Boeing pilot involved in Max testing is indicted in Texas
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Boeing had history of bad ethics after the merger with McDonnell Douglas. This merger was bad for Boeing. Certain persons tarnished Boeing reputation and they are still destroying Boeing legacy: 767 Tanker scandal, 2 Boeing managers charged over stealing and using Lockheed secrets, fake Boeing 787 roll out and 787 debacle ( delay, way over budget, outsourcing., several groundings/halted delivery), 767 tanker problems, and most importantly 2 737 MAX crashes that killed 346 persons, 20 billion loss. The final report of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure blasted Boeing and FAA and exposed them. Boeing had influence on FAA as mentioned in the final report of the House Committee.Since you mentioned in your post about fuel leak,I am including also a fuel leak as example. Some excerpts from new papers about bad ethics at Boeing where it shows falsified papers and sloppy works led FAA to fine Boeing (it was slap on the wrist):
Here another example of bad ethics in Boeing. It was Boeing that pressurized the Dutch Safety Board to downplay the role design errors in the Boeing 737 NG played in the crash of Turkish Airlines crash near Schiphol in 2009
According to the following article, U.S officials pressurized the Dutch Safety Board
https://nltimes.nl/2020/01/21/us-pressu ... ash-report
"While investigating the Turkish Airlines plane crash near Schiphol in 2009, the Dutch Safety Board was pressured by Americans to downplay the role design errors in the Boeing 737 NG played in the crash, the New York Times reports based on its own research. According to the newspaper, there are many parallels between the 2009 crash and the recent crashes with Boeing 737 MAX planes, the successor of the Boeing 737 NG."
According to the New York Times, comments from American parties - including Boeing and the American aviation authority FAA - resulted in the Dutch Safety Board largely omitting a study by professor Sidney Dekker from the official report. Dekker, a specialist in human actions in disasters and previously a part-time pilot on the Boeing 737, was asked by the Safety Board to investigate the human factors in the crash.
Dekker's study emphasized the design errors of the Boeing 737 NG and their catastrophic consequences. According to Dekker, the 2009 accident "represents such a sentinel event that was never taken seriously". In his study, Dekker accused Boeing of deflecting attention from its own "design shortcomings" and other mistakes with "hardly credible" statements that admonished pilots to be more vigilant, according to the newspaper. Only around one page of Dekker's 90-page long final report made it into the Dutch Safety Board's report.
In February 2020, it was reported that Boeing had refused to cooperate with a new Dutch review on the crash investigation and that the NTSB had also refused a request from Dutch lawmakers to participate.
The bottom line Boeing (FAA also by certifying the 737 MAX) made big mistakes (not honest mistakes) and didn't want to assume the responsibility because of the consequences of the liability. That's why Boeing are blaming pilots. There was a shared responsibility between Boeing and FAA and not pilots
Capt Sully (who landed safely a disabled A320t on Hudson river on 2009) said in Congress very truthful comments regarding the Boeing 737 Max crashes
Some quotes from Capt Sully during US house Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure hearing:
-" Max jetliner crashes should never have happened”—and possibly could have been avoided with better safety processes and pilot training"
-“These crashes are demonstrable evidence that our current system of aircraft design and certification has failed us".
So he mentioned clearly Boeing and FAA and not pilots.
-"Boeing have said that they didn't categorize a failure of the MCAS is more critical because they assumed the pilot action would be the safeguard. From my 52 years of flying experience and many decades of safety work I know we must consider all the humans factors of these accidents and how system design determines how many and what kind of errors will be made and how consequential there will be"
-" These 2 recent crashes happened in foreign countries, but if we don't address all the important issues and factors they can and will happen here".
Clearly Capt Sully is contradicting certain persons who were and still blaming pilots a lot. For example the actual Boeing CEO blamed the pilots on developing countries and said these crashes would not happened if US airline pilots were flying these 2 planes.
-"We owe it here to everyone who flies passengers alike to make sure that pilots will be able to handle an unexpected emergency and keep their passengers and crews safe. But first we should design aircraft for them to fly that do not have inadvertent trap set for them".
-" I am one of relatively small group of people who have experience such crisis and lived to share what we learn about it. I can tell you first hand that the startle factor is real and huge and is absolutely interferes with one's ability to analyses the crisis and take effective action. Withing seconds these crews would have been fighting with their lives in the fight for their lives. In both accidents the failure of a single of AOA sensor quickly caused multiple instruments indication anomalies and sudden loud, and in some case false warnings creating major distractions masking the cause and would make it ever harder to analyze the situation quickly and take effective and corrective actions. I recently experienced all these warnings in 737 MAX flight simulator during recreation of accident flights. Even knowing what was going to happen I could see how crews could run out of time before to resolve the problems. Prior to these accidents I think it is unluckily that any US pilot were confronted with this scenario in simulator training.
