrenaline surge are hopefully soon to be outdated. UPRT is coming through the industry and a good portion of that deals (well at least in our courses) with the startle effect.
With all due respect UPRT is unlikely to reproduce the genuine startle effect of a totally unusual emergency beyond anything you may have experienced before. UPRT was well after my time so perhaps I am out of date!! And neither have I seen a simulator which can produce the disorientation and 'g' effects (both positive and negative) referred to by fdr in para 2 of his post No. 158 and which can occur in a genuine upset.
Only half a speed-brake
- preceded by 1 day of CBT, I knew a week in advance something out of the ordinary is going to happen with the aeroplane between 4 and 6 p.m.
- SIM is all 1 g exactly irrespective of all the smart tilting
- flown with shoulder harness on, not the standard cruise configuration
- did not experience how it is to slip upwards from the seat and lose physical connection with the flight controls.
Especially the last one. Easy it is to unload inverted if you don't have to use your feet for it, being curled around the IRS switches.
Compressor stall, I first did UPRT in the 90's and it was going through the industry. It was in response to the two 737 rudder hardovers. The theory being that airline pilots were not trained to deal with sudden unexpected changes in attitude and needed to be more aggressive in their handling of the aircraft. The pilots on the FBW aircraft in the fleet did not have to do this training as it was assumed that the protections on that aircraft would prevent it from ever requiring the pilots to undergo UPRT. So now we have gone full circle. EBT and UPRT does not prepare you for an aircraft that has a design flaw and requires the reflexes and the thought processes of a test pilot to recover from its software malfunctions.
I know UPRT is valuable, please don't get me wrong. But the point I was trying to make in my post 165 above was, having once been in a genuine sudden emergency where high 'g' forces were involved, I can vouch for the fact that the simulator cannot reproduce the physical and emotional effects adequately. The simulator training is still valuable but the real thing is very much more dramatic.
Only half a speed-brake
I think we (at least me) are saying the same thing. It helps you read the abnormal attitude and practice the needed secondary effects of some flight controls. Other than that, the scope did not extend much beyond.
Bergerie1
I agree with your view of the inability to generate appropriate surprise in simulation: situational surprise vs fundamental surprise.
Startle normally relates to the physical output response.
Simulation can create some surprise - “I did not expect that”, but the situation is plausible with a known or knowable response; training. In very rare simulated situations - the instructor makes it up - the unknowable aspects can be dismissed as only being a simulation, I wont die; lets have fun, I’m not really surprised.
The more extreme, fundamental surprise is unimaginable, not plausible, fearful of an unknown (temporarily unmanageable) outcome; reality in flying, not a simulation.
The question is what type of surprise are pilots expected to manage (encounter):
Situational surprise in normal operations. Reactions should be self evident, education, knowledge, behaviour, training; if not, then the industry has a safety issue.
Fundamental surprise, rare, unforeseeable, cannot have a procedural response. It requires a calm reframing of awareness, to making sense of what is being experienced. To seek understanding, which at best can be turned into situational surprise, but with continuing inherent fear of the unknown - we overreact.
Consider if there is some similar situation, what can be done. Whether that reaction is correct or not depends on questioning understandings, being prepared to change viewpoint and adapt; there is no SOP.
Regarding this thread; Boeing faced fundamental surprise, not that the events were unknowable, but were mentally dismissed as non existent, not a problem. Belatedly they accepted situational surprise, but chose an inappropriate reaction - money before safety, no change of viewpoint (use the money SOP).
The issues in the development simulator could similarly be dismissed - the aircraft was still being developed, the simulator spec or coding incorrect; thus the underlying system problems were not fully appreciated, - there was no threat of death and the much need imagination was put on hold.
‘Flight testers don't like to break things. They like to dispel the illusion that things work’
Prosecuting individuals is akin to error, blame (after the fact); an easy solution for senior management. The industry could minimise this by refocussing safety on the system opposed to the individual.
* never say never; fundamental surprise in simulators. The day the simulator cab fell off the motion jacks - “I don't believe it”, unimaginable at the time, only plausible when outside - ever used the escape ropes for real, are there any escape ropes in the sim.
I agree with your view of the inability to generate appropriate surprise in simulation: situational surprise vs fundamental surprise.
Startle normally relates to the physical output response.
Simulation can create some surprise - “I did not expect that”, but the situation is plausible with a known or knowable response; training. In very rare simulated situations - the instructor makes it up - the unknowable aspects can be dismissed as only being a simulation, I wont die; lets have fun, I’m not really surprised.
The more extreme, fundamental surprise is unimaginable, not plausible, fearful of an unknown (temporarily unmanageable) outcome; reality in flying, not a simulation.
The question is what type of surprise are pilots expected to manage (encounter):
Situational surprise in normal operations. Reactions should be self evident, education, knowledge, behaviour, training; if not, then the industry has a safety issue.
Fundamental surprise, rare, unforeseeable, cannot have a procedural response. It requires a calm reframing of awareness, to making sense of what is being experienced. To seek understanding, which at best can be turned into situational surprise, but with continuing inherent fear of the unknown - we overreact.
Consider if there is some similar situation, what can be done. Whether that reaction is correct or not depends on questioning understandings, being prepared to change viewpoint and adapt; there is no SOP.
Regarding this thread; Boeing faced fundamental surprise, not that the events were unknowable, but were mentally dismissed as non existent, not a problem. Belatedly they accepted situational surprise, but chose an inappropriate reaction - money before safety, no change of viewpoint (use the money SOP).
The issues in the development simulator could similarly be dismissed - the aircraft was still being developed, the simulator spec or coding incorrect; thus the underlying system problems were not fully appreciated, - there was no threat of death and the much need imagination was put on hold.
‘Flight testers don't like to break things. They like to dispel the illusion that things work’
Prosecuting individuals is akin to error, blame (after the fact); an easy solution for senior management. The industry could minimise this by refocussing safety on the system opposed to the individual.
* never say never; fundamental surprise in simulators. The day the simulator cab fell off the motion jacks - “I don't believe it”, unimaginable at the time, only plausible when outside - ever used the escape ropes for real, are there any escape ropes in the sim.
Last edited by safetypee; 31st Mar 2022 at 06:14.
From ET-302 Interim Investigation Report - p13
"At 05:39:42, the crew engaged Level Change mode and set MCP speed to 238kt"
Description taken from piece by Seattle Times, March 7th 2021
According to the interim investigation report released a year ago, the faulty Angle of Attack sensor on Flight ET302, even before it triggered MCAS to push the plane’s nose down, interfered with other sensor readings of altitude and airspeed. Registering the plane as still below 800 feet above the ground even after it passed that threshold, the jet’s computer had the autothrottle maintain full takeoff thrust for 16 seconds after it should have reduced the power for the climb phase. More significantly, seconds later the pilots set the jet’s speed target at 238 knots, but the autothrottle didn’t follow through. Again because of the faulty sensor on the left, the flight computer detected the discrepancy between the left and right airspeed values and flagged the data as invalid. Unable to validate the aircraft’s speed, the computer stopped sending thrust instructions to the autothrottle. As a result, the engines remained at maximum thrust for the rest of the fatal flight. The plane eventually exceeded the 737’s maximum design speed of 340 knots. This so increased the forces on the jet’s tail that the pilots couldn’t budge it manually.
Compressor stall, I first did UPRT in the 90's and it was going through the industry. It was in response to the two 737 rudder hardovers. The theory being that airline pilots were not trained to deal with sudden unexpected changes in attitude and needed to be more aggressive in their handling of the aircraft. The pilots on the FBW aircraft in the fleet did not have to do this training as it was assumed that the protections on that aircraft would prevent it from ever requiring the pilots to undergo UPRT.
So now we have gone full circle.
EBT and UPRT does not prepare you for an aircraft that has a design flaw and requires the reflexes and the thought processes of a test pilot to recover from its software malfunctions.
I'm still staggered that no investigative journalist has gone to town on the grandfathering safety standards of the 1960s 737 design still being produced today under the guise of "newly certified" (when it's only the change that's certified), let alone get into the skeletons that FDR is suggesting are hidden in the Chicago closet...
Bergerie1 and others yes, agree 100% that no sim can adequately replicate G. But you can replicate startle factor in a sim, should your training program allow. And you can also train techniques for resilience to the startle and surprise effect, which and the end of the day, is a very important tool in the pilot's kit.
Last edited by compressor stall; 31st Mar 2022 at 00:41.
Great writing fdr as well as technical insight. A pleasure to read your views. Especially on the vagaries of the 737 stabilizer trim. Regardless of the MCAS debacle I have long mulled over the fact that stabilizer trim issues that I have witnessed in the sim have had potentially catastrophic outcomes. And to suggest that one of the solutions is the fabled rollercoaster technique implies that there is fundamentally an outdated or even fundamentally flawed design not fit for purpose in 2022. A small elevator combined with a large and powerful stabilizer backed up by a Heath Robinson handle so what can possibly go wrong?