Here what the capt sully said exactly during a U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure hearing:
Allied Pilots Association president Dan Carey (35 years as pilot when he said this on May 2019) talked about the MCAS and discussed tense meeting with Boeing about 737 MAX 8. He said Boeing already knew about the danger of the MCAS. Why Boeing didn't ground the MAX after the first crash? Why Boeing took the pilot out of the loop...since they expected the pilot to be the last resort. Basically they came out with a bad design (not honest mistake) and they wanted pilots to figure out a solution when the MCAS misfires. Here the video which I think it is a strong evidence that Boeing prioritized the profit over the safety and they knew the danger of the MCAS:
Here what he said exactly in this video:
It is inconceivable that Boeing designed such critical system (MCAS) with one AOA sensor...etc. The MCAS was a rushed design and it was not honest mistake. Boeing was under pressure by 320 NEO and the requests of certain airlines. So Boeing chose the profit over the safety. The Senate final report mentioned several evidence about this flawed design. Here few examples:
-“Are we vulnerable to single AOA sensor sensor failures with the MCAS implementation or is there some checking that occurs?” asked Boeing engineer in a December 2015 email
-A separate Boeing document about MCAS from June 2018, four months before Lion Air Flight 610 crashed in Indonesia, warned that slow reaction times to runaway trim, which can push the nose of the plane down, could be “catastrophic” if pilots take more than 10 seconds to react and said it found a typical reaction time was four second.
The real problem was in the airplane itself that's why it was grounded 20 months. If It was a problem of airlines and their training systems the 737 MAX would be grounded for short period of time. In addition after the 2 crashes the sim training was mandatory for all pilots including in the US. Which contradicted the actual CEO who said that these crashes would not happened in the US (for US airlines pilots), but it could happen only in developing countries. At the opposite of Boeing CEO, Capt Sully said in the hearing "These 2 recent crashes happened in foreign countries, but if we don't address all the important issues and factors they can and will happen here"
An exchange between 2 Boeing pilots about MCAS on the sim, please click on the link.
I depend on the logic of the situation - what a coldly rational evaluation of the situation was. Ethiopia made a business calculation. Just like they did to invade the Tigray region. Boeing, et al, did not foresee that a mass casualty event would be acceptable to a typical airline, but underestimated what invulnerability allows an actor to consider.
If Ethiopia had halted all MAX flights to retrain all their pilots for that brand new centerpiece acquisition, that would make their political position weaker and cost them for the retraining and loss of ticket sales. Skipping training was a positive. They knew that if the plane crashed from mishandling due to MCAS inputs that would be a bargaining position. Those considering a war against civilians certainly aren't concerned with a handful of passengers.
Why not proceed -- you claim "roulette," but there was no gambling at all as they controlled the house or, in this case, the narrative.
That pilot who did quit Ethiopian related a case where an engine was thought to be leaking fuel - a ramp worker reported a far larger than normal amount of fuel pooled under an engine. The pilot called for someone to check the engine, which would delay the flight. He reported he was told that a leak was not his concern - if the engine caught fire the airline would seek compensation from the engine maker.
That's the sort of calculation they would have made about MCAS. I don't currently believe they looked forward to a crash, I would say they did not care if it happened because the outcome was a benefit. For certain the Chief Pilot wasn't on that plan
If Ethiopia had halted all MAX flights to retrain all their pilots for that brand new centerpiece acquisition, that would make their political position weaker and cost them for the retraining and loss of ticket sales. Skipping training was a positive. They knew that if the plane crashed from mishandling due to MCAS inputs that would be a bargaining position. Those considering a war against civilians certainly aren't concerned with a handful of passengers.
Why not proceed -- you claim "roulette," but there was no gambling at all as they controlled the house or, in this case, the narrative.
That pilot who did quit Ethiopian related a case where an engine was thought to be leaking fuel - a ramp worker reported a far larger than normal amount of fuel pooled under an engine. The pilot called for someone to check the engine, which would delay the flight. He reported he was told that a leak was not his concern - if the engine caught fire the airline would seek compensation from the engine maker.