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Wall Street Journal reporting that in a federal court litigation matter in Texas, a recent "legal filing" includes documents from both companies that show, allegedly, Southwest was much more involved with setting Boeing's pilot training requirements for the 737 MAX than known until now. This SLF/attorney's first reaction was, 'what federal court litigation in Texas?'
Turns out that there's another class-action, though not directly related to the accidents, and it's before the federal appellate court now, on the matter of class certification, evidently.
More to follow.... wondering what impact this might have on efforts by the accident victims' families to reopen the Deferred Prosecution Agreement? Could get interesting.
Turns out that there's another class-action, though not directly related to the accidents, and it's before the federal appellate court now, on the matter of class certification, evidently.
More to follow.... wondering what impact this might have on efforts by the accident victims' families to reopen the Deferred Prosecution Agreement? Could get interesting.
You seem to have convieniently ignored the Autothrottle issue whereby while the pilots were busy trying to figure out the MCAS issue amid the myriad or alarms, the autothrottle was silently accelerating well past the speed set by the pilots.
From ET-302 Interim Investigation Report - p13
"At 05:39:42, the crew engaged Level Change mode and set MCP speed to 238kt"
Description taken from piece by Seattle Times, March 7th 2021
According to the interim investigation report released a year ago, the faulty Angle of Attack sensor on Flight ET302, even before it triggered MCAS to push the plane’s nose down, interfered with other sensor readings of altitude and airspeed....
... As a result, the engines remained at maximum thrust for the rest of the fatal flight. The plane eventually exceeded the 737’s maximum design speed of 340 knots. This so increased the forces on the jet’s tail that the pilots couldn’t budge it manually.
From ET-302 Interim Investigation Report - p13
"At 05:39:42, the crew engaged Level Change mode and set MCP speed to 238kt"
Description taken from piece by Seattle Times, March 7th 2021
According to the interim investigation report released a year ago, the faulty Angle of Attack sensor on Flight ET302, even before it triggered MCAS to push the plane’s nose down, interfered with other sensor readings of altitude and airspeed....
... As a result, the engines remained at maximum thrust for the rest of the fatal flight. The plane eventually exceeded the 737’s maximum design speed of 340 knots. This so increased the forces on the jet’s tail that the pilots couldn’t budge it manually.
Our odd industry has taken every opportunity to remove the innate competency of the pilot from the flight deck, and we wonder why when confronted with anomalies, the crew get out of sorts.
We don't spend time training pilots to actually fly the aircraft anymore, we spend valuable resources in ticking boxes of matters that are being tracked by flight data routinely in the real world, but then we have to go and waste our time showing the same again, and again. Our training is cookie cutter to satisfy bureaucracy, not to actually enhance the skill sets of the crew. We do however waste valuable time in the FFS doing HF/CRM/LOFT evolutions that can be done more effectively in PTT or FBTs or FTD's.
I have lamented that the FFS has constraints in fidelity and validity of the aero model at the stall and post-stall, sometimes spectacularly, sometimes trivially... but giving crews confidence that say a B777 or A321 is pretty much still just a glorified Piper Cub is missing. As a result, the crews when they invariably get out of sorts with the world end up having a very steep learning curve and that can result in unfortunate inputs, action, or inaction. Within rational bounds most sims (not the MD-11) do behave in a manner similar to the real plane, and a rational review of the QTG derivatives will give a fairly clear indication of constraints. There is considerable data available outside of the flight test envelope that can be fed in to improve the models, like when roll reversal may occur, (we got that figure at a very high cost...) and what happens when you hold full back stick on a FBW aircraft for half a day (got that one too...sadly)
Would be nice to have regulators that actually reassessed what and why we do what we do in training, and in recurrent/repetitive procedures. Pretty sure that wet drills and fire extinguishers still work the same today as they did in the 70's, same with how an ILS works, a VOR etc.... On occasions, we train in a number of business jets doing base and upper air work, including stalls, and UA's, and they need not be a scary evolution, care, yes; fear, no.
As an industry and as pax, we can hardly blame the crew for the lack of rational guidance from the regulators and those that are happy to tick IOSA/BARS and other ISO standard compliance matters to "prove" that all is good. Frankly, I believe the king has no clothes, and it is time for a sea change.
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I have to go along with fdr's previous post. If one moves back a notch in the armchair, has a coffee, and contemplates the flying universe .. then it becomes clear that when the JB's are doing their things nicely and when the failures are as practised according to Hoyle, things tend to be in the character of a "walk in the park".
Unfortunately, the combination of ever-increasing emphasis on JB solutions, and ever-decreasing pilot stick and rudder skills, can rapidly put us in a situation where the pilot is overwhelmed before he/she can start to get a picture of what might be going on when things go awry.
I'm an unabashed dinosaur. Yes, the pilot does need to be on top of the attractive and eye-catching bells and whistles but when things get too far out of the routine perceptions of line pilot reality, unless the pilot is able to do the stick and rudder stuff adequately, all might be lost very quickly. From some years involvement in sim training/checking (737) and throwing the odd curved ball at crews (pre-briefed no-hazard but, also, no details) I came to a firm conclusion that the crews which could/did dispense with the bells and whistles and put the system back in its simplest state did themselves a favour. From that position, they could figure out whether it was the basic hardware, or the superimposed software, which was trying to kill them and then progressively get things back to a semi-functioning arrangement. While it would be nice to trouble shoot and figure out just what was what, that may not be feasible or necessary. The need is to get back to something approximating a flyable aeroplane and then gingerly figure out how best to get it back onto the ground without killing all the players.
Even the basic aircraft have their ways. fdr mentioned the Cub. Well do I recall my checkout on the wonderful SuperCub many decades ago. For those who haven't flown one and, more particularly, haven't experienced the initial stick loads associated with a missed approach from the flare .....
Unfortunately, the combination of ever-increasing emphasis on JB solutions, and ever-decreasing pilot stick and rudder skills, can rapidly put us in a situation where the pilot is overwhelmed before he/she can start to get a picture of what might be going on when things go awry.
I'm an unabashed dinosaur. Yes, the pilot does need to be on top of the attractive and eye-catching bells and whistles but when things get too far out of the routine perceptions of line pilot reality, unless the pilot is able to do the stick and rudder stuff adequately, all might be lost very quickly. From some years involvement in sim training/checking (737) and throwing the odd curved ball at crews (pre-briefed no-hazard but, also, no details) I came to a firm conclusion that the crews which could/did dispense with the bells and whistles and put the system back in its simplest state did themselves a favour. From that position, they could figure out whether it was the basic hardware, or the superimposed software, which was trying to kill them and then progressively get things back to a semi-functioning arrangement. While it would be nice to trouble shoot and figure out just what was what, that may not be feasible or necessary. The need is to get back to something approximating a flyable aeroplane and then gingerly figure out how best to get it back onto the ground without killing all the players.
Even the basic aircraft have their ways. fdr mentioned the Cub. Well do I recall my checkout on the wonderful SuperCub many decades ago. For those who haven't flown one and, more particularly, haven't experienced the initial stick loads associated with a missed approach from the flare .....
John T,
I am also an unabashed dinosaur. Every modern FBW and non-FBW jet transport can be flown using basic flying skills, even with many failures this old formula works - level the wings, set the right attitude and thrust, and the result is the correct performance. Simples.
I repeat, when the automatics start to do things you don't like just disconnect them, level the wings and set attitude and thrust.
This recent article from the Royal Aeronautical Society explains a lot:- https://www.aerosociety.com/news/dow...47XU5S,62OYB,1
I am also an unabashed dinosaur. Every modern FBW and non-FBW jet transport can be flown using basic flying skills, even with many failures this old formula works - level the wings, set the right attitude and thrust, and the result is the correct performance. Simples.
I repeat, when the automatics start to do things you don't like just disconnect them, level the wings and set attitude and thrust.
This recent article from the Royal Aeronautical Society explains a lot:- https://www.aerosociety.com/news/dow...47XU5S,62OYB,1
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The standards for training have been much discussed in this thread and many others, and so rightly so. Skills reduction and focussing on the demanded/obligatory parts are regularly mentioned.
Next to those, there are knowledge parts and voluntary choices that help define and maintain the quality of pilots. So what is available to pilots who would want to know more and do even more to better themselves. One element of the safety culture in a number of major airlines was a set of bulletins that were regularly and freely shared with the technical, operational and pilots communities. I wonder what happened to those in other airlines over time.
Next to those, there are knowledge parts and voluntary choices that help define and maintain the quality of pilots. So what is available to pilots who would want to know more and do even more to better themselves. One element of the safety culture in a number of major airlines was a set of bulletins that were regularly and freely shared with the technical, operational and pilots communities. I wonder what happened to those in other airlines over time.