That's the sort of calculation they would have made about MCAS. I don't currently believe they looked forward to a crash, I would say they did not care if it happened because the outcome was a benefit. For certain the Chief Pilot wasn't on that plan
Boeing had history of bad ethics after the merger with McDonnell Douglas. This merger was bad for Boeing. Certain persons tarnished Boeing reputation and they are still destroying Boeing legacy: 767 Tanker scandal, 2 Boeing managers charged over stealing and using Lockheed secrets, fake Boeing 787 roll out and 787 debacle ( delay, way over budget, outsourcing., several groundings/halted delivery), 767 tanker problems, and most importantly 2 737 MAX crashes that killed 346 persons, 20 billion loss. The final report of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure blasted Boeing and FAA and exposed them. Boeing had influence on FAA as mentioned in the final report of the House Committee.
Since you mentioned in your post about fuel leak,I am including also a fuel leak as example. Some excerpts from new papers about bad ethics at Boeing where it shows falsified papers and sloppy works led FAA to fine Boeing (it was slap on the wrist):
"Leaking fuel around a hot engine is a fire hazard. An FAA investigation revealed that Boeing had noted the leak nine months earlier, before it delivered the plane, and had supposedly reworked the pylon at a Seattle-area plant in the city of Everett to fix the problem. A mechanic and a quality-control inspector signed off on the rework as completed. But as the FAA noted, this "did not represent work performed." In other words, the repair work hadn't been done.
This is the link for the article of the news paper https://www.chicagotribune.com/busin...213-story.html
Since you mentioned pilots training in your post. It was Boeing that decided that the flight simulator training was not needed to lure airlines/customers under the pressure of 320 NEO (profit and greed over safety). Boeing decided that iPad course was enough for 737 MAX training. For example Lion Air requested from Boeing a sim training for the 737 MAX and Boeing said it is not needed. A Boeing employee even mocked Lion Air pilot after their requests and called them "idiots". It is Boeing that decided to put a critical automated system (MCAS) on the plane without even telling pilots about this critical system, let alone the really bad design of the MCAS.Here another example of bad ethics in Boeing. It was Boeing that pressurized the Dutch Safety Board to downplay the role design errors in the Boeing 737 NG played in the crash of Turkish Airlines crash near Schiphol in 2009
According to the following article, U.S officials pressurized the Dutch Safety Board
https://nltimes.nl/2020/01/21/us-pressu ... ash-report
"While investigating the Turkish Airlines plane crash near Schiphol in 2009, the Dutch Safety Board was pressured by Americans to downplay the role design errors in the Boeing 737 NG played in the crash, the New York Times reports based on its own research. According to the newspaper, there are many parallels between the 2009 crash and the recent crashes with Boeing 737 MAX planes, the successor of the Boeing 737 NG."
According to the New York Times, comments from American parties - including Boeing and the American aviation authority FAA - resulted in the Dutch Safety Board largely omitting a study by professor Sidney Dekker from the official report. Dekker, a specialist in human actions in disasters and previously a part-time pilot on the Boeing 737, was asked by the Safety Board to investigate the human factors in the crash.
Dekker's study emphasized the design errors of the Boeing 737 NG and their catastrophic consequences. According to Dekker, the 2009 accident "represents such a sentinel event that was never taken seriously". In his study, Dekker accused Boeing of deflecting attention from its own "design shortcomings" and other mistakes with "hardly credible" statements that admonished pilots to be more vigilant, according to the newspaper. Only around one page of Dekker's 90-page long final report made it into the Dutch Safety Board's report.
In February 2020, it was reported that Boeing had refused to cooperate with a new Dutch review on the crash investigation and that the NTSB had also refused a request from Dutch lawmakers to participate.
The bottom line Boeing (FAA also by certifying the 737 MAX) made big mistakes (not honest mistakes) and didn't want to assume the responsibility because of the consequences of the liability. That's why Boeing are blaming pilots. There was a shared responsibility between Boeing and FAA and not pilots
Capt Sully (who landed safely a disabled A320t on Hudson river on 2009) said in Congress very truthful comments regarding the Boeing 737 Max crashes
Some quotes from Capt Sully during US house Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure hearing:
-" Max jetliner crashes should never have happened”—and possibly could have been avoided with better safety processes and pilot training"
-“These crashes are demonstrable evidence that our current system of aircraft design and certification has failed us".
So he mentioned clearly Boeing and FAA and not pilots.
-"Boeing have said that they didn't categorize a failure of the MCAS is more critical because they assumed the pilot action would be the safeguard. From my 52 years of flying experience and many decades of safety work I know we must consider all the humans factors of these accidents and how system design determines how many and what kind of errors will be made and how consequential there will be"
-" These 2 recent crashes happened in foreign countries, but if we don't address all the important issues and factors they can and will happen here".
Clearly Capt Sully is contradicting certain persons who were and still blaming pilots a lot. For example the actual Boeing CEO blamed the pilots on developing countries and said these crashes would not happened if US airline pilots were flying these 2 planes.
-"We owe it here to everyone who flies passengers alike to make sure that pilots will be able to handle an unexpected emergency and keep their passengers and crews safe. But first we should design aircraft for them to fly that do not have inadvertent trap set for them".
-" I am one of relatively small group of people who have experience such crisis and lived to share what we learn about it. I can tell you first hand that the startle factor is real and huge and is absolutely interferes with one's ability to analyses the crisis and take effective action. Withing seconds these crews would have been fighting with their lives in the fight for their lives. In both accidents the failure of a single of AOA sensor quickly caused multiple instruments indication anomalies and sudden loud, and in some case false warnings creating major distractions masking the cause and would make it ever harder to analyze the situation quickly and take effective and corrective actions. I recently experienced all these warnings in 737 MAX flight simulator during recreation of accident flights. Even knowing what was going to happen I could see how crews could run out of time before to resolve the problems. Prior to these accidents I think it is unluckily that any US pilot were confronted with this scenario in simulator training.
Here what the capt sully said exactly during a U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure hearing:
Allied Pilots Association president Dan Carey (35 years as pilot when he said this on May 2019) talked about the MCAS and discussed tense meeting with Boeing about 737 MAX 8. He said Boeing already knew about the danger of the MCAS. Why Boeing didn't ground the MAX after the first crash? Why Boeing took the pilot out of the loop...since they expected the pilot to be the last resort. Basically they came out with a bad design (not honest mistake) and they wanted pilots to figure out a solution when the MCAS misfires. Here the video which I think it is a strong evidence that Boeing prioritized the profit over the safety and they knew the danger of the MCAS:
Here what he said exactly in this video:
It is inconceivable that Boeing designed such critical system (MCAS) with one AOA sensor...etc. The MCAS was a rushed design and it was not honest mistake. Boeing was under pressure by 320 NEO and the requests of certain airlines. So Boeing chose the profit over the safety. The Senate final report mentioned several evidence about this flawed design. Here few examples:
-“Are we vulnerable to single AOA sensor sensor failures with the MCAS implementation or is there some checking that occurs?” asked Boeing engineer in a December 2015 email
-A separate Boeing document about MCAS from June 2018, four months before Lion Air Flight 610 crashed in Indonesia, warned that slow reaction times to runaway trim, which can push the nose of the plane down, could be “catastrophic” if pilots take more than 10 seconds to react and said it found a typical reaction time was four second.
The real problem was in the airplane itself that's why it was grounded 20 months. If It was a problem of airlines and their training systems the 737 MAX would be grounded for short period of time. In addition after the 2 crashes the sim training was mandatory for all pilots including in the US. Which contradicted the actual CEO who said that these crashes would not happened in the US (for US airlines pilots), but it could happen only in developing countries. At the opposite of Boeing CEO, Capt Sully said in the hearing "These 2 recent crashes happened in foreign countries, but if we don't address all the important issues and factors they can and will happen here"
An exchange between 2 Boeing pilots about MCAS on the sim, please click on the link.
Report on Avweb
So-far-unnamed senior FAA officials overruled their own engineers who called for the immediate grounding of Boeing 737 MAX after the second fatal crash in five months in Ethiopia in March of 2019. The Transportation Department’s Office of Inspector General issued its report on the decision chain within the agency on Friday. It said the engineers immediately noticed the similarities between the Ethiopian Airlines crash and one in October of 2018 involving a Lion Air MAX off Indonesia and urged immediate grounding. “Yet agency officials at headquarters and the Seattle (Aircraft Certification Office) opted not to do so.”
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Issued April 26, 2023, Report AV202325
"FAA Has Completed 737 MAX Return to Service Efforts, but Opportunities Exist to Improve the Agency's Risk Assessments and Certification Processes."
https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/39461
"FAA Has Completed 737 MAX Return to Service Efforts, but Opportunities Exist to Improve the Agency's Risk Assessments and Certification Processes."
https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/39461